Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of fear: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear causes contraction?
(2) Whether it makes men suitable for counsel?
(3) Whether it makes one tremble?
(4) Whether it hinders action?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear causes contraction?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fear does not cause contraction. For when
contraction takes place, the heat and vital spirits are withdrawn
inwardly. But accumulation of heat and vital spirits in the interior
parts of the body, dilates the heart unto endeavors of daring, as may be
seen in those who are angered: while the contrary happens in those who
are afraid. Therefore fear does not cause contraction.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, when, as a result of contraction, the vital spirits and
heat are accumulated in the interior parts, man cries out, as may be seen
in those who are in pain. But those who fear utter nothing: on the
contrary they lose their speech. Therefore fear does not cause
contraction.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above (Q[41], A[4]).
But "those who are ashamed blush," as Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8),
and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9) observe. But blushing is an
indication, not of contraction, but of the reverse. Therefore contraction
is not an effect of fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 23) that "fear is a
power according to {systole}," i.e. contraction.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (Q[28], A[5]), in the passions of the
soul, the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power, while
the bodily transmutation is the material element. Both of these are
mutually proportionate; and consequently the bodily transmutation assumes
a resemblance to and the very nature of the appetitive movement. Now, as
to the appetitive movement of the soul, fear implies a certain
contraction: the reason of which is that fear arises from the imagination
of some threatening evil which is difficult to repel, as stated above
(Q[41], A[2]). But that a thing be difficult to repel is due to lack of
power, as stated above (Q[43], A[2]): and the weaker a power is, the
fewer the things to which it extends. Wherefore from the very imagination
that causes fear there ensues a certain contraction in the appetite. Thus
we observe in one who is dying that nature withdraws inwardly, on account
of the lack of power: and again we see the inhabitants of a city, when
seized with fear, leave the outskirts, and, as far as possible, make for
the inner quarters. It is in resemblance to this contraction, which
pertains to the appetite of the soul, that in fear a similar contraction
of heat and vital spirits towards the inner parts takes place in regard
to the body.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3), although in
those who fear, the vital spirits recede from outer to the inner parts of
the body, yet the movement of vital spirits is not the same in those who
are angry and those who are afraid. For in those who are angry, by reason
of the heat and subtlety of the vital spirits, which result from the
craving for vengeance, the inward movement has an upward direction:
wherefore the vital spirits and heat concentrate around the heart: the
result being that an angry man is quick and brave in attacking. But in
those who are afraid, on account of the condensation caused by cold, the
vital spirits have a downward movement; the said cold being due to the
imagined lack of power. Consequently the heat and vital spirits abandon
the heart instead of concentrating around it: the result being that a man
who is afraid is not quick to attack, but is more inclined to run away.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To everyone that is in pain, whether man or animal, it is
natural to use all possible means of repelling the harmful thing that
causes pain but its presence: thus we observe that animals, when in pain,
attack with their jaws or with their horns. Now the greatest help for all
purposes, in animals, is heat and vital spirits: wherefore when they are
in pain, their nature stores up the heat and vital spirits within them,
in order to make use thereof in repelling the harmful object. Hence the
Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 9) when the vital spirits and heat
are concentrated together within, they require to find a vent in the
voice: for which reason those who are in pain can scarcely refrain from
crying aloud. On the other hand, in those who are afraid, the internal
heat and vital spirits move from the heart downwards, as stated above (ad
1): wherefore fear hinders speech which ensues from the emission of the
vital spirits in an upward direction through the mouth: the result being
that fear makes its subject speechless. For this reason, too, fear "makes
its subject tremble," as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 1,6,7).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Mortal perils are contrary not only to the appetite of the
soul, but also to nature. Consequently in such like fear, there is
contraction not only in the appetite, but also in the corporeal nature:
for when an animal is moved by the imagination of death, it experiences a
contraction of heat towards the inner parts of the body, as though it
were threatened by a natural death. Hence it is that "those who are in
fear of death turn pale" (Ethic. iv, 9). But the evil that shame fears,
is contrary, not to nature, but only to the appetite of the soul.
