Aquin.: SMT TP Prologue Para. 1/3

THIRD PART (TP) OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA (QQ[1]-90)


PROLOGUE

 Forasmuch as our Saviour the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to "save His 
people from their sins" (Mt. 1:21), as the angel announced, showed unto 
us in His own Person the way of truth, whereby we may attain to the bliss 
of eternal life by rising again, it is necessary, in order to complete 
the work of theology, that after considering the last end of human life, 
and the virtues and vices, there should follow the consideration of the 
Saviour of all, and of the benefits bestowed by Him on the human race.

Aquin.: SMT TP Prologue Para. 2/3

 Concerning this we must consider (1) the Saviour Himself; (2) the 
sacraments by which we attain to our salvation; (3) the end of immortal 
life to which we attain by the resurrection.

Aquin.: SMT TP Prologue Para. 3/3

 Concerning the first, a double consideration occurs: the first, about 
the mystery of the Incarnation itself, whereby God was made man for our 
salvation; the second, about such things as were done and suffered by our 
Saviour---i.e. God incarnate.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] Out. Para. 1/2

TREATISE ON THE INCARNATION (QQ[1]-59)


OF THE FITNESS OF THE INCARNATION (SIX ARTICLES)

 Concerning the first, three things occur to be considered: first, the 
fitness of the Incarnation; secondly, the mode of union of the Word 
Incarnate; thirdly, what follows this union.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] Out. Para. 2/2

 Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether it is fitting for God to become incarnate?

 (2) Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race?

 (3) Whether if there had been no sin God would have become incarnate?

 (4) Whether He became incarnate to take away original sin rather than 
actual?

 (5) Whether it was fitting for God to become incarnate from the 
beginning of the world?

 (6) Whether His Incarnation ought to have been deferred to the end of 
the world?


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for God to become 
incarnate. Since God from all eternity is the very essence of goodness, 
it was best for Him to be as He had been from all eternity. But from all 
eternity He had been without flesh. Therefore it was most fitting for Him 
not to be united to flesh. Therefore it was not fitting for God to become 
incarnate.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is not fitting to unite things that are  infinitely 
apart, even as it would not be a fitting union if one were "to paint a 
figure in which the neck of a horse was joined to the head of a man" 
[*Horace, Ars. Poet., line 1]. But God and flesh are infinitely apart; 
since God is most simple, and flesh is most composite---especially human 
flesh. Therefore it was not fitting that God should be united to human 
flesh.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a body is as distant from the highest spirit as evil is 
from the highest good. But it was wholly unfitting that God, Who is the 
highest good, should assume evil. Therefore it was not fitting that the 
highest uncreated spirit should assume a body.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, it is not becoming that He Who surpassed the greatest 
things should be contained in the least, and He upon Whom rests the care 
of great things should leave them for lesser things. But God---Who takes 
care of the whole world---the whole universe of things cannot contain. 
Therefore it would seem unfitting that "He should be hid under the frail 
body of a babe in swathing bands, in comparison with Whom the whole 
universe is accounted as little; and that this Prince should quit His 
throne for so long, and transfer the government of the whole world to so 
frail a body," as Volusianus writes to Augustine (Ep. cxxxv).

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It would seem most fitting that by visible things the 
invisible things of God should be made known; for to this end was the 
whole world made, as is clear from the word of the Apostle (Rm. 1:20): 
"For the invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood 
by the things that are made." But, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 
1), by the mystery of the Incarnation are made known at once the 
goodness, the wisdom, the justice, and the power or might of God---"His 
goodness, for He did not despise the weakness of His own handiwork; His 
justice, since, on man's defeat, He caused the tyrant to be overcome by 
none other than man, and yet He did not snatch men forcibly from death; 
His wisdom, for He found a suitable discharge for a most heavy debt; His 
power, or infinite might, for there is nothing greater than for God to 
become incarnate . . ."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, To each things, that is befitting which belongs to it by 
reason of its very nature; thus, to reason befits man, since this belongs 
to him because he is of a rational nature. But the very nature of God is 
goodness, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Hence, what belongs 
to the essence of goodness befits God. But it belongs to the essence of 
goodness to communicate itself to others, as is plain from Dionysius 
(Div. Nom. iv). Hence it belongs to the essence of the highest good to 
communicate itself in the highest manner to the creature, and this is 
brought about chiefly by "His so joining created nature to Himself that 
one Person is made up of these three---the Word, a soul and flesh," as 
Augustine says (De Trin. xiii). Hence it is manifest that it was fitting 
that God should become incarnate.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The mystery of the Incarnation was not completed through 
God being changed in any way from the state in which He had  been from 
eternity, but through His having united Himself to the creature in a new 
way, or rather through having united it to Himself. But it is fitting 
that a creature which by nature is mutable, should not always be in one 
way. And therefore, as the creature began to be, although it had not been 
before, so likewise, not having been previously united to God in Person, 
it was afterwards united to Him.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: To be united to God in unity of person was not fitting to 
human flesh, according to its natural endowments, since it was above its 
dignity; nevertheless, it was fitting that God, by reason of His infinite 
goodness, should unite it to Himself for man's salvation.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Every mode of being wherein any creature whatsoever differs 
from the Creator has been established by God's wisdom, and is ordained to 
God's goodness. For God, Who is uncreated, immutable, and incorporeal, 
produced mutable and corporeal creatures for His own goodness. And so 
also the evil of punishment was established by God's justice for God's 
glory. But evil of fault is committed by withdrawing from the art of the 
Divine wisdom and from the order of the Divine goodness. And therefore it 
could be fitting to God to assume a nature created, mutable, corporeal, 
and subject to penalty, but it did not become Him to assume the evil of 
fault.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: As Augustine replies (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "The 
Christian doctrine nowhere holds that God was so joined to human flesh as 
either to desert or lose, or to transfer and as it were, contract within 
this frail body, the care of governing the universe. This is the thought 
of men unable to see anything but corporeal things . . . God is great not 
in mass, but in might. Hence the greatness of His might feels no straits 
in narrow surroundings. Nor, if the passing word of a man is heard at 
once by many, and wholly by each, is it incredible that the abiding Word 
of God should be everywhere at once?" Hence nothing unfitting arises from 
God becoming incarnate.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race that the 
Word of God should become incarnate?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for the reparation of the 
human race that the Word of God should become incarnate. For since the 
Word of God is perfect God, as has been said (FP, Q[4], AA[1],2), no 
power was added to Him by the assumption of flesh. Therefore, if the 
incarnate Word of God restored human nature. He could also have restored 
it without assuming flesh.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, for the restoration of human nature, which had fallen 
through sin, nothing more is required than that man should satisfy for 
sin. Now man can satisfy, as it would seem, for sin; for God cannot 
require from man more than man can do, and since He is more inclined to 
be merciful than to punish, as He lays the act  of sin to man's charge, 
so He ought to credit him with the contrary act. Therefore it was not 
necessary for the restoration of human nature that the Word of God should 
become incarnate.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, to revere God pertains especially to man's salvation; 
hence it is written (Mal. 1:6): "If, then, I be a father, where is my 
honor? and if I be a master, where is my fear?" But men revere God the 
more by considering Him as elevated above all, and far beyond man's 
senses, hence (Ps. 112:4) it is written: "The Lord is high above all 
nations, and His glory above the heavens"; and farther on: "Who is as the 
Lord our God?" which pertains to reverence. Therefore it would seem 
unfitting to man's salvation that God should be made like unto us by 
assuming flesh.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, What frees the human race from perdition is necessary 
for the salvation of man. But the mystery of the Incarnation is such; 
according to Jn. 3:16: "God so loved the world as to give His 
only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but 
may have life everlasting." Therefore it was necessary for man's 
salvation that God should become incarnate.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, A thing is said to be necessary for a certain end in two 
ways. First, when the end cannot be without it; as food is necessary for 
the preservation of human life. Secondly, when the end is attained better 
and more conveniently, as a horse is necessary for a journey. In the 
first way it was not necessary that God should become incarnate for the 
restoration of human nature. For God with His omnipotent power could have 
restored human nature in many other ways. But in the second way it was 
necessary that God should become incarnate for the restoration of human 
nature. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 10): "We shall also show that 
other ways were not wanting to God, to Whose power all things are equally 
subject; but that there was not a more fitting way of healing our misery."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 2/4

 Now this may be viewed with respect to our "furtherance in good." First, 
with regard to faith, which is made more certain by believing God Himself 
Who speaks; hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 2): "In order that man 
might journey more trustfully toward the truth, the Truth itself, the Son 
of God, having assumed human nature, established and founded faith." 
Secondly, with regard to hope, which is thereby greatly strengthened; 
hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "Nothing was so necessary for 
raising our hope as to show us how deeply God loved us. And what could 
afford us a stronger proof of this than that the Son of God should become 
a partner with us of human nature?" Thirdly, with regard to charity, 
which is greatly enkindled by this; hence Augustine says (De Catech. 
Rudib. iv): "What greater cause is there of the Lord's coming than to 
show God's love for us?" And he afterwards adds: "If we have been slow to 
love, at least let us hasten to love in return." Fourthly, with regard to 
well-doing, in which He set us an example; hence Augustine says in a 
sermon (xxii de Temp.): "Man who might be seen was not to be followed; 
but God was to be followed, Who could not be seen. And therefore God was 
made man, that He Who  might be seen by man, and Whom man might follow, 
might be shown to man." Fifthly, with regard to the full participation of 
the Divinity, which is the true bliss of man and end of human life; and 
this is bestowed upon us by Christ's humanity; for Augustine says in a 
sermon (xiii de Temp.): "Go was made man, that man might be made God."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 3/4

 So also was this useful for our "withdrawal from evil." First, because 
man is taught by it not to prefer the devil to himself, nor to honor him 
who is the author of sin; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): 
"Since human nature is so united to God as to become one person, let not 
these proud spirits dare to prefer themselves to man, because they have 
no bodies." Secondly, because we are thereby taught how great is man's 
dignity, lest we should sully it with sin; hence Augustine says (De Vera 
Relig. xvi): "God has proved to us how high a place human nature holds 
amongst creatures, inasmuch as He appeared to men as a true man." And 
Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Nativity (xxi): "Learn, O Christian, thy 
worth; and being made a partner of the Divine nature, refuse to return by 
evil deeds to your former worthlessness." Thirdly, because, "in order to 
do away with man's presumption, the grace of God is commended in Jesus 
Christ, though no merits of ours went before," as Augustine says (De 
Trin. xiii, 17). Fourthly, because "man's pride, which is the greatest 
stumbling-block to our clinging to God, can be convinced and cured by 
humility so great," as Augustine says in the same place. Fifthly, in 
order to free man from the thraldom of sin, which, as Augustine says (De 
Trin. xiii, 13), "ought to be done in such a way that the devil should be 
overcome by the justice of the man Jesus Christ," and this was done by 
Christ satisfying for us. Now a mere man could not have satisfied for the 
whole human race, and God was not bound to satisfy; hence it behooved 
Jesus Christ to be both God and man. Hence Pope Leo says in the same 
sermon: "Weakness is assumed by strength, lowliness by majesty, mortality 
by eternity, in order that one and the same Mediator of God and men might 
die in one and rise in the other---for this was our fitting remedy. 
Unless He was God, He would not have brought a remedy; and unless He was 
man, He would not have set an example."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 4/4

 And there are very many other advantages which accrued, above man's 
apprehension.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This reason has to do with the first kind of necessity, 
without which we cannot attain to the end.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Satisfaction may be said to be sufficient in two 
ways---first, perfectly, inasmuch as it is condign, being adequate to 
make good the fault committed, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere 
man cannot be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of human nature 
has been corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of any person or persons 
could not be made up adequately for the harm done to the whole of the 
nature; and also because a sin committed against God has a kind of 
infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, because the greater the 
person we offend, the more  grievous the offense. Hence for condign 
satisfaction it was necessary that the act of the one satisfying should 
have an infinite efficiency, as being of God and man. Secondly, man's 
satisfaction may be termed sufficient, imperfectly---i.e. in the 
acceptation of him who is content with it, even though it is not condign, 
and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man is sufficient. And 
forasmuch as every imperfect presupposes some perfect thing, by which it 
is sustained, hence it is that satisfaction of every mere man has its 
efficiency from the satisfaction of Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: By taking flesh, God did not lessen His majesty; and in 
consequence did not lessen the reason for reverencing Him, which is 
increased by the increase of knowledge of Him. But, on the contrary, 
inasmuch as He wished to draw nigh to us by taking flesh, He greatly drew 
us to know Him.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that if man had not sinned, God would still have 
become incarnate. For the cause remaining, the effect also remains. But 
as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): "Many other things are to be 
considered in the Incarnation of Christ besides absolution from sin"; and 
these were discussed above (A[2]). Therefore if man had not sinned, God 
would have become incarnate.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it belongs to the omnipotence of the Divine power to 
perfect His works, and to manifest Himself by some infinite effect. But 
no mere creature can be called an infinite effect, since it is finite of 
its very essence. Now, seemingly, in the work of the Incarnation alone is 
an infinite effect of the Divine power manifested in a special manner by 
which power things infinitely distant are united, inasmuch as it has been 
brought about that man is God. And in this work especially the universe 
would seem to be perfected, inasmuch as the last creature---viz. man---is 
united to the first principle---viz. God. Therefore, even if man had not 
sinned, God would have become incarnate.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, human nature has not been made more capable of grace by 
sin. But after sin it is capable of the grace of union, which is the 
greatest grace. Therefore, if man had not sinned, human nature would have 
been capable of this grace; nor would God have withheld from human nature 
any good it was capable of. Therefore, if man had not sinned, God would 
have become incarnate.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, God's predestination is eternal. But it is said of 
Christ (Rm. 1:4): "Who was predestined the Son of God in power." 
Therefore, even before sin, it was necessary that the Son of God should 
become incarnate, in order to fulfil God's predestination.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[3] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 5: Further, the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to the first 
man, as is plain from Gn. 2:23. "This now is bone of my  bones," etc. 
which the Apostle says is "a great sacrament . . . in Christ and in the 
Church," as is plain from Eph. 5:32. But man could not be fore-conscious 
of his fall, for the same reason that the angels could not, as Augustine 
proves (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18). Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God 
would have become incarnate.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. viii, 2), expounding 
what is set down in Lk. 19:10, "For the Son of Man is come to seek and to 
save that which was lost"; "Therefore, if man had not sinned, the Son of 
Man would not have come." And on 1 Tim. 1:15, "Christ Jesus came into 
this world to save sinners," a gloss says, "There was no cause of 
Christ's coming into the world, except to save sinners. Take away 
diseases, take away wounds, and there is no need of medicine."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[3] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, There are different opinions about this question. For 
some say that even if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would have 
become incarnate. Others assert the contrary, and seemingly our assent 
ought rather to be given to this opinion.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[3] Body Para. 2/2

 For such things as spring from God's will, and beyond the creature's 
due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in the Sacred 
Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us. Hence, since 
everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned 
as the reason of the Incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to 
say that the work of the Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy for 
sin; so that, had sin not existed, the Incarnation would not have been. 
And yet the power of God is not limited to this; even had sin not 
existed, God could have become incarnate.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: All the other causes which are assigned in the preceding 
article have to do with a remedy for sin. For if man had not sinned, he 
would have been endowed with the light of Divine wisdom, and would have 
been perfected by God with the righteousness of justice in order to know 
and carry out everything needful. But because man, on deserting God, had 
stooped to corporeal things, it was necessary that God should take flesh, 
and by corporeal things should afford him the remedy of salvation. Hence, 
on Jn. 1:14, "And the Word was made flesh," St. Augustine says (Tract. 
ii): "Flesh had blinded thee, flesh heals thee; for Christ came and 
overthrew the vices of the flesh."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The infinity of Divine power is shown in the mode of 
production of things from nothing. Again, it suffices for the perfection 
of the universe that the creature be ordained in a natural manner to God 
as to an end. But that a creature should be united to God in person 
exceeds the limits of the perfection of nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: A double capability may be remarked in human nature: one, 
in respect of the order of natural power, and this is always fulfilled by 
God, Who apportions to each according to its  natural capability; the 
other in respect to the order of the Divine power, which all creatures 
implicitly obey; and the capability we speak of pertains to this. But God 
does not fulfil all such capabilities, otherwise God could do only what 
He has done in creatures, and this is false, as stated above (FP, Q[105], 
A[6]). But there is no reason why human nature should not have been 
raised to something greater after sin. For God allows evils to happen in 
order to bring a greater good therefrom; hence it is written (Rm. 5:20): 
"Where sin abounded, grace did more abound." Hence, too, in the blessing 
of the Paschal candle, we say: "O happy fault, that merited such and so 
great a Redeemer!"

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of future 
things; and hence, as God predestines the salvation of anyone to be 
brought about by the prayers of others, so also He predestined the work 
of the Incarnation to be the remedy of human sin.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[3] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 5: Nothing prevents an effect from being revealed to one to 
whom the cause is not revealed. Hence, the mystery of the Incarnation 
could be revealed to the first man without his being fore-conscious of 
his fall. For not everyone who knows the effect knows the cause.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether God became incarnate in order to take away actual sin, rather 
than to take away original sin?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that God became incarnate as a remedy for actual 
sins rather than for original sin. For the more grievous the sin, the 
more it runs counter to man's salvation, for which God became incarnate. 
But actual sin is more grievous than original sin; for the lightest 
punishment is due to original sin, as Augustine says (Contra Julian. v, 
11). Therefore the Incarnation of Christ is chiefly directed to taking 
away actual sins.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, pain of sense is not due to original sin, but merely 
pain of loss, as has been shown (FS, Q[87], A[5]). But Christ came to 
suffer the pain of sense on the Cross in satisfaction for sins---and not 
the pain of loss, for He had no defect of either the beatific vision or 
fruition. Therefore He came in order to take away actual sin rather than 
original sin.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, as Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii, 3): "This 
must be the mind of the faithful servant, to account the benefits of his 
Lord, which have been bestowed on all alike, as though they were bestowed 
on himself alone. For as if speaking of himself alone, Paul writes to the 
Galatians 2:20: 'Christ . . . loved me and delivered Himself for me.'" 
But our individual sins are actual sins; for original sin is the common 
sin. Therefore we ought to have this conviction, so as to believe that He 
has come chiefly for actual sins.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:29): "Behold the Lamb of  God, 
behold Him Who taketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] of the world."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, It is certain that Christ came into this world not only 
to take away that sin which is handed on originally to posterity, but 
also in order to take away all sins subsequently added to it; not that 
all are taken away (and this is from men's fault, inasmuch as they do not 
adhere to Christ, according to Jn. 3:19: "The light is come into the 
world, and men loved darkness rather than the light"), but because He 
offered what was sufficient for blotting out all sins. Hence it is 
written (Rm. 5:15-16): "But not as the offense, so also the gift . . . 
For judgment indeed was by one unto condemnation, but grace is of many 
offenses unto justification."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 Moreover, the more grievous the sin, the more particularly did Christ 
come to blot it out. But "greater" is said in two ways: in one way 
"intensively," as a more intense whiteness is said to be greater, and in 
this way actual sin is greater than original sin; for it has more of the 
nature of voluntary, as has been shown (FS, Q[81], A[1]). In another way 
a thing is said to be greater "extensively," as whiteness on a greater 
superficies is said to be greater; and in this way original sin, whereby 
the whole human race is infected, is greater than any actual sin, which 
is proper to one person. And in this respect Christ came principally to 
take away original sin, inasmuch as "the good of the race is a more 
Divine thing than the good of an individual," as is said Ethic. i, 2.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This reason looks to the intensive greatness of sin.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: In the future award the pain of sense will not be meted out 
to original sin. Yet the penalties, such as hunger, thirst, death, and 
the like, which we suffer sensibly in this life flow from original sin. 
And hence Christ, in order to satisfy fully for original sin, wished to 
suffer sensible pain, that He might consume death and the like in Himself.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii, 6): "The 
Apostle used these words, not as if wishing to diminish Christ's gifts, 
ample as they are, and spreading throughout the whole world, but that he 
might account himself alone the occasion of them. For what does it matter 
that they are given to others, if what are given to you are as complete 
and perfect as if none of them were given to another than yourself?" And 
hence, although a man ought to account Christ's gifts as given to 
himself, yet he ought not to consider them not to be given to others. And 
thus we do not exclude that He came to wipe away the sin of the whole 
nature rather than the sin of one person. But the sin of the nature is as 
perfectly healed in each one as if it were healed in him alone. Hence, on 
account of the union of charity, what is vouchsafed to all ought to be 
accounted his own by each one.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1 

Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning 
of the human race?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it was fitting that God should become 
incarnate in the beginning of the human race. For the work of the 
Incarnation sprang from the immensity of Divine charity, according to 
Eph. 2:4,5: "But God (Who is rich in mercy), for His exceeding charity 
wherewith He loved us . . . even when we were dead in sins, hath 
quickened us together in Christ." But charity does not tarry in bringing 
assistance to a friend who is suffering need, according to Prov. 3:28: 
"Say not to thy friend: Go, and come again, and tomorrow I will give to 
thee, when thou canst give at present." Therefore God ought not to have 
put off the work of the Incarnation, but ought thereby to have brought 
relief to the human race from the beginning.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is written (1 Tim. 1:15): "Christ Jesus came into 
this world to save sinners." But more would have been saved had God 
become incarnate at the beginning of the human race; for in the various 
centuries very many, through not knowing God, perished in their sin. 
Therefore it was fitting that God should become incarnate at the 
beginning of the human race.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the work of grace is not less orderly than the work of 
nature. But nature takes its rise with the more perfect, as Boethius says 
(De Consol. iii). Therefore the work of Christ ought to have been perfect 
from the beginning. But in the work of the Incarnation we see the 
perfection of grace, according to Jn. 1:14: "The Word was made flesh"; 
and afterwards it is added: "Full of grace and truth." Therefore Christ 
ought to have become incarnate at the beginning of the human race.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 4:4): "But when the fulness of the 
time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the law": 
upon which a gloss says that "the fulness of the time is when it was 
decreed by God the Father to send His Son." But God decreed everything by 
His wisdom. Therefore God became incarnate at the most fitting time; and 
it was not fitting that God should become incarnate at the beginning of 
the human race.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 1/5

 I answer that, Since the work of the Incarnation is principally ordained 
to the restoration of the human race by blotting out sin, it is manifest 
that it was not fitting for God to become incarnate at the beginning of 
the human race before sin. For medicine is given only to the sick. Hence 
our Lord Himself says (Mt. 9:12,13): "They that are in health need not a 
physician, but they that are ill . . . For I am not come to call the 
just, but sinners."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 2/5

 Nor was it fitting that God should become incarnate immediately after 
sin. First, on account of the manner of man's sin, which had come of 
pride; hence man was to be liberated in such a manner that he might be 
humbled, and see how he stood in need of a deliverer. Hence on the words 
in Gal. 3:19, "Being ordained by  angels in the hand of a mediator," a 
gloss says: "With great wisdom was it so ordered that the Son of Man 
should not be sent immediately after man's fall. For first of all God 
left man under the natural law, with the freedom of his will, in order 
that he might know his natural strength; and when he failed in it, he 
received the law; whereupon, by the fault, not of the law, but of his 
nature, the disease gained strength; so that having recognized his 
infirmity he might cry out for a physician, and beseech the aid of grace."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 3/5

 Secondly, on account of the order of furtherance in good, whereby we 
proceed from imperfection to perfection. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 
15:46,47): "Yet that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is 
natural; afterwards that which is spiritual . . . The first man was of 
the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 4/5

 Thirdly, on account of the dignity of the incarnate Word, for on the 
words (Gal. 4:4), "But when the fulness of the time was come," a gloss 
says: "The greater the judge who was coming, the more numerous was the 
band of heralds who ought to have preceded him."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 5/5

 Fourthly, lest the fervor of faith should cool by the length of time, 
for the charity of many will grow cold at the end of the world. Hence 
(Lk. 18:8) it is written: "But yet the Son of Man, when He cometh, shall 
He find think you, faith on earth?"

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Charity does not put off bringing assistance to a friend: 
always bearing in mind the circumstances as well as the state of the 
persons. For if the physician were to give the medicine at the very 
outset of the ailment, it would do less good, and would hurt rather than 
benefit. And hence the Lord did not bestow upon the human race the remedy 
of the Incarnation in the beginning, lest they should despise it through 
pride, if they did not already recognize their disease.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Augustine replies to this (De Sex Quest. Pagan., Ep. cii), 
saying (Q[2]) that "Christ wished to appear to man and to have His 
doctrine preached to them when and where He knew those were who would 
believe in Him. But in such times and places as His Gospel was not 
preached He foresaw that not all, indeed, but many would so bear 
themselves towards His preaching as not to believe in His corporeal 
presence, even were He to raise the dead." But the same Augustine, taking 
exception to this reply in his book (De Perseverantia ix), says: "How can 
we say the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon would not believe when such 
great wonders were wrought in their midst, or would not have believed had 
they been wrought, when God Himself bears witness that they would have 
done penance with great humility if these signs of Divine power had been 
wrought in their midst?" And he adds in answer (De Perseverantia xi): 
"Hence, as the Apostle says (Rm. 9:16), 'it is not of him that willeth 
nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy'; Who (succors 
whom He will of) those who, as He foresaw, would believe in His  miracles 
if wrought amongst them, (while others) He succors not, having judged 
them in His predestination secretly yet justly. Therefore let us 
unshrinkingly believe His mercy to be with those who are set free, and 
His truth with those who are condemned." [*The words in brackets are not 
in the text of St. Augustine].

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Perfection is prior to imperfection, both in time and 
nature, in things that are different (for what brings others to 
perfection must itself be perfect); but in one and the same, imperfection 
is prior in time though posterior in nature. And thus the eternal 
perfection of God precedes in duration the imperfection of human nature; 
but the latter's ultimate perfection in union with God follows.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the 
world?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the work of the Incarnation ought to have been 
put off till the end of the world. For it is written (Ps. 91:11): "My old 
age in plentiful mercy"---i.e. "in the last days," as a gloss says. But 
the time of the Incarnation is especially the time of mercy, according to 
Ps. 101:14: "For it is time to have mercy on it." Therefore the 
Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as has been said (A[5], ad 3), in the same subject, 
perfection is subsequent in time to imperfection. Therefore, what is most 
perfect ought to be the very last in time. But the highest perfection of 
human nature is in the union with the Word, because "in Christ it hath 
pleased the Father that all the fulness of the Godhead should dwell," as 
the Apostle says (Col. 1:19, and 2:9). Therefore the Incarnation ought to 
have been put off till the end of the world.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, what can be done by one ought not to be done by two. But 
the one coming of Christ at the end of the world was sufficient for the 
salvation of human nature. Therefore it was not necessary for Him to come 
beforehand in His Incarnation; and hence the Incarnation ought to have 
been put off till the end of the world.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Hab. 3:2): "In the midst of the years 
Thou shalt make it known." Therefore the mystery of the Incarnation which 
was made known to the world ought not to have been put off till the end 
of the world.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[6] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, As it was not fitting that God should become incarnate at 
the beginning of the world, so also it was not fitting that the 
Incarnation should be put off till the end of the world. And this is 
shown first from the union of the Divine and human nature. For, as it has 
been said (A[5], ad 3), perfection precedes imperfection in time in one 
way, and contrariwise in another way imperfection precedes perfection. 
For in that which is made perfect  from being imperfect, imperfection 
precedes perfection in time, whereas in that which is the efficient cause 
of perfection, perfection precedes imperfection in time. Now in the work 
of the Incarnation both concur; for by the Incarnation human nature is 
raised to its highest perfection; and in this way it was not becoming 
that the Incarnation should take place at the beginning of the human 
race. And the Word incarnate is the efficient cause of the perfection of 
human nature, according to Jn. 1:16: "Of His fulness we have all 
received"; and hence the work of the Incarnation ought not to have been 
put off till the end of the world. But the perfection of glory to which 
human nature is to be finally raised by the Word Incarnate will be at the 
end of the world.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[6] Body Para. 2/3

 Secondly, from the effect of man's salvation; for, as is said Qq. Vet et 
Nov. Test., qu. 83, "it is in the power of the Giver to have pity when, 
or as much as, He wills. Hence He came when He knew it was fitting to 
succor, and when His boons would be welcome. For when by the feebleness 
of the human race men's knowledge of God began to grow dim and their 
morals lax, He was pleased to choose Abraham as a standard of the 
restored knowledge of God and of holy living; and later on when reverence 
grew weaker, He gave the law to Moses in writing; and because the 
gentiles despised it and would not take it upon themselves, and they who 
received it would not keep it, being touched with pity, God sent His Son, 
to grant to all remission of their sin and to offer them, justified, to 
God the Father." But if this remedy had been put off till the end of the 
world, all knowledge and reverence of God and all uprightness of morals 
would have been swept away from the earth.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[6] Body Para. 3/3

 Thirdly, this appears fitting to the manifestation of the Divine power, 
which has saved men in several ways---not only by faith in some future 
thing, but also by faith in something present and past.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This gloss has in view the mercy of God, which leads us to 
glory. Nevertheless, if it is referred to the mercy shown the human race 
by the Incarnation of Christ, we must reflect that, as Augustine says 
(Retract. i), the time of the Incarnation may be compared to the youth of 
the human race, "on account of the strength and fervor of faith, which 
works by charity"; and to old age---i.e. the sixth age---on account of 
the number of centuries, for Christ came in the sixth age. And although 
youth and old age cannot be together in a body, yet they can be together 
in a soul, the former on account of quickness, the latter on account of 
gravity. And hence Augustine says elsewhere (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 44) that 
"it was not becoming that the Master by Whose imitation the human race 
was to be formed to the highest virtue should come from heaven, save in 
the time of youth." But in another work (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 23) he 
says: that Christ came in the sixth age---i.e. in the old age---of the 
human race.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The work of the Incarnation is to be viewed not as merely 
the terminus of a movement from imperfection to  perfection, but also as 
a principle of perfection to human nature, as has been said.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[1] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As Chrysostom says on Jn. 3:11, "For God sent not His Son 
into the world to judge the world" (Hom. xxviii): "There are two comings 
of Christ: the first, for the remission of sins; the second, to judge the 
world. For if He had not done so, all would have perished together, since 
all have sinned and need the glory of God." Hence it is plain that He 
ought not to have put off the coming in mercy till the end of the world.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] Out. Para. 1/2

OF THE MODE OF UNION OF THE WORD INCARNATE (TWELVE ARTICLES)

 Now we must consider the mode of union of the Incarnate Word; and, 
first, the union itself; secondly, the Person assuming; thirdly, the 
nature assumed.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] Out. Para. 2/2

 Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature?

