(C) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
This story was originally published by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and is unaltered.
 . . . . . . . . . .



Wider Europe [1]

[]

Date: 2024-11-15  

Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.

I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: the EU's training mission for Ukrainian soldiers and the main takeaways from the hearing on the EU's new enlargement commissioner.

Note to Readers: You can now listen to my briefings by clicking on the audio link below. We're actually using an AI version of my voice and would love to know what you think -- and, of course, what we can improve.

Briefing #1: EU Training Mission To Ukraine To Continue -- But No Boots On The Ground

What You Need To Know: As European Union ambassadors on November 6 woke up to the news that Donald Trump will return to the White House early next year, they took the little-heralded but rather symbolic decision to prolong by two years the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine -- EUMAM Ukraine, for short.

This mission was first approved by the bloc's member states in the fall of 2022. According to a concept note from the time, it was set up "with the strategic objective to contribute to enhancing the military capacity of the Ukrainian armed forces in order to support Ukraine in its struggle against Russia's war of aggression."

By late November of that same year, EUMAM Ukraine was welcoming the first Ukrainian soldiers for training on EU soil. And by the end of this year, close to 75,000 Ukrainians will have received training from EU countries. Given that the initial plan was to train around 15,000 soldiers, it can certainly be said that the mission has delivered.

Under a Trump presidency, there are fears in Brussels that the EU will have to shoulder more of the burden of financial and military support for Ukraine. Western funding to the tune of $50 billion, covering the entirety of 2025, was agreed by the Group of Seven (G7) leading industrialized nations in late October. By comparison, EUMAM Ukraine cost just 362 million euro ($388 million) over the last year.

It is precisely these sorts of initiatives, considered cost-efficient by diplomats, that the Europeans might increasingly have to turn to. As a result, the annual budget for EUMAM Ukraine is expected to increase to 408 million euros over the next couple of years and will be financed by the European Peace Facility (EPF), an off-EU budget vehicle in which EU member states pay in a share based on their gross national income (GNI).

Deep Background: Since last year, Hungary has blocked several tranches of EPF money going to EU member states. (The idea is that those member states send arms to Ukraine and then get compensated through the EPF.)

EUMAM Ukraine has, however, been green-lighted by Budapest, even though it wasn't entirely frictionless. There was an idea that the bloc would expand the mission to include EU training of Ukrainian soldiers inside Ukraine. However, this was vetoed by Hungary, plus many other member states are strictly against any "EU boots on the ground" -- something that France has been pushing for.

Those in favor of expanding the mission argued that it wasn't military personnel being sent to Ukraine but something more akin to administrators overseeing training exercises.

In the end, the decision was recently taken to prolong the mission but with no expanded mandate and just a slightly increased budget. There will also be a strategic assessment of EUMAM Ukraine conducted in early 2025 to see if new things are needed.

Drilling Down

In the final agreement on EUMAM Ukraine, seen by RFE/RL, there is another interesting element: "the necessary exchange of classified information should be authorized between EUMAM Ukraine and NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU)." NSATU is essentially the NATO equivalent of EUMAM Ukraine with a 700-person headquarters opening in Germany this fall. It is a small political breakthrough that the two Brussels-based organizations will actually cooperate, something that historically has not proved easy.

This only leads to inevitable questions in Brussels: Why are both NATO and the EU running training missions for Ukrainian soldiers? And wouldn't it be more efficient if only one Western organization did so to avoid duplication? The answer from both NATO and EU officials is usually that all efforts are welcomed by Kyiv -- and it is good that the EU is engaged in hard security measures, especially if a new U.S. administration withdraws support for NATO training in the future.

All that aside, EUMAM Ukraine is just a drop in the ocean. A high-ranking Ukrainian official, who wasn't authorized to speak on the record, told me recently that EUMAM Ukraine "covers just a fraction of our needs." And while it offers solid and up-to-date training, for example, in areas such as demining and cyberwarfare, it does not give Ukraine what it wants most of all: heavy artillery (along with the permission to use it deep inside Russian territory) and ammunition.

An EU official, also speaking anonymously, put it to me even more bluntly: "It's good that it is there, and they are doing useful things, but it is not the things that Kyiv most desperately needs now. It's a typical European solution -- let's do something, anything, that we then can communicate as a major win."

And while there isn't any issue with money in the upcoming year, funds will be an issue in the future. The EU's European External Action Service (EEAS) has proposed that EPF should be topped up via "voluntary contributions" rather than EU members paying in a mandatory share based on GNI. While this method would circumvent potential future vetoes, by stripping nonpaying countries of a chance to block, some member states are afraid that a voluntary scheme would allow some countries a free ride.

In this context, I understand that the bloc's lawyers are currently looking at the EU treaties to check whether the common EU budget, which currently stands at over a trillion euros, can be used for defense spending as well. Traditionally, that hasn't been the case, but with the ongoing war in Ukraine, that could well change in the years to come.

Briefing #2: What We Might Expect From The EU's New Enlargement Commissioner

What You Need To Know: Prospective EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos got the thumbs-up from the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee in Brussels on November 7. The Slovenian, a former journalist, businesswoman, and diplomat, could now be sworn in with the rest of the new European Commission before the end of this year.