Consequently there results a contraction in this appetite, but not in the
corporeal nature; in fact, the soul, as though contracted in itself, is
free to set the vital spirits and heat in movement, so that they spread
to the outward parts of the body: the result being that those who are
ashamed blush.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear makes one suitable for counsel?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fear does not make one suitable for counsel.
For the same thing cannot be conducive to counsel, and a hindrance
thereto. But fear hinders counsel: because every passion disturbs repose,
which is requisite for the good use of reason. Therefore fear does not
make a man suitable for counsel.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, counsel is an act of reason, in thinking and
deliberating about the future. But a certain fear "drives away all
thought, and dislocates the mind," as Cicero observes (De Quaest. Tusc.
iv, 8). Therefore fear does not conduce to counsel, but hinders it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as we have recourse to counsel in order to avoid
evil, so do we, in order to attain good things. But whereas fear is of
evil to be avoided, so is hope of good things to be obtained. Therefore
fear is not more conducive to counsel, than hope is.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes men
of counsel."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, A man of counsel may be taken in two ways. First, from
his being willing or anxious to take counsel. And thus fear makes men of
counsel. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "we take
counsel on great matters, because therein we distrust ourselves." Now
things which make us afraid, are not simply evil, but have a certain
magnitude, both because they seem difficult to repel, and because they
are apprehended as near to us, as stated above (Q[42], A[2]). Wherefore
men seek for counsel especially when they are afraid.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Secondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for giving good counsel:
and in this sense, neither fear nor any passion makes men of counsel.
Because when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to him greater
or smaller than they really are: thus to a lover, what he loves seems
better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more dreadful.
Consequently owing to the want of right judgment, every passion,
considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good counsel.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The stronger a passion is, the greater the hindrance is it
to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear is intense, man
does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are so disturbed, that
he can find no counsel. If, however, the fear be slight, so as to make a
man wish to take counsel, without gravely disturbing the reason; it may
even make it easier for him to take good counsel, by reason of his
ensuing carefulness.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hope also makes man a good counsellor: because, as the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "no man takes counsel in matters he
despairs of," nor about impossible things, as he says in Ethic. iii, 3.
But fear incites to counsel more than hope does. Because hope is of good
things, as being possible of attainment; whereas fear is of evil things,
as being difficult to repel, so that fear regards the aspect of
difficulty more than hope does. And it is in matters of difficulty,
especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take counsel, as stated
above.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear makes one tremble?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that trembling is not an effect of fear. Because
trembling is occasioned by cold; thus we observe that a cold person
trembles. Now fear does not seem to make one cold, but rather to cause a
parching heat: a sign whereof is that those who fear are thirsty,
especially if their fear be very great, as in the case of those who are
being led to execution. Therefore fear does not cause trembling.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, faecal evacuation is occasioned by heat; hence laxative
medicines are generally warm. But these evacuations are often caused by
fear. Therefore fear apparently causes heat; and consequently does not
cause trembling.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in fear, the heat is withdrawn from the outer to the
inner parts of the body. If, therefore, man trembles in his outward
parts, through the heat being withdrawn thus; it seems that fear should
cause this trembling in all the external members. But such is not the
case. Therefore trembling of the body is not caused by fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) that "fear is
followed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), in fear there takes place a
certain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body, the
result being that the outer parts become cold; and for this reason
trembling is occasioned in these parts, being caused by a lack of power
in controlling the members: which lack of power is due to the want of
heat, which is the instrument whereby the soul moves those members, as
stated in De Anima ii, 4.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: When the heat withdraws from the outer to the inner parts,
the inward heat increases, especially in the inferior or nutritive parts.