 (2) Whether it took place in the Person?

 (3) Whether it took place in the suppositum or hypostasis?

 (4) Whether the Person or hypostasis of Christ is composite after the 
Incarnation?

 (5) Whether any union of body and soul took place in Christ?

 (6) Whether the human nature was united to the Word accidentally?

 (7) Whether the union itself is something created?

 (8) Whether it is the same as assumption?

 (9) Whether the union of the two natures is the greatest union?

 (10) Whether the union of the two natures in Christ was brought about by 
grace?

 (11) Whether any merits preceded it?

 (12) Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ?


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Union of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Union of the Word Incarnate took place in 
the nature. For Cyril says (he is quoted in the acts of the Council of 
Chalcedon, part ii, act. 1): "We must understand not two natures, but one 
incarnate nature of the Word of God"; and this could not be unless the 
union took place in the nature. Therefore the union of the Word Incarnate 
took place in the nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Athanasius says that, as the rational soul and the flesh 
together form the human nature, so God and man together form a certain 
one nature; therefore the union took place in the nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, of two natures one is not denominated by the other 
unless they are to some extent mutually transmuted. But the Divine and 
human natures in Christ are denominated one by the  other; for Cyril says 
(quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part ii, act. 1) that 
the Divine nature "is incarnate"; and Gregory Nazianzen says (Ep. i ad 
Cledon.) that the human nature is "deified," as appears from Damascene 
(De Fide Orth. iii, 6,11). Therefore from two natures one seems to have 
resulted.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is said in the declaration of the Council of 
Chalcedon: "We confess that in these latter times the only-begotten Son 
of God appeared in two natures, without confusion, without change, 
without division, without separation---the distinction of natures not 
having been taken away by the union." Therefore the union did not take 
place in the nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[1] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, To make this question clear we must consider what is 
"nature." Now it is to be observed that the word "nature" comes from 
nativity. Hence this word was used first of all to signify the begetting 
of living beings, which is called "birth" or "sprouting forth," the word 
"natura" meaning, as it were, "nascitura." Afterwards this word "nature" 
was taken to signify the principle of this begetting; and because in 
living things the principle of generation is an intrinsic principle, this 
word "nature" was further employed to signify any intrinsic principle of 
motion: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "nature is the 
principle of motion in that in which it is essentially and not 
accidentally." Now this principle is either form or matter. Hence 
sometimes form is called nature, and sometimes matter. And because the 
end of natural generation, in that which is generated, is the essence of 
the species, which the definition signifies, this essence of the species 
is called the "nature." And thus Boethius defines nature (De Duab. Nat.): 
"Nature is what informs a thing with its specific difference,"---i.e. 
which perfects the specific definition. But we are now speaking of nature 
as it signifies the essence, or the "what-it-is," or the quiddity of the 
species.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[1] Body Para. 2/4

 Now, if we take nature in this way, it is impossible that the union of 
the Incarnate Word took place in the nature. For one thing is made of two 
or more in three ways. First, from two complete things which remain in 
their perfection. This can only happen to those whose form is 
composition, order, or figure, as a heap is made up of many stones 
brought together without any order, but solely with juxtaposition; and a 
house is made of stones and beams arranged in order, and fashioned to a 
figure. And in this way some said the union was by manner of confusion 
(which is without order) or by manner of commensuration (which is with 
order). But this cannot be. First, because neither composition nor order 
nor figure is a substantial form, but accidental; and hence it would 
follow that the union of the Incarnation was not essential, but 
accidental, which will be disproved later on (A[6]). Secondly, because 
thereby we should not have an absolute unity, but relative only, for 
there remain several things actually. Thirdly, because the form of such 
is not a nature, but an art, as the form of a house; and thus one nature 
would not be constituted in Christ, as they wish. 

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[1] Body Para. 3/4

 Secondly, one thing is made up of several things, perfect but changed, 
as a mixture is made up of its elements; and in this way some have said 
that the union of the Incarnation was brought about by manner of 
combination. But this cannot be. First, because the Divine Nature is 
altogether immutable, as has been said (FP, Q[9], AA[1],2), hence neither 
can it be changed into something else, since it is incorruptible; nor can 
anything else be changed into it, for it cannot be generated. Secondly, 
because what is mixed is of the same species with none of the elements; 
for flesh differs in species from any of its elements. And thus Christ 
would be of the same nature neither with His Father nor with His Mother. 
Thirdly, because there can be no mingling of things widely apart; for the 
species of one of them is absorbed, e.g. if we were to put a drop of 
water in a flagon of wine. And hence, since the Divine Nature infinitely 
exceeds the human nature, there could be no mixture, but the Divine 
Nature alone would remain.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[1] Body Para. 4/4

 Thirdly, a thing is made up of things not mixed nor changed, but 
imperfect; as man is made up of soul and body, and likewise of divers 
members. But this cannot be said of the mystery of the Incarnation. 
First, because each nature, i.e. the Divine and the human, has its 
specific perfection. Secondly, because the Divine and human natures 
cannot constitute anything after the manner of quantitative parts, as the 
members make up the body; for the Divine Nature is incorporeal; nor after 
the manner of form and matter, for the Divine Nature cannot be the form 
of anything, especially of anything corporeal, since it would follow that 
the species resulting therefrom would be communicable to several, and 
thus there would be several Christs. Thirdly, because Christ would exist 
neither in human nature nor in the Divine Nature: since any difference 
varies the species, as unity varies number, as is said (Metaph. viii, 
text. 10).

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This authority of Cyril is expounded in the Fifth Synod 
(i.e. Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 8) thus: "If anyone proclaiming 
one nature of the Word of God to be incarnate does not receive it as the 
Fathers taught, viz. that from the Divine and human natures (a union in 
subsistence having taken place) one Christ results, but endeavors from 
these words to introduce one nature or substance of the Divinity and 
flesh of Christ, let such a one be anathema." Hence the sense is not that 
from two natures one results; but that the Nature of the Word of God 
united flesh to Itself in Person.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: From the soul and body a double unity, viz. of nature and 
person---results in each individual---of nature inasmuch as the soul is 
united to the body, and formally perfects it, so that one nature springs 
from the two as from act and potentiality or from matter and form. But 
the comparison is not in this sense, for the Divine Nature cannot be the 
form of a body, as was proved (FP, Q[3], A[8]). Unity of person results 
from them, however, inasmuch as there is an individual subsisting in 
flesh and soul; and herein lies the likeness, for the one Christ subsists 
in the Divine and  human natures.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6,11), the Divine 
Nature is said to be incarnate because It is united to flesh personally, 
and not that It is changed into flesh. So likewise the flesh is said to 
be deified, as he also says (De Fide Orth. 15,17), not by change, but by 
union with the Word, its natural properties still remaining, and hence it 
may be considered as deified, inasmuch as it becomes the flesh of the 
Word of God, but not that it becomes God.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the Person?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnate Word did not take 
place in the person. For the Person of God is not distinct from His 
Nature, as we said (FP, Q[39], A[1]). If, therefore, the union did not 
take place in the nature, it follows that it did not take place in the 
person.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Christ's human nature has no less dignity than ours. But 
personality belongs to dignity, as was stated above (FP, Q[29], A[3], ad 
2). Hence, since our human nature has its proper personality, much more 
reason was there that Christ's should have its proper personality.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), a person is an 
individual substance of rational nature. But the Word of God assumed an 
individual human nature, for "universal human nature does not exist of 
itself, but is the object of pure thought," as Damascene says (De Fide 
Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the human nature of Christ has its personality. 
Hence it does not seem that the union took place in the person.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, We read in the Synod of Chalcedon (Part ii, act. 5): 
"We confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is not parted or divided into two 
persons, but is one and the same only-Begotten Son and Word of God." 
Therefore the union took place in the person.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Person has a different meaning from "nature." For nature, 
as has been said (A[1]), designates the specific essence which is 
signified by the definition. And if nothing was found to be added to what 
belongs to the notion of the species, there would be no need to 
distinguish the nature from the suppositum of the nature (which is the 
individual subsisting in this nature), because every individual 
subsisting in a nature would be altogether one with its nature. Now in 
certain subsisting things we happen to find what does not belong to the 
notion of the species, viz. accidents and individuating principles, which 
appears chiefly in such as are composed of matter and form. Hence in such 
as these the nature and the suppositum really differ; not indeed as if 
they were wholly separate, but because the suppositum includes the 
nature, and in addition certain other things outside the notion of the 
species. Hence the suppositum is taken to be a whole which has the nature 
as  its formal part to perfect it; and consequently in such as are 
composed of matter and form the nature is not predicated of the 
suppositum, for we do not say that this man is his manhood. But if there 
is a thing in which there is nothing outside the species or its nature 
(as in God), the suppositum and the nature are not really distinct in it, 
but only in our way of thinking, inasmuch it is called "nature" as it is 
an essence, and a "suppositum" as it is subsisting. And what is said of a 
suppositum is to be applied to a person in rational or intellectual 
creatures; for a person is nothing else than "an individual substance of 
rational nature," according to Boethius. Therefore, whatever adheres to a 
person is united to it in person, whether it belongs to its nature or 
not. Hence, if the human nature is not united to God the Word in person, 
it is nowise united to Him; and thus belief in the Incarnation is 
altogether done away with, and Christian faith wholly overturned. 
Therefore, inasmuch as the Word has a human nature united to Him, which 
does not belong to His Divine Nature, it follows that the union took 
place in the Person of the Word, and not in the nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Although in God Nature and Person are not really distinct, 
yet they have distinct meanings, as was said above, inasmuch as person 
signifies after the manner of something subsisting. And because human 
nature is united to the Word, so that the Word subsists in it, and not so 
that His Nature receives therefrom any addition or change, it follows 
that the union of human nature to the Word of God took place in the 
person, and not in the nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Personality pertains of necessity to the dignity of a 
thing, and to its perfection so far as it pertains to the dignity and 
perfection of that thing to exist by itself (which is understood by the 
word "person"). Now it is a greater dignity to exist in something nobler 
than oneself than to exist by oneself. Hence the human nature of Christ 
has a greater dignity than ours, from this very fact that in us, being 
existent by itself, it has its own personality, but in Christ it exists 
in the Person of the Word. Thus to perfect the species belongs to the 
dignity of a form, yet the sensitive part in man, on account of its union 
with the nobler form which perfects the species, is more noble than in 
brutes, where it is itself the form which perfects.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The Word of God "did not assume human nature in general, 
but 'in atomo'"---that is, in an individual---as Damascene says (De Fide 
Orth. iii, 11) otherwise every man would be the Word of God, even as 
Christ was. Yet we must bear in mind that not every individual in the 
genus of substance, even in rational nature, is a person, but that alone 
which exists by itself, and not that which exists in some more perfect 
thing. Hence the hand of Socrates, although it is a kind of individual, 
is not a person, because it does not exist by itself, but in something 
more perfect, viz. in the whole. And hence, too, this is signified by a 
"person" being defined as "an individual substance," for the hand is not 
a complete substance, but part of a substance. Therefore, although this 
human nature is a kind of individual in the genus of  substance, it has 
not its own personality, because it does not exist separately, but in 
something more perfect, viz. in the Person of the Word. Therefore the 
union took place in the person.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the suppositum or 
hypostasis?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the union of the Word Incarnate did not take 
place in the suppositum or hypostasis. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 
xxxv, xxxviii): "Both the Divine and human substance are one Son of God, 
but they are one thing [aliud] by reason of the Word and another thing 
[aliud] by reason of the man." And Pope Leo says in his letter to Flavian 
(Ep. xxviii): "One of these is glorious with miracles, the other succumbs 
under injuries." But "one" [aliud] and "the other" [aliud] differ in 
suppositum. Therefore the union of the Word Incarnate did not take place 
in the suppositum.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, hypostasis is nothing more than a "particular 
substance," as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.). But it is plain that in 
Christ there is another particular substance beyond the hypostasis of the 
Word, viz. the body and the soul and the resultant of these. Therefore 
there is another hypostasis in Him besides the hypostasis of the Word.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the hypostasis of the Word is not included in any genus 
or species, as is plain from FP, Q[3], A[5]. But Christ, inasmuch as He 
is made man, is contained under the species of man; for Dionysius says 
(Div. Nom. 1): "Within the limits of our nature He came, Who far 
surpasses the whole order of nature supersubstantially." Now nothing is 
contained under the human species unless it be a hypostasis of the human 
species. Therefore in Christ there is another hypostasis besides the 
hypostasis of the Word of God; and hence the same conclusion follows as 
above.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4,5): "In our Lord 
Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures and one hypostasis."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Some who did not know the relation of hypostasis to 
person, although granting that there is but one person in Christ, held, 
nevertheless, that there is one hypostasis of God and another of man, and 
hence that the union took place in the person and not in the hypostasis. 
Now this, for three reasons, is clearly erroneous. First, because person 
only adds to hypostasis a determinate nature, viz. rational, according to 
what Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), "a person is an individual substance 
of rational nature"; and hence it is the same to attribute to the human 
nature in Christ a proper hypostasis and a proper person. And the holy 
Fathers, seeing this, condemned both in the Fifth Council held at 
Constantinople, saying: "If anyone seeks to introduce into the mystery of 
the Incarnation two subsistences or two persons, let him be anathema. For 
by the incarnation of one of the Holy Trinity,  God the Word, the Holy 
Trinity received no augment of person or subsistence." Now "subsistence" 
is the same as the subsisting thing, which is proper to hypostasis, as is 
plain from Boethius (De Duab. Nat.). Secondly, because if it is granted 
that person adds to hypostasis something in which the union can take 
place, this something is nothing else than a property pertaining to 
dignity; according as it is said by some that a person is a "hypostasis 
distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity." If, therefore, the 
union took place in the person and not in the hypostasis, it follows that 
the union only took place in regard to some dignity. And this is what 
Cyril, with the approval of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 3), 
condemned in these terms: "If anyone after the uniting divides the 
subsistences in the one Christ, only joining them in a union of dignity 
or authority or power, and not rather in a concourse of natural union, 
let him be anathema." Thirdly, because to the hypostasis alone are 
attributed the operations and the natural properties, and whatever 
belongs to the nature in the concrete; for we say that this man reasons, 
and is risible, and is a rational animal. So likewise this man is said to 
be a suppositum, because he underlies [supponitur] whatever belongs to 
man and receives its predication. Therefore, if there is any hypostasis 
in Christ besides the hypostasis of the Word, it follows that whatever 
pertains to man is verified of some other than the Word, e.g. that He was 
born of a Virgin, suffered, was crucified, was buried. And this, too, was 
condemned with the approval of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 4) 
in these words: "If anyone ascribes to two persons or subsistences such 
words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been 
said of Christ by the saints, or by Himself of Himself, and, moreover, 
applies some of them to the man, taken as distinct from the Word of God, 
and some of them (as if they could be used of God alone) only to the Word 
of God the Father, let him be anathema." Therefore it is plainly a heresy 
condemned long since by the Church to say that in Christ there are two 
hypostases, or two supposita, or that the union did not take place in the 
hypostasis or suppositum. Hence in the same Synod (can. 2) it is said: 
"If anyone does not confess that the Word was united to flesh in 
subsistence, and that Christ with His flesh is both---to wit, God and 
man---let him be anathema."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As accidental difference makes a thing "other" [alterum], 
so essential difference makes "another thing" [aliud]. Now it is plain 
that the "otherness" which springs from accidental difference may pertain 
to the same hypostasis or suppositum in created things, since the same 
thing numerically can underlie different accidents. But it does not 
happen in created things that the same numerically can subsist in divers 
essences or natures. Hence just as when we speak of "otherness" in regard 
to creatures we do not signify diversity of suppositum, but only 
diversity of accidental forms, so likewise when Christ is said to be one 
thing or another thing, we do not imply diversity of suppositum or 
hypostasis, but diversity of nature. Hence Gregory Nazianzen says in a 
letter to Chelidonius (Ep. ci): "In the Saviour we may find one thing and 
another, yet He is not one person and another. And I say 'one thing and 
another'; whereas, on the contrary, in the  Trinity we say one Person and 
another (so as not to confuse the subsistences), but not one thing and 
another."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Hypostasis signifies a particular substance, not in every 
way, but as it is in its complement. Yet as it is in union with something 
more complete, it is not said to be a hypostasis, as a hand or a foot. So 
likewise the human nature in Christ, although it is a particular 
substance, nevertheless cannot be called a hypostasis or suppositum, 
seeing that it is in union with a completed thing, viz. the whole Christ, 
as He is God and man. But the complete being with which it concurs is 
said to be a hypostasis or suppositum.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: In created things a singular thing is placed in a genus or 
species, not on account of what belongs to its individuation, but on 
account of its nature, which springs from its form, and in composite 
things individuation is taken more from matter. Hence we say that Christ 
is in the human species by reason of the nature assumed, and not by 
reason of the hypostasis.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether after the Incarnation the Person or Hypostasis of Christ is 
composite?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Person of Christ is not composite. For the 
Person of Christ is naught else than the Person or hypostasis of the 
Word, as appears from what has been said (A[2]). But in the Word, Person 
and Nature do not differ, as appears from FP, Q[39], A[1]. Therefore 
since the Nature of the Word is simple, as was shown above (FP, Q[3], 
A[7]), it is impossible that the Person of Christ be composite.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, all composition requires parts. But the Divine Nature is 
incompatible with the notion of a part, for every part implicates the 
notion of imperfection. Therefore it is impossible that the Person of 
Christ be composed of two natures.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, what is composed of others would seem to be homogeneous 
with them, as from bodies only a body can be composed. Therefore if there 
is anything in Christ composed of the two natures, it follows that this 
will not be a person but a nature; and hence the union in Christ will 
take place in the nature, which is contrary to A[2].

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4,5), "In the Lord 
Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures, but one hypostasis composed from 
both."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, The Person or hypostasis of Christ may be viewed in two 
ways. First as it is in itself, and thus it is altogether simple, even as 
the Nature of the Word. Secondly, in the aspect of person or hypostasis 
to which it belongs to subsist in a nature; and thus the Person of Christ 
subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one subsisting being in 
Him, yet there are  different aspects of subsistence, and hence He is 
said to be a composite person, insomuch as one being subsists in two.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 And thereby the solution to the first is clear.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This composition of a person from natures is not so called 
on account of parts, but by reason of number, even as that in which two 
things concur may be said to be composed of them.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: It is not verified in every composition, that the thing 
composed is homogeneous with its component parts, but only in the parts 
of a continuous thing; for the continuous is composed solely of 
continuous [parts]. But an animal is composed of soul and body, and 
neither of these is an animal.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether in Christ there is any union of soul and body?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no union of soul and body. 
For from the union of soul and body in us a person or a human hypostasis 
is caused. Hence if the soul and body were united in Christ, it follows 
that a hypostasis resulted from their union. But this was not the 
hypostasis of God the Word, for It is eternal. Therefore in Christ there 
would be a person or hypostasis besides the hypostasis of the Word, which 
is contrary to AA[2],3.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, from the union of soul and body results the nature of 
the human species. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3), that "we 
must not conceive a common species in the Lord Jesus Christ." Therefore 
there was no union of soul and body in Him.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the soul is united to the body for the sole purpose of 
quickening it. But the body of Christ could be quickened by the Word of 
God Himself, seeing He is the fount and principle of life. Therefore in 
Christ there was no union of soul and body.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The body is not said to be animated save from its union 
with the soul. Now the body of Christ is said to be animated, as the 
Church chants: "Taking an animate body, He deigned to be born of a 
Virgin" [*Feast of the Circumcision, Ant. ii, Lauds]. Therefore in Christ 
there was a union of soul and body.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Christ is called a man univocally with other men, as 
being of the same species, according to the Apostle (Phil. 2:7), "being 
made in the likeness of a man." Now it belongs essentially to the human 
species that the soul be united to the body, for the form does not 
constitute the species, except inasmuch as it becomes the act of matter, 
and this is the terminus of generation through which nature intends the 
species. Hence it must be said that in Christ the soul was united to the 
body; and the contrary is heretical, since it destroys the truth of 
Christ's humanity.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This would seem to be the reason which was of  weight with 
such as denied the union of the soul and body in Christ, viz. lest they 
should thereby be forced to admit a second person or hypostasis in 
Christ, since they saw that the union of soul and body in mere men 
resulted in a person. But this happens in mere men because the soul and 
body are so united in them as to exist by themselves. But in Christ they 
are united together, so as to be united to something higher, which 
subsists in the nature composed of them. And hence from the union of the 
soul and body in Christ a new hypostasis or person does not result, but 
what is composed of them is united to the already existing hypostasis or 
Person. Nor does it therefore follow that the union of the soul and body 
in Christ is of less effect than in us, for its union with something 
nobler does not lessen but increases its virtue and worth; just as the 
sensitive soul in animals constitutes the species, as being considered 
the ultimate form, yet it does not do so in man, although it is of 
greater effect and dignity, and this because of its union with a further 
and nobler perfection, viz. the rational soul, as has been said above 
(A[2], ad 2).

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: This saying of Damascene may be taken in two ways: First, 
as referring to human nature, which, as it is in one individual alone, 
has not the nature of a common species, but only inasmuch as either it is 
abstracted from every individual, and considered in itself by the mind, 
or according as it is in all individuals. Now the Son of God did not 
assume human nature as it exists in the pure thought of the intellect, 
since in this way He would not have assumed human nature in reality, 
unless it be said that human nature is a separate idea, just as the 
Platonists conceived of man without matter. But in this way the Son of 
God would not have assumed flesh, contrary to what is written (Lk. 
24:39), "A spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have." 
Neither can it be said that the Son of God assumed human nature as it is 
in all the individuals of the same species, otherwise He would have 
assumed all men. Therefore it remains, as Damascene says further on (De 
Fide Orth. iii, 11) that He assumed human nature "in atomo," i.e. in an 
individual; not, indeed, in another individual which is a suppositum or a 
person of that nature, but in the Person of the Son of God.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 Secondly, this saying of Damascene may be taken not as referring to 
human nature, as if from the union of soul and body one common nature 
(viz. human) did not result, but as referring to the union of the two 
natures Divine and human: which do not combine so as to form a third 
something that becomes a common nature, for in this way it would become 
predicable of many, and this is what he is aiming at, since he adds: "For 
there was not generated, neither will there ever be generated, another 
Christ, Who from the Godhead and manhood, and in the Godhead and manhood, 
is perfect God and perfect man."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: There are two principles of corporeal life: one the 
effective principle, and in this way the Word of God is the principle of 
all life; the other, the formal principle of life, for since "in living 
things to be is to live," as the Philosopher says  (De Anima ii, 37), 
just as everything is formally by its form, so likewise the body lives by 
the soul: in this way a body could not live by the Word, Which cannot be 
the form of a body.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the human nature was united to the Word of God accidentally?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the human nature was united to the Word of God 
accidentally. For the Apostle says (Phil. 2:7) of the Son of God, that He 
was "in habit found as a man." But habit is accidentally associated with 
that to which it pertains, whether habit be taken for one of the ten 
predicaments or as a species of quality. Therefore human nature is 
accidentally united to the Son of God.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, whatever comes to a thing that is complete in being 
comes to it accidentally, for an accident is said to be what can come or 
go without the subject being corrupted. But human nature came to Christ 
in time, Who had perfect being from eternity. Therefore it came to Him 
accidentally.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, whatever does not pertain to the nature or the essence 
of a thing is its accident, for whatever is, is either a substance or an 
accident. But human nature does not pertain to the Divine Essence or 
Nature of the Son of God, for the union did not take place in the nature, 
as was said above (A[1]). Hence the human nature must have accrued 
accidentally to the Son of God.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[6] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, an instrument accrues accidentally. But the human nature 
was the instrument of the Godhead in Christ, for Damascene says (De Fide 
Orth. iii, 15), that "the flesh of Christ is the instrument of the 
Godhead." Therefore it seems that the human nature was united to the Son 
of God accidentally.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Whatever is predicated accidentally, predicates, not 
substance, but quantity, or quality, or some other mode of being. If 
therefore the human nature accrues accidentally, when we say Christ is 
man, we do not predicate substance, but quality or quantity, or some 
other mode of being, which is contrary to the Decretal of Pope Alexander 
III, who says (Conc. Later. iii): "Since Christ is perfect God and 
perfect man, what foolhardiness have some to dare to affirm that Christ 
as man is not a substance?"

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[6] Body Para. 1/4

 I answer that, In evidence of this question we must know that two 
heresies have arisen with regard to the mystery of the union of the two 
natures in Christ. The first confused the natures, as Eutyches and 
Dioscorus, who held that from the two natures one nature resulted, so 
that they confessed Christ to be "from" two natures (which were distinct 
before the union), but not "in" two natures (the distinction of nature 
coming to an end after the union). The second was the heresy of Nestorius 
and Theodore of Mopsuestia, who separated the persons. For they held the 
Person of the Son of God to be distinct from the Person of the Son of 
man,  and said these were mutually united: first, "by indwelling," 
inasmuch as the Word of God dwelt in the man, as in a temple; secondly, 
"by unity of intention," inasmuch as the will of the man was always in 
agreement with the will of the Word of God; thirdly, "by operation," 
inasmuch as they said the man was the instrument of the Word of God; 
fourthly, "by greatness of honor," inasmuch as all honor shown to the Son 
of God was equally shown to the Son of man, on account of His union with 
the Son of God; fifthly, "by equivocation," i.e. communication of names, 
inasmuch as we say that this man is God and the Son of God. Now it is 
plain that these modes imply an accidental union.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[6] Body Para. 2/4

 But some more recent masters, thinking to avoid these heresies, through 
ignorance fell into them. For some conceded one person in Christ, but 
maintained two hypostases, or two supposita, saying that a man, composed 
of body and soul, was from the beginning of his conception assumed by the 
Word of God. And this is the first opinion set down by the Master (Sent. 
iii, D, 6). But others desirous of keeping the unity of person, held that 
the soul of Christ was not united to the body, but that these two were 
mutually separate, and were united to the Word accidentally, so that the 
number of persons might not be increased. And this is the third opinion 
which the Master sets down (Sent. iii, D, 6).

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[6] Body Para. 3/4

 But both of these opinions fall into the heresy of Nestorius; the first, 
indeed, because to maintain two hypostases or supposita in Christ is the 
same as to maintain two persons, as was shown above (A[3]). And if stress 
is laid on the word "person," we must have in mind that even Nestorius 
spoke of unity of person on account of the unity of dignity and honor. 
Hence the fifth Council (Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 5) directs 
an anathema against such a one as holds "one person in dignity, honor and 
adoration, as Theodore and Nestorius foolishly wrote." But the other 
opinion falls into the error of Nestorius by maintaining an accidental 
union. For there is no difference in saying that the Word of God is 
united to the Man Christ by indwelling, as in His temple (as Nestorius 
said), or by putting on man, as a garment, which is the third opinion; 
rather it says something worse than Nestorius---to wit, that the soul and 
body are not united.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[6] Body Para. 4/4

 Now the Catholic faith, holding the mean between the aforesaid 
positions, does not affirm that the union of God and man took place in 
the essence or nature, nor yet in something accidental, but midway, in a 
subsistence or hypostasis. Hence in the fifth Council (Constantinople II, 
coll. viii, can. 5) we read: "Since the unity may be understood in many 
ways, those who follow the impiety of Apollinaris and Eutyches, 
professing the destruction of what came together" (i.e. destroying both 
natures), "confess a union by mingling; but the followers of Theodore and 
Nestorius, maintaining division, introduce a union of purpose. But the 
Holy Church of God, rejecting the impiety of both these treasons, 
confesses a union of the Word of God with flesh, by composition, which is 
in subsistence." Therefore it is plain that the second of the three 
opinions, mentioned by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6), which holds  one 
hypostasis of God and man, is not to be called an opinion, but an article 
of Catholic faith. So likewise the first opinion which holds two 
hypostases, and the third which holds an accidental union, are not to be 
styled opinions, but heresies condemned by the Church in Councils.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26): "Examples need 
not be wholly and at all points similar, for what is wholly similar is 
the same, and not an example, and especially in Divine things, for it is 
impossible to find a wholly similar example in the Theology," i.e. in the 
Godhead of Persons, "and in the Dispensation," i.e. the mystery of the 
Incarnation. Hence the human nature in Christ is likened to a habit, i.e. 
a garment, not indeed in regard to accidental union, but inasmuch as the 
Word is seen by the human nature, as a man by his garment, and also 
inasmuch as the garment is changed, for it is shaped according to the 
figure of him who puts it on, and yet he is not changed from his form on 
account of the garment. So likewise the human nature assumed by the Word 
of God is ennobled, but the Word of God is not changed, as Augustine says 
(Qq. 83, qu. 73).

