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=                   Bombing of Yawata (June 1944)                    =
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                             Introduction                             
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The bombing of Yawata ('Yahata kūshū') on the night of 15-16 June 1944
marked the beginning of the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF)
strategic bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands during
the Pacific War and was the first such raid to employ strategic
bombers. The raid was undertaken by 75 Boeing B-29 Superfortress heavy
bombers staging from bases in China. Only 47 of these aircraft dropped
bombs near the raid's primary target, the Imperial Iron and Steel
Works at Yawata in northern Kyūshū, and little damage was caused. Five
B-29s were lost in accidents during the operation and two were
destroyed by Japanese aircraft.

While the raid did not achieve its aims, it raised Japanese civilians'
awareness that their country was being defeated and received positive
media coverage in the United States. Intelligence gathered by the
B-29s also revealed weaknesses in Japan's air defenses and the raid
was the second of many on Japan. Yawata was attacked again by B-29s
operating from China on 20 August 1944 and much of the city was
destroyed in a firebombing raid conducted by B-29s based in the
Mariana Islands on 8 August 1945.


                              Background                              
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The first United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) raid on Japan took
place on 18 April 1942 when 16 North American B-25 Mitchell medium
bombers flying from an aircraft carrier attacked several cities during
the Doolittle Raid. Although this raid caused little damage, it
boosted morale in the United States. The Japanese government responded
to the attack by both increasing the number of fighter units based in
the home islands and conducting an offensive in the Pacific Ocean
which ended in defeat during the Battle of Midway. The USAAF could not
mount further attacks on the Japanese home islands after this raid,
however, as none of its combat aircraft had sufficient range to reach
this area from bases in China or the Pacific until the B-29
Superfortress heavy bomber was ready for combat.

The B-29 Superfortress had a difficult introduction into service. Work
began on designing the bomber in early 1940, and the first prototype
flew on 21 September 1942. The Superfortress was the largest combat
aircraft of World War II and boasted a heavy maximum bomb load, long
range, and powerful defensive armament. The B-29 also incorporated a
number of new features, such as a pressurized cabin and
remote-controlled turrets. While 1,664  had been ordered by the USAAF
before the aircraft first flew, its development was set back by
several months when the second prototype crashed on 18 February 1943
and problems with the design were gradually solved. The 58th
Bombardment Wing was formed in June 1943 to operate the USAAF's first
B-29s, but it did not begin receiving these aircraft until October.
The slow delivery of B-29s and mechanical problems with the aircraft
meant that the wing lagged behind its training schedule and only
became capable of deployment in March 1944, after the so-called
"Battle of Kansas" program began to produce combat-ready aircraft.

In late 1943, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a
proposal to begin a strategic air campaign against the Japanese home
islands and East Asia by basing B-29s in India and establishing
forward airfields in areas of China. This strategy, which was
designated Operation Matterhorn, required the construction of large
airstrips near Chengdu in inland China which would be supplied by
Allied cargo aircraft and be used to refuel B-29s traveling from bases
in Bengal en route to bombing targets in Japan. XX Bomber Command was
assigned responsibility for this effort, and its ground crew began to
leave the United States for India by sea in December 1943. The
Twentieth Air Force was formed in April 1944 to oversee all B-29
operations. In an unprecedented move, the commander of the USAAF,
General Henry H. Arnold, took personal command of this unit and ran it
from the Pentagon. The 58th Bombardment Wing was XX Bomber Command's
main combat unit, and its movement from Kansas to India took place
from April to mid-May. While the wing had not completed training at
the time that it left for India, its combat groups were more
experienced than most newly deployed USAAF bomber units.