Consequently the humid element being spent, thirst ensues; sometimes
indeed the result is a loosening of the bowels, and urinary or even
seminal evacuation. Or else such like evacuations are due to contraction
of the abdomen and testicles, as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxii,
11).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In fear, heat abandons the heart, with a downward
movement: hence in those who are afraid the heart especially trembles, as
also those members which are connected with the breast where the heart
resides. Hence those who fear tremble especially in their speech, on
account of the tracheal artery being near the heart. The lower lip, too,
and the lower jaw tremble, through their connection with the heart; which
explains the chattering of the teeth. For the same reason the arms and
hands tremble. Or else because the aforesaid members are more mobile. For
which reason the knees tremble in those who are afraid, according to Is.
35:3: "Strengthen ye the feeble hands, and confirm the trembling [Vulg.:
'weak'] knees."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear hinders action?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fear hinders action. For action is hindered
chiefly by a disturbance in the reason, which directs action. But fear
disturbs reason, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore fear hinders action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those who fear while doing anything, are more apt to
fail: thus a man who walks on a plank placed aloft, easily falls through
fear; whereas, if he were to walk on the same plank down below, he would
not fall, through not being afraid. Therefore fear hinders action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, laziness or sloth is a kind of fear. But laziness
hinders action. Therefore fear does too.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 2:12): "With fear and trembling
work out your salvation": and he would not say this if fear were a
hindrance to a good work. Therefore fear does not hinder a good action.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Man's exterior actions are caused by the soul as first
mover, but by the bodily members as instruments. Now action may be
hindered both by defect of the instrument, and by defect of the principal
mover. On the part of the bodily instruments, fear, considered in itself,
is always apt to hinder exterior action, on account of the outward
members being deprived, through fear, of their heat. But on the part of
the soul, if the fear be moderate, without much disturbance of the
reason, it conduces to working well, in so far as it causes a certain
solicitude, and makes a man take counsel and work with greater attention.
If, however, fear increases so much as to disturb the reason, it hinders
action even on the part of the soul. But of such a fear the Apostle does
not speak.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: He that falls from a plank placed aloft, suffers a
disturbance of his imagination, through fear of the fall that is pictured
to his imagination.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[44] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Everyone in fear shuns that which he fears: and therefore,
since laziness is a fear of work itself as being toilsome, it hinders
work by withdrawing the will from it. But fear of other things conduces
to action, in so far as it inclines the will to do that whereby a man
escapes from what he fears.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] Out. Para. 1/1
OF DARING (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider daring: under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether daring is contrary to fear?
(2) How is daring related to hope?
(3) Of the cause of daring;
(4) Of its effect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether daring is contrary to fear?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that daring is not contrary to fear. For Augustine
says (QQ. 83, qu. 31) that "daring is a vice." Now vice is contrary to
virtue. Since, therefore, fear is not a virtue but a passion, it seems
that daring is not contrary to fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary. But hope is contrary
to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every passion excludes its opposite. But fear excludes
safety; for Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "fear takes forethought
for safety." Therefore safety is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is
not contrary to fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "daring is
contrary to fear."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is of the essence of contraries to be "farthest
removed from one another," as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Now that which is
farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away from the
future hurt, on account of its victory over him that fears it; whereas
daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that
same danger. Consequently it is evident that daring is contrary to fear.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Anger, daring and all the names of the passions can be
taken in two ways. First, as denoting absolutely movements of the
sensitive appetite in respect of some object, good or bad: and thus they
are names of passions. Secondly, as denoting besides this movement, a
straying from the order of reason: and thus they are names of vices. It
is in this sense that Augustine speaks of daring: but we are speaking of
it in the first sense.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: To one thing, in the same respect, there are not several
contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one thing having
several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above (Q[23], A[2];
Q[40], A[4]) that the irascible passions admit of a twofold contrariety:
one, according to the opposition of good and evil, and thus fear is
contrary to hope: the other, according to the opposition of approach and
withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to fear, and despair contrary to
hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Safety does not denote something contrary to fear, but
merely the exclusion of fear: for he is said to be safe, who fears not.