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Whatever accrues after the completion of the being comes 
accidentally, unless it be taken into communion with the complete being, 
just as in the resurrection the body comes to the soul which pre-exists, 
yet not accidentally, because it is assumed unto the same being, so that 
the body has vital being through the soul; but it is not so with 
whiteness, for the being of whiteness is other than the being of man to 
which whiteness comes. But the Word of God from all eternity had complete 
being in hypostasis or person; while in time the human nature accrued to 
it, not as if it were assumed unto one being inasmuch as this is of the 
nature (even as the body is assumed to the being of the soul), but to one 
being inasmuch as this is of the hypostasis or person. Hence the human 
nature is not accidentally united to the Son of God.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Accident is divided against substance. Now substance, as is 
plain from Metaph. v, 25, is taken in two ways: first, for essence or 
nature; secondly, for suppositum or hypostasis---hence the union having 
taken place in the hypostasis, is enough to show that it is not an 
accidental union, although the union did not take place in the nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[6] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: Not everything that is assumed as an instrument pertains to 
the hypostasis of the one who assumes, as is plain in the case of a saw 
or a sword; yet nothing prevents what is assumed into the unity of the 
hypostasis from being as an instrument, even as the body of man or his 
members. Hence Nestorius held that the human nature was assumed by the 
Word merely as an instrument, and not into the unity of the hypostasis. 
And therefore he did not concede that the man was really the Son of God, 
but His instrument. Hence Cyril says (Epist. ad Monach. Aegyptii): "The 
Scripture does not affirm that this Emmanuel," i.e. Christ, "was assumed 
for the office of an instrument, but as God truly humanized," i.e. made 
man. But Damascene held that the human nature in Christ is an  instrument 
belonging to the unity of the hypostasis.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the union of the Divine nature and the human is anything created?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the union of the Divine and human natures is 
not anything created. For there can be nothing created in God, because 
whatever is in God is God. But the union is in God, for God Himself is 
united to human nature. Therefore it seems that the union is not anything 
created.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the end holds first place in everything. But the end of 
the union is the Divine hypostasis or Person in which the union is 
terminated. Therefore it seems that this union ought chiefly to be judged 
with reference to the dignity of the Divine hypostasis, which is not 
anything created. Therefore the union is nothing created.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, "That which is the cause of a thing being such is still 
more so" (Poster. i). But man is said to be the Creator on account of the 
union. Therefore much more is the union itself nothing created, but the 
Creator.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Whatever has a beginning in time is created. Now this 
union was not from eternity, but began in time. Therefore the union is 
something created.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[7] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The union of which we are speaking is a relation which we 
consider between the Divine and the human nature, inasmuch as they come 
together in one Person of the Son of God. Now, as was said above (FP, 
Q[13], A[7]), every relation which we consider between God and the 
creature is really in the creature, by whose change the relation is 
brought into being; whereas it is not really in God, but only in our way 
of thinking, since it does not arise from any change in God. And hence we 
must say that the union of which we are speaking is not really in God, 
except only in our way of thinking; but in the human nature, which is a 
creature, it is really. Therefore we must say it is something created.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This union is not really in God, but only in our way of 
thinking, for God is said to be united to a creature inasmuch as the 
creature is really united to God without any change in Him.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The specific nature of a relation, as of motion, depends on 
the subject. And since this union has its being nowhere save in a created 
nature, as was said above, it follows that it has a created being.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: A man is called Creator and is God because of the union, 
inasmuch as it is terminated in the Divine hypostasis; yet it does not 
follow that the union itself is the Creator or God, because that a thing 
is said to be created regards its being rather  than its relation.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether union is the same as assumption?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that union is the same as assumption. For 
relations, as motions, are specified by their termini. Now the term of 
assumption and union is one and the same, viz. the Divine hypostasis. 
Therefore it seems that union and assumption are not different.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the same thing seems 
to be what unites and what assumes, and what is united and what is 
assumed. But union and assumption seem to follow the action and passion 
of the thing uniting and the united, of the thing assuming and the 
assumed. Therefore union seems to be the same as assumption.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "Union is one 
thing, incarnation is another; for union demands mere copulation, and 
leaves unsaid the end of the copulation; but incarnation and humanation 
determine the end of copulation." But likewise assumption does not 
determine the end of copulation. Therefore it seems that union is the 
same as assumption.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Divine Nature is said to be united, not assumed.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[8] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As was stated above (A[7]), union implies a certain 
relation of the Divine Nature and the human, according as they come 
together in one Person. Now all relations which begin in time are brought 
about by some change; and change consists in action and passion. Hence 
the "first" and principal difference between assumption and union must be 
said to be that union implies the relation: whereas assumption implies 
the action, whereby someone is said to assume, or the passion, whereby 
something is said to be assumed. Now from this difference another 
"second" difference arises, for assumption implies "becoming," whereas 
union implies "having become," and therefore the thing uniting is said to 
be united, but the thing assuming is not said to be assumed. For the 
human nature is taken to be in the terminus of assumption unto the Divine 
hypostasis when man is spoken of; and hence we can truly say that the Son 
of God, Who assumes human nature unto Himself, is man. But human nature, 
considered in itself, i.e. in the abstract, is viewed as assumed; and we 
do not say the Son of God is human nature. From this same follows a 
"third" difference, which is that a relation, especially one of 
equiparance, is no more to one extreme than to the other, whereas action 
and passion bear themselves differently to the agent and the patient, and 
to different termini. And hence assumption determines the term whence and 
the term whither; for assumption means a taking to oneself from another. 
But union determines none of these things. hence it may be said 
indifferently that the human nature is united with the Divine, or 
conversely. But the Divine Nature is not said to be assumed by  the 
human, but conversely, because the human nature is joined to the Divine 
personality, so that the Divine Person subsists in human nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Union and assumption have not the same relation to the 
term, but a different relation, as was said above.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: What unites and what assumes are not the same. For 
whatsoever Person assumes unites, and not conversely. For the Person of 
the Father united the human nature to the Son, but not to Himself; and 
hence He is said to unite and not to assume. So likewise the united and 
the assumed are not identical, for the Divine Nature is said to be 
united, but not assumed.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Assumption determines with whom the union is made on the 
part of the one assuming, inasmuch as assumption means taking unto 
oneself [ad se sumere], whereas incarnation and humanation (determine 
with whom the union is made) on the part of the thing assumed, which is 
flesh or human nature. And thus assumption differs logically both from 
union and from incarnation or humanation.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the union of the two natures in Christ is the greatest of all 
unions?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the union of the two natures in Christ is not 
the greatest of all unions. For what is united falls short of the unity 
of what is one, since what is united is by participation, but one is by 
essence. Now in created things there are some that are simply one, as is 
shown especially in unity itself, which is the principle of number. 
Therefore the union of which we are speaking does not imply the greatest 
of all unions.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the greater the distance between things united, the less 
the union. Now, the things united by this union are most 
distant---namely, the Divine and human natures; for they are infinitely 
apart. Therefore their union is the least of all.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, from union there results one. But from the union of soul 
and body in us there arises what is one in person and nature; whereas 
from the union of the Divine and human nature there results what is one 
in person only. Therefore the union of soul and body is greater than that 
of the Divine and human natures; and hence the union of which we speak 
does not imply the greatest unity.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 10) that "man is in the Son 
of God, more than the Son in the Father." But the Son is in the Father by 
unity of essence, and man is in the Son by the union of the Incarnation. 
Therefore the union of the Incarnation is greater than the unity of the 
Divine Essence, which nevertheless is the greatest union; and thus the 
union of the Incarnation implies the greatest unity. 

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[9] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Union implies the joining of several in some one thing. 
Therefore the union of the Incarnation may be taken in two ways: first, 
in regard to the things united; secondly, in regard to that in which they 
are united. And in this regard this union has a pre-eminence over other 
unions; for the unity of the Divine Person, in which the two natures are 
united, is the greatest. But it has no pre-eminence in regard to the 
things united.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The unity of the Divine Person is greater than numerical 
unity, which is the principle of number. For the unity of a Divine Person 
is an uncreated and self-subsisting unity, not received into another by 
participation. Also, it is complete in itself, having in itself whatever 
pertains to the nature of unity; and therefore it is not compatible with 
the nature of a part, as in numerical unity, which is a part of number, 
and which is shared in by the things numbered. And hence in this respect 
the union of the Incarnation is higher than numerical unity by reason of 
the unity of the Divine Person, and not by reason of the human nature, 
which is not the unity of the Divine Person, but is united to it.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This reason regards the things united, and not the Person 
in Whom the union takes place.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 3: The unity of the Divine Person is greater than the unity of 
person and nature in us; and hence the union of the Incarnation is 
greater than the union of soul and body in us.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2

 And because what is urged in the argument "on the contrary" rests upon 
what is untrue---namely, that the union of the Incarnation is greater 
than the unity of the Divine Persons in Essence---we must say to the 
authority of Augustine that the human nature is not more in the Son of 
God than the Son of God in the Father, but much less. But the man in some 
respects is more in the Son than the Son in the Father---namely, inasmuch 
as the same suppositum is signified when I say "man," meaning Christ, and 
when I say "Son of God"; whereas it is not the same suppositum of Father 
and Son.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the union of the Incarnation took place by grace?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnation did not take 
place by grace. For grace is an accident, as was shown above (FS, Q[110], 
A[2]). But the union of the human nature to the Divine did not take place 
accidentally, as was shown above (A[6]). Therefore it seems that the 
union of the Incarnation did not take place by grace.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the subject of grace is the soul. But it is written 
(Col. 2:9): "In Christ [Vulg.: 'Him'] dwelleth all the fulness of the 
Godhead corporeally." Therefore it seems that this union did not take 
place by grace. 

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every saint is united to God by grace. If, therefore, 
the union of the Incarnation was by grace, it would seem that Christ is 
said to be God no more than other holy men.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. xv): "By the same 
grace every man is made a Christian, from the beginning of his faith, as 
this man from His beginning was made Christ." But this man became Christ 
by union with the Divine Nature. Therefore this union was by grace.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[10] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As was said above (FS, Q[110], A[1]), grace is taken in 
two ways:--first, as the will of God gratuitously bestowing something; 
secondly, as the free gift of God. Now human nature stands in need of the 
gratuitous will of God in order to be lifted up to God, since this is 
above its natural capability. Moreover, human nature is lifted up to God 
in two ways: first, by operation, as the saints know and love God; 
secondly, by personal being, and this mode belongs exclusively to Christ, 
in Whom human nature is assumed so as to be in the Person of the Son of 
God. But it is plain that for the perfection of operation the power needs 
to be perfected by a habit, whereas that a nature has being in its own 
suppositum does not take place by means of a habit.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[10] Body Para. 2/2

 And hence we must say that if grace be understood as the will of God 
gratuitously doing something or reputing anything as well-pleasing or 
acceptable to Him, the union of the Incarnation took place by grace, even 
as the union of the saints with God by knowledge and love. But if grace 
be taken as the free gift of God, then the fact that the human nature is 
united to the Divine Person may be called a grace, inasmuch as it took 
place without being preceded by any merits---but not as though there were 
an habitual grace, by means of which the union took place.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The grace which is an accident is a certain likeness of the 
Divinity participated by man. But by the Incarnation human nature is not 
said to have participated a likeness of the Divine nature, but is said to 
be united to the Divine Nature itself in the Person of the Son. Now the 
thing itself is greater than a participated likeness of it.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: Habitual grace is only in the soul; but the grace, i.e. the 
free gift of God, of being united to the Divine Person belongs to the 
whole human nature, which is composed of soul and body. And hence it is 
said that the fulness of the Godhead dwelt corporeally in Christ because 
the Divine Nature is united not merely to the soul, but to the body also. 
Although it may also be said that it dwelt in Christ corporeally, i.e. 
not as in a shadow, as it dwelt in the sacraments of the old law, of 
which it is said in the same place (Col. 2:17) that they are the "shadow 
of things to come but the body is Christ" [Vulg.: 'Christ's'], inasmuch 
as the body is opposed to the shadow. And some say that the Godhead is 
said to have dwelt in Christ corporeally, i.e. in three ways, just as a 
body has three dimensions: first, by essence, presence, and  power, as in 
other creatures; secondly, by sanctifying grace, as in the saints; 
thirdly, by personal union, which is proper to Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 Hence the reply to the third is manifest, viz. because the union of the 
Incarnation did not take place by habitual grace alone, but in 
subsistence or person.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether any merits preceded the union of the Incarnation?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnation followed upon 
certain merits, because upon Ps. 32:22, "Let Thy mercy, o Lord, be upon 
us, as," etc. a gloss says: "Here the prophet's desire for the 
Incarnation and its merited fulfilment are hinted at." Therefore the 
Incarnation falls under merit.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, whoever merits anything merits that without which it 
cannot be. But the ancient Fathers merited eternal life, to which they 
were able to attain only by the Incarnation; for Gregory says (Moral. 
xiii): "Those who came into this world before Christ's coming, whatsoever 
eminency of righteousness they may have had, could not, on being divested 
of the body, at once be admitted into the bosom of the heavenly country, 
seeing that He had not as yet come Who, by His own descending, should 
place the souls of the righteous in their everlasting seat." Therefore it 
would seem that they merited the Incarnation.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, of the Blessed Virgin it is sung that "she merited to 
bear the Lord of all" [*Little Office of B. V. M., Dominican Rite, Ant. 
at Benedictus], and this took place through the Incarnation. Therefore 
the Incarnation falls under merit.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. xv): "Whoever can find 
merits preceding the singular generation of our Head, may also find 
merits preceding the repeated regeneration of us His members." But no 
merits preceded our regeneration, according to Titus 3:5: "Not by the 
works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved 
us, by the laver of regeneration." Therefore no merits preceded the 
generation of Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[11] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, With regard to Christ Himself, it is clear from the above 
(A[10]) that no merits of His could have preceded the union. For we do 
not hold that He was first of all a mere man, and that afterwards by the 
merits of a good life it was granted Him to become the Son of God, as 
Photinus held; but we hold that from the beginning of His conception this 
man was truly the Son of God, seeing that He had no other hypostasis but 
that of the Son of God, according to Luke 1:35: "The Holy which shall be 
born of thee shall be called the Son of God." And hence every operation 
of this man followed the union. Therefore no operation of His could have 
been meritorious of the union.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[11] Body Para. 2/3

 Neither could the needs of any other man whatsoever have merited this 
union condignly: first, because the meritorious works  of man are 
properly ordained to beatitude, which is the reward of virtue, and 
consists in the full enjoyment of God. Whereas the union of the 
Incarnation, inasmuch as it is in the personal being, transcends the 
union of the beatified mind with God, which is by the act of the soul in 
fruition; and therefore it cannot fall under merit. Secondly, because 
grace cannot fall under merit, for the principle of merit does not fall 
under merit; and therefore neither does grace, for it is the principle of 
merit. Hence, still less does the Incarnation fall under merit, since it 
is the principle of grace, according to Jn. 1:17: "Grace and truth came 
by Jesus Christ." Thirdly, because the Incarnation is for the reformation 
of the entire human nature, and therefore it does not fall under the 
merit of any individual man, since the goodness of a mere man cannot be 
the cause of the good of the entire nature. Yet the holy Fathers merited 
the Incarnation congruously by desiring and beseeching; for it was 
becoming that God should harken to those who obeyed Him.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[11] Body Para. 3/3

 And thereby the reply to the First Objection is manifest.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It is false that under merit falls everything without which 
there can be no reward. For there is something pre-required not merely 
for reward, but also for merit, as the Divine goodness and grace and the 
very nature of man. And again, the mystery of the Incarnation is the 
principle of merit, because "of His fulness we all have received" (Jn. 
1:16).

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The Blessed Virgin is said to have merited to bear the Lord 
of all; not that she merited His Incarnation, but because by the grace 
bestowed upon her she merited that grade of purity and holiness, which 
fitted her to be the Mother of God.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the grace of union was not natural to the man 
Christ. For the union of the Incarnation did not take place in the 
nature, but in the Person, as was said above (A[2]). Now a thing is 
denominated from its terminus. Therefore this grace ought rather to be 
called personal than natural.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, grace is divided against nature, even as gratuitous 
things, which are from God, are distinguished from natural things, which 
are from an intrinsic principle. But if things are divided in opposition 
to one another, one is not denominated by the other. Therefore the grace 
of Christ was not natural to Him.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, natural is that which is according to nature. But the 
grace of union is not natural to Christ in regard to the Divine Nature, 
otherwise it would belong to the other Persons; nor is it natural to Him 
according to the human nature, otherwise it would belong to all men, 
since they are of the same nature as He. Therefore it would seem that the 
grace of union is nowise natural  to Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): "In the assumption of 
human nature, grace itself became somewhat natural to that man, so as to 
leave no room for sin in Him."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[12] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), nature 
designates, in one way, nativity; in another, the essence of a thing. 
Hence natural may be taken in two ways: first, for what is only from the 
essential principles of a thing, as it is natural to fire to mount; 
secondly, we call natural to man what he has had from his birth, 
according to Eph. 2:3: "We were by nature children of wrath"; and Wis. 
12:10: "They were a wicked generation, and their malice natural." 
Therefore the grace of Christ, whether of union or habitual, cannot be 
called natural as if caused by the principles of the human nature of 
Christ, although it may be called natural, as if coming to the human 
nature of Christ by the causality of His Divine Nature. But these two 
kinds of grace are said to be natural to Christ, inasmuch as He had them 
from His nativity, since from the beginning of His conception the human 
nature was united to the Divine Person, and His soul was filled with the 
gift of grace.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Although the union did not take place in the nature, yet it 
was caused by the power of the Divine Nature, which is truly the nature 
of Christ, and it, moreover, belonged to Christ from the beginning of His 
nativity.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The union is not said to be grace and natural in the same 
respect; for it is called grace inasmuch as it is not from merit; and it 
is said to be natural inasmuch as by the power of the Divine Nature it 
was in the humanity of Christ from His nativity.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[2] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The grace of union is not natural to Christ according to 
His human nature, as if it were caused by the principles of the human 
nature, and hence it need not belong to all men. Nevertheless, it is 
natural to Him in regard to the human nature on account of the "property" 
of His birth, seeing that He was conceived by the Holy Ghost, so that He 
might be the natural Son of God and of man. But it is natural to Him in 
regard to the Divine Nature, inasmuch as the Divine Nature is the active 
principle of this grace; and this belongs to the whole Trinity---to wit, 
to be the active principle of this grace.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE MODE OF UNION ON THE PART OF THE PERSON ASSUMING (EIGHT ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the union on the part of the Person assuming, and 
under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether to assume is befitting to a Divine Person?

 (2) Whether it is befitting to the Divine Nature?

 (3) Whether the Nature abstracted from the Personality can assume?

 (4) Whether one Person can assume without another? 

 (5) Whether each Person can assume?

 (6) Whether several Persons can assume one individual nature?

 (7) Whether one Person can assume two individual natures?

 (8) Whether it was more fitting for the Person of the Son of God to 
assume human nature than for another Divine Person?


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is befitting for a Divine Person to assume?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not befitting to a Divine Person to 
assume a created nature. For a Divine Person signifies something most 
perfect. Now no addition can be made to what is perfect. Therefore, since 
to assume is to take to oneself, and consequently what is assumed is 
added to the one who assumes, it does not seem to be befitting to a 
Divine Person to assume a created nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, that to which anything is assumed is communicated in 
some degree to what is assumed to it, just as dignity is communicated to 
whosoever is assumed to a dignity. But it is of the nature of a person to 
be incommunicable, as was said above (FP, Q[29], A[1]). Therefore it is 
not befitting to a Divine Person to assume, i.e. to take to Himself.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, person is constituted by nature. But it is repugnant 
that the thing constituted should assume the constituent, since the 
effect does not act on its cause. Hence it is not befitting to a Person 
to assume a nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum ii): 
"This God, i.e. the only-Begotten one, took the form," i.e. the nature, 
"of a servant to His own Person." But the only-Begotten God is a Person. 
Therefore it is befitting to a Person to take, i.e. to assume a nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, In the word "assumption" are implied two things, viz. the 
principle and the term of the act, for to assume is to take something to 
oneself. Now of this assumption a Person is both the principle and the 
term. The principle---because it properly belongs to a person to act, and 
this assuming of flesh took place by the Divine action. Likewise a Person 
is the term of this assumption, because, as was said above (Q[2], AA[1]
,2), the union took place in the Person, and not in the nature. Hence it 
is plain that to assume a nature is most properly befitting to a Person.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Since the Divine Person is infinite, no addition can be 
made to it: Hence Cyril says [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 26]: "We 
do not conceive the mode of conjunction to be according to addition"; 
just as in the union of man with God, nothing is added to God by the 
grace of adoption, but what is Divine is united to man; hence, not God 
but man is perfected.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A Divine Person is said to be incommunicable inasmuch as It 
cannot be predicated of several supposita, but  nothing prevents several 
things being predicated of the Person. Hence it is not contrary to the 
nature of person to be communicated so as to subsist in several natures, 
for even in a created person several natures may concur accidentally, as 
in the person of one man we find quantity and quality. But this is proper 
to a Divine Person, on account of its infinity, that there should be a 
concourse of natures in it, not accidentally, but in subsistence.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As was said above (Q[2], A[1]), the human nature 
constitutes a Divine Person, not simply, but forasmuch as the Person is 
denominated from such a nature. For human nature does not make the Son of 
Man to be simply, since He was from eternity, but only to be man. It is 
by the Divine Nature that a Divine Person is constituted simply. Hence 
the Divine Person is not said to assume the Divine Nature, but to assume 
the human nature.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is befitting to the Divine Nature to assume?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not befitting to the Divine Nature to 
assume. Because, as was said above (A[1]), to assume is to take to 
oneself. But the Divine Nature did not take to Itself human nature, for 
the union did not take place in the nature, as was said above (Q[2], 
AA[1],3). Hence it is not befitting to the Divine Nature to assume human 
nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Divine Nature is common to the three Persons. If, 
therefore, it is befitting to the Divine Nature to assume, it 
consequently is befitting to the three Persons; and thus the Father 
assumed human nature even as the Son, which is erroneous.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, to assume is to act. But to act befits a person, not a 
nature, which is rather taken to be the principle by which the agent 
acts. Therefore to assume is not befitting to the nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius) says (De Fide ad Petrum ii): 
"That nature which remains eternally begotten of the Father" (i.e. which 
is received from the Father by eternal generation) "took our nature free 
of sin from His Mother."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As was said above (A[1]), in the word assumption two 
things are signified---to wit, the principle and the term of the action. 
Now to be the principle of the assumption belongs to the Divine Nature in 
itself, because the assumption took place by Its power; but to be the 
term of the assumption does not belong to the Divine Nature in itself, 
but by reason of the Person in Whom It is considered to be. Hence a 
Person is primarily and more properly said to assume, but it may be said 
secondarily that the Nature assumed a nature to Its Person. And after the 
same manner the Nature is also said to be incarnate, not that it is 
changed to flesh, but that it assumed the nature of flesh. Hence 
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6): "Following the blessed Athanasius 
and  Cyril we say that the Nature of God is incarnate."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: "Oneself" is reciprocal, and points to the same suppositum. 
But the Divine Nature is not a distinct suppositum from the Person of the 
Word. Hence, inasmuch as the Divine Nature took human nature to the 
Person of the Word, It is said to take it to Itself. But although the 
Father takes human nature to the Person of the Word, He did not thereby 
take it to Himself, for the suppositum of the Father and the Son is not 
one. and hence it cannot properly be said that the Father assumes human 
nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: What is befitting to the Divine Nature in Itself is 
befitting to the three Persons, as goodness, wisdom, and the like. But to 
assume belongs to It by reason of the Person of the Word, as was said 
above, and hence it is befitting to that Person alone.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As in God "what is" and "whereby it is" are the same, so 
likewise in Him "what acts" and "whereby it acts" are the same, since 
everything acts, inasmuch as it is a being. Hence the Divine Nature is 
both that whereby God acts, and the very God Who acts.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Nature abstracted from the Personality can assume?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that if we abstract the Personality by our mind, 
the Nature cannot assume. For it was said above (A[1]) that it belongs to 
the Nature to assume by reason of the Person. But what belongs to one by 
reason of another cannot belong to it if the other is removed; as a body, 
which is visible by reason of color, without color cannot be seen. Hence 
if the Personality be mentally abstracted, the Nature cannot assume.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, assumption implies the term of union, as was said above 
(A[1]). But the union cannot take place in the nature, but only in the 
Person. Therefore, if the Personality be abstracted, the Divine Nature 
cannot assume.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it has been said above (FP, Q[40], A[3]) that in the 
Godhead if the Personality is abstracted, nothing remains. But the one 
who assumes is something. Therefore, if the Personality is abstracted, 
the Divine Nature cannot assume.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, In the Godhead Personality signifies a personal 
property; and this is threefold, viz. Paternity, Filiation and 
Procession, as was said above (FP, Q[30], A[2]). Now if we mentally 
abstract these, there still remains the omnipotence of God, by which the 
Incarnation was wrought, as the angel says (Lk. 1:37): "No word shall be 
impossible with God." Therefore it seems that if the Personality be 
removed, the Divine Nature can still assume.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The intellect stands in two ways towards God. First, to 
know God as He is, and in this manner it is impossible  for the intellect 
to circumscribe something in God and leave the rest, for all that is in 
God is one, except the distinction of Persons; and as regards these, if 
one is removed the other is taken away, since they are distinguished by 
relations only which must be together at the same time. Secondly, the 
intellect stands towards God, not indeed as knowing God as He is, but in 
its own way, i.e. understanding manifoldly and separately what in God is 
one: and in this way our intellect can understand the Divine goodness and 
wisdom, and the like, which are called essential attributes, without 
understanding Paternity or Filiation, which are called Personalities. And 
hence if we abstract Personality by our intellect, we may still 
understand the Nature assuming.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Because in God "what is," and "whereby it is," are one, if 
any one of the things which are attributed to God in the abstract is 
considered in itself, abstracted from all else, it will still be 
something subsisting, and consequently a Person, since it is an 
intellectual nature. Hence just as we now say three Persons, on account 
of holding three personal properties, so likewise if we mentally exclude 
the personal properties there will still remain in our thought the Divine 
Nature as subsisting and as a Person. And in this way It may be 
understood to assume human nature by reason of Its subsistence or 
Personality.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Even if the personal properties of the three Persons are 
abstracted by our mind, nevertheless there will remain in our thoughts 
the one Personality of God, as the Jews consider. And the assumption can 
be terminated in It, as we now say it is terminated in the Person of the 
Word.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: If we mentally abstract the Personality, it is said that 
nothing remains by way of resolution, i.e. as if the subject of the 
relation and the relation itself were distinct because all we can think 
of in God is considered as a subsisting suppositum. However, some of the 
things predicated of God can be understood without others, not by way of 
resolution, but by the way mentioned above.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether one Person without another can assume a created nature?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that one Person cannot assume a created nature 
without another assuming it. For "the works of the Trinity are 
inseparable," as Augustine says (Enchiridion xxxviii). But as the three 
Persons have one essence, so likewise They have one operation. Now to 
assume is an operation. Therefore it cannot belong to one without 
belonging to another.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as we say the Person of the Son became incarnate, so 
also did the Nature; for "the whole Divine Nature became incarnate in one 
of Its hypostases," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6). But the 
Nature is common to the three Persons. Therefore the assumption is.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 3: Further, as the human nature in Christ is assumed by God, so 
likewise are men assumed by Him through grace, according to Rm. 14:3: 
"God hath taken him to Him." But this assumption pertains to all the 
Persons; therefore the first also.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that the mystery of the 
Incarnation pertains to "discrete theology," i.e. according to which 
something "distinct" is said of the Divine Persons.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As was said above (A[1]), assumption implies two things, 
viz. the act of assuming and the term of assumption. Now the act of 
assumption proceeds from the Divine power, which is common to the three 
Persons, but the term of the assumption is a Person, as stated above 
(A[2]). Hence what has to do with action in the assumption is common to 
the three Persons; but what pertains to the nature of term belongs to one 
Person in such a manner as not to belong to another; for the three 
Persons caused the human nature to be united to the one Person of the Son.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This reason regards the operation, and the conclusion would 
follow if it implied this operation only, without the term, which is a 
Person.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The Nature is said to be incarnate, and to assume by reason 
of the Person in Whom the union is terminated, as stated above (AA[1],2), 
and not as it is common to the three Persons. Now "the whole Divine 
Nature is" said to be "incarnate"; not that It is incarnate in all the 
Persons, but inasmuch as nothing is wanting to the perfection of the 
Divine Nature of the Person incarnate, as Damascene explains there.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The assumption which takes place by the grace of adoption 
is terminated in a certain participation of the Divine Nature, by an 
assimilation to Its goodness, according to 2 Pt. 1:4: "That you may be 
made partakers of the Divine Nature"; and hence this assumption is common 
to the three Persons, in regard to the principle and the term. But the 
assumption which is by the grace of union is common on the part of the 
principle, but not on the part of the term, as was said above.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether each of the Divine Persons could have assumed human nature?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that no other Divine Person could have assumed 
human nature except the Person of the Son. For by this assumption it has 
been brought about that God is the Son of Man. But it was not becoming 
that either the Father or the Holy Ghost should be said to be a Son; for 
this would tend to the confusion of the Divine Persons. Therefore the 
Father and Holy Ghost could not have assumed flesh.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, by the Divine Incarnation men have come into possession 
of the adoption of sons, according to Rm. 8:15: "For you  have not 
received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but the spirit of adoption 
of sons." But sonship by adoption is a participated likeness of natural 
sonship which does not belong to the Father nor the Holy Ghost; hence it 
is said (Rm. 8:29): "For whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be 
made conformable to the image of His Son." Therefore it seems that no 
other Person except the Person of the Son could have become incarnate.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Son is said to be sent and to be begotten by the 
temporal nativity, inasmuch as He became incarnate. But it does not 
belong to the Father to be sent, for He is innascible, as was said above 
(FP, Q[32], A[3]; FP, Q[43], A[4]). Therefore at least the Person of the 
Father cannot become incarnate.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Whatever the Son can do, so can the Father and the Holy 
Ghost, otherwise the power of the three Persons would not be one. But the 
Son was able to become incarnate. Therefore the Father and the Holy Ghost 
were able to become incarnate.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As was said above (AA[1],2,4), assumption implies two 
things, viz. the act of the one assuming and the term of the assumption. 
Now the principle of the act is the Divine power, and the term is a 
Person. But the Divine power is indifferently and commonly in all the 
Persons. Moreover, the nature of Personality is common to all the 
Persons, although the personal properties are different. Now whenever a 
power regards several things indifferently, it can terminate its action 
in any of them indifferently, as is plain in rational powers, which 
regard opposites, and can do either of them. Therefore the Divine power 
could have united human nature to the Person of the Father or of the Holy 
Ghost, as It united it to the Person of the Son. And hence we must say 
that the Father or the Holy Ghost could have assumed flesh even as the 
Son.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The temporal sonship, whereby Christ is said to be the Son 
of Man, does not constitute His Person, as does the eternal Sonship; but 
is something following upon the temporal nativity. Hence, if the name of 
son were transferred to the Father or the Holy Ghost in this manner, 
there would be no confusion of the Divine Persons.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Adoptive sonship is a certain participation of natural 
sonship; but it takes place in us, by appropriation, by the Father, Who 
is the principle of natural sonship, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost, 
Who is the love of the Father and Son, according to Gal. 4:6: "God hath 
sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts crying, Abba, Father." And 
therefore, even as by the Incarnation of the Son we receive adoptive 
sonship in the likeness of His natural sonship, so likewise, had the 
Father become incarnate, we should have received adoptive sonship from 
Him, as from the principle of the natural sonship, and from the Holy 
Ghost as from the common bond of Father and Son.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: It belongs to the Father to be innascible as to  eternal 
birth, and the temporal birth would not destroy this. But the Son of God 
is said to be sent in regard to the Incarnation, inasmuch as He is from 
another, without which the Incarnation would not suffice for the nature 
of mission.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether several Divine Persons can assume one and the same individual 
nature?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that two Divine Persons cannot assume one and the 
same individual nature. For, this being granted, there would either be 
several men or one. But not several, for just as one Divine Nature in 
several Persons does not make several gods, so one human nature in 
several persons does not make several men. Nor would there be only one 
man, for one man is "this man," which signifies one person; and hence the 
distinction of three Divine Persons would be destroyed, which cannot be 
allowed. Therefore neither two nor three Persons can take one human 
nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the assumption is terminated in the unity of Person, as 
has been said above (A[2]). But the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not 
one Person. Therefore the three Persons cannot assume one human nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4), and Augustine 
(De Trin. i, 11,12,13), that from the Incarnation of God the Son it 
follows that whatever is said of the Son of God is said of the Son of 
Man, and conversely. Hence, if three Persons were to assume one human 
nature, it would follow that whatever is said of each of the three 
Persons would be said of the man; and conversely, what was said of the 
man could be said of each of the three Persons. Therefore what is proper 
to the Father, viz. to beget the Son, would be said of the man, and 
consequently would be said of the Son of God; and this could not be. 
Therefore it is impossible that the three Persons should assume one human 
nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Incarnate Person subsists in two natures. But the 
three Persons can subsist in one Divine Nature. Therefore they can also 
subsist in one human nature in such a way that the human nature be 
assumed by the three Persons.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As was said above (Q[2], A[5], ad 1), by the union of the 
soul and body in Christ neither a new person is made nor a new 
hypostasis, but one human nature is assumed to the Divine Person or 
hypostasis, which, indeed, does not take place by the power of the human 
nature, but by the power of the Divine Person. Now such is the 
characteristic of the Divine Persons that one does not exclude another 
from communicating in the same nature, but only in the same Person. 
Hence, since in the mystery of the Incarnation "the whole reason of the 
deed is the power of the doer," as Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum 
cxxxvii), we must judge of it in regard to the quality of the Divine 
Person assuming, and not according to the quality of the human nature 
assumed. Therefore it is not impossible that two or three Divine Persons 
should assume  one human nature, but it would be impossible for them to 
assume one human hypostasis or person; thus Anselm says in the book De 
Concep. Virg. (Cur Deus Homo ii, 9), that "several Persons cannot assume 
one and the same man to unity of Person."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: In the hypothesis that three Persons assume one human 
nature, it would be true to say that the three Persons were one man, 
because of the one human nature. For just as it is now true to say the 
three Persons are one God on account of the one Divine Nature, so it 
would be true to say they are one man on account of the one human nature. 
Nor would "one" imply unity of person, but unity in human nature; for it 
could not be argued that because the three Persons were one man they were 
one simply. For nothing hinders our saying that men, who are many simply, 
are in some respect one, e.g. one people, and as Augustine says (De Trin. 
vi, 3): "The Spirit of God and the spirit of man are by nature different, 
but by inherence one spirit results," according to 1 Cor. 6:17: "He who 
is joined to the Lord is one spirit."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: In this supposition the human nature would be assumed to 
the unity, not indeed of one Person, but to the unity of each Person, so 
that even as the Divine Nature has a natural unity with each Person, so 
also the human nature would have a unity with each Person by assumption.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: In the mystery of the Incarnation, there results a 
communication of the properties belonging to the nature, because whatever 
belongs to the nature can be predicated of the Person subsisting in that 
nature, no matter to which of the natures it may apply. Hence in this 
hypothesis, of the Person of the Father may be predicated what belongs to 
the human nature and what belongs to the Divine; and likewise of the 
Person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. But what belongs to the Person 
of the Father by reason of His own Person could not be attributed to the 
Person of the Son or Holy Ghost on account of the distinction of Persons 
which would still remain. Therefore it might be said that as the Father 
was unbegotten, so the man was unbegotten, inasmuch as "man" stood for 
the Person of the Father. But if one were to go on to say, "The man is 
unbegotten; the Son is man; therefore the Son is unbegotten," it would be 
the fallacy of figure of speech or of accident; even as we now say God is 
unbegotten, because the Father is unbegotten, yet we cannot conclude that 
the Son is unbegotten, although He is God.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether one Divine Person can assume two human natures?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that one Divine Person cannot assume two human 
natures. For the nature assumed in the mystery of the Incarnation has no 
other suppositum than the suppositum of the Divine Person, as is plain 
from what has been stated above (Q[2], AA[3],6). Therefore, if we suppose 
one Person to assume two human natures, there would be one suppositum of 
two natures of the same species; which would seem to imply a 
contradiction, for the nature of one species is only multiplied by 
distinct supposita. 