 United States 
===============
After establishing itself in India, XX Bomber Command under the
command of Brigadier General Kenneth B. Wolfe undertook various tasks
to prepare for raids against Japan. Foremost among these was
stockpiling fuel at the airfields in China. Until late 1944, USAAF Air
Transport Command aircraft did not transport fuel for XX Bomber
Command, and this task was instead undertaken by the B-29s. This
arrangement proved inefficient, however, as 12 B-29 sorties between
India and China were needed to transport enough fuel and other
supplies to enable one of the heavy bombers to fly a round trip
between China and Japan. As a result, it took longer than expected to
build up sufficient stockpiles in China to allow B-29 operations to
commence. Moreover, continued technical problems with the
Superfortress, and particularly their Wright R-3350 engines, resulted
in many of XX Bomber Command's aircraft being unserviceable and in
need of modification at all times.

XX Bomber Command conducted its first combat operation on 5 June 1944.
On this day, 98 B-29s were dispatched from bases in India to attack
targets in Bangkok, Thailand, as a 'dress rehearsal' for more
ambitious operations against Japan and targets in South East Asia.
Although little damage was done and five B-29s were lost to flying
accidents and technical faults, the operation was rated a success by
XX Bomber Command, as it provided useful combat experience for the
bomber crews, as well as data on how the B-29 performed in action.

On 6 June, Wolfe received a message from Arnold informing him that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted a raid to be conducted against Japan as
soon as possible. The goals of this operation were to relieve pressure
on Chinese forces which were being attacked by the Japanese and to
support the invasion of Saipan. Arnold's message also asked how many
B-29s could be dispatched on 15 and 20 June. At the time, the first
raid on Japan was tentatively scheduled for 23 June, when sufficient
supplies were expected to be available in China to support 100 B-29
sorties. Wolfe replied, stating that 50 B-29s could be used on 15 June
and 55 if the operation was conducted on the 20th of the month. Arnold
regarded these numbers as too low and directed that a raid by at least
70 B-29s be conducted against Japan on 15 June. Following this order,
XX Bomber Command's B-29s and transport aircraft embarked on an
intensive effort to move fuel to China. Further fuel supplies were
made available to the heavy bombers by reducing the activities of
USAAF fighter units based in China. During the same period, the
command's ground crews reconditioned as many B-29s as possible to
improve their reliability.

The target selected for the first raid on Japan was the Imperial Iron
and Steel Works at Yawata, an industrial city about 1600 mi from
Chengdu. This was the single most important facility in Japan's steel
industry, as it produced 24 percent of the country's total output of
rolled steel. The facility was dependent on three coke plants, and the
largest of these was selected as the designated aiming point for the
B-29s. Nearby Laoyao harbor, which was an important industrial port,
was designated as the raid's secondary target. The selection of
Yawata's steelworks as the first target to be attacked was in
accordance with a decision made by the Twentieth Air Force on 1 April
1944, which assigned the highest priority to attacking Japan's steel
and coke industry. It was decided to conduct the raid at night, with
each B-29 bombing individually, as the aircraft lacked the range
needed to conduct a more fuel-intensive formation flight between the
forward air bases and Yawata.


 Japanese 
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Despite an elaborate deception plan, which included planted news
stories claiming that B-29s would be deployed as bombers in Europe but
only be used as armed transports in the China Burma India Theater, the
Japanese military detected the preparation of B-29 bases in India and
China. Moreover, Japanese agents in China reported on all B-29
movements, giving hours of warning time before raids on the home
islands. Japanese intelligence services deduced that once logistical
preparations were complete, the heavy bombers would attack factories
in northern Kyūshū, and that the first raid would be made at night. On
26 April, Japanese fighters encountered a B-29 for the first time,
when two Nakajima Ki-43 "Oscars" attacked and damaged a lone B-29
flying near the China-India border.