Wherefore safety is opposed to fear, as a privation: while daring is
opposed thereto as a contrary. And as contrariety implies privation, so
daring implies safety.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether daring ensues from hope?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that daring does not ensue from hope. Because
daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But
hope regards good things, as stated above (Q[40], A[1]). Therefore they
have different objects and are not in the same order. Therefore daring
does not ensue from hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair
contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from despair: in fact, despair
excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore daring
does not result from hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, daring is intent on something good, viz. victory. But it
belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult. Therefore
daring is the same as hope; and consequently does not result from it.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "those are
hopeful are full of daring." Therefore it seems that daring ensues from
hope.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As we have often stated (Q[22], A[2]; Q[35], A[1]; Q[41],
A[1]), all these passions belong to the appetitive power. Now every
movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one either of pursuit or
of avoidance. Again, pursuit or avoidance is of something either by
reason of itself or by reason of something else. By reason of itself,
good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the object of avoidance: but by
reason of something else, evil can be the object of pursuit, through some
good attaching to it; and good can be the object of avoidance, through
some evil attaching to it. Now that which is by reason of something else,
follows that which is by reason of itself. Consequently pursuit of evil
follows pursuit of good; and avoidance of good follows avoidance of evil.
Now these four things belong to four passions, since pursuit of good
belongs to hope, avoidance of evil to fear, the pursuit of the fearful
evil belongs to daring, and the avoidance of good to despair. It follows,
therefore, that daring results from hope; since it is in the hope of
overcoming the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly.
But despair results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs is
because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good he should hope for.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument would hold, if good and evil were not
co-ordinate objects. But because evil has a certain relation to good,
since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit; consequently
daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which pursues good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although good, absolutely speaking, is prior to evil, yet
avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good; just as the pursuit of good
precedes the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope precedes daring,
so fear precedes despair. And just as fear does not always lead to
despair, but only when it is intense; so hope does not always lead to
daring, save only when it is strong.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although the object of daring is an evil to which, in the
estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is conjoined; yet
daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined good. In like
manner despair regards directly the good which it turns away from, while
fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly speaking, daring is not
a part of hope, but its effect: just as despair is an effect, not a part,
of fear. For this reason, too, daring cannot be a principal passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether some defect is a cause of daring?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that some defect is a cause of daring. For the
Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 4) that "lovers of wine are strong
and daring." But from wine ensues the effect of drunkenness. Therefore
daring is caused by a defect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who have
no experience of danger are bold." But want of experience is a defect.
Therefore daring is caused by a defect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, those who have suffered wrongs are wont to be daring;
"like the beasts when beaten," as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. But the
suffering of wrongs pertains to defect. Therefore daring is caused by a
defect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that the cause of
daring "is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means of
safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either non-existent
or far off." But anything pertaining to defect implies either the removal
of the means of safety, or the proximity of something to be feared.
Therefore nothing pertaining to defect is a cause of daring.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],2) daring results from hope and is
contrary to fear: wherefore whatever is naturally apt to cause hope or
banish fear, is a cause of daring. Since, however, fear and hope, and
also daring, being passions, consist in a movement of the appetite, and
in a certain bodily transmutation; a thing may be considered as the cause
of daring in two ways, whether by raising hope, or by banishing fear; in
one way, in the part of the appetitive movement; in another way, on the
part of the bodily transmutation.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
On the part of the appetitive movement which follows apprehension, hope
that leads to daring is roused by those things that make us reckon
victory as possible. Such things regard either our own power, as bodily
strength, experience of dangers, abundance of wealth, and the like; or
they regard the powers of others, such as having a great number of
friends or any other means of help, especially if a man trust in the
Divine assistance: wherefore "those are more daring, with whom it is well
in regard to godlike things," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Fear
is banished, in this way, by the removal of threatening causes of fear;
for instance, by the fact that a man has not enemies, through having
harmed nobody, so that he is not aware of any imminent danger; since
those especially appear to be threatened by danger, who have harmed
others.