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, in this hypothesis it could not be said that the Divine 
Person incarnate was one man, seeing that He would not have one human 
nature; neither could it be said that there were several, for several men 
have distinct supposita, whereas in this case there would be only one 
suppositum. Therefore the aforesaid hypothesis is impossible.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the whole Divine 
Nature is united to the whole nature assumed, i.e. to every part of it, 
for Christ is "perfect God and perfect man, complete God and complete 
man," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 7). But two human natures 
cannot be wholly united together, inasmuch as the soul of one would be 
united to the body of the other; and, again, two bodies would be 
together, which would give rise to confusion of natures. Therefore it is 
not possibly for one Divine Person to assume two human natures.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Whatever the Father can do, that also can the Son do. 
But after the Incarnation the Father can still assume a human nature 
distinct from that which the Son has assumed; for in nothing is the power 
of the Father or the Son lessened by the Incarnation of the Son. 
Therefore it seems that after the Incarnation the Son can assume another 
human nature distinct from the one He has assumed.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[7] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, What has power for one thing, and no more, has a power 
limited to one. Now the power of a Divine Person is infinite, nor can it 
be limited by any created thing. Hence it may not be said that a Divine 
Person so assumed one human nature as to be unable to assume another. For 
it would seem to follow from this that the Personality of the Divine 
Nature was so comprehended by one human nature as to be unable to assume 
another to its Personality; and this is impossible, for the Uncreated 
cannot be comprehended by any creature. Hence it is plain that, whether 
we consider the Divine Person in regard to His power, which is the 
principle of the union, or in regard to His Personality, which is the 
term of the union, it has to be said that the Divine Person, over and 
beyond the human nature which He has assumed, can assume another distinct 
human nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: A created nature is completed in its essentials by its 
form, which is multiplied according to the division of matter. And hence, 
if the composition of matter and form constitutes a new suppositum, the 
consequence is that the nature is multiplied by the multiplication of 
supposita. But in the mystery of the Incarnation the union of form and 
matter, i.e. of soul and body, does not constitute a new suppositum, as 
was said above (A[6]). Hence there can be a numerical multitude on the 
part of the nature, on account of the division of matter, without 
distinction of supposita.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It might seem possible to reply that in such a hypothesis 
it would follow that there were two men by reason of the  two natures, 
just as, on the contrary, the three Persons would be called one man, on 
account of the one nature assumed, as was said above (A[6], ad 1). But 
this does not seem to be true; because we must use words according to the 
purpose of their signification, which is in relation to our surroundings. 
Consequently, in order to judge of a word's signification or 
co-signification, we must consider the things which are around us, in 
which a word derived from some form is never used in the plural unless 
there are several supposita. For a man who has on two garments is not 
said to be "two persons clothed," but "one clothed with two garments"; 
and whoever has two qualities is designated in the singular as "such by 
reason of the two qualities." Now the assumed nature is, as it were, a 
garment, although this similitude does not fit at all points, as has been 
said above (Q[2], A[6], ad 1). And hence, if the Divine Person were to 
assume two human natures, He would be called, on account of the unity of 
suppositum, one man having two human natures. Now many men are said to be 
one people, inasmuch as they have some one thing in common, and not on 
account of the unity of suppositum. So likewise, if two Divine Persons 
were to assume one singular human nature, they would be said to be one 
man, as stated (A[6], ad 1), not from the unity of suppositum, but 
because they have some one thing in common.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The Divine and human natures do not bear the same relation 
to the one Divine Person, but the Divine Nature is related first of all 
thereto, inasmuch as It is one with It from eternity; and afterwards the 
human nature is related to the Divine Person, inasmuch as it is assumed 
by the Divine Person in time, not indeed that the nature is the Person, 
but that the Person of God subsists in human nature. For the Son of God 
is His Godhead, but is not His manhood. And hence, in order that the 
human nature may be assumed by the Divine Person, the Divine Nature must 
be united by a personal union with the whole nature assumed, i.e. in all 
its parts. Now in the two natures assumed there would be a uniform 
relation to the Divine Person, nor would one assume the other. Hence it 
would not be necessary for one of them to be altogether united to the 
other, i.e. all the parts of one with all the parts of the other.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it was more fitting that the Person of the Son rather than any 
other Divine Person should assume human nature?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it was not more fitting that the Son of God 
should become incarnate than the Father or the Holy Ghost. For by the 
mystery of the Incarnation men are led to the true knowledge of God, 
according to Jn. 18:37: "For this was I born, and for this came I into 
the world, to give testimony to the truth." But by the Person of the Son 
of God becoming incarnate many have been kept back from the true 
knowledge of God, since they referred to the very Person of the Son what 
was said of the Son in His human nature, as Arius, who held an inequality 
of Persons, according to what is said (Jn. 14:28): "The Father is greater 
than I." Now this error would not have arisen if the Person of the Father 
had become  incarnate, for no one would have taken the Father to be less 
than the Son. Hence it seems fitting that the Person of the Father, 
rather than the Person of the Son, should have become incarnate.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the effect of the Incarnation would seem to be, as it 
were, a second creation of human nature, according to Gal. 6:15: "For in 
Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, 
but a new creature." But the power of creation is appropriated to the 
Father. Therefore it would have been more becoming to the Father than to 
the Son to become incarnate.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Incarnation is ordained to the remission of sins, 
according to Mt. 1:21: "Thou shalt call His name Jesus. For He shall save 
His people from their sins." Now the remission of sins is attributed to 
the Holy Ghost according to Jn. 20:22,23: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost. 
Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them." Therefore it 
became the Person of the Holy Ghost rather than the Person of the Son to 
become incarnate.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 1): "In the mystery 
of the Incarnation the wisdom and power of God are made known: the 
wisdom, for He found a most suitable discharge for a most heavy debt; the 
power, for He made the conquered conquer." But power and wisdom are 
appropriated to the Son, according to 1 Cor. 1:24: "Christ, the power of 
God and the wisdom of God." Therefore it was fitting that the Person of 
the Son should become incarnate.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[8] Body Para. 1/3

 I answer that, It was most fitting that the Person of the Son should 
become incarnate. First, on the part of the union; for such as are 
similar are fittingly united. Now the Person of the Son, Who is the Word 
of God, has a certain common agreement with all creatures, because the 
word of the craftsman, i.e. his concept, is an exemplar likeness of 
whatever is made by him. Hence the Word of God, Who is His eternal 
concept, is the exemplar likeness of all creatures. And therefore as 
creatures are established in their proper species, though movably, by the 
participation of this likeness, so by the non-participated and personal 
union of the Word with a creature, it was fitting that the creature 
should be restored in order to its eternal and unchangeable perfection; 
for the craftsman by the intelligible form of his art, whereby he 
fashioned his handiwork, restores it when it has fallen into ruin. 
Moreover, He has a particular agreement with human nature, since the Word 
is a concept of the eternal Wisdom, from Whom all man's wisdom is 
derived. And hence man is perfected in wisdom (which is his proper 
perfection, as he is rational) by participating the Word of God, as the 
disciple is instructed by receiving the word of his master. Hence it is 
said (Ecclus. 1:5): "The Word of God on high is the fountain of wisdom." 
And hence for the consummate perfection of man it was fitting that the 
very Word of God should be personally united to human nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[8] Body Para. 2/3

 Secondly, the reason of this fitness may be taken from the end of the 
union, which is the fulfilling of predestination, i.e. of  such as are 
preordained to the heavenly inheritance, which is bestowed only on sons, 
according to Rm. 8:17: "If sons, heirs also." Hence it was fitting that 
by Him Who is the natural Son, men should share this likeness of sonship 
by adoption, as the Apostle says in the same chapter (Rm. 8:29): "For 
whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the 
image of His Son."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[8] Body Para. 3/3

 Thirdly, the reason for this fitness may be taken from the sin of our 
first parent, for which the Incarnation supplied the remedy. For the 
first man sinned by seeking knowledge, as is plain from the words of the 
serpent, promising to man the knowledge of good and evil. Hence it was 
fitting that by the Word of true knowledge man might be led back to God, 
having wandered from God through an inordinate thirst for knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: There is nothing which human malice cannot abuse, since it 
even abuses God's goodness, according to Rm. 2:4: "Or despisest thou the 
riches of His goodness?" Hence, even if the Person of the Father had 
become incarnate, men would have been capable of finding an occasion of 
error, as though the Son were not able to restore human nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The first creation of things was made by the power of God 
the Father through the Word; hence the second creation ought to have been 
brought about through the Word, by the power of God the Father, in order 
that restoration should correspond to creation according to 2 Cor. 5:19: 
"For God indeed was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[3] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: To be the gift of the Father and the Son is proper to the 
Holy Ghost. But the remission of sins is caused by the Holy Ghost, as by 
the gift of God. And hence it was more fitting to man's justification 
that the Son should become incarnate, Whose gift the Holy Ghost is.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] Out. Para. 1/3

OF THE MODE OF UNION ON THE PART OF THE HUMAN NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the union on the part of what was assumed. About 
which we must consider first what things were assumed by the Word of God; 
secondly, what were co-assumed, whether perfections or defects.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] Out. Para. 2/3

 Now the Son of God assumed human nature and its parts. Hence a threefold 
consideration arises. First, with regard to the nature; secondly, with 
regard to its parts; thirdly, with regard to the order of the assumption.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] Out. Para. 3/3

 Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether human nature was more capable of being assumed than any 
other nature?

 (2) Whether He assumed a person?

 (3) Whether He assumed a man?

 (4) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature 
abstracted from all individuals? 

 (5) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in all 
its individuals?

 (6) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in any 
man begotten of the stock of Adam?


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether human nature was more assumable by the Son of God than any other 
nature?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that human nature is not more capable of being 
assumed by the Son of God than any other nature. For Augustine says (Ep. 
ad Volusianum cxxxvii): "In deeds wrought miraculously the whole reason 
of the deed is the power of the doer." Now the power of God Who wrought 
the Incarnation, which is a most miraculous work, is not limited to one 
nature, since the power of God is infinite. Therefore human nature is not 
more capable of being assumed than any other creature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, likeness is the foundation of the fittingness of the 
Incarnation of the Divine Person, as above stated (Q[3], A[8]). But as in 
rational creatures we find the likeness of image, so in irrational 
creatures we find the image of trace. Therefore the irrational creature 
was as capable of assumption as human nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, in the angelic nature we find a more perfect likeness 
than in human nature, as Gregory says: (Hom. de Cent. Ovib.; xxxiv in 
Ev.), where he introduces Ezech. 28:12: "Thou wast the seal of 
resemblance." And sin is found in angels, even as in man, according to 
Job 4:18: "And in His angels He found wickedness." Therefore the angelic 
nature was as capable of assumption as the nature of man.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, since the highest perfection belongs to God, the more 
like to God a thing is, the more perfect it is. But the whole universe is 
more perfect than its parts, amongst which is human nature. Therefore the 
whole universe is more capable of being assumed than human nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 8:31) by the mouth of Begotten 
Wisdom: "My delights were to be with the children of men"; and hence 
there would seem some fitness in the union of the Son of God with human 
nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A thing is said to be assumable as being capable of being 
assumed by a Divine Person, and this capability cannot be taken with 
reference to the natural passive power, which does not extend to what 
transcends the natural order, as the personal union of a creature with 
God transcends it. Hence it follows that a thing is said to be assumable 
according to some fitness for such a union. Now this fitness in human 
nature may be taken from two things, viz. according to its dignity, and 
according to its need. According to its dignity, because human nature, as 
being rational and intellectual, was made for attaining to the Word to 
some extent by its operation, viz. by knowing and loving Him.  According 
to its need---because it stood in need of restoration, having fallen 
under original sin. Now these two things belong to human nature alone. 
For in the irrational creature the fitness of dignity is wanting, and in 
the angelic nature the aforesaid fitness of need is wanting. Hence it 
follows that only human nature was assumable.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Creatures are said to be "such" with reference to their 
proper causes, not with reference to what belongs to them from their 
first and universal causes; thus we call a disease incurable, not that it 
cannot be cured by God, but that it cannot be cured by the proper 
principles of the subject. Therefore a creature is said to be not 
assumable, not as if we withdrew anything from the power of God, but in 
order to show the condition of the creature, which has no capability for 
this.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The likeness of image is found in human nature, forasmuch 
as it is capable of God, viz. by attaining to Him through its own 
operation of knowledge and love. But the likeness of trace regards only a 
representation by Divine impression, existing in the creature, and does 
not imply that the irrational creature, in which such a likeness is, can 
attain to God by its own operation alone. For what does not come up to 
the less, has no fitness for the greater; as a body which is not fitted 
to be perfected by a sensitive soul is much less fitted for an 
intellectual soul. Now much greater and more perfect is the union with 
God in personal being than the union by operation. And hence the 
irrational creature which falls short of the union with God by operation 
has no fitness to be united with Him in personal being.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Some say that angels are not assumable, since they are 
perfect in their personality from the beginning of their creation, 
inasmuch as they are not subject to generation and corruption; hence they 
cannot be assumed to the unity of a Divine Person, unless their 
personality be destroyed, and this does not befit the incorruptibility of 
their nature nor the goodness of the one assuming, to Whom it does not 
belong to corrupt any perfection in the creature assumed. But this would 
not seem totally to disprove the fitness of the angelic nature for being 
assumed. For God by producing a new angelic nature could join it to 
Himself in unity of Person, and in this way nothing pre-existing would be 
corrupted in it. But as was said above, there is wanting the fitness of 
need, because, although the angelic nature in some is the subject of sin, 
their sin is irremediable, as stated above (FP, Q[64], A[2]).

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: The perfection of the universe is not the perfection of one 
person or suppositum, but of something which is one by position or order, 
whereof very many parts are not capable of assumption, as was said above. 
Hence it follows that only human nature is capable of being assumed.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Son of God assumed a person? 

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Son of God assumed a person. For Damascene 
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the Son of God "assumed human nature 
'in atomo,'" i.e. in an individual. But an individual in rational nature 
is a person, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab. Nat.). Therefore the Son 
of God assumed a person.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that the Son of 
God "assumed what He had sown in our nature." But He sowed our 
personality there. Therefore the Son of God assumed a person.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, nothing is absorbed unless it exist. But Innocent III 
[*Paschas. Diac., De Spiritu Sanct. ii] says in a Decretal that "the 
Person of God absorbed the person of man." Therefore it would seem that 
the person of man existed previous to its being assumed.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum ii) 
that "God assumed the nature, not the person, of man."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A thing is said to be assumed inasmuch as it is taken 
into another. Hence, what is assumed must be presupposed to the 
assumption, as what is moved locally is presupposed to the motion. Now a 
person in human nature is not presupposed to assumption; rather, it is 
the term of the assumption, as was said (Q[3], AA[1],2). For if it were 
presupposed, it must either have been corrupted---in which case it was 
useless; or it remains after the union---and thus there would be two 
persons, one assuming and the other assumed, which is false, as was shown 
above (Q[2], A[6]). Hence it follows that the Son of God nowise assumed a 
human person.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Son of God assumed human nature "in atomo," i.e. in an 
individual, which is no other than the uncreated suppositum, the Person 
of the Son of God. Hence it does not follow that a person was assumed.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Its proper personality is not wanting to the nature assumed 
through the loss of anything pertaining to the perfection of the human 
nature but through the addition of something which is above human nature, 
viz. the union with a Divine Person.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Absorption does not here imply the destruction of anything 
pre-existing, but the hindering what might otherwise have been. For if 
the human nature had not been assumed by a Divine Person, the human 
nature would have had its own personality; and in this way is it said, 
although improperly, that the Person "absorbed the person," inasmuch as 
the Divine Person by His union hindered the human nature from having its 
personality.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Divine Person assumed a man?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Divine Person assumed a man. For  it is 
written (Ps. 64:5): "Blessed is he whom Thou hast chosen and taken to 
Thee," which a gloss expounds of Christ; and Augustine says (De Agone 
Christ. xi): "The Son of God assumed a man, and in him bore things human."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the word "man" signifies a human nature. But the Son of 
God assumed a human nature. Therefore He assumed a man.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Son of God is a man. But He is not one of the men He 
did not assume, for with equal reason He would be Peter or any other man. 
Therefore He is the man whom He assumed.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Is the authority of Felix, Pope and Martyr, which is 
quoted by the Council of Ephesus: "We believe in our Lord Jesus Christ, 
born of the Virgin Mary, because He is the Eternal Son and Word of God, 
and not a man assumed by God, in such sort that there is another besides 
Him. For the Son of God did not assume a man, so that there be another 
besides Him."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As has been said above (A[2]), what is assumed is not the 
term of the assumption, but is presupposed to the assumption. Now it was 
said (Q[3], AA[1],2) that the individual to Whom the human nature is 
assumed is none other than the Divine Person, Who is the term of the 
assumption. Now this word "man" signifies human nature, as it is in a 
suppositum, because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4,11), this 
word God signifies Him Who has human nature. And hence it cannot properly 
be said that the Son assumed a man, granted (as it must be, in fact) that 
in Christ there is but one suppositum and one hypostasis. But according 
to such as hold that there are two hypostases or two supposita in Christ, 
it may fittingly and properly be said that the Son of God assumed a man. 
Hence the first opinion quoted in Sent. iii, D. 6, grants that a man was 
assumed. But this opinion is erroneous, as was said above (Q[2], A[6]).

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: These phrases are not to be taken too literally, but are to 
be loyally explained, wherever they are used by holy doctors; so as to 
say that a man was assumed, inasmuch as his nature was assumed; and 
because the assumption terminated in this---that the Son of God is man.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The word "man" signifies human nature in the concrete, 
inasmuch as it is in a suppositum; and hence, since we cannot say a 
suppositum was assumed, so we cannot say a man was assumed.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The Son of God is not the man whom He assumed, but the man 
whose nature He assumed.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature abstracted from 
all individuals?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed  human 
nature abstracted from all individuals. For the assumption of human 
nature took place for the common salvation of all men; hence it is said 
of Christ (1 Tim. 4:10) that He is "the Saviour of all men, especially of 
the faithful." But nature as it is in individuals withdraws from its 
universality. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature 
as it is abstracted from all individuals.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, what is noblest in all things ought to be attributed to 
God. But in every genus what is of itself is best. Therefore the Son of 
God ought to have assumed self-existing [per se] man, which, according to 
Platonists, is human nature abstracted from its individuals. Therefore 
the Son of God ought to have assumed this.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, human nature was not assumed by the Son of God in the 
concrete as is signified by the word "man," as was said above (A[3]). Now 
in this way it signifies human nature as it is in individuals, as is 
plain from what has been said (A[3]). Therefore the Son of God assumed 
human nature as it is separated from individuals.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "God the Word 
Incarnate did not assume a nature which exists in pure thought; for this 
would have been no Incarnation, but a false and fictitious Incarnation." 
But human nature as it is separated or abstracted from individuals is 
"taken to be a pure conception, since it does not exist in itself," as 
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the Son of God did not 
assume human nature, as it is separated from individuals.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, The nature of man or of any other sensible thing, beyond 
the being which it has in individuals, may be taken in two ways: first, 
as if it had being of itself, away from matter, as the Platonists held; 
secondly, as existing in an intellect either human or Divine. Now it 
cannot subsist of itself, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, 
26,27,29,51), because sensible matter belongs to the specific nature of 
sensible things, and is placed in its definition, as flesh and bones in 
the definition of man. Hence human nature cannot be without sensible 
matter. Nevertheless, if human nature were subsistent in this way, it 
would not be fitting that it should be assumed by the Word of God. First, 
because this assumption is terminated in a Person, and it is contrary to 
the nature of a common form to be thus individualized in a person. 
Secondly, because to a common nature can only be attributed common and 
universal operations, according to which man neither merits nor demerits, 
whereas, on the contrary, the assumption took place in order that the Son 
of God, having assumed our nature, might merit for us. Thirdly, because a 
nature so existing would not be sensible, but intelligible. But the Son 
of God assumed human nature in order to show Himself in men's sight, 
according to Baruch 3:38: "Afterwards He was seen upon earth, and 
conversed with men."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[4] Body Para. 2/2 

 Likewise, neither could human nature have been assumed by the Son of 
God, as it is in the Divine intellect, since it would be none other than 
the Divine Nature; and, according to this, human nature would be in the 
Son of God from eternity. Neither can we say that the Son of God assumed 
human nature as it is in a human intellect, for this would mean nothing 
else but that He is understood to assume a human nature; and thus if He 
did not assume it in reality, this would be a false understanding; nor 
would this assumption of the human nature be anything but a fictitious 
Incarnation, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11).

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The incarnate Son of God is the common Saviour of all, not 
by a generic or specific community, such as is attributed to the nature 
separated from the individuals, but by a community of cause, whereby the 
incarnate Son of God is the universal cause of human salvation.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Self-existing [per se] man is not to be found in nature in 
such a way as to be outside the singular, as the Platonists held, 
although some say Plato believed that the separate man was only in the 
Divine intellect. And hence it was not necessary for it to be assumed by 
the Word, since it had been with Him from eternity.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Although human nature was not assumed in the concrete, as 
if the suppositum were presupposed to the assumption, nevertheless it is 
assumed in an individual, since it is assumed so as to be in an 
individual.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature in all 
individuals?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed human 
nature in all individuals. For what is assumed first and by itself is 
human nature. But what belongs essentially to a nature belongs to all who 
exist in the nature. Therefore it was fitting that human nature should be 
assumed by the Word of God in all its supposita.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Divine Incarnation proceeded from Divine Love; hence 
it is written (Jn. 3:16): "God so loved the world as to give His 
only-begotten Son." But love makes us give ourselves to our friends as 
much as we can, and it was possible for the Son of God to assume several 
human natures, as was said above (Q[3], A[7]), and with equal reason all. 
Hence it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature in all its 
supposita.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a skilful workman completes his work in the shortest 
manner possible. But it would have been a shorter way if all men had been 
assumed to the natural sonship than for one natural Son to lead many to 
the adoption of sons, as is written Gal. 4:5 (cf. Heb. 2:10). Therefore 
human nature ought to have been assumed by God in all its supposita. 