The Japanese military began transferring fighter aircraft from China
and the Pacific to the home islands in early 1944 in anticipation of
B-29 raids. In June 1944, Yawata lay within the Western District of
Japan's four regional defense commands. The 19th Air Brigade was
formed in June 1944 to command fighter units in the Western District
and comprised the 4th and 59th Air Regiments. The 4th Air Regiment was
stationed at Ozuki Airfield and was equipped with 35 Kawasaki Ki-45
Toryu twin-engined heavy fighters, of which 25 were operational in
mid-June, and had the brigade's best-trained pilots. The inexperienced
59th Air Regiment was based at Ashiya Fukuoka Airfield and operated 25
Kawasaki Ki-61 Hien single-engined fighters, though only about seven
or eight were operational. In addition, Yawata and northern Kyūshū
were defended by anti-aircraft artillery units and barrage balloons.
Radar stations and a network of lookout posts provided early warning
of raids.

The 19th Air Brigade's primary mission was to defend the industrial
facilities in northern Kyūshū, and particularly the ironworks at
Yawata. The brigade's plans for the defense of the Western District
called for its interceptor aircraft to be concentrated over Yawata and
not move far from the area. While this inflexible deployment was
considered unsatisfactory by the 19th Air Brigade, it was deemed
necessary, as few aircraft were available, the only searchlight units
needed to facilitate night operations were stationed near Yawata and
northern Kyūshū was regarded by the Army as being the most important
region in the Western District. Prior to the raid on Yawata, the 19th
Air Brigade undertook joint planning with anti-aircraft units and
implemented a training program which included practice in responding
to alerts and night flying.


                                 Raid                                 
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The 58th Bombardment Wing's B-29s began moving from India to the
forward bases in China on 13 June. By 15 June, 83 Superfortresses had
reached the four forward airfields around Chengdu, though at least 12
turned back before reaching China, and another crashed, causing the
death of its entire crew. Each of the aircraft had departed India
carrying the 2 ST of 500-pound bombs they would use in the raid. A
large number of staff officers, including eight generals, also
traveled to Chengdu to observe the operation but were not allowed to
participate in the raid. The bomber crews were joined by eight
journalists and three news photographers, however. At the time, the
USAAF had few recent photos of Japanese industrial areas, and the
bomber crews were briefed on Yawata using maps and photos from the
late 1920s and early 1930s.

The Superfortresses began to depart their bases at 16:16 local time on
15 June. The raiding force was led by the 58th Bombardment Wing's
commander, Brigadier General LaVerne G. Saunders.  One aircraft
crashed immediately after taking off with no casualties and a further
four turned back suffering mechanical problems. The remaining 70
aircraft proceeded on a direct course to Okino Island, where they
turned for the run-in to Yawata. Each of the 58th Bombardment Wing's
four groups sent two aircraft ahead to mark the target and the other
aircraft flew in a long bomber stream; both of these tactics had been
adopted from those used by the British Royal Air Force's Bomber
Command in Europe. The raiders were detected by Japanese Army and Army
Air Force units in China. These reports were passed onto the 19th Air
Brigade, which estimated that the bombers were bound for northern
Kyūshū and would arrive there at about midnight local time. A radar
station and lookout posts on Cheju-Do subsequently detected the
bombers from 23:31 to 00:30 local time. An air raid alarm was issued
at 00:24 and 24 aircraft of the  began to take off three minutes later
to patrol over northern Kyūshū. The 59th Air Regiment was not
scrambled, as its pilots had not worked with those of the 4th Air
Regiment in night operations, its aircraft were suffering from
mechanical problems, and it was feared that the B-29s would sight and
attack the base at Ashiya.

B-29s began to arrive over Yawata at 00:38 local time, and the attack
on the city lasted almost two hours. Only 15 of the American aircraft
were able to aim their bombs visually, as the city was blacked out and
obscured by smoke or haze; the other 32 bombed by radar. Two further
B-29s bombed Laoyao harbor in China and another five struck targets of
opportunity; overall 107 tons of bombs were dropped during the raid.
After the first bombs were released, regular updates on the operation
were transmitted to the Twentieth Air Force's headquarters in
Washington, from where they were relayed to Arnold, who was in London
at the time. The raiders were met with heavy but inaccurate
anti-aircraft fire, and the searchlights stationed around Yawata were
not effective. The 4th Air Regiment achieved the only kill of the
night when one of its fighters shot down a B-29. The Regiment's other
aircraft struggled to make contact with the bombers and achieved few
interceptions.