On the part of the bodily transmutation, daring is caused through the
incitement of hope and the banishment of fear, by those things which
raise the temperature about the heart. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De
Part. Animal. iii, 4) that "those whose heart is small in size, are more
daring; while animals whose heart is large are timid; because the natural
heat is unable to give the same degree of temperature to a large as to a
small heart; just as a fire does not heat a large house as well as it
does a small house." He says also (De Problem. xxvii, 4), that "those
whose lungs contain much blood, are more daring, through the heat in the
heart that results therefrom." He says also in the same passage that
"lovers of wine are more daring, on account of the heat of the wine":
hence it has been said above (Q[40], A[6]) that drunkenness conduces to
hope, since the heat in the heart banishes fear and raises hope, by
reason of the dilatation and enlargement of the heart.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Drunkenness causes daring, not through being a defect, but
through dilating the heart: and again through making a man think greatly
of himself.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Those who have no experience of dangers are more daring,
not on account of a defect, but accidentally, i.e. in so far as through
being inexperienced they do not know their own failings, nor the dangers
that threaten. Hence it is that the removal of the cause of fear gives
rise to daring.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) "those who have been
wronged are courageous, because they think that God comes to the
assistance of those who suffer unjustly."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Hence it is evident that no defect causes daring except accidentally,
i.e. in so far as some excellence attaches thereto, real or imaginary,
either in oneself or in another.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the brave are more eager at first than in the midst of danger?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the daring are not more eager at first than in
the midst of danger. Because trembling is caused by fear, which is
contrary to daring, as stated above (A[1]; Q[44], A[3]). But the daring
sometimes tremble at first, as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii,
3). Therefore they are not more eager at first than in the midst of
danger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, passion is intensified by an increase in its object:
thus since a good is lovable, what is better is yet more lovable. But the
object of daring is something difficult. Therefore the greater the
difficulty, the greater the daring. But danger is more arduous and
difficult when present. It is then therefore that daring is greatest.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, anger is provoked by the infliction of wounds. But anger
causes daring; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "anger makes
man bold." Therefore when man is in the midst of danger and when he is
being beaten, then is he most daring.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that "the daring are
precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the midst of
dangers they stand aloof."
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite,
follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive
faculty cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into circumstances;
its judgment is instantaneous. Now it happens sometimes that it is
impossible for a man to take note in an instant of all the difficulties
of a certain situation: hence there arises the movement of daring to face
the danger; so that when he comes to experience the danger, he feels the
difficulty to be greater than he expected, and so gives way.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a situation.
Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according to the judgment
of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the danger not from
passion but with due deliberation. Yet when they are in the midst of
danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but sometimes the difficulty
turns out to be less than they anticipated; wherefore they are more
persevering. Moreover, it may be because they face the danger on account
of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of their will, however
great the danger may prove: whereas men of daring face the danger on
account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and banishing fear, as
stated above (A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Trembling does occur in men of daring, on account of the
heat being withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the body, as
occurs also in those who are afraid. But in men of daring the heat
withdraws to the heart; whereas in those who are afraid, it withdraws to
the inferior parts.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The object of love is good simply, wherefore if it be
increased, love is increased simply. But the object of daring is a
compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil
presupposes the movement of hope towards good. If, therefore, so much
difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the movement of
daring does not ensue, but fails. But if the movement of daring does
ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the daring considered to be.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[45] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hurt does not give rise to anger unless there be some kind
of hope, as we shall see later on (Q[46], A[1]). Consequently if the
danger be so great as to banish all hope of victory, anger does not
ensue. It is true, however, that if anger does ensue, there will be
greater daring.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] Out. Para. 1/2
OF ANGER, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider anger: and (1) anger in itself; (2) the cause of
anger and its remedy; (3) the effect of anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether anger is a special passion?
(2) Whether the object of anger is good or evil?
(3) Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?
(4) Whether anger is accompanied by an act of reason?
(5) Whether anger is more natural than desire?
(6) Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?
(7) Whether anger is only towards those with whom we have a relation of
justice?