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the Son of 
God "did not assume human nature as a species, nor did He assume all its 
hypostases."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, It was unfitting for human nature to be assumed by the 
Word in all its supposita. First, because the multitude of supposita of 
human nature, which are natural to it, would have been taken away. For 
since we must not see any other suppositum in the assumed nature, except 
the Person assuming, as was said above (A[3]), if there was no human 
nature except what was assumed, it would follow that there was but one 
suppositum of human nature, which is the Person assuming. Secondly, 
because this would have been derogatory to the dignity of the incarnate 
Son of God, as He is the First-born of many brethren, according to the 
human nature, even as He is the First-born of all creatures according to 
the Divine, for then all men would be of equal dignity. Thirdly, because 
it is fitting that as one Divine suppositum is incarnate, so He should 
assume one human nature, so that on both sides unity might be found.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: To be assumed belongs to the human nature of itself, 
because it does not belong to it by reason of a person, as it belongs to 
the Divine Nature to assume by reason of the Person; not, however, that 
it belongs to it of itself as if belonging to its essential principles, 
or as its natural property in which manner it would belong to all its 
supposita.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The love of God to men is shown not merely in the 
assumption of human nature, but especially in what He suffered in human 
nature for other men, according to Rm. 5:8: "But God commendeth His 
charity towards us; because when as yet we were sinners . . . Christ died 
for us," which would not have taken place had He assumed human nature in 
all its supposita.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: In order to shorten the way, which every skilful workman 
does, what can be done by one must not be done by many. Hence it was most 
fitting that by one man all the rest should be saved.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature of the 
stock of Adam?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for the Son of God to 
assume human nature of the stock of Adam, for the Apostle says (Heb. 
7:26): "For it was fitting that we should have such a high priest . . . 
separated from sinners." But He would have been still further separated 
from sinners had He not assumed human nature of the stock of Adam, a 
sinner. Hence it seems that He ought not to have assumed human nature of 
the stock of Adam.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, in every genus the principle is nobler than what is from 
the principle. Hence, if He wished to assume human  nature, He ought to 
have assumed it in Adam himself.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the Gentiles were greater sinners than the Jews, as a 
gloss says on Gal. 2:15: "For we by nature are Jews, and not of the 
Gentiles, sinners." Hence, if He wished to assume human nature from 
sinners, He ought rather to have assumed it from the Gentiles than from 
the stock of Abraham, who was just.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, (Lk. 3), the genealogy of our Lord is traced back to 
Adam.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 18): "God was able to 
assume human nature elsewhere than from the stock of Adam, who by his sin 
had fettered the whole human race; yet God judged it better to assume 
human nature from the vanquished race, and thus to vanquish the enemy of 
the human race." And this for three reasons: First, because it would seem 
to belong to justice that he who sinned should make amends; and hence 
that from the nature which he had corrupted should be assumed that 
whereby satisfaction was to be made for the whole nature. Secondly, it 
pertains to man's greater dignity that the conqueror of the devil should 
spring from the stock conquered by the devil. Thirdly, because God's 
power is thereby made more manifest, since, from a corrupt and weakened 
nature, He assumed that which was raised to such might and glory.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Christ ought to be separated from sinners as regards sin, 
which He came to overthrow, and not as regards nature which He came to 
save, and in which "it behooved Him in all things to be made like to His 
brethren," as the Apostle says (Heb. 2:17). And in this is His innocence 
the more wonderful, seeing that though assumed from a mass tainted by 
sin, His nature was endowed with such purity.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As was said above (ad 1) it behooved Him Who came to take 
away sins to be separated from sinners as regards sin, to which Adam was 
subject, whom Christ "brought out of his sin," as is written (Wis. 10:2). 
For it behooved Him Who came to cleanse all, not to need cleansing 
Himself; just as in every genus of motion the first mover is immovable as 
regards that motion, and the first to alter is itself unalterable. Hence 
it was not fitting that He should assume human nature in Adam himself.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[4] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Since Christ ought especially to be separated from sinners 
as regards sin, and to possess the highest innocence, it was fitting that 
between the first sinner and Christ some just men should stand midway, in 
whom certain forecasts of (His) future holiness should shine forth. And 
hence, even in the people from whom Christ was to be born, God appointed 
signs of holiness, which began in Abraham, who was the first to receive 
the promise of Christ, and circumcision, as a sign that the covenant 
should be kept, as is written (Gn. 17:11).


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE PARTS OF HUMAN NATURE WHICH WERE ASSUMED (FOUR ARTICLES) 

 We must now consider the assumption of the parts of human nature; and 
under this head there are four points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body?

 (2) Whether He ought to have assumed an earthly body, i.e. one of flesh 
and blood?

 (3) Whether He ought to have assumed a soul?

 (4) Whether He ought to have assumed an intellect?


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a true body. For 
it is written (Phil. 2:7), that He was "made in the likeness of men." But 
what is something in truth is not said to be in the likeness thereof. 
Therefore the Son of God did not assume a true body.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the assumption of a body in no way diminishes the 
dignity of the Godhead; for Pope Leo says (Serm. de Nativ.) that "the 
glorification did not absorb the lesser nature, nor did the assumption 
lessen the higher." But it pertains to the dignity of God to be 
altogether separated from bodies. Therefore it seems that by the 
assumption God was not united to a body.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, signs ought to correspond to the realities. But the 
apparitions of the Old Testament which were signs of the manifestation of 
Christ were not in a real body, but by visions in the imagination, as is 
plain from Is. 60:1: "I saw the Lord sitting," etc. Hence it would seem 
that the apparition of the Son of God in the world was not in a real 
body, but only in imagination.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 13): "If the body of 
Christ was a phantom, Christ deceived us, and if He deceived us, He is 
not the Truth. But Christ is the Truth. Therefore His body was not a 
phantom." Hence it is plain that He assumed a true body.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As is said (De Eccles. Dogm. ii). The Son of God was not 
born in appearance only, as if He had an imaginary body; but His body was 
real. The proof of this is threefold. First, from the essence of human 
nature to which it pertains to have a true body. Therefore granted, as 
already proved (Q[4], A[1]), that it was fitting for the Son of God to 
assume human nature, He must consequently have assumed a real body. The 
second reason is taken from what was done in the mystery of the 
Incarnation. For if His body was not real but imaginary, He neither 
underwent a real death, nor of those things which the Evangelists recount 
of Him, did He do any in very truth, but only in appearance; and hence it 
would also follow that the real salvation of man has not taken place; 
since the effect must be proportionate to the cause. The third reason is 
taken from the dignity of the Person assuming, Whom it did not become to 
have anything fictitious in His work, since He is the Truth. Hence our 
Lord Himself deigned to refute this error (Lk.  24:37,39), when the 
disciples, "troubled and frighted, supposed that they saw a spirit," and 
not a true body; wherefore He offered Himself to their touch, saying: 
"Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to 
have."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This likeness indicates the truth of the human nature in 
Christ---just as all that truly exist in human nature are said to be like 
in species---and not a mere imaginary likeness. In proof of this the 
Apostle subjoins (Phil. 2:8) that He became "obedient unto death, even to 
the death of the cross"; which would have been impossible, had it been 
only an imaginary likeness.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: By assuming a true body the dignity of the Son of God is 
nowise lessened. Hence Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum 
ii): "He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, that He might 
become a servant; yet did He not lose the fulness of the form of God." 
For the Son of God assumed a true body, not so as to become the form of a 
body, which is repugnant to the Divine simplicity and purity---for this 
would be to assume a body to the unity of the nature, which is 
impossible, as is plain from what has been stated above (Q[2], A[1]): 
but, the natures remaining distinct, He assumed a body to the unity of 
Person.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The figure ought to correspond to the reality as regards 
the likeness and not as regards the truth of the thing. For if they were 
alike in all points, it would no longer be a likeness but the reality 
itself, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26). Hence it was more 
fitting that the apparitions of the old Testament should be in appearance 
only, being figures; and that the apparition of the Son of God in the 
world should be in a real body, being the thing prefigured by these 
figures. Hence the Apostle says (Col. 2:17): "Which are a shadow of 
things to come, but the body is Christ's."


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a carnal or earthly body?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that Christ had not a carnal or earthly, but a 
heavenly body. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:41): "The first man was of 
the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly." But the first 
man, i.e. Adam, was of the earth as regards his body, as is plain from 
Gn. 1. Therefore the second man, i.e. Christ, was of heaven as regards 
the body.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is said (1 Cor. 15:50): "Flesh and blood shall not 
[Vulg.: 'cannot'] possess the kingdom of God." But the kingdom of God is 
in Christ chiefly. Therefore there is no flesh or blood in Him, but 
rather a heavenly body.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, whatever is best is to be attributed to God. But of all 
bodies a heavenly body is the best. Therefore it behooved Christ to 
assume such a body.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1 

 On the contrary, our Lord says (Lk. 24:39): "A spirit hath not flesh and 
bones, as you see Me to have." Now flesh and bones are not of the matter 
of heavenly bodies, but are composed of the inferior elements. Therefore 
the body of Christ was not a heavenly, but a carnal and earthly body.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, By the reasons which proved that the body of Christ was 
not an imaginary one, it may also be shown that it was not a heavenly 
body. First, because even as the truth of the human nature of Christ 
would not have been maintained had His body been an imaginary one, such 
as Manes supposed, so likewise it would not have been maintained if we 
supposed, as did Valentine, that it was a heavenly body. For since the 
form of man is a natural thing, it requires determinate matter, to wit, 
flesh and bones, which must be placed in the definition of man, as is 
plain from the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 39). Secondly, because this 
would lessen the truth of such things as Christ did in the body. For 
since a heavenly body is impassible and incorruptible, as is proved De 
Coel. i, 20, if the Son of God had assumed a heavenly body, He would not 
have truly hungered or thirsted, nor would he have undergone His passion 
and death. Thirdly, this would have detracted from God's truthfulness. 
For since the Son of God showed Himself to men, as if He had a carnal and 
earthly body, the manifestation would have been false, had He had a 
heavenly body. Hence (De Eccles. Dogm. ii) it is said: "The Son of God 
was born, taking flesh of the Virgin's body, and not bringing it with Him 
from heaven."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: Christ is said in two ways to have come down from heaven. 
First, as regards His Divine Nature; not indeed that the Divine Nature 
ceased to be in heaven, but inasmuch as He began to be here below in a 
new way, viz. by His assumed. nature, according to Jn. 3:13: "No man hath 
ascended into heaven, but He that descended from heaven, the Son of Man, 
Who is in heaven."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 Secondly, as regards His body, not indeed that the very substance of the 
body of Christ descended from heaven, but that His body was formed by a 
heavenly power, i.e. by the Holy Ghost. Hence Augustine, explaining the 
passage quoted, says (Ad Orosium [*Dial. Qq. lxv, qu. 4, work of an 
unknown author]): "I call Christ a heavenly man because He was not 
conceived of human seed." And Hilary expounds it in the same way (De 
Trin. x).

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Flesh and blood are not taken here for the substance of 
flesh and blood, but for the corruption of flesh, which was not in Christ 
as far as it was sinful; but as far as it was a punishment; thus, for a 
time, it was in Christ, that He might carry through the work of our 
redemption.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: It pertains to the greatest glory of God to have raised a 
weak and earthly body to such sublimity. Hence in the General Council of 
Ephesus (P. II, Act. I) we read the saying of St. Theophilus: "Just as 
the best workmen are esteemed not merely for displaying their skill in 
precious materials, but very often because by making use of the poorest . 
. . lay and commonest earth,  they show the power of their craft; so the 
best of all workmen, the Word of God, did not come down to us by taking a 
heavenly body of some most precious matter, but shewed the greatness of 
His skill in clay."


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Son of God assumed a soul?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul. For John 
has said, teaching the mystery of the Incarnation (Jn. 1:14): "The Word 
was made flesh"---no mention being made of a soul. Now it is not said 
that "the Word was made flesh" as if changed to flesh, but because He 
assumed flesh. Therefore He seems not to have assumed a soul.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a soul is necessary to the body, in order to quicken it. 
But this was not necessary for the body of Christ, as it would seem, for 
of the Word of God it is written (Ps. 35:10): Lord, "with Thee is the 
fountain of life." Therefore it would seem altogether superfluous for the 
soul to be there, when the Word was present. But "God and nature do 
nothing uselessly," as the Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 32; ii, 56). 
Therefore the Word would seem not to have assumed a soul.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, by the union of soul and body is constituted the common 
nature, which is the human species. But "in the Lord Jesus Christ we are 
not to look for a common species," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 
3). Therefore He did not assume a soul.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xxi): "Let us not 
hearken to such as say that only a human body was assumed by the Word of 
God; and take 'the Word was made flesh' to mean that the man had no soul 
nor any other part of a man, save flesh."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As Augustine says (De Haeres. 69,55), it was first of all 
the opinion of Arius and then of Apollinaris that the Son of God assumed 
only flesh, without a soul, holding that the Word took the place of a 
soul to the body. And consequently it followed that there were not two 
natures in Christ, but only one; for from a soul and body one human 
nature is constituted. But this opinion cannot hold, for three reasons. 
First, because it is counter to the authority of Scripture, in which our 
Lord makes mention of His soul, Mt. 26:38: "My soul is sorrowful even 
unto death"; and Jn. 10:18: "I have power to lay down My soul [animam 
meam: Douay: 'My life']." But to this Apollinaris replied that in these 
words soul is taken metaphorically, in which way mention is made in the 
Old Testament of the soul of God (Is. 1:14): "My soul hateth your new 
moons and your solemnities." But, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 
80), the Evangelists relate how Jesus wondered, was angered, sad, and 
hungry. Now these show that He had a true soul, just as that He ate, 
slept and was weary shows that He had a true human body: otherwise, if 
these things are a metaphor, because the like are said of God in the Old 
Testament, the trustworthiness of the Gospel story is undermined. For it 
is one thing that things  were foretold in a figure, and another that 
historical events were related in very truth by the Evangelists. 
Secondly, this error lessens the utility of the Incarnation, which is 
man's liberation. For Augustine [*Vigilius Tapsensis] argues thus (Contra 
Felician. xiii): "If the Son of God in taking flesh passed over the soul, 
either He knew its sinlessness, and trusted it did not need a remedy; or 
He considered it unsuitable to Him, and did not bestow on it the boon of 
redemption; or He reckoned it altogether incurable, and was unable to 
heal it; or He cast it off as worthless and seemingly unfit for any use. 
Now two of these reasons imply a blasphemy against God. For how shall we 
call Him omnipotent, if He is unable to heal what is beyond hope? Or God 
of all, if He has not made our soul. And as regards the other two 
reasons, in one the cause of the soul is ignored, and in the other no 
place is given to merit. Is He to be considered to understand the cause 
of the soul, Who seeks to separate it from the sin of wilful 
transgression, enabled as it is to receive the law by the endowment of 
the habit of reason? Or how can His generosity be known to any one who 
says it was despised on account of its ignoble sinfulness? If you look at 
its origin, the substance of the soul is more precious than the body: but 
if at the sin of transgression, on account of its intelligence it is 
worse than the body. Now I know and declare that Christ is perfect 
wisdom, nor have I any doubt that He is most loving; and because of the 
first of these He did not despise what was better and more capable of 
prudence; and because of the second He protected what was most wounded." 
Thirdly, this position is against the truth of the Incarnation. For flesh 
and the other parts of man receive their species through the soul. Hence, 
if the soul is absent, there are no bones nor flesh, except equivocally, 
as is plain from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9; Metaph. vii, 34).

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: When we say, "The Word was made flesh," "flesh" is taken 
for the whole man, as if we were to say, "The Word was made man," as Is. 
40:5: "All flesh together shall see that the mouth of the Lord hath 
spoken." And the whole man is signified by flesh, because, as is said in 
the authority quoted, the Son of God became visible by flesh; hence it is 
subjoined: "And we saw His glory." Or because, as Augustine says (Qq. 
lxxxiii, qu. 80), "in all that union the Word is the highest, and flesh 
the last and lowest. Hence, wishing to commend the love of God's humility 
to us, the Evangelist mentioned the Word and flesh, leaving the soul on 
one side, since it is less than the Word and nobler than flesh." Again, 
it was reasonable to mention flesh, which, as being farther away from the 
Word, was less assumable, as it would seem.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The Word is the fountain of life, as the first effective 
cause of life; but the soul is the principle of the life of the body, as 
its form. Now the form is the effect of the agent. Hence from the 
presence of the Word it might rather have been concluded that the body 
was animated, just as from the presence of fire it may be concluded that 
the body, in which fire adheres, is warm.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 3: It is not unfitting, indeed it is necessary to say that in 
Christ there was a nature which was constituted by the soul coming to the 
body. But Damascene denied that in Jesus Christ there was a common 
species, i.e. a third something resulting from the Godhead and the 
humanity.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Son of God assumed a human mind or intellect?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a human mind or 
intellect. For where a thing is present, its image is not required. But 
man is made to God's image, as regards his mind, as Augustine says (De 
Trin. xiv, 3,6). Hence, since in Christ there was the presence of the 
Divine Word itself, there was no need of a human mind.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the greater light dims the lesser. But the Word of God, 
Who is "the light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this 
world," as is written Jn. 1:9, is compared to the mind as the greater 
light to the lesser; since our mind is a light, being as it were a lamp 
enkindled by the First Light (Prov. 20:27): "The spirit of a man is the 
lamp of the Lord." Therefore in Christ Who is the Word of God, there is 
no need of a human mind.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the assumption of human nature by the Word of God is 
called His Incarnation. But the intellect or human mind is nothing 
carnal, either in its substance or in its act. for it is not the act of a 
body, as is proved De Anima iii, 6. Hence it would seem that the Son of 
God did not assume a human mind.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum xiv): 
"Firmly hold and nowise doubt that Christ the Son of God has true flesh 
and a rational soul of the same kind as ours, since of His flesh He says 
(Lk. 24:39): 'Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as 
you see Me to have.' And He proves that He has a soul, saying (Jn. 
10:17): 'I lay down My soul [Douay: 'life'] that I may take it again.' 
And He proves that He has an intellect, saying (Mt. 11:29): 'Learn of Me, 
because I am meek and humble of heart.' And God says of Him by the 
prophet (Is. 52:13): 'Behold my servant shall understand.'"

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As Augustine says (De Haeres. 49,50), "the Apollinarists 
thought differently from the Catholic Church concerning the soul of 
Christ, saying with the Arians, that Christ took flesh alone, without a 
soul; and on being overcome on this point by the Gospel witness, they 
went on to say that the mind was wanting to Christ's soul, but that the 
Word supplied its place." But this position is refuted by the same 
arguments as the preceding. First, because it runs counter to the Gospel 
story, which relates how He marveled (as is plain from Mt. 8:10). Now 
marveling cannot be without reason, since it implies the collation of 
effect and cause, i.e. inasmuch as when we see an effect and are ignorant 
of its cause, we seek to know it, as is said Metaph. i, 2. Secondly, it 
is inconsistent with the purpose of the Incarnation,  which is the 
justification of man from sin. For the human soul is not capable of sin 
nor of justifying grace except through the mind. Hence it was especially 
necessary for the mind to be assumed. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 
iii, 6) that "the Word of God assumed a body and an intellectual and 
rational soul," and adds afterwards: "The whole was united to the whole, 
that He might bestow salvation on me wholly; for what was not assumed is 
not curable." Thirdly, it is against the truth of the Incarnation. For 
since the body is proportioned to the soul as matter to its proper form, 
it is not truly human flesh if it is not perfected by human, i.e. a 
rational soul. And hence if Christ had had a soul without a mind, He 
would not have had true human flesh, but irrational flesh, since our soul 
differs from an animal soul by the mind alone. Hence Augustine says (Qq. 
lxxxiii, qu. 80) that from this error it would have followed that the Son 
of God "took an animal with the form of a human body," which, again, is 
against the Divine truth, which cannot suffer any fictitious untruth.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Where a thing is by its presence, its image is not required 
to supply the place of the thing, as where the emperor is the soldiers do 
not pay homage to his image. Yet the image of a thing is required 
together with its presence, that it may be perfected by the presence of 
the thing, just as the image in the wax is perfected by the impression of 
the seal, and as the image of man is reflected in the mirror by his 
presence. Hence in order to perfect the human mind it was necessary that 
the Word should unite it to Himself.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The greater light dims the lesser light of another luminous 
body; but it does not dim, rather it perfects the light of the body 
illuminated---at the presence of the sun the light of the stars is put 
out, but the light of the air is perfected. Now the intellect or mind of 
man is, as it were, a light lit up by the light of the Divine Word; and 
hence by the presence of the Word the mind of man is perfected rather 
than overshadowed.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[5] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Although the intellective power is not the act of a body, 
nevertheless the essence of the human soul, which is the form of the 
body, requires that it should be more noble, in order that it may have 
the power of understanding; and hence it is necessary that a better 
disposed body should correspond to it.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE ORDER OF ASSUMPTION (SIX ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the order of the foregoing assumption, and under 
this head there are six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul?

 (2) Whether He assumed the soul through the medium of the spirit or mind?

 (3) Whether the soul was assumed previous to the flesh?

 (4) Whether the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word previous to 
being united to the soul?

 (5) Whether the whole human nature was assumed through the  medium of 
the parts?

 (6) Whether it was assumed through the medium of grace?


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume flesh through 
the medium of the soul. For the mode in which the Son of God is united to 
human nature and its parts, is more perfect than the mode whereby He is 
in all creatures. But He is in all creatures immediately by essence, 
power and presence. Much more, therefore, is the Son of God united to 
flesh without the medium of the soul.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the soul and flesh are united to the Word of God in 
unity of hypostasis or person. But the body pertains immediately to the 
human hypostasis or person, even as the soul. Indeed, the human body, 
since it is matter, would rather seem to be nearer the hypostasis than 
the soul, which is a form, since the principle of individuation, which is 
implied in the word "hypostasis," would seem to be matter. Hence the Son 
of God did not assume flesh through the medium of the soul.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, take away the medium and you separate what were joined 
by the medium; for example, if the superficies be removed color would 
leave the body, since it adheres to the body through the medium of the 
superficies. But though the soul was separated from the body by death, 
yet there still remained the union of the Word to the flesh, as will be 
shown (Q[50], AA[2],3). Hence the Word was not joined to flesh through 
the medium of the soul.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvi): "The 
greatness of the Divine power fitted to itself a rational soul, and 
through it a human body, so as to raise the whole man to something 
higher."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A medium is in reference to a beginning and an end. Hence 
as beginning and end imply order, so also does a medium. Now there is a 
twofold order: one, of time; the other, of nature. But in the mystery of 
the Incarnation nothing is said to be a medium in the order of time, for 
the Word of God united the whole human nature to Himself at the same 
time, as will appear (Q[30], A[3]). An order of nature between things may 
be taken in two ways: first, as regards rank of dignity, as we say the 
angels are midway between man and God; secondly, as regards the idea of 
causality, as we say a cause is midway between the first cause and the 
last effect. And this second order follows the first to some extent; for 
as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiii), God acts upon the more remote 
substances through the less remote. Hence if we consider the rank of 
dignity, the soul is found to be midway between God and flesh; and in 
this way it may be said that the Son of God united flesh to Himself, 
through the medium of the soul. But even as regards the second order of 
causality the soul is to some extent the cause of  flesh being united to 
the Son of God. For the flesh would not have been assumable, except by 
its relation to the rational soul, through which it becomes human flesh. 
For it was said above (Q[4], A[1]) that human nature was assumable before 
all others.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: We may consider a twofold order between creatures and God: 
the first is by reason of creatures being caused by God and depending on 
Him as on the principle of their being; and thus on account of the 
infinitude of His power God touches each thing immediately, by causing 
and preserving it, and so it is that God is in all things by essence, 
presence and power. But the second order is by reason of things being 
directed to God as to their end; and it is here that there is a medium 
between the creature and God, since lower creatures are directed to God 
by higher, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v); and to this order pertains 
the assumption of human nature by the Word of God, Who is the term of the 
assumption; and hence it is united to flesh through the soul.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: If the hypostasis of the Word of God were constituted 
simply by human nature, it would follow that the body was nearest to it, 
since it is matter which is the principle of individuation; even as the 
soul, being the specific form, would be nearer the human nature. But 
because the hypostasis of the Word is prior to and more exalted than the 
human nature, the more exalted any part of the human nature is, the 
nearer it is to the hypostasis of the Word. And hence the soul is nearer 
the Word of God than the body is.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Nothing prevents one thing being the cause of the aptitude 
and congruity of another, and yet if it be taken away the other remains; 
because although a thing's becoming may depend on another, yet when it is 
in being it no longer depends on it, just as a friendship brought about 
by some other may endure when the latter has gone; or as a woman is taken 
in marriage on account of her beauty, which makes a woman's fittingness 
for the marriage tie, yet when her beauty passes away, the marriage tie 
still remains. So likewise, when the soul was separated, the union of the 
Word with flesh still endured.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Son of God assumed a soul through the medium of the spirit or 
mind?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul through 
the medium of the spirit or mind. For nothing is a medium between itself 
and another. But the spirit is nothing else in essence but the soul 
itself, as was said above (FP, Q[77], A[1], ad 1). Therefore the Son of 
God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, what is the medium of the assumption is itself more 
assumable. But the spirit or mind is not more assumable than the soul; 
which is plain from the fact that angelic spirits are not assumable, as 
was said above (Q[4], A[1]). Hence it seems that the Son  of God did not 
assume a soul through the medium of the spirit.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, that which comes later is assumed by the first through 
the medium of what comes before. But the soul implies the very essence, 
which naturally comes before its power---the mind. Therefore it would 
seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the 
spirit or mind.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xviii): "The invisible 
and unchangeable Truth took a soul by means of the spirit, and a body by 
means of the soul."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the Son of God is said to have 
assumed flesh through the medium of the soul, on account of the order of 
dignity, and the congruity of the assumption. Now both these may be 
applied to the intellect, which is called the spirit, if we compare it 
with the other parts of the soul. For the soul is assumed congruously 
only inasmuch as it has a capacity for God, being in His likeness: which 
is in respect of the mind that is called the spirit, according to Eph. 
4:23: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind." So, too, the intellect is 
the highest and noblest of the parts of the soul, and the most like to 
God, and hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that "the Word of 
God is united to flesh through the medium of the intellect; for the 
intellect is the purest part of the soul, God Himself being an intellect."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Although the intellect is not distinct from the soul in 
essence, it is distinct from the other parts of the soul as a power; and 
it is in this way that it has the nature of a medium.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Fitness for assumption is wanting to the angelic spirits, 
not from any lack of dignity, but because of the irremediableness of 
their fall, which cannot be said of the human spirit, as is clear from 
what has been said above (FP, Q[62], A[8]; FP, Q[64], A[2]).