The B-29s' return flight to China was largely uneventful. One of the
Superfortresses was strafed and destroyed by Japanese aircraft after
landing at Neihsiang with engine trouble, and a further two aircraft
crashed with the loss of their entire crews and a correspondent from
the magazine 'Newsweek'. Overall, American losses in the raid were
seven B-29s destroyed and a further six damaged by anti-aircraft guns;
57 airmen and one journalist were killed aboard these aircraft. Many
of the B-29s were stranded in China for several days after the raid by
fuel shortages there and only returned to India after Wolfe borrowed
15000 USgal of fuel from the 312th Fighter Wing's supplies. During
this period, the bombers were highly vulnerable to Japanese
retaliatory raids, but none came about.


                              Aftermath                               
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Little damage was caused by the raid on Yawata. On 18 June, a USAAF
Fourteenth Air Force aircraft overflew the city and photographed the
target area. These photos showed that only a single bomb had landed
within the Imperial Iron and Steel Works complex, and it had hit a
powerhouse 3700 ft from the nearest coke oven. Light damage had also
been inflicted on Kokura Arsenal and other industrial and civilian
buildings in the area. Despite a USAAF policy of encouraging factual
reporting of B-29 operations, the raid's results were overstated in
the U.S. media. The light combat losses suffered by the raiders and
electronic intelligence collected by the B-29s revealed the
ineffectiveness of Japanese radar and air defenses. As a result, the
USAAF dispatched a single photo-reconnaissance B-29 to overfly much of
Japan and Korea on 21 June. This sortie was successful and greatly
improved U.S. intelligence holdings on these areas.

The Yawata raid revealed serious shortcomings in Japan's air defenses.
While the 19th Air Brigade initially claimed to have shot down eight
B-29s and damaged a further four, it was soon determined that only two
of the bombers had been destroyed. This loss ratio was considered too
low to defeat attacks on the home islands. The raid demonstrated that
Japan had too few airbases and not enough aircraft were available for
night operations. It was also found that the Toryu fighter was not
well suited to intercepting B-29s, as it was slower than the bombers,
too lightly armed, and most aircraft lacked radar. While the air raid
alert system had proved successful in this instance, the radars which
detected the American aircraft had been unable to determine their
altitude, and it was decided that there was a need to further expand
radar coverage. The performance of the 131st Anti Aircraft Regiment
during the raid was judged to be so poor that its commander was
transferred to Manchuria. News reports of the Yawata raid and
successful U.S. landing at Saipan on the same day also indicated to
Japanese civilians that the war was not going well. In response to the
raid, Japanese Government ministers urged families living in the
country's four major cities to evacuate their children to rural areas.

The 15-16 June 1944 raid on Yawata marked the beginning of the USAAF's
strategic bombing campaign against Japan. The city was struck again by
B-29s during daylight and night raids on 20 August, but no serious
damage was caused. XX Bomber Command conducted 49 raids from its bases
in China and India between June 1944 and March 1945, of which nine
were made on targets in the Japanese home islands, but Operation
Matterhorn did not achieve its goals. Despite initial problems, XXI
Bomber Command's operations from the Mariana Islands, which began on
28 October 1944, proved much more effective. As a result, XX Bomber
Command was transferred to the Mariana Islands in early 1945. Yawata
was targeted again by B-29s on 8 August 1945, two days after the
atomic bombing of Hiroshima. On this day the city was attacked by 221
B-29s, escorted by three groups of P-47N Thunderbolt fighters,
including the 318th Fighter Group based on Ie Shima off the coast of
Okinawa. The bombers were armed with incendiary bombs, and the
resulting firestorm destroyed 21 percent of Yawata's urban area.


                               See also                               
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* Air raids on Japan


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