(8) Of the species of anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anger is a special passion?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that anger is not a special passion. For the
irascible power takes its name from anger [ira]. But there are several
passions in this power, not only one. Therefore anger is not one special
passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to every special passion there is a contrary passion; as
is evident by going through them one by one. But no passion is contrary
to anger, as stated above (Q[23], A[3]). Therefore anger is not a special
passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, one special passion does not include another. But anger
includes several passions: since it accompanies sorrow, pleasure, and
hope, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2). Therefore anger is not a
special passion.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) calls anger a special
passion: and so does Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 7).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A thing is said to be general in two ways. First, by
predication; thus "animal" is general in respect of all animals.
Secondly, by causality; thus the sun is the general cause of all things
generated here below, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Because just
as a genus contains potentially many differences, according to a likeness
of matter; so an efficient cause contains many effects according to its
active power. Now it happens that an effect is produced by the
concurrence of various causes; and since every cause remains somewhat in
its effect, we may say that, in yet a third way, an effect which is due
to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain generality, inasmuch
as several causes are, in a fashion, actually existing therein.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general passion but is
condivided with the other passions, as stated above (Q[23], A[4]). In
like manner, neither is it in the second way: since it is not a cause of
the other passions. But in this way, love may be called a general
passion, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), because love is
the primary root of all the other passions, as stated above (Q[27], A[4]
). But, in a third way, anger may be called a general passion, inasmuch
as it is caused by a concurrence of several passions. Because the
movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted,
and unless there be desire and hope of revenge: for, as the Philosopher
says (Rhet. ii, 2), "the angry man hopes to punish; since he craves for
revenge as being possible." Consequently if the person, who inflicted the
injury, excel very much, anger does not ensue, but only sorrow, as
Avicenna states (De Anima iv, 6).
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The irascible power takes its name from "ira" [anger], not
because every movement of that power is one of anger; but because all its
movements terminate in anger; and because, of all these movements, anger
is the most patent.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: From the very fact that anger is caused by contrary
passions, i.e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which is of
evil, it includes in itself contrariety: and consequently it has no
contrary outside itself. Thus also in mixed colors there is no
contrariety, except that of the simple colors from which they are made.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a genus
includes several species; but rather according to the inclusion of cause
and effect.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the object of anger is good or evil?
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the object of anger is evil. For Gregory of
Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] that anger is "the sword-bearer
of desire," inasmuch, to wit, as it assails whatever obstacle stands in
the way of desire. But an obstacle has the character of evil. Therefore
anger regards evil as its object.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each
seeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred regards evil as its object,
as stated above (Q[29], A[1]). Therefore anger does also.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. viii, 6) that "anger acts with sorrow." But evil is the object of
sorrow. Therefore it is also the object of anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] OTC Para. 1/2
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "anger craves for
revenge." But the desire for revenge is a desire for something good:
since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the object of anger is good.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] OTC Para. 2/2
Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes
pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the object of hope
and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of anger.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The movement of the appetitive power follows an act of
the apprehensive power. Now the apprehensive power apprehends a thing in
two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we understand
what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, as when we
understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each of these ways
the appetitive power can tend to both good and evil: by way of a simple
and incomplex object, when the appetite simply follows and adheres to
good, or recoils from evil: and such movements are desire, hope,
pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of a complex object, as when the
appetite is concerned with some good or evil being in, or being done to,
another, either seeking this or recoiling from it. This is evident in the
case of love and hatred: for we love someone, in so far as we wish some
good to be in him; and we hate someone, in so far as we wish some evil to
be in him. It is the same with anger; for when a man is angry, he wishes
to be avenged on someone. Hence the movement of anger has a twofold
tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, which it desires and hopes for as
being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on
whom it seeks vengeance, as to something contrary and hurtful, which
bears the character of evil.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between
anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The first
difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas love and
hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is said to love
wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second difference is,
that both the objects of love are good: since the lover wishes good to
someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the objects of
hatred bear the character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes evil to
someone, as to something disagreeable to him. Whereas anger regards one
object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person, on whom it
seeks to be avenged. Consequently it is a passion somewhat made up of
contrary passions.
Aquin.: SMT FS Q[46] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.