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The soul, between which and the Word of God the intellect 
is said to be a medium, does not stand for the essence of the soul, which 
is common to all the powers, but for the lower powers, which are common 
to every soul.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the soul was assumed before the flesh by the Son of God?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ was assumed before the 
flesh by the Word. For the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of 
the soul, as was said above (A[1]). Now the medium is reached before the 
end. Therefore the Son of God assumed the soul before the body.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the soul of Christ is nobler than the angels, according 
to Ps. 96:8: "Adore Him, all you His angels." But the angels were created 
in the beginning, as was said above (FP, Q[46],  A[3]). Therefore the 
soul of Christ also (was created in the beginning). But it was not 
created before it was assumed, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 
2,3,9), that "neither the soul nor the body of Christ ever had any 
hypostasis save the hypostasis of the Word." Therefore it would seem that 
the soul was assumed before the flesh, which was conceived in the womb of 
the Virgin.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Jn. 1:14): "We saw Him [Vulg.: 'His 
glory'] full of grace and truth," and it is added afterwards that "of His 
fulness we have all received" (Jn. 1:16), i.e. all the faithful of all 
time, as Chrysostom expounds it (Hom. xiii in Joan.). Now this could not 
have been unless the soul of Christ had all fulness of grace and truth 
before all the saints, who were from the beginning of the world, for the 
cause is not subsequent to the effect. Hence since the fulness of grace 
and truth was in the soul of Christ from union with the Word, according 
to what is written in the same place: "We saw His glory, the glory as it 
were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth," it 
would seem in consequence that from the beginning of the world the soul 
of Christ was assumed by the Word of God.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 6): "The intellect 
was not, as some untruthfully say, united to the true God, and henceforth 
called Christ, before the Incarnation which was of the Virgin."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8; ii, 8) maintained that all 
souls, amongst which he placed Christ's soul, were created in the 
beginning. But this is not fitting, if we suppose that it was first of 
all created, but not at once joined to the Word, since it would follow 
that this soul once had its proper subsistence without the Word; and 
thus, since it was assumed by the Word, either the union did not take 
place in the subsistence, or the pre-existing subsistence of the soul was 
corrupted. So likewise it is not fitting to suppose that this soul was 
united to the Word from the beginning, and that it afterwards became 
incarnate in the womb of the Virgin; for thus His soul would not seem to 
be of the same nature as ours, which are created at the same time that 
they are infused into bodies. Hence Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Julian. xxxv) 
that "Christ's flesh was not of a different nature to ours, nor was a 
different soul infused into it in the beginning than into other men."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As was said above (A[1]), the soul of Christ is said to be 
the medium in the union of the flesh with the Word, in the order of 
nature; but it does not follow from this that it was the medium in the 
order of time.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As Pope Leo says in the same Epistle, Christ's soul excels 
our soul "not by diversity of genus, but by sublimity of power"; for it 
is of the same genus as our souls, yet excels even the angels in "fulness 
of grace and truth." But the mode of creation is in harmony with the 
generic property of the soul; and since it is the form of the body, it is 
consequently created at the  same time that it is infused into and united 
with the body; which does not happen to angels, since they are substances 
entirely free from matter.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Of the fulness of Christ all men receive according to the 
faith they have in Him; for it is written (Rm. 3:22) that "the justice of 
God is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe 
in Him." Now just as we believe in Him as already born; so the ancients 
believed in Him as about to be born, since "having the same spirit of 
faith . . . we also believe," as it is written (2 Cor. 4:13). But the 
faith which is in Christ has the power of justifying by reason of the 
purpose of the grace of God, according to Rm. 4:5: "But to him that 
worketh not, yet believeth in Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith 
is reputed to justice according to the purpose of the grace of God." 
Hence because this purpose is eternal, there is nothing to hinder some 
from being justified by the faith of Jesus Christ, even before His soul 
was full of grace and truth.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word before being united 
to the soul?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word 
before being united to the soul. For Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De 
Fide ad Petrum xviii): "Most firmly hold, and nowise doubt that the flesh 
of Christ was not conceived in the womb of the Virgin without the Godhead 
before it was assumed by the Word." But the flesh of Christ would seem to 
have been conceived before being united to the rational soul, because 
matter or disposition is prior to the completive form in order of 
generation. Therefore the flesh of Christ was assumed before being united 
to the soul.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as the soul is a part of human nature, so is the body. 
But the human soul in Christ had no other principle of being than in 
other men, as is clear from the authority of Pope Leo, quoted above (A[3]
). Therefore it would seem that the body of Christ had no other principle 
of being than we have. But in us the body is begotten before the rational 
soul comes to it. Therefore it was the same in Christ; and thus the flesh 
was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, as is said (De Causis), the first cause excels the 
second in bringing about the effect, and precedes it in its union with 
the effect. But the soul of Christ is compared to the Word as a second 
cause to a first. Hence the Word was united to the flesh before it was to 
the soul.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2): "At the same 
time the Word of God was made flesh, and flesh was united to a rational 
and intellectual soul." Therefore the union of the Word with the flesh 
did not precede the union with the soul.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[4] Body Para. 1/1 

 I answer that, The human flesh is assumable by the Word on account of 
the order which it has to the rational soul as to its proper form. Now it 
has not this order before the rational soul comes to it, because when any 
matter becomes proper to any form, at the same time it receives that 
form; hence the alteration is terminated at the same instant in which the 
substantial form is introduced. And hence it is that the flesh ought not 
to have been assumed before it was human flesh; and this happened when 
the rational soul came to it. Therefore since the soul was not assumed 
before the flesh, inasmuch as it is against the nature of the soul to be 
before it is united to the body, so likewise the flesh ought not to have 
been assumed before the soul, since it is not human flesh before it has a 
rational soul.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Human flesh depends upon the soul for its being; and hence, 
before the coming of the soul, there is no human flesh, but there may be 
a disposition towards human flesh. Yet in the conception of Christ, the 
Holy Ghost, Who is an agent of infinite might, disposed the matter and 
brought it to its perfection at the same time.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The form actually gives the species; but the matter in 
itself is in potentiality to the species. And hence it would be against 
the nature of a form to exist before the specific nature. And therefore 
the dissimilarity between our origin and Christ's origin, inasmuch as we 
are conceived before being animated, and Christ's flesh is not, is by 
reason of what precedes the perfection of the nature, viz. that we are 
conceived from the seed of man, and Christ is not. But a difference which 
would be with reference to the origin of the soul, would bespeak a 
diversity of nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The Word of God is understood to be united to the flesh 
before the soul by the common mode whereby He is in the rest of creatures 
by essence, power, and presence. Yet I say "before," not in time, but in 
nature; for the flesh is understood as a being, which it has from the 
Word, before it is understood as animated, which it has from the soul. 
But by the personal union we understand the flesh as united to the soul 
before it is united to the Word, for it is from its union with the soul 
that it is capable of being united to the Word in Person; especially 
since a person is found only in the rational nature


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the whole human nature was assumed through the medium of the 
parts?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Son of God assumed the whole human nature 
through the medium of its parts. For Augustine says (De Agone Christ. 
xviii) that "the invisible and unchangeable Truth assumed the soul 
through the medium of the spirit, and the body through the medium of the 
soul, and in this way the whole man." But the spirit, soul, and body are 
parts of the whole man. Therefore He assumed all, through the medium of 
the parts. 

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the 
soul because the soul is more like to God than the body. But the parts of 
human nature, since they are simpler than the body, would seem to be more 
like to God, Who is most simple, than the whole. Therefore He assumed the 
whole through the medium of the parts.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the whole results from the union of parts. But the union 
is taken to be the term of the assumption, and the parts are presupposed 
to the assumption. Therefore He assumed the whole by the parts.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 16): "In our Lord 
Jesus Christ we do not behold parts of parts, but such as are immediately 
joined, i.e. the Godhead and the manhood." Now the humanity is a whole, 
which is composed of soul and body, as parts. Therefore the Son of God 
assumed the parts through the medium of the whole.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, When anything is said to be a medium in the assumption of 
the Incarnation, we do not signify order of time, because the assumption 
of the whole and the parts was simultaneous. For it has been shown (AA[3]
,4) that the soul and body were mutually united at the same time in order 
to constitute the human nature of the Word. But it is order of nature 
that is signified. Hence by what is prior in nature, that is assumed 
which is posterior in nature. Now a thing is prior in nature in two ways: 
First on the part of the agent, secondly on the part of the matter; for 
these two causes precede the thing. On the part of the agent---that is 
simply first, which is first included in his intention; but that is 
relatively first, with which his operation begins---and this because the 
intention is prior to the operation. On the part of the matter---that is 
first which exists first in the transmutation of the matter. Now in the 
Incarnation the order depending on the agent must be particularly 
considered, because, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii), "in 
such things the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer." But 
it is manifest that, according to the intention of the doer, what is 
complete is prior to what is incomplete, and, consequently, the whole to 
the parts. Hence it must be said that the Word of God assumed the parts 
of human nature, through the medium of the whole; for even as He assumed 
the body on account of its relation to the rational soul, so likewise He 
assumed a body and soul on account of their relation to human nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: From these words nothing may be gathered, except that the 
Word, by assuming the parts of human nature, assumed the whole human 
nature. And thus the assumption of parts is prior in the order of the 
intellect, if we consider the operation, but not in order of time; 
whereas the assumption of the nature is prior if we consider the 
intention: and this is to be simply first, as was said above.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 2: God is so simple that He is also most perfect; and hence 
the whole is more like to God than the parts, inasmuch as it is more 
perfect.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: It is a personal union wherein the assumption is 
terminated, not a union of nature, which springs from a conjunction of 
parts.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the human nature was assumed through the medium of grace?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Son of God assumed human nature through 
the medium of grace. For by grace we are united to God. But the human 
nature in Christ was most closely united to God. Therefore the union took 
place by grace.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as the body lives by the soul, which is its perfection, 
so does the soul by grace. But the human nature was fitted for the 
assumption by the soul. Therefore the Son of God assumed the soul through 
the medium of grace.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 11) that the incarnate Word 
is like our spoken word. But our word is united to our speech by means of 
"breathing" [spiritus]. Therefore the Word of God is united to flesh by 
means of the Holy Spirit, and hence by means of grace, which is 
attributed to the Holy Spirit, according to 1 Cor. 12:4: "Now there are 
diversities of graces, but the same Spirit."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Grace is an accident in the soul, as was shown above 
(FS, Q[110], A[2]). Now the union of the Word with human nature took 
place in the subsistence, and not accidentally, as was shown above (Q[2], 
A[6]). Therefore the human nature was not assumed by means of grace.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, In Christ there was the grace of union and habitual 
grace. Therefore grace cannot be taken to be the medium of the assumption 
of the human nature, whether we speak of the grace of union or of 
habitual grace. For the grace of union is the personal being that is 
given gratis from above to the human nature in the Person of the Word, 
and is the term of the assumption. Whereas the habitual grace pertaining 
to the spiritual holiness of the man is an effect following the union, 
according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw His glory . . . as it were of the 
Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth"---by which we are 
given to understand that because this Man (as a result of the union) is 
the Only-begotten of the Father, He is full of grace and truth. But if by 
grace we understand the will of God doing or bestowing something gratis, 
the union took place by grace, not as a means, but as the efficient cause.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Our union with God is by operation, inasmuch as we know and 
love Him; and hence this union is by habitual grace, inasmuch as a 
perfect operation proceeds from a habit. Now the  union of the human 
nature with the Word of God is in personal being, which depends not on 
any habit, but on the nature itself.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The soul is the substantial perfection of the body; grace 
is but an accidental perfection of the soul. Hence grace cannot ordain 
the soul to personal union, which is not accidental, as the soul ordains 
the body.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[6] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Our word is united to our speech, by means of breathing 
[spiritus], not as a formal medium, but as a moving medium. For from the 
word conceived within, the breathing proceeds, from which the speech is 
formed. And similarly from the eternal Word proceeds the Holy Spirit, Who 
formed the body of Christ, as will be shown (Q[32], A[1]). But it does 
not follow from this that the grace of the Holy Spirit is the formal 
medium in the aforesaid union.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] Out. Para. 1/4

OF THE GRACE OF CHRIST AS AN INDIVIDUAL MAN (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)

 We must now consider such things as were co-assumed by the Son of God in 
human nature; and first what belongs to perfection; secondly, what 
belongs to defect.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] Out. Para. 2/4

 Concerning the first, there are three points of consideration: (1) The 
grace of Christ; (2) His knowledge; (3) His power.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] Out. Para. 3/4

 With regard to His grace we must consider two things: (1) His grace as 
He is an individual man; (2) His grace as He is the Head of the Church. 
Of the grace of union we have already spoken (Q[2]).

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] Out. Para. 4/4

 Under the first head there are thirteen points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether in the soul of Christ there was any habitual grace?

 (2) Whether in Christ there were virtues?

 (3) Whether He had faith?

 (4) Whether He had hope?

 (5) Whether in Christ there were the gifts?

 (6) Whether in Christ there was the gift of fear?

 (7) Whether in Christ there were any gratuitous graces?

 (8) Whether in Christ there was prophecy?

 (9) Whether there was the fulness of grace in Him?

 (10) Whether such fulness was proper to Christ?

 (11) Whether the grace of Christ was infinite?

 (12) Whether it could have been increased?

 (13) How this grace stood towards the union?


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether in the Soul of Christ there was any habitual grace?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem there was no habitual grace in the soul assumed by 
the Word. For grace is a certain partaking of the Godhead by the rational 
creature, according to 2 Pt. 1:4: "By Whom He hath given us most great 
and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the 
Divine Nature." Now Christ is God  not by participation, but in truth. 
Therefore there was no habitual grace in Him.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, grace is necessary to man, that he may operate well, 
according to 1 Cor. 15:10: "I have labored more abundantly than all they; 
yet not I, but the grace of God with me"; and in order that he may reach 
eternal life, according to Rm. 6:23: "The grace of God (is) life 
everlasting." Now the inheritance of everlasting life was due to Christ 
by the mere fact of His being the natural Son of God; and by the fact of 
His being the Word, by Whom all things were made, He had the power of 
doing all things well. Therefore His human nature needed no further grace 
beyond union with the Word.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, what operates as an instrument does not need a habit for 
its own operations, since habits are rooted in the principal agent. Now 
the human nature in Christ was "as the instrument of the Godhead," as 
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15). Therefore there was no need of 
habitual grace in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord shall 
rest upon Him"---which (Spirit), indeed, is said to be in man by habitual 
grace, as was said above (FP, Q[8], A[3]; FP, Q[43], AA[3],6). Therefore 
there was habitual grace in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, It is necessary to suppose habitual grace in Christ for 
three reasons. First, on account of the union of His soul with the Word 
of God. For the nearer any recipient is to an inflowing cause, the more 
does it partake of its influence. Now the influx of grace is from God, 
according to Ps. 83:12: "The Lord will give grace and glory." And hence 
it was most fitting that His soul should receive the influx of Divine 
grace. Secondly, on account of the dignity of this soul, whose operations 
were to attain so closely to God by knowledge and love, to which it is 
necessary for human nature to be raised by grace. Thirdly, on account of 
the relation of Christ to the human race. For Christ, as man, is the 
"Mediator of God and men," as is written, 1 Tim. 2:5; and hence it 
behooved Him to have grace which would overflow upon others, according to 
Jn. 1:16: "And of His fulness we have all received, and grace for grace."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Christ is the true God in Divine Person and Nature. Yet 
because together with unity of person there remains distinction of 
natures, as stated above (Q[2], AA[1],2), the soul of Christ. is not 
essentially Divine. Hence it behooves it to be Divine by participation, 
which is by grace.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: To Christ, inasmuch as He is the natural Son of God, is due 
an eternal inheritance, which is the uncreated beatitude through the 
uncreated act of knowledge and love of God, i.e. the same whereby the 
Father knows and loves Himself. Now the soul was not capable of this act, 
on account of the difference of natures. Hence it behooved it to attain 
to God by a created act of fruition which could not be without grace. 
Likewise, inasmuch as He  was the Word of God, He had the power of doing 
all things well by the Divine operation. And because it is necessary to 
admit a human operation, distinct from the Divine operation, as will be 
shown (Q[19], A[1]), it was necessary for Him to have habitual grace, 
whereby this operation might be perfect in Him.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The humanity of Christ is the instrument of the 
Godhead---not, indeed, an inanimate instrument, which nowise acts, but is 
merely acted upon; but an instrument animated by a rational soul, which 
is so acted upon as to act. And hence the nature of the action demanded 
that he should have habitual grace.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether in Christ there were virtues?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that in Christ there were no virtues. For Christ 
had the plenitude of grace. Now grace is sufficient for every good act, 
according to 2 Cor. 12:9: "My grace is sufficient for thee." Therefore 
there were no virtues in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1), virtue is 
contrasted with a "certain heroic or godlike habit" which is attributed 
to godlike men. But this belongs chiefly to Christ. Therefore Christ had 
not virtues, but something higher than virtue.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, as was said above (FS, Q[65], AA[1],2), all the virtues 
are bound together. But it was not becoming for Christ to have all the 
virtues, as is clear in the case of liberality and magnificence, for 
these have to do with riches, which Christ spurned, according to Mt. 
8:20: "The Son of man hath not where to lay His head." Temperance and 
continence also regard wicked desires, from which Christ was free. 
Therefore Christ had not the virtues.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, on Ps. 1:2, "But His will is in the law of the Lord," a 
gloss says: "This refers to Christ, Who is full of all good." But a good 
quality of the mind is a virtue. Therefore Christ was full of all virtue.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As was said above (FS, Q[110], AA[3],4), as grace regards 
the essence of the soul, so does virtue regard its power. Hence it is 
necessary that as the powers of the soul flow from its essence, so do the 
virtues flow from grace. Now the more perfect a principle is, the more it 
impresses its effects. Hence, since the grace of Christ was most perfect, 
there flowed from it, in consequence, the virtues which perfect the 
several powers of the soul for all the soul's acts; and thus Christ had 
all the virtues.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Grace suffices a man for all whereby he is ordained to 
beatitude; nevertheless, it effects some of these by itself---as to make 
him pleasing to God, and the like; and some others through the medium of 
the virtues which proceed from grace.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A heroic or godlike habit only differs from  virtue 
commonly so called by a more perfect mode, inasmuch as one is disposed to 
good in a higher way than is common to all. Hence it is not hereby proved 
that Christ had not the virtues, but that He had them most perfectly 
beyond the common mode. In this sense Plotinus gave to a certain sublime 
degree of virtue the name of "virtue of the purified soul" (cf. FS, Q[61]
, A[5]).

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Liberality and magnificence are praiseworthy in regard to 
riches, inasmuch as anyone does not esteem wealth to the extent of 
wishing to retain it, so as to forego what ought to be done. But he 
esteems them least who wholly despises them, and casts them aside for 
love of perfection. And hence by altogether contemning all riches, Christ 
showed the highest kind of liberality and magnificence; although He also 
performed the act of liberality, as far as it became Him, by causing to 
be distributed to the poor what was given to Himself. Hence, when our 
Lord said to Judas (Jn. 13:21), "That which thou dost do quickly," the 
disciples understood our Lord to have ordered him to give something to 
the poor. But Christ had no evil desires whatever, as will be shown 
(Q[15], AA[1],2); yet He was not thereby prevented from having 
temperance, which is the more perfect in man, as he is without evil 
desires. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9), the 
temperate man differs from the continent in this---that the temperate has 
not the evil desires which the continent suffers. Hence, taking 
continence in this sense, as the Philosopher takes it, Christ, from the 
very fact that He had all virtue, had not continence, since it is not a 
virtue, but something less than virtue.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether in Christ there was faith?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there was faith in Christ. For faith is a 
nobler virtue than the moral virtues, e.g. temperance and liberality. Now 
these were in Christ, as stated above (A[2]). Much more, therefore, was 
there faith in Him.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Christ did not teach virtues which He had not Himself, 
according to Acts 1:1: "Jesus began to do and to teach." But of Christ it 
is said (Heb. 12:2) that He is "the author and finisher of our faith." 
Therefore there was faith in Him before all others.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, everything imperfect is excluded from the blessed. But 
in the blessed there is faith; for on Rm. 1:17, "the justice of God is 
revealed therein from faith to faith," a gloss says: "From the faith of 
words and hope to the faith of things and sight." Therefore it would seem 
that in Christ also there was faith, since it implies nothing imperfect.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:1): "Faith is the evidence of 
things that appear not." But there was nothing that did not appear to 
Christ, according to what Peter said to Him (Jn. 21:17): "Thou knowest 
all things." Therefore there was no faith in Christ. 

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As was said above (SS, Q[1], A[4]), the object of faith 
is a Divine thing not seen. Now the habit of virtue, as every other 
habit, takes its species from the object. Hence, if we deny that the 
Divine thing was not seen, we exclude the very essence of faith. Now from 
the first moment of His conception Christ saw God's Essence fully, as 
will be made clear (Q[34], A[1]). Hence there could be no faith in Him.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Faith is a nobler virtue than the moral virtues, seeing 
that it has to do with nobler matter; nevertheless, it implies a certain 
defect with regard to that matter; and this defect was not in Christ. And 
hence there could be no faith in Him, although the moral virtues were in 
Him, since in their nature they imply no defect with regard to their 
matter.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The merit of faith consists in this---that man through 
obedience assents to what things he does not see, according to Rm. 1:5: 
"For obedience to the faith in all nations for His name." Now Christ had 
most perfect obedience to God, according to Phil. 2:8: "Becoming obedient 
unto death." And hence He taught nothing pertaining to merit which He did 
not fulfil more perfectly Himself.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As a gloss says in the same place, faith is that "whereby 
such things as are not seen are believed." But faith in things seen is 
improperly so called, and only after a certain similitude with regard to 
the certainty and firmness of the assent.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether in Christ there was hope?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there was hope in Christ. For it is said in 
the Person of Christ (Ps. 30:1): "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped." But the 
virtue of hope is that whereby a man hopes in God. Therefore the virtue 
of hope was in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, hope is the expectation of the bliss to come, as was 
shown above (SS, Q[17], A[5], ad 3). But Christ awaited something 
pertaining to bliss, viz. the glorifying of His body. Therefore it seems 
there was hope in Him.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, everyone may hope for what pertains to his perfection, 
if it has yet to come. But there was something still to come pertaining 
to Christ's perfection, according to Eph. 4:12: "For the perfecting of 
the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the building up [Douay: 
'edifying'] of the body of Christ." Hence it seems that it befitted 
Christ to have hope.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Rm. 8:24): "What a man seeth, why doth 
he hope for?" Thus it is clear that as faith is of the unseen, so also is 
hope. But there was no faith in Christ, as was said above (A[1]): 
neither, consequently, was there hope.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[4] Body Para. 1/1 

 I answer that, As it is of the nature of faith that one assents to what 
one sees not, so is it of the nature of hope that one expects what as yet 
one has not; and as faith, forasmuch as it is a theological virtue, does 
not regard everything unseen, but only God; so likewise hope, as a 
theological virtue, has God Himself for its object, the fruition of Whom 
man chiefly expects by the virtue of hope; yet, in consequence, whoever 
has the virtue of hope may expect the Divine aid in other things, even as 
he who has the virtue of faith believes God not only in Divine things, 
but even in whatsoever is divinely revealed. Now from the beginning of 
His conception Christ had the Divine fruition fully, as will be shown 
(Q[34], A[4]), and hence he had not the virtue of hope. Nevertheless He 
had hope as regards such things as He did not yet possess, although He 
had not faith with regard to anything; because, although He knew all 
things fully, wherefore faith was altogether wanting to Him, nevertheless 
He did not as yet fully possess all that pertained to His perfection, 
viz. immortality and glory of the body, which He could hope for.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This is said of Christ with reference to hope, not as a 
theological virtue, but inasmuch as He hoped for some other things not 
yet possessed, as was said above.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The glory of the body does not pertain to beatitude as 
being that in which beatitude principally consists, but by a certain 
outpouring from the soul's glory, as was said above (FS, Q[4], A[6]). 
Hence hope, as a theological virtue, does not regard the bliss of the 
body but the soul's bliss, which consists in the Divine fruition.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The building up of the church by the conversion of the 
faithful does not pertain to the perfection of Christ, whereby He is 
perfect in Himself, but inasmuch as it leads others to a share of His 
perfection. And because hope properly regards what is expected by him who 
hopes, the virtue of hope cannot properly be said to be in Christ, 
because of the aforesaid reason.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether in Christ there were the gifts?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the gifts were not in Christ. For, as is 
commonly said, the gifts are given to help the virtues. But what is 
perfect in itself does not need an exterior help. Therefore, since the 
virtues of Christ were perfect, it seems there were no gifts in Him.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, to give and to receive gifts would not seem to belong to 
the same; since to give pertains to one who has, and to receive pertains 
to one who has not. But it belongs to Christ to give gifts according to 
Ps. 67:19. "Thou hast given gifts to men [Vulg.: 'Thou hast received 
gifts in men']." Therefore it was not becoming that Christ should receive 
gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, four gifts would seem to pertain to the  contemplation 
of earth, viz. wisdom, knowledge, understanding, and counsel which 
pertains to prudence; hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) enumerates 
these with the intellectual virtues. But Christ had the contemplation of 
heaven. Therefore He had not these gifts.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Is. 4:1): "Seven women shall take hold 
of one man": on which a gloss says: "That is, the seven gifts of the Holy 
Ghost shall take hold of Christ."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As was said above (FS, Q[68], A[1]), the gifts, properly, 
are certain perfections of the soul's powers, inasmuch a[9] these have a 
natural aptitude to be moved by the Holy Ghost, according to Luke 4:1: 
"And Jesus, being full of the Holy Ghost, returned from the Jordan, and 
was led by the Spirit into the desert." Hence it is manifest that in 
Christ the gifts were in a pre-eminent degree.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: What is perfect in the order of its nature needs to be 
helped by something of a higher nature; as man, however perfect, needs to 
be helped by God. And in this way the virtues, which perfect the powers 
of the soul, as they are controlled by reason, no matter how perfect they 
are, need to be helped by the gifts, which perfect the soul's powers, 
inasmuch as these are moved by the Holy Ghost.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Christ is not a recipient and a giver of the gifts of the 
Holy Ghost, in the same respect; for He gives them as God and receives 
them as man. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the Holy Ghost never 
quitted the human nature of Christ, from Whose Divine nature He 
proceedeth."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: In Christ there was not only heavenly knowledge, but also 
earthly knowledge, as will be said (Q[15], A[10]). And yet even in heaven 
the gifts of the Holy Ghost will still exist, in a certain manner, as was 
said above (FS, Q[68], A[6]).


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether in Christ there was the gift of fear?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the gift of fear. For 
hope would seem to be stronger than fear; since the object of hope is 
goodness, and of fear, evil. as was said above (FS, Q[40], A[1]; FS, 
Q[42], A[1]). But in Christ there was not the virtue of hope, as was said 
above (A[4]). Hence, likewise, there was not the gift of fear in Him.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, by the gift of fear we fear either to be separated from 
God, which pertains to "chaste" fear---or to be punished by Him, which 
pertains to "servile" fear, as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. ix). But 
Christ did not fear being separated from God by sin, nor being punished 
by Him on account of a fault, since it was impossible for Him to sin, as 
will be said (Q[15], AA[1],2). Now fear is not of the impossible. 
Therefore in Christ there was not the gift of fear. 

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is written (1 Jn. 4:18) that "perfect charity casteth 
out fear." But in Christ there was most perfect charity, according to 
Eph. 3:19: "The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge." 
Therefore in Christ there was not the gift of fear.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:3): "And He shall be filled with 
the spirit of the fear of the Lord."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As was said above (FS, Q[42], A[1]), fear regards two 
objects, one of which is an evil causing terror; the other is that by 
whose power an evil can be inflicted, as we fear the king inasmuch as he 
has the power of putting to death. Now whoever can hurt would not be 
feared unless he had a certain greatness of might, to which resistance 
could not easily be offered; for what we easily repel we do not fear. And 
hence it is plain that no one is feared except for some pre-eminence. And 
in this way it is said that in Christ there was the fear of God, not 
indeed as it regards the evil of separation from God by fault, nor as it 
regards the evil of punishment for fault; but inasmuch as it regards the 
Divine pre-eminence, on account of which the soul of Christ, led by the 
Holy Spirit, was borne towards God in an act of reverence. Hence it is 
said (Heb. 5:7) that in all things "he was heard for his reverence." For 
Christ as man had this act of reverence towards God in a fuller sense and 
beyond all others. And hence Scripture attributes to Him the fulness of 
the fear of the Lord.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The habits of virtues and gifts regard goodness properly 
and of themselves; but evil, consequently; since it pertains to the 
nature of virtue to render acts good, as is said Ethic. ii, 6. And hence 
the nature of the gift of fear regards not that evil which fear is 
concerned with, but the pre-eminence of that goodness, viz. of God, by 
Whose power evil may be inflicted. on the other hand, hope, as a virtue, 
regards not only the author of good, but even the good itself, as far as 
it is not yet possessed. And hence to Christ, Who already possessed the 
perfect good of beatitude, we do not attribute the virtue of hope, but we 
do attribute the gift of fear.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This reason is based on fear in so far as it regards the 
evil object.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Perfect charity casts out servile fear, which principally 
regards punishment. But this kind of fear was not in Christ.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the gratuitous graces were in Christ?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the gratuitous graces were not in Christ. For 
whoever has anything in its fulness, to him it does not pertain to have 
it by participation. Now Christ has grace in its fulness, according to 
Jn. 1:14: "Full of grace and truth." But the  gratuitous graces would 
seem to be certain participations, bestowed distributively and 
particularly upon divers subjects, according to 1 Cor. 12:4: "Now there 
are diversities of graces." Therefore it would seem that there were no 
gratuitous graces in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, what is due to anyone would not seem to be gratuitously 
bestowed on him. But it was due to the man Christ that He should abound 
in the word of wisdom and knowledge, and to be mighty in doing wonderful 
works and the like, all of which pertain to gratuitous graces: since He 
is "the power of God and the wisdom of God," as is written 1 Cor. 1:24. 
Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to have the gratuitous graces.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, gratuitous graces are ordained to the benefit of the 
faithful. But it does not seem that a habit which a man does not use is 
for the benefit of others, according to Ecclus. 20:32: "Wisdom that is 
hid and treasure that is not seen: what profit is there in them both?" 
Now we do not read that Christ made use of these gratuitously given 
graces, especially as regards the gift of tongues. Therefore not all the 
gratuitous graces were in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Dardan. cclxxxvii) that "as in 
the head are all the senses, so in Christ were all the graces."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[7] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As was said above (FS, Q[3], AA[1],4), the gratuitous 
graces are ordained for the manifestation of faith and spiritual 
doctrine. For it behooves him who teaches to have the means of making his 
doctrine clear; otherwise his doctrine would be useless. Now Christ is 
the first and chief teacher of spiritual doctrine and faith, according to 
Heb. 2:3,4: "Which having begun to be declared by the Lord was confirmed 
unto us by them that heard Him, God also bearing them witness by signs 
and wonders." Hence it is clear that all the gratuitous graces were most 
excellently in Christ, as in the first and chief teacher of the faith.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As sanctifying grace is ordained to meritorious acts both 
interior and exterior, so likewise gratuitous grace is ordained to 
certain exterior acts manifestive of the faith, as the working of 
miracles, and the like. Now of both these graces Christ had the fulness. 
since inasmuch as His soul was united to the Godhead, He had the perfect 
power of effecting all these acts. But other saints who are moved by God 
as separated and not united instruments, receive power in a particular 
manner in order to bring about this or that act. And hence in other 
saints these graces are divided, but not in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Christ is said to be the power of God and the wisdom of 
God, inasmuch as He is the Eternal Son of God. But in this respect it 
does not pertain to Him to have grace, but rather to be the bestower of 
grace. but it pertains to Him in His human nature to have grace.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The gift of tongues was bestowed on the apostles,  because 
they were sent to teach all nations; but Christ wished to preach 
personally only in the one nation of the Jews, as He Himself says (Mt. 
15:24): "I was not sent but to the sheep that are lost of the house of 
Israel"; and the Apostle says (Rm. 15:8): "I say that Christ Jesus was 
minister of the circumcision." And hence it was not necessary for Him to 
speak several languages. Yet was a knowledge of all languages not wanting 
to Him, since even the secrets of hearts, of which all words are signs, 
were not hidden from Him, as will be shown (Q[10], A[2]). Nor was this 
knowledge uselessly possessed. just as it is not useless to have a habit, 
which we do not use when there is no occasion.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether in Christ there was the gift of prophecy?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the gift of prophecy. 
For prophecy implies a certain obscure and imperfect knowledge, according 
to Num. 12:6: "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear 
to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream." But Christ had 
full and unveiled knowledge, much more than Moses, of whom it is 
subjoined that "plainly and not by riddles and figures doth he see God" 
(Num. 6:8). Therefore we ought not to admit prophecy in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as faith has to do with what is not seen, and hope with 
what is not possessed, so prophecy has to do with what is not present, 
but distant; for a prophet means, as it were, a teller of far-off things. 
But in Christ there could be neither faith nor hope, as was said above 
(AA[3],4). Hence prophecy also ought not to be admitted in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a prophet is in an inferior order to an angel; hence 
Moses, who was the greatest of the prophets, as was said above (SS, 
Q[174], A[4]) is said (Acts 7:38) to have spoken with an angel in the 
desert. But Christ was "made lower than the angels," not as to the 
knowledge of His soul, but only as regards the sufferings of His body, as 
is shown Heb. 2:9. Therefore it seems that Christ was not a prophet.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written of Him (Dt. 18:15): "Thy God will raise 
up to thee a prophet of thy nation and of thy brethren," and He says of 
Himself (Mt. 13:57; Jn. 4:44): "A prophet is not without honor, save in 
his own country."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[8] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, A prophet means, as it were, a teller or seer of far-off 
things, inasmuch as he knows and announces what things are far from men's 
senses, as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xvi, 18). Now we must bear in 
mind that no one can be called a prophet for knowing and announcing what 
is distant from others, with whom he is not. And this is clear in regard 
to place and time. For if anyone living in France were to know and 
announce to others living in France what things were transpiring in 
Syria, it would be prophetical, as Eliseus told Giezi (4 Kgs. 5:26) how 
the man had leaped down from his chariot to meet him. But if anyone 
living in  Syria were to announce what things were there, it would not be 
prophetical. And the same appears in regard to time. For it was 
prophetical of Isaias to announce that Cyrus, King of the Persians, would 
rebuild the temple of God, as is clear from Is. 44:28. But it was not 
prophetical of Esdras to write it, in whose time it took place. Hence if 
God or angels, or even the blessed, know and announce what is beyond our 
knowing, this does not pertain to prophecy, since they nowise touch our 
state. Now Christ before His passion touched our state, inasmuch as He 
was not merely a "comprehensor," but a "wayfarer." Hence it was 
prophetical in Him to know and announce what was beyond the knowledge of 
other "wayfarers": and for this reason He is called a prophet.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: These words do not prove that enigmatical knowledge, viz. 
by dream and vision, belongs to the nature of prophecy; but the 
comparison is drawn between other prophets, who saw Divine things in 
dreams and visions, and Moses, who saw God plainly and not by riddles, 
and who yet is called a prophet, according to Dt. 24:10: "And there arose 
no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses." Nevertheless it may be said 
that although Christ had full and unveiled knowledge as regards the 
intellective part, yet in the imaginative part He had certain 
similitudes, in which Divine things could be viewed, inasmuch as He was 
not only a "comprehensor," but a "wayfarer."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Faith regards such things as are unseen by him who 
believes; and hope, too, is of such things as are not possessed by the 
one who hopes; but prophecy is of such things as are beyond the sense of 
men, with whom the prophet dwells and converses in this state of life. 
And hence faith and hope are repugnant to the perfection of Christ's 
beatitude; but prophecy is not.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Angels, being "comprehensors," are above prophets, who are 
merely "wayfarers"; but not above Christ, Who was both a "comprehensor" 
and a "wayfarer."