During her three-hour hearing, Kos repeated the talking points of so many of her predecessors: that EU enlargement is "a marathon not a sprint;" that the accession process for new members is "merit-based with no shortcuts;" and that enlargement offers "a historical opportunity to achieve peace, freedom, and prosperity on the whole continent."

Kos added, however, that the EU must reform before welcoming new countries and that she would push for a doubling of financial support for civil society and media in vulnerable EU neighborhood countries.

Deep Background: The most interesting thing to look out for when a prospective EU enlargement commissioner is being grilled is if the person mentions any time frames as to when the club might expand. With her mandate running till 2029, could she oversee the first new addition(s) to the EU since Croatia joined in 2013?

Kos didn't commit to any dates regarding when the bloc could admit new members, adding that "today, for the first time after 10 years, there is a real chance that we will bring one or two countries to the end of the negotiating process."

She then pointed out the ambitious goals of Montenegro wanting to complete its talks with Brussels at the end of 2026 and Albania in 2027. She also said that Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic had recently underlined that he was willing to do everything to align his country's legislation with that of the EU.

It was perhaps telling that she didn't mention North Macedonia at all. Kos was repeatedly quizzed by Bulgarian EU parliamentarians on the contentious issue in North Macedonia of amending the constitution to include Bulgarians as a founding people, something Skopje has repeatedly failed to do and which has slowed down the country's accession bid.

Predictably, Kos came down on Sofia's side, indicating that the interests of EU member states "of course come first" and that the bloc "cannot import bilateral issues." North Macedonia now appears to be further back in line compared to Albania, Montenegro, and even Serbia.

Drilling Down

So, what about Ukraine? Nothing much concrete apart from Kos saying in her introductory remarks that "enlargement negotiations are the European guiding star for this brave nation," adding that the same was true for Moldova. She also confirmed that Ukraine likely would be her first destination as enlargement commissioner and that, while the EU had already started the reconstruction process, investment from the private sector will be needed going forward as well.

There was one big omission. While mentioning both Ukraine and Moldova in her introduction, together with the Western Balkans, Turkey, and even the possibility of "fostering peace with Armenia and Azerbaijan," she skipped Georgia completely.

In fact, when asked by a parliamentarian about her view of the South Caucasus republic, where contested parliamentary elections in late October have left the EU struggling with a response, she said that she had a message to the people of Georgia: "Don't give up hope."

She said that she would be ready to resume the enlargement process with Georgia but only after the sitting government, which in recent years has taken an increasingly authoritarian approach, abolishes the recently adopted "foreign-agent law" and "anti-LGBT law."

There was not a word on the elections, but there was an indication that Brussels is still prepared to work with the ruling Georgian Dream party. The pro-EU opposition in Georgia will likely not be thrilled with that almost "business-as-usual" approach.

Away from the classical enlargement beat, Kos did hint that she aims to play a bigger role in the EU-facilitated dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, which the new EU foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, will oversee and could be approached differently this time around. She offered few hints but did make one thing crystal-clear: there will be no land-swaps in the Western Balkans. "It is out of the question. We will not follow these tendencies," she said.

Otherwise, she managed to swerve some of the more politically loaded questions. When pressed on Serbia's failure to align with EU sanctions on Russia, she appeared contradictory, first saying it was not a condition during the enlargement process but then admitting that a 100 percent alignment is necessary before becoming a member.

Kos also ducked multiple questions on possible sanctions on Serbia over the Banjska attack in September 2023, when dozens of ethnic Serb gunmen attacked a police unit in northern Kosovo. Similarly, she failed to answer whether the bloc's restrictive measures on Kosovo, in place since last year over tension in the Serb-majority northern part of the country, should be lifted and nor did she give details about how she would handle the separatist tendencies of Milorad Dodik, the leader of the Republika Srpska entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Many of the same questions are expected when the prospective EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas faces the EU parliamentarians later on November 12. The former Estonian prime minister is expected to be one of the key players in Brussels in the years ahead, especially if she can shape a coherent EU foreign policy on everything from Ukraine to the Middle East.

Looking Ahead

There is a curious case in the General Court, one of the courts making up the Court of Justice of the European Union, on November 13. The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine has asked the judges to annul a 2023 decision by the Office of the European Union for Intellectual Property (EUIPO) to refuse to register the famous utterance, "Russian warship, go f*** yourself," as a trademark in the EU.

The phrase became famous in the early stages of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 when a border guard used it in a standoff with an approaching Russian warship.

The Ukrainian border guard service had originally tried to register the slogan, as it was being used on clothes and other products, but the request was struck down by the court on the grounds that it was a "political slogan devoid of distinctive character for the goods and services in question." Let's see what happens this time around.

That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at jozwiakr@rferl.org.

Until next time,

Rikard Jozwiak

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition subscribe here.

[END]
---
[1] Url: https://www.rferl.org/Wider-Europe/2024/11/15

Published and (C) by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Content appears here under this condition or license: By permission of RFE/RL.

via Magical.Fish Gopher News Feeds:
gopher://magical.fish/1/feeds/news/rferl/