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether in Christ there was the fulness of grace?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the fulness of grace. 
For the virtues flow from grace, as was said above (FS, Q[110], A[4]). 
But in Christ there were not all the virtues; for there was neither faith 
nor hope in Him, as was shown above (AA[3],4). Therefore in Christ there 
was not the fulness of grace.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as is plain from what was said above (FS, Q[111], A[2]), 
grace is divided into operating and cooperating. Now operating grace 
signifies that whereby the ungodly is justified, which has no place in 
Christ, Who never lay under any sin. Therefore in Christ there was not 
the fulness of grace.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is written (James 1:17): "Every best gift and every 
perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights." But 
what comes thus is possessed partially, and not  fully. Therefore no 
creature, not even the soul of Christ, can have the fulness of the gifts 
of grace.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:14): "We saw Him [Vulg.: 'His 
glory'] full of grace and truth."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[9] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, To have fully is to have wholly and perfectly. Now 
totality and perfection can be taken in two ways: First as regards their 
"intensive" quantity; for instance, I may say that some man has whiteness 
fully, because he has as much of it as can naturally be in him; secondly, 
"as regards power"; for instance, if anyone be said to have life fully, 
inasmuch as he has it in all the effects or works of life; and thus man 
has life fully, but senseless animals or plants have not. Now in both 
these ways Christ has the fulness of grace. First, since He has grace in 
its highest degree, in the most perfect way it can be had. And this 
appears, first, from the nearness of Christ's soul to the cause of grace. 
For it was said above (A[1]) that the nearer a recipient is to the 
inflowing cause, the more it receives. And hence the soul of Christ, 
which is more closely united to God than all other rational creatures, 
receives the greatest outpouring of His grace. Secondly, in His relation 
to the effect. For the soul of Christ so received grace, that, in a 
manner, it is poured out from it upon others. And hence it behooved Him 
to have the greatest grace; as fire which is the cause of heat in other 
hot things, is of all things the hottest.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[9] Body Para. 2/2

 Likewise, as regards the "virtue" of grace, He had grace fully, since He 
had it for all the operations and effects of grace; and this, because 
grace was bestowed on Him, as upon a universal principle in the genus of 
such as have grace. Now the virtue of the first principle of a genus 
universally extends itself to all the effects of that genus; thus the 
force of the sun, which is the universal cause of generation, as 
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), extends to all things that come under 
generation. Hence the second fulness of grace is seen in Christ inasmuch 
as His grace extends to all the effects of grace, which are the virtues, 
gifts, and the like.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Faith and hope signify effects of grace with certain 
defects on the part of the recipient of grace, inasmuch as faith is of 
the unseen, and hope of what is not yet possessed. Hence it was not 
necessary that in Christ, Who is the author of grace, there should be any 
defects such as faith and hope imply; but whatever perfection is in faith 
and hope was in Christ most perfectly; as in fire there are not all the 
modes of heat which are defective by the subject's defect, but whatever 
belongs to the perfection of heat.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It pertains essentially to operating grace to justify; but 
that it makes the ungodly to be just is accidental to it on the part of 
the subject, in which sin is found. Therefore the soul of Christ was 
justified by operating grace, inasmuch as it was rendered just and holy 
by it from the beginning of His conception;  not that it was until then 
sinful, or even not just.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The fulness of grace is attributed to the soul of Christ 
according to the capacity of the creature and not by comparison with the 
infinite fulness of the Divine goodness.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the fulness of grace is proper to Christ?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the fulness of grace is not proper to Christ. 
For what is proper to anyone belongs to him alone. But to be full of 
grace is attributed to some others; for it was said to the Blessed Virgin 
(Lk. 1:28): "Hail, full of grace"; and again it is written (Acts 6:8): 
"Stephen, full of grace and fortitude." Therefore the fulness of grace is 
not proper to Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, what can be communicated to others through Christ does 
not seem to be proper to Christ. But the fulness of grace can be 
communicated to others through Christ, since the Apostle says (Eph. 
3:19): "That you may be filled unto all the fulness of God." Therefore 
the fulness of grace is not proper to Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the state of the wayfarer seems to be proportioned to 
the state of the comprehensor. But in the state of the comprehensor there 
will be a certain fulness, since "in our heavenly country with its 
fulness of all good, although some things are bestowed in a pre-eminent 
way, yet nothing is possessed singularly," as is clear from Gregory (Hom. 
De Cent. Ovib.; xxxiv in Ev.). Therefore in the state of the comprehensor 
the fulness of grace is possessed by everyone, and hence the fulness of 
grace is not proper to Christ. on the contrary, The fulness of grace is 
attributed to Christ inasmuch as He is the only-begotten of the Father, 
according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw Him [Vulg.: 'His glory'] as it were . . . 
the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." But to be the 
Only-begotten of the Father is proper to Christ. Therefore it is proper 
to Him to be full of grace and truth.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[10] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The fulness of grace may be taken in two ways: First, on 
the part of grace itself, or secondly on the part of the one who has 
grace. Now on the part of grace itself there is said to be the fulness of 
grace when the limit of grace is attained, as to essence and power, 
inasmuch as grace is possessed in its highest possible excellence and in 
its greatest possible extension to all its effects. And this fulness of 
grace is proper to Christ. But on the part of the subject there is said 
to be the fulness of grace when anyone fully possesses grace according to 
his condition---whether as regards intensity, by reason of grace being 
intense in him, to the limit assigned by God, according to Eph. 4:1: "But 
to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving 
of Christ"---or "as regards power," by reason of a man having the help of 
grace for all that belongs to his office or state, as the Apostle says 
(Eph. 3:8): "To me, the least  of all the saints, is given this grace . . 
. to enlighten all men." And this fulness of grace is not proper to 
Christ, but is communicated to others by Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Blessed Virgin is said to be full of grace, not on the 
part of grace itself---since she had not grace in its greatest possible 
excellence---nor for all the effects of grace; but she is said to be full 
of grace in reference to herself, i.e. inasmuch as she had sufficient 
grace for the state to which God had chosen her, i.e. to be the mother of 
His Only-begotten. So, too, Stephen is said to be full of grace, since he 
had sufficient grace to be a fit minister and witness of God, to which 
office he had been called. And the same must be said of others. Of these 
fulnesses one is greater than another, according as one is divinely 
pre-ordained to a higher or lower state.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The Apostle is there speaking of that fulness which has 
reference to the subject, in comparison with what man is divinely 
pre-ordained to; and this is either something in common, to which all the 
saints are pre-ordained, or something special, which pertains to the 
pre-eminence of some. And in this manner a certain fulness of grace is 
common to all the saints, viz. to have grace enough to merit eternal 
life, which consists in the enjoyment of God. And this is the fulness of 
grace which the Apostle desires for the faithful to whom he writes.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: These gifts which are in common in heaven, viz.: vision, 
possession and fruition, and the like, have certain gifts corresponding 
to them in this life which are also common to all the saints. Yet there 
are certain prerogatives of saints, both in heaven and on earth, which 
are not possessed by all.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the grace of Christ is infinite?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that Christ's grace is infinite. For everything 
immeasurable is infinite. But the grace of Christ is immeasurable; since 
it is written (Jn. 3:34): "For God doth not give the Spirit by measure to 
His Son [*'To His Son' is lacking in the Vulgate], namely Christ." 
Therefore the grace of Christ is infinite.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, an infinite effect betokens an infinite power which can 
only spring from an infinite essence. But the effect of Christ's grace is 
infinite, since it extends to the salvation of the whole human race; for 
He is the propitiation for our sins . . . and for those of the whole 
world, as is said (1 Jn. 2:2). Therefore the grace of Christ is infinite.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, every finite thing by addition can attain to the 
quantity of any other finite thing. Therefore if the grace of Christ is 
finite the grace of any other man could increase to such an extent as to 
reach to an equality with Christ's grace, against what is written (Job 
28:17): "Gold nor crystal cannot equal it," as  Gregory expounds it 
(Moral. xviii). Therefore the grace of Christ is infinite.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Grace is something created in the soul. But every 
created thing is finite, according to Wis. 11:21: "Thou hast ordered all 
things in measure and number and weight." Therefore the grace of Christ 
is not infinite.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[11] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As was made clear above (Q[2], A[10]), a twofold grace 
may be considered in Christ; the first being the grace of union, which, 
as was said (Q[6], A[6]), is for Him to be personally united to the Son 
of God, which union has been bestowed gratis on the human nature; and it 
is clear that this grace is infinite, as the Person of God is infinite. 
The second is habitual grace; which may be taken in two ways: first as a 
being, and in this way it must be a finite being, since it is in the soul 
of Christ, as in a subject, and Christ's soul is a creature having a 
finite capacity; hence the being of grace cannot be infinite, since it 
cannot exceed its subject. Secondly it may be viewed in its specific 
nature of grace; and thus the grace of Christ can be termed infinite, 
since it is not limited, i.e. it has whatsoever can pertain to the nature 
of grace, and what pertains to the nature of grace is not bestowed on Him 
in a fixed measure; seeing that "according to the purpose" of God to Whom 
it pertains to measure grace, it is bestowed on Christ's soul as on a 
universal principle for bestowing grace on human nature, according to 
Eph. 1:5,6, "He hath graced us in His beloved Son"; thus we might say 
that the light of the sun is infinite, not indeed in being, but in the 
nature of light, as having whatever can pertain to the nature of light.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[11] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: When it is said that the Father "doth not give the Spirit 
by measure," it may be expounded of the gift which God the Father from 
all eternity gave the Son, viz. the Divine Nature, which is an infinite 
gift. Hence the comment of a certain gloss: "So that the Son may be as 
great as the Father is." Or again, it may be referred to the gift which 
is given the human nature, to be united to the Divine Person, and this 
also is an infinite gift. Hence a gloss says on this text: "As the Father 
begot a full and perfect Word, it is united thus full and perfect to 
human nature." Thirdly, it may be referred to habitual grace, inasmuch as 
the grace of Christ extends to whatever belongs to grace. Hence Augustine 
expounding this (Tract. xiv in Joan.) says: "The division of the gifts is 
a measurement. For to one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of 
wisdom, to another the word of knowledge." But Christ the giver does not 
receive by measure.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[11] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The grace of Christ has an infinite effect, both because of 
the aforesaid infinity of grace, and because of the unity [*Perhaps we 
should read 'infinity'---Ed.] of the Divine Person, to Whom Christ's soul 
is united.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[11] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The lesser can attain by augment to the quantity of the 
greater, when both have the same kind of quantity. But the grace of any 
man is compared to the grace of Christ as a particular  to a universal 
power; hence as the force of fire, no matter how much it increases, can 
never equal the sun's strength, so the grace of a man, no matter how much 
it increases, can never equal the grace of Christ.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the grace of Christ could increase?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the grace of Christ could increase. For to 
every finite thing addition can be made. But the grace of Christ was 
finite. Therefore it could increase.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is by Divine power that grace is increased, according 
to 2 Cor. 9:8: "And God is able to make all grace abound in you." But the 
Divine power, being infinite, is confined by no limits. Therefore it 
seems that the grace of Christ could have been greater.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Lk. 2:52) that the child "Jesus advanced 
in wisdom and age and grace with God and men." Therefore the grace of 
Christ could increase.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:14): "We saw Him [Vulg.: 'His 
glory'] as it were . . . the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace 
and truth." But nothing can be or can be thought greater than that anyone 
should be the Only-begotten of the Father. Therefore no greater grace can 
be or can be thought than that of which Christ was full.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[12] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, For a form to be incapable of increase happens in two 
ways: First on the part of the subject; secondly, on the part of the form 
itself. On the part of the subject, indeed, when the subject reaches the 
utmost limit wherein it partakes of this form, after its own manner, e.g. 
if we say that air cannot increase in heat, when it has reached the 
utmost limit of heat which can exist in the nature of air, although there 
may be greater heat in actual existence, viz. the heat of fire. But on 
the part of the form, the possibility of increase is excluded when a 
subject reaches the utmost perfection which this form can have by nature, 
e.g. if we say the heat of fire cannot be increased because there cannot 
be a more perfect grade of heat than that to which fire attains. Now the 
proper measure of grace, like that of other forms, is determined by the 
Divine wisdom, according to Wis. 11:21: "Thou hast ordered all things in 
number, weight and measure." And it is with reference to its end that a 
measure is set to every form. as there is no greater gravity than that of 
the earth, because there is no lower place than that of the earth. Now 
the end of grace is the union of the rational creature with God. But 
there can neither be nor be thought a greater union of the rational 
creature with God than that which is in the Person. And hence the grace 
of Christ reached the highest measure of grace. Hence it is clear that 
the grace of Christ cannot be increased on the part of grace. But neither 
can it be increased on the part of the subject, since Christ as man was a 
true and full comprehensor from the first  instant of His conception. 
Hence there could have been no increase of grace in Him, as there could 
be none in the rest of the blessed, whose grace could not increase, 
seeing that they have reached their last end. But as regards men who are 
wholly wayfarers, their grace can be increased not merely on the part of 
the form, since they have not attained the highest degree of grace, but 
also on the part of the subject, since they have not yet attained their 
end.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: If we speak of mathematical quantity, addition can be made 
to any finite quantity, since there is nothing on the part of finite 
quantity which is repugnant to addition. But if we speak of natural 
quantity, there may be repugnance on the part of the form to which a 
determined quantity is due, even as other accidents are determined. Hence 
the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 41) that "there is naturally a term of 
all things, and a fixed limit of magnitude and increase." And hence to 
the quantity of the whole there can be no addition. And still more must 
we suppose a term in the forms themselves, beyond which they may not go. 
Hence it is not necessary that addition should be capable of being made 
to Christ's grace, although it is finite in its essence.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although the Divine power can make something greater and 
better than the habitual grace of Christ, yet it could not make it to be 
ordained to anything greater than the personal union with the 
Only-begotten Son of the Father; and to this union, by the purpose of the 
Divine wisdom, the measure of grace is sufficient.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Anyone may increase in wisdom and grace in two ways. First 
inasmuch as the very habits of wisdom and grace are increased; and in 
this way Christ did not increase. Secondly, as regards the effects, i.e. 
inasmuch as they do wiser and greater works; and in this way Christ 
increased in wisdom and grace even as in age, since in the course of time 
He did more perfect works, to prove Himself true man, both in the things 
of God, and in the things of man.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[13] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the habitual grace of Christ followed after the union?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[13] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the habitual grace did not follow after the 
union. For nothing follows itself. But this habitual grace seems to be 
the same as the grace of union; for Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. 
xv): "Every man becomes a Christian from the beginning of his belief, by 
the same grace whereby this Man from His beginning became Christ"; and of 
these two the first pertains to habitual grace and the second to the 
grace of union. Therefore it would seem that habitual grace did not 
follow upon the union.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[13] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, disposition precedes perfection, if not in time, at 
least in thought. But the habitual grace seems to be a disposition in 
human nature for the personal union. Therefore it seems that the habitual 
grace did not follow but rather preceded  the union.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[13] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the common precedes the proper. But habitual grace is 
common to Christ and other men; and the grace of union is proper to 
Christ. Therefore habitual grace is prior in thought to the union. 
Therefore it does not follow it.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[13] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Is. 42:1): "Behold my servant, I will 
uphold Him . . . "and farther on: "I have given My Spirit upon Him"; and 
this pertains to the gift of habitual grace. Hence it remains that the 
assumption of human nature to the unity of the Person preceded the 
habitual grace of Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[13] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The union of the human nature with the Divine Person, 
which, as we have said above (Q[2], A[10]; Q[6], A[6]), is the grace of 
union, precedes the habitual grace of Christ, not in order of time, but 
by nature and in thought; and this for a triple reason: First, with 
reference to the order of the principles of both. For the principle of 
the union is the Person of the Son assuming human nature, Who is said to 
be sent into the world, inasmuch as He assumed human nature; but the 
principle of habitual grace, which is given with charity, is the Holy 
Ghost, Who is said to be sent inasmuch as He dwells in the mind by 
charity. Now the mission of the Son is prior, in the order of nature, to 
the mission of the Holy Ghost, even as in the order of nature the Holy 
Ghost proceeds from the Son, and love from wisdom. Hence the personal 
union, according to which the mission of the Son took place, is prior in 
the order of nature to habitual grace, according to which the mission of 
the Holy Ghost takes place. Secondly, the reason of this order may be 
taken from the relation of grace to its cause. For grace is caused in man 
by the presence of the Godhead, as light in the air by the presence of 
the sun. Hence it is written (Ezech. 43:2): "The glory of the God of 
Israel came in by the way of the east . . . and the earth shone with His 
majesty." But the presence of God in Christ is by the union of human 
nature with the Divine Person. Hence the habitual grace of Christ is 
understood to follow this union, as light follows the sun. Thirdly, the 
reason of this union can be taken from the end of grace, since it is 
ordained to acting rightly, and action belongs to the suppositum and the 
individual. Hence action and, in consequence, grace ordaining thereto, 
presuppose the hypostasis which operates. Now the hypostasis did not 
exist in the human nature before the union, as is clear from Q[4], A[2]. 
Therefore the grace of union precedes, in thought, habitual grace.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[13] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Augustine here means by grace the gratuitous will of God, 
bestowing benefits gratis; and hence every man is said to be made a 
Christian by the same grace whereby a Man became Christ, since both take 
place by the gratuitous will of God without merits.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[13] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As disposition in the order of generation precedes the 
perfection to which it disposes, in such things as are gradually 
perfected; so it naturally follows the perfection which one has already 
obtained; as heat, which was a disposition to the  form of fire, is an 
effect flowing from the form of already existing fire. Now the human 
nature in Christ is united to the Person of the Word from the beginning 
without succession. Hence habitual grace is not understood to have 
preceded the union, but to have followed it; as a natural property. 
Hence, as Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): "Grace is in a manner natural 
to the Man Christ."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[7] A[13] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The common precedes the proper, when both are of the same 
genus; but when they are of divers genera, there is nothing to prevent 
the proper being prior to the common. Now the grace of union is not in 
the same genus as habitual grace; but is above all genera even as the 
Divine Person Himself. Hence there is nothing to prevent this proper from 
being before the common since it does not result from something being 
added to the common, but is rather the principle and source of that which 
is common.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE GRACE OF CHRIST, AS HE IS THE HEAD OF THE CHURCH (EIGHT ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the grace of Christ as the Head of the Church; and 
under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether Christ is the Head of the Church?

 (2) Whether He is the Head of men as regards their bodies or only as 
regards their souls?

 (3) Whether He is the Head of all men?

 (4) Whether He is the Head of the angels?

 (5) Whether the grace of Christ as Head of the Church is the same as His 
habitual grace as an individual man?

 (6) Whether to be Head of the Church is proper to Christ?

 (7) Whether the devil is the head of all the wicked?

 (8) Whether Anti-christ can be called the head of all the wicked?


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether Christ is the Head of the Church?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that it does not belong to Christ as man to be Head 
of the Church. For the head imparts sense and motion to the members. Now 
spiritual sense and motion which are by grace, are not imparted to us by 
the Man Christ, because, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 12; xv, 24), "not 
even Christ, as man, but only as God, bestows the Holy Ghost." Therefore 
it does not belong to Him as man to be Head of the Church.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, it is not fitting for the head to have a head. But God 
is the Head of Christ, as man, according to 1 Cor. 11:3, "The Head of 
Christ is God." Therefore Christ Himself is not a head.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Furthermore, the head of a man is a particular member, receiving 
an influx from the heart. But Christ is the universal principle of the 
whole Church. Therefore He is not the Head of the Church.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:22): "And He . . . hath  made Him 
head over all the Church."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As the whole Church is termed one mystic body from its 
likeness to the natural body of a man, which in divers members has divers 
acts, as the Apostle teaches (Rm. 12; 1 Cor. 12), so likewise Christ is 
called the Head of the Church from a likeness with the human head, in 
which we may consider three things, viz. order, perfection, and power: 
"Order," indeed; for the head is the first part of man, beginning from 
the higher part; and hence it is that every principle is usually called a 
head according to Ezech. 16:25: "At every head of the way, thou hast set 
up a sign of thy prostitution"---"Perfection," inasmuch as in the head 
dwell all the senses, both interior and exterior, whereas in the other 
members there is only touch, and hence it is said (Is. 9:15): "The aged 
and honorable, he is the head"---"Power," because the power and movement 
of the other members, together with the direction of them in their acts, 
is from the head, by reason of the sensitive and motive power there 
ruling; hence the ruler is called the head of a people, according to 1 
Kgs. 15:17: "When thou wast a little one in thy own eyes, wast thou not 
made the head of the tribes of Israel?" Now these three things belong 
spiritually to Christ. First, on account of His nearness to God His grace 
is the highest and first, though not in time, since all have received 
grace on account of His grace, according to Rm. 8:29: "For whom He 
foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of 
His Son; that He might be the first-born amongst many brethren." 
Secondly, He had perfection as regards the fulness of all graces, 
according to Jn. 1:14, "We saw Him [Vulg.: 'His glory'] . . . full of 
grace and truth," as was shown, Q[7], A[9]. Thirdly, He has the power of 
bestowing grace on all the members of the Church, according to Jn. 1:16: 
"Of His fulness we have all received." And thus it is plain that Christ 
is fittingly called the Head of the Church.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: To give grace or the Holy Ghost belongs to Christ as He is 
God, authoritatively; but instrumentally it belongs also to Him as man, 
inasmuch as His manhood is the instrument of His Godhead. And hence by 
the power of the Godhead His actions were beneficial, i.e. by causing 
grace in us, both meritoriously and efficiently. But Augustine denies 
that Christ as man gives the Holy Ghost authoritatively. Even other 
saints are said to give the Holy Ghost instrumentally, or ministerially, 
according to Gal. 3:5: "He . . . who giveth to you the Spirit."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: In metaphorical speech we must not expect a likeness in all 
respects; for thus there would be not likeness but identity. Accordingly 
a natural head has not another head because one human body is not part of 
another; but a metaphorical body, i.e. an ordered multitude, is part of 
another multitude as the domestic multitude is part of the civil 
multitude; and hence the father who is head of the domestic multitude has 
a head above him, i.e. the civil governor. And hence there is no reason 
why God should not be the Head of Christ, although Christ Himself is Head 
of the Church. 

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The head has a manifest pre-eminence over the other 
exterior members; but the heart has a certain hidden influence. And hence 
the Holy Ghost is likened to the heart, since He invisibly quickens and 
unifies the Church; but Christ is likened to the Head in His visible 
nature in which man is set over man.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether Christ is the Head of men as to their bodies or only as to their 
souls?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that Christ is not the Head of men as to their 
bodies. For Christ is said to be the Head of the Church inasmuch as He 
bestows spiritual sense and the movement of grace on the Church. But a 
body is not capable of this spiritual sense and movement. Therefore 
Christ is not the Head of men as regards their bodies.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, we share bodies with the brutes. If therefore Christ was 
the Head of men as to their bodies, it would follow that He was the Head 
of brute animals; and this is not fitting.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Christ took His body from other men, as is clear from 
Mt. 1 and Luke 3. But the head is the first of the members, as was said 
above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore Christ is not the Head of the Church as 
regards bodies.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 3:21): "Who will reform the body 
of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The human body has a natural relation to the rational 
soul, which is its proper form and motor. Inasmuch as the soul is its 
form, it receives from the soul life and the other properties which 
belong specifically to man; but inasmuch as the soul is its motor, the 
body serves the soul instrumentally. Therefore we must hold that the 
manhood of Christ had the power of "influence," inasmuch as it is united 
to the Word of God, to Whom His body is united through the soul, as 
stated above (Q[6], A[1]). Hence the whole manhood of Christ, i.e. 
according to soul and body, influences all, both in soul and body; but 
principally the soul, and secondarily the body: First, inasmuch as the 
"members of the body are presented as instruments of justice" in the soul 
that lives through Christ, as the Apostle says (Rm. 6:13): secondly, 
inasmuch as the life of glory flows from the soul on to the body, 
according to Rm. 8:11: "He that raised up Jesus from the dead shall 
quicken also your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in 
you."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The spiritual sense of grace does not reach to the body 
first and principally, but secondarily and instrumentally, as was said 
above.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The body of an animal has no relation to a rational soul, 
as the human body has. Hence there is no parity. 

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Although Christ drew the matter of His body from other men, 
yet all draw from Him the immortal life of their body, according to 1 
Cor. 15:22: "And as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made 
alive."


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether Christ is the Head of all men?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that Christ is not the Head of all men. For the 
head has no relation except to the members of its body. Now the 
unbaptized are nowise members of the Church which is the body of Christ, 
as it is written (Eph. 1:23). Therefore Christ is not the Head of all men.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle writes to the Ephesians (5:25,27): "Christ 
delivered Himself up for" the Church "that He might present it to Himself 
a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing." But 
there are many of the faithful in whom is found the spot or the wrinkle 
of sin. Therefore Christ is not the Head of all the faithful.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the sacraments of the Old Law are compared to Christ as 
the shadow to the body, as is written (Col. 2:17). But the fathers of the 
Old Testament in their day served unto these sacraments, according to 
Heb. 8:5: "Who serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things." 
Hence they did not pertain to Christ's body, and therefore Christ is not 
the Head of all men.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. 4:10): "Who is the Saviour of all 
men, especially of the faithful," and (1 Jn. 2:2): "He is the 
propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of 
the whole world." Now to save men and to be a propitiation for their sins 
belongs to Christ as Head. Therefore Christ is the Head of all men.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, This is the difference between the natural body of man 
and the Church's mystical body, that the members of the natural body are 
all together, and the members of the mystical are not all 
together---neither as regards their natural being, since the body of the 
Church is made up of the men who have been from the beginning of the 
world until its end---nor as regards their supernatural being, since, of 
those who are at any one time, some there are who are without grace, yet 
will afterwards obtain it, and some have it already. We must therefore 
consider the members of the mystical body not only as they are in act, 
but as they are in potentiality. Nevertheless, some are in potentiality 
who will never be reduced to act, and some are reduced at some time to 
act; and this according to the triple class, of which the first is by 
faith, the second by the charity of this life, the third by the fruition 
of the life to come. Hence we must say that if we take the whole time of 
the world in general, Christ is the Head of all men, but diversely. For, 
first and principally, He is the Head of such as are united to Him by 
glory; secondly, of those who are actually  united to Him by charity; 
thirdly, of those who are actually united to Him by faith; fourthly, of 
those who are united to Him merely in potentiality, which is not yet 
reduced to act, yet will be reduced to act according to Divine 
predestination; fifthly, of those who are united to Him in potentiality, 
which will never be reduced to act; such are those men existing in the 
world, who are not predestined, who, however, on their departure from 
this world, wholly cease to be members of Christ, as being no longer in 
potentiality to be united to Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Those who are unbaptized, though not actually in the 
Church, are in the Church potentially. And this potentiality is rooted in 
two things---first and principally, in the power of Christ, which is 
sufficient for the salvation of the whole human race; secondly, in 
free-will.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: To be "a glorious Church not having spot or wrinkle" is the 
ultimate end to which we are brought by the Passion of Christ. Hence this 
will be in heaven, and not on earth, in which "if we say we have no sin, 
we deceive ourselves," as is written (1 Jn. 1:8). Nevertheless, there are 
some, viz. mortal, sins from which they are free who are members of 
Christ by the actual union of charity; but such as are tainted with these 
sins are not members of Christ actually, but potentially; except, 
perhaps, imperfectly, by formless faith, which unites to God, relatively 
but not simply, viz. so that man partake of the life of grace. For, as is 
written (James 2:20): "Faith without works is dead." Yet such as these 
receive from Christ a certain vital act, i.e. to believe, as if a 
lifeless limb were moved by a man to some extent.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The holy Fathers made use of the legal sacraments, not as 
realities, but as images and shadows of what was to come. Now it is the 
same motion to an image as image, and to the reality, as is clear from 
the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin. ii). Hence the ancient Fathers, by 
observing the legal sacraments, were borne to Christ by the same faith 
and love whereby we also are borne to Him, and hence the ancient Fathers 
belong to the same Church as we.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether Christ is the Head of the angels?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that Christ as man is not the head of the angels. 
For the head and members are of one nature. But Christ as man is not of 
the same nature with the angels, but only with men, since, as is written 
(Heb. 2:16): "For nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the 
seed of Abraham He taketh hold." Therefore Christ as man is not the head 
of the angels.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Christ is the head of such as belong to the Church, 
which is His Body, as is written (Eph. 1:23). But the angels do not 
belong to the Church. For the Church is the congregation of the faithful: 
and in the angels there is no faith, for they do not "walk by faith" but 
"by sight," otherwise they would be "absent from the Lord," as the 
Apostle argues (2 Cor.  5:6,7). Therefore Christ as man is not head of 
the angels.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xix; xxiii in Joan.), that as 
"the Word" which "was in the beginning with the Father" quickens souls, 
so the "Word made flesh" quickens bodies, which angels lack. But the Word 
made flesh is Christ as man. Therefore Christ as man does not give life 
to angels, and hence as man He is not the head of the angels.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:10), "Who is the head of all 
Principality and Power," and the same reason holds good with the other 
orders of angels. Therefore Christ is the Head of the angels.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As was said above (A[1], ad 2), where there is one body 
we must allow that there is one head. Now a multitude ordained to one 
end, with distinct acts and duties, may be metaphorically called one 
body. But it is manifest that both men and angels are ordained to one 
end, which is the glory of the Divine fruition. Hence the mystical body 
of the Church consists not only of men but of angels. Now of all this 
multitude Christ is the Head, since He is nearer God, and shares His 
gifts more fully, not only than man, but even than angels; and of His 
influence not only men but even angels partake, since it is written (Eph. 
1:20-22): that God the Father set "Him," namely Christ, "on His right 
hand in the heavenly places, above all Principality and Power and Virtue 
and Dominion and every name that is named not only in this world, but 
also in that which is to come. And He hath subjected all things under His 
feet." Therefore Christ is not only the Head of men, but of angels. Hence 
we read (Mt. 4:11) that "angels came and ministered to Him."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Christ's influence over men is chiefly with regard to their 
souls; wherein men agree with angels in generic nature, though not in 
specific nature. By reason of this agreement Christ can be said to be the 
Head of the angels, although the agreement falls short as regards the 
body.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The Church, on earth, is the congregation of the faithful; 
but, in heaven, it is the congregation of comprehensors. Now Christ was 
not merely a wayfarer, but a comprehensor. And therefore He is the Head 
not merely of the faithful, but of comprehensors, as having grace and 
glory most fully.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Augustine here uses the similitude of cause and effect, 
i.e. inasmuch as corporeal things act on bodies, and spiritual things on 
spiritual things. Nevertheless, the humanity of Christ, by virtue of the 
spiritual nature, i.e. the Divine, can cause something not only in the 
spirits of men, but also in the spirits of angels, on account of its most 
close conjunction with God, i.e. by personal union.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the grace of Christ, as Head of the Church, is the same as  His 
habitual grace, inasmuch as He is Man?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the grace whereby Christ is Head of the Church 
and the individual grace of the Man are not the same. For the Apostle 
says (Rm. 5:15): "If by the offense of one many died, much more the grace 
of God and the gift, by the grace of one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded 
unto many." But the actual sin of Adam is distinct from original sin 
which he transmitted to his posterity. Hence the personal grace which is 
proper to Christ is distinct from His grace, inasmuch as He is the Head 
of the Church, which flows to others from Him.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, habits are distinguished by acts. But the personal grace 
of Christ is ordained to one act, viz. the sanctification of His soul; 
and the capital grace is ordained to another, viz. to sanctifying others. 
Therefore the personal grace of Christ is distinct from His grace as He 
is the Head of the Church.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, as was said above (Q[6], A[6]), in Christ we distinguish 
a threefold grace, viz. the grace of union, capital grace, and the 
individual grace of the Man. Now the individual grace of Christ is 
distinct from the grace of union. Therefore it is also distinct from the 
capital grace.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:16): "Of His fulness we all have 
received." Now He is our Head, inasmuch as we receive from Him. Therefore 
He is our Head, inasmuch as He has the fulness of grace. Now He had the 
fulness of grace, inasmuch as personal grace was in Him in its 
perfection, as was said above (Q[7], A[9]). Hence His capital and 
personal grace are not distinct.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Since everything acts inasmuch as it is a being in act, 
it must be the same act whereby it is in act and whereby it acts, as it 
is the same heat whereby fire is hot and whereby it heats. Yet not every 
act whereby anything is in act suffices for its being the principle of 
acting upon others. For since the agent is nobler than the patient, as 
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 
19), the agent must act on others by reason of a certain pre-eminence. 
Now it was said above (A[1]; Q[7], A[9]) grace was received by the soul 
of Christ in the highest way; and therefore from this pre-eminence of 
grace which He received, it is from Him that this grace is bestowed on 
others---and this belongs to the nature of head. Hence the personal 
grace, whereby the soul of Christ is justified, is essentially the same 
as His grace, as He is the Head of the Church, and justifies others; but 
there is a distinction of reason between them.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Original sin in Adam, which is a sin of the nature, is 
derived from his actual sin, which is a personal sin, because in him the 
person corrupted the nature; and by means of this corruption the sin of 
the first man is transmitted to posterity, inasmuch as the corrupt nature 
corrupts the person. Now grace is not vouchsafed us by means of human 
nature, but solely by  the personal action of Christ Himself. Hence we 
must not distinguish a twofold grace in Christ, one corresponding to the 
nature, the other to the person as in Adam we distinguish the sin of the 
nature and of the person.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Different acts, one of which is the reason and the cause of 
the other, do not diversify a habit. Now the act of the personal grace 
which is formally to sanctify its subject, is the reason of the 
justification of others, which pertains to capital grace. Hence it is 
that the essence of the habit is not diversified by this difference.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Personal and capital grace are ordained to an act; but the 
grace of union is not ordained to an act, but to the personal being. 
Hence the personal and the capital grace agree in the essence of the 
habit; but the grace of union does not, although the personal grace can 
be called in a manner the grace of union, inasmuch as it brings about a 
fitness for the union; and thus the grace of union, the capital, and the 
personal grace are one in essence, though there is a distinction of 
reason between them.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether it is proper to Christ to be Head of the Church?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It seems that it is not proper to Christ to be Head of the 
Church. For it is written (1 Kgs. 15:17): "When thou wast a little one in 
thy own eyes, wast thou not made the head of the tribes of Israel?" Now 
there is but one Church in the New and the Old Testament. Therefore it 
seems that with equal reason any other man than Christ might be head of 
the Church.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Christ is called Head of the Church from His bestowing 
grace on the Church's members. But it belongs to others also to grant 
grace to others, according to Eph. 4:29: "Let no evil speech proceed from 
your mouth; but that which is good to the edification of faith, that it 
may administer grace to the hearers." Therefore it seems to belong also 
to others than Christ to be head of the Church.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Christ by His ruling over the Church is not only called 
"Head," but also "Shepherd" and "Foundation." Now Christ did not retain 
for Himself alone the name of Shepherd, according to 1 Pt. 5:4, "And when 
the prince of pastors shall appear, you shall receive a never-fading 
crown of glory"; nor the name of Foundation, according to Apoc. 21:14: 
"And the wall of the city had twelve foundations." Therefore it seems 
that He did not retain the name of Head for Himself alone.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Col. 2:19): "The head" of the Church is 
that "from which the whole body, by joints and bands being supplied with 
nourishment and compacted groweth unto the increase of God." But this 
belongs only to Christ. Therefore Christ alone is Head of the Church.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[6] Body Para. 1/1 

 I answer that, The head influences the other members in two ways. First, 
by a certain intrinsic influence, inasmuch as motive and sensitive force 
flow from the head to the other members; secondly, by a certain exterior 
guidance, inasmuch as by sight and the senses, which are rooted in the 
head, man is guided in his exterior acts. Now the interior influx of 
grace is from no one save Christ, Whose manhood, through its union with 
the Godhead, has the power of justifying; but the influence over the 
members of the Church, as regards their exterior guidance, can belong to 
others; and in this way others may be called heads of the Church, 
according to Amos 6:1, "Ye great men, heads of the people"; differently, 
however, from Christ. First, inasmuch as Christ is the Head of all who 
pertain to the Church in every place and time and state; but all other 
men are called heads with reference to certain special places, as bishops 
of their Churches. Or with reference to a determined time as the Pope is 
the head of the whole Church, viz. during the time of his Pontificate, 
and with reference to a determined state, inasmuch as they are in the 
state of wayfarers. Secondly, because Christ is the Head of the Church by 
His own power and authority; while others are called heads, as taking 
Christ's place, according to 2 Cor. 2:10, "For what I have pardoned, if I 
have pardoned anything, for your sakes I have done it in the person of 
Christ," and 2 Cor. 5:20, "For Christ therefore we are ambassadors, God, 
as it were, exhorting by us."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The word "head" is employed in that passage in regard to 
exterior government; as a king is said to be the head of his kingdom.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Man does not distribute grace by interior influx, but by 
exteriorly persuading to the effects of grace.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (Tract. xlvi in Joan.): "If the rulers of 
the Church are Shepherds, how is there one Shepherd, except that all 
these are members of one Shepherd?" So likewise others may be called 
foundations and heads, inasmuch as they are members of the one Head and 
Foundation. Nevertheless, as Augustine says (Tract. xlvii), "He gave to 
His members to be shepherds; yet none of us calleth himself the Door. He 
kept this for Himself alone." And this because by door is implied the 
principal authority, inasmuch as it is by the door that all enter the 
house; and it is Christ alone by "Whom also we have access . . . into 
this grace, wherein we stand" (Rm. 5:2); but by the other names 
above-mentioned there may be implied not merely the principal but also 
the secondary authority.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the devil is the head of all the wicked?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the devil is not the head of the wicked. For 
it belongs to the head to diffuse sense and movement into the members, as 
a gloss says, on Eph. 1:22, "And made Him head," etc. But the devil has 
no power of spreading the evil of sin, which proceeds from the will of 
the sinner. Therefore the  devil cannot be called the head of the wicked.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, by every sin a man is made evil. But not every sin is 
from the devil; and this is plain as regards the demons, who did not sin 
through the persuasion of another; so likewise not every sin of man 
proceeds from the devil, for it is said (De Eccles. Dogm. lxxxii): "Not 
all our wicked thoughts are always raised up by the suggestion of the 
devil; but sometimes they spring from the movement of our will." 
Therefore the devil is not the head of all the wicked.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, one head is placed on one body. But the whole multitude 
of the wicked do not seem to have anything in which they are united, for 
evil is contrary to evil and springs from divers defects, as Dionysius 
says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore the devil cannot be called the head of all 
the wicked.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, A gloss [*St. Gregory, Moral. xiv] on Job 18:17, "Let 
the memory of him perish from the earth," says: "This is said of every 
evil one, yet so as to be referred to the head," i.e. the devil.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[7] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As was said above (A[6]), the head not only influences 
the members interiorly, but also governs them exteriorly, directing their 
actions to an end. Hence it may be said that anyone is the head of a 
multitude, either as regards both, i.e. by interior influence and 
exterior governance, and thus Christ is the Head of the Church, as was 
stated (A[6]); or as regards exterior governance, and thus every prince 
or prelate is head of the multitude subject to him. And in this way the 
devil is head of all the wicked. For, as is written (Job 41:25): "He is 
king over all the children of pride." Now it belongs to a governor to 
lead those whom he governs to their end. But the end of the devil is the 
aversion of the rational creature from God; hence from the beginning he 
has endeavored to lead man from obeying the Divine precept. But aversion 
from God has the nature of an end, inasmuch as it is sought for under the 
appearance of liberty, according to Jer. 2:20: "Of old time thou hast 
broken my yoke, thou hast burst my bands, and thou saidst, 'I will not 
serve.'" Hence, inasmuch as some are brought to this end by sinning, they 
fall under the rule and government of the devil, and therefore he is 
called their head.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Although the devil does not influence the rational mind 
interiorly, yet he beguiles it to evil by persuasion.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: A governor does not always suggest to his subjects to obey 
his will; but proposes to all the sign of his will, in consequence of 
which some are incited by inducement, and some of their own free-will, as 
is plain in the leader of an army, whose standard all the soldiers 
follow, though no one persuades them. Therefore in the same way, the 
first sin of the devil, who "sinneth from the beginning" (1 Jnn 3:8), is 
held out to all to be followed, and some imitate at his suggestion, and 
some of their own will without any suggestion. And hence the devil is the 
head of all  the wicked, inasmuch as they imitate Him, according to Wis. 
2:24,25: "By the envy of the devil, death came into the world. And they 
follow him that are of his side."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: All sins agree in aversion from God, although they differ 
by conversion to different changeable goods.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether Anti-christ may be called the head of all the wicked?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that Antichrist is not the head of the wicked. For 
there are not several heads of one body. But the devil is the head of the 
multitude of the wicked. Therefore Anti-christ is not their head.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Anti-christ is a member of the devil. Now the head is 
distinguished from the members. Therefore Anti-christ is not the head of 
the wicked.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the head has an influence over the members. But 
Anti-christ has no influence over the wicked who have preceded him. 
Therefore Anti-christ is not the head of the wicked.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, A gloss [*St. Gregory, Moral. xv] on Job 21:29, "Ask 
any of them that go by the way," says: "Whilst he was speaking of the 
body of all the wicked, suddenly he turned his speech to Anti-christ the 
head of all evil-doers."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[8] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As was said above (A[1]), in the head are found three 
things: order, perfection, and the power of influencing. But as regards 
the order of the body, Anti-christ is not said to be the head of the 
wicked as if his sin had preceded, as the sin of the devil preceded. So 
likewise he is not called the head of the wicked from the power of 
influencing, although he will pervert some in his day by exterior 
persuasion; nevertheless those who were before him were not beguiled into 
wickedness by him nor have imitated his wickedness. Hence he cannot be 
called the head of all the wicked in this way, but of some. Therefore it 
remains to be said that he is the head of all the wicked by reason of the 
perfection of his wickedness. Hence, on 2 Thess. 2:4, "Showing himself as 
if he were God," a gloss says: "As in Christ dwelt the fulness of the 
Godhead, so in Anti-christ the fulness of all wickedness." Not indeed as 
if his humanity were assumed by the devil into unity of person, as the 
humanity of Christ by the Son of God; but that the devil by suggestion 
infuses his wickedness more copiously into him than into all others. And 
in this way all the wicked who have gone before are signs of Anti-christ, 
according to 2 Thess. 2:7, "For the mystery of iniquity already worketh."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The devil and Anti-christ are not two heads, but one; since 
Anti-christ is called the head, inasmuch as the wickedness of the devil 
is most fully impressed on him. Hence, on 2 Thess. 2:4, "Showing himself 
as if he were God," a gloss says: "The head of all the wicked, namely the 
devil, who is king over all  the children of pride will be in him." Now 
he is said to be in him not by personal union, nor by indwelling, since 
"the Trinity alone dwells in the mind" (as is said De Eccles. Dogm. 
lxxxiii), but by the effect of wickedness.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As the head of Christ is God, and yet He is the Head of the 
Church, as was said above (A[1], ad 2), so likewise Anti-christ is a 
member of the devil and yet is head of the wicked.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[8] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Anti-christ is said to be the head of all the wicked not by 
a likeness of influence, but by a likeness of perfection. For in him the 
devil, as it were, brings his wickedness to a head, in the same way that 
anyone is said to bring his purpose to a head when he executes it.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] Out. Para. 1/2

OF CHRIST'S KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must now consider Christ's knowledge; concerning which the 
consideration will be twofold. First, of Christ's knowledge in general; 
secondly, of each particular kind of knowledge He had.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] Out. Para. 2/2

 Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the Divine?

 (2) Whether He had the knowledge which the blessed or comprehensors have?

 (3) Whether He had an imprinted or infused knowledge?

 (4) Whether He had any acquired knowledge?


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the Divine?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no knowledge except the 
Divine. For knowledge is necessary that things may be known thereby. But 
by His Divine knowledge Christ knew all things. Therefore any other 
knowledge would have been superfluous in Him.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the lesser light is dimmed by the greater. But all 
created knowledge in comparison with the uncreated knowledge of God is as 
the lesser to the greater light. Therefore there shone in Christ no other 
knowledge except the Divine.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the union of the human nature with the Divine took place 
in the Person, as is clear from Q[2], A[2]. Now, according to some there 
is in Christ a certain "knowledge of the union," whereby Christ knew what 
belongs to the mystery of the Incarnation more fully than anyone else. 
Hence, since the personal union contains two natures, it would seem that 
there are not two knowledges in Christ, but one only, pertaining to both 
natures.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Incarnat. vii): "God assumed the 
perfection of human nature in the flesh; He took upon Himself the sense 
of man, but not the swollen sense of the flesh." But created knowledge 
pertains to the sense of man. Therefore in Christ there was created 
knowledge. 

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As said above (Q[5]), the Son of God assumed an entire 
human nature, i.e. not only a body, but also a soul, and not only a 
sensitive, but also a rational soul. And therefore it behooved Him to 
have created knowledge, for three reasons. First, on account of the 
soul's perfection. For the soul, considered in itself, is in potentiality 
to knowing intelligible things. since it is like "a tablet on which 
nothing is written," and yet it may be written upon through the possible 
intellect, whereby it may become all things, as is said De Anima iii, 18. 
Now what is in potentiality is imperfect unless reduced to act. But it 
was fitting that the Son of God should assume, not an imperfect, but a 
perfect human nature, since the whole human race was to be brought back 
to perfection by its means. Hence it behooved the soul of Christ to be 
perfected by a knowledge, which would be its proper perfection. And 
therefore it was necessary that there should be another knowledge in 
Christ besides the Divine knowledge, otherwise the soul of Christ would 
have been more imperfect than the souls of the rest of men. Secondly, 
because, since everything is on account of its operation, as stated De 
Coel. ii, 17, Christ would have had an intellective soul to no purpose if 
He had not understood by it; and this pertains to created knowledge. 
Thirdly, because some created knowledge pertains to the nature of the 
human soul, viz. that whereby we naturally know first principles; since 
we are here taking knowledge for any cognition of the human intellect. 
Now nothing natural was wanting to Christ, since He took the whole human 
nature, as stated above (Q[5]). And hence the Sixth Council [*Third 
Council of Constantinople, Act. 4] condemned the opinion of those who 
denied that in Christ there are two knowledges or wisdoms.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Christ knew all things with the Divine knowledge by an 
uncreated operation which is the very Essence of God; since God's 
understanding is His substance, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. xii, 
text. 39). Hence this act could not belong to the human soul of Christ, 
seeing that it belongs to another nature. Therefore, if there had been no 
other knowledge in the soul of Christ, it would have known nothing; and 
thus it would have been assumed to no purpose, since everything is on 
account of its operation.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: If the two lights are supposed to be in the same order, the 
lesser is dimmed by the greater, as the light of the sun dims the light 
of a candle, both being in the class of illuminants. But if we suppose 
two lights, one of which is in the class of illuminants and the other in 
the class of illuminated, the lesser light is not dimmed by the greater, 
but rather is strengthened, as the light of the air by the light of the 
sun. And in this manner the light of knowledge is not dimmed, but rather 
is heightened in the soul of Christ by the light of the Divine knowledge, 
which is "the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into 
this world," as is written Jn. 1:9.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: On the part of what are united we hold there is  a 
knowledge in Christ, both as to His Divine and as to His human nature; so 
that, by reason of the union whereby there is one hypostasis of God and 
man, the things of God are attributed to man, and the things of man are 
attributed to God, as was said above (Q[3], AA[1],6). But on the part of 
the union itself we cannot admit any knowledge in Christ. For this union 
is in personal being, and knowledge belongs to person only by reason of a 
nature.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether Christ had the knowledge which the blessed or comprehensors have?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the knowledge of the 
blessed or comprehensors. For the knowledge of the blessed is a 
participation of Divine light, according to Ps. 35:10: "In Thy light we 
shall see light." Now Christ had not a participated light, but He had the 
Godhead Itself substantially abiding in Him, according to Col. 2:9: "For 
in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporeally." Therefore in 
Christ there was not the knowledge of the blessed.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the knowledge of the blessed makes them blessed, 
according to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, 
the only true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." But this Man 
was blessed through being united to God in person, according to Ps. 64:5: 
"Blessed is He Whom Thou hast chosen and taken to Thee." Therefore it is 
not necessary to suppose the knowledge of the blessed in Him.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, to man belongs a double knowledge---one by nature, one 
above nature. Now the knowledge of the blessed, which consists in the 
vision of God, is not natural to man, but above his nature. But in Christ 
there was another and much higher supernatural knowledge, i.e. the Divine 
knowledge. Therefore there was no need of the knowledge of the blessed in 
Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The knowledge of the blessed consists in the knowledge 
of God. But He knew God fully, even as He was man, according to Jn. 8:55: 
"I do know Him, and do keep His word." Therefore in Christ there was the 
knowledge of the blessed.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, What is in potentiality is reduced to act by what is in 
act; for that whereby things are heated must itself be hot. Now man is in 
potentiality to the knowledge of the blessed, which consists in the 
vision of God; and is ordained to it as to an end; since the rational 
creature is capable of that blessed knowledge, inasmuch as he is made in 
the image of God. Now men are brought to this end of beatitude by the 
humanity of Christ, according to Heb. 2:10: "For it became Him, for Whom 
are all things, and by Whom are all things, Who had brought many children 
unto glory, to perfect the author of their salvation by His passion." And 
hence it was necessary that the beatific knowledge, which consists in the 
vision of God, should belong to Christ pre-eminently, since the cause 
ought always to be more efficacious  than the effect.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Godhead is united to the manhood of Christ in Person, 
not in essence or nature; yet with the unity of Person remains the 
distinction of natures. And therefore the soul of Christ, which is a part 
of human nature, through a light participated from the Divine Nature, is 
perfected with the beatific knowledge whereby it sees God in essence.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: By the union this Man is blessed with the uncreated 
beatitude, even as by the union He is God; yet besides the uncreated 
beatitude it was necessary that there should be in the human nature of 
Christ a created beatitude, whereby His soul was established in the last 
end of human nature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The beatific vision and knowledge are to some extent above 
the nature of the rational soul, inasmuch as it cannot reach it of its 
own strength; but in another way it is in accordance with its nature, 
inasmuch as it is capable of it by nature, having been made to the 
likeness of God, as stated above. But the uncreated knowledge is in every 
way above the nature of the human soul.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether Christ had an imprinted or infused knowledge?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that there was not in Christ another infused 
knowledge besides the beatific knowledge. For all other knowledge 
compared to the beatific knowledge is like imperfect to perfect. But 
imperfect knowledge is removed by the presence of perfect knowledge, as 
the clear "face-to-face" vision removes the enigmatical vision of faith, 
as is plain from 1 Cor. 13:10,12. Since, therefore, in Christ there was 
the beatific knowledge, as stated above (A[2]), it would seem that there 
could not be any other imprinted knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, an imperfect mode of cognition disposes towards a more 
perfect, as opinion, the result of dialectical syllogisms, disposes 
towards science, which results from demonstrative syllogisms. Now, when 
perfection is reached, there is no further need of the disposition, even 
as on reaching the end motion is no longer necessary. Hence, since every 
created cognition is compared to beatific cognition, as imperfect to 
perfect and as disposition to its term, it seems that since Christ had 
beatific knowledge, it was not necessary for Him to have any other 
knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, as corporeal matter is in potentiality to sensible 
forms, so the possible intellect is in potentiality to intelligible 
forms. Now corporeal matter cannot receive two forms at once! one more 
perfect and the other less perfect. Therefore neither can the soul 
receive a double knowledge at once, one more perfect and the other less 
perfect; and hence the same conclusion as above. 

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Col. 2:3) that in Christ "are hid all 
the treasures of wisdom and knowledge."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), it was fitting that the human 
nature assumed by the Word of God should not be imperfect. Now everything 
in potentiality is imperfect unless it be reduced to act. But the passive 
intellect of man is in potentiality to all intelligible things. and it is 
reduced to act by intelligible species, which are its completive forms, 
as is plain from what is said De Anima iii, 32,38. And hence we must 
admit in the soul of Christ an infused knowledge, inasmuch as the Word of 
God imprinted upon the soul of Christ, which is personally united to Him, 
intelligible species of all things to which the possible intellect is in 
potentiality; even as in the beginning of the creation of things, the 
Word of God imprinted intelligible species upon the angelic mind, as is 
clear from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). And therefore, even as in the 
angels, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,24,30), there is a 
double knowledge---one the morning knowledge, whereby they know things in 
the Word; the other the evening knowledge, whereby they know things in 
their proper natures by infused species; so likewise, besides the Divine 
and uncreated knowledge in Christ, there is in His soul a beatific 
knowledge, whereby He knows the Word, and things in the Word; and an 
infused or imprinted knowledge, whereby He knows things in their proper 
nature by intelligible species proportioned to the human mind.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The imperfect vision of faith is essentially opposed to 
manifest vision, seeing that it is of the essence of faith to have 
reference to the unseen, as was said above (SS, Q[1], A[4]). But 
cognition by infused species includes no opposition to beatific 
cognition. Therefore there is no parity.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Disposition is referred to perfection in two ways: first, 
as a way leading to perfection; secondly, as an effect proceeding from 
perfection; thus matter is disposed by heat to receive the form of fire, 
and, when this comes, the heat does not cease, but remains as an effect 
of this form. So, too, opinion caused by a dialectical syllogism is a way 
to knowledge, which is acquired by demonstration, yet, when this has been 
acquired, there may still remain the knowledge gained by the dialectical 
syllogism, following, so to say, the demonstrative knowledge, which is 
based on the cause, since he who knows the cause is thereby enabled the 
better to understand the probable signs from which dialectical syllogisms 
proceed. So likewise in Christ, together with the beatific knowledge, 
there still remains infused knowledge, not as a way to beatitude, but as 
strengthened by beatitude.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The beatific knowledge is not by a species, that is a 
similitude of the Divine Essence, or of whatever is known in the Divine 
Essence, as is plain from what has been said in the FP, Q[12], A[2]; but 
it is a knowledge of the Divine Essence immediately, inasmuch as the 
Divine Essence itself is united to the beatified mind as an intelligible 
to an intelligent being; and the Divine  Essence is a form exceeding the 
capacity of any creature whatsoever. Hence, together with this 
super-exceeding form, there is nothing to hinder from being in the 
rational mind, intelligible species, proportioned to its nature.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether Christ had any acquired knowledge?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no empiric and acquired 
knowledge. For whatever befitted Christ, He had most perfectly. Now 
Christ did not possess acquired knowledge most perfectly, since He did 
not devote Himself to the study of letters, by which knowledge is 
acquired in its perfection; for it is said (Jn. 7:15): "The Jews 
wondered, saying: How doth this Man know letters, having never learned?" 
Therefore it seems that in Christ there was no acquired knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, nothing can be added to what is full. But the power of 
Christ's soul was filled with intelligible species divinely infused, as 
was said above (A. 3). Therefore no acquired species could accrue to His 
soul.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, he who already has the habit of knowledge, acquires no 
new habit, through what he receives from the senses (otherwise two forms 
of the same species would be in the same thing together); but the habit 
which previously existed is strengthened and increased. Therefore, since 
Christ had the habit of infused knowledge, it does not seem that He 
acquired a new knowledge through what He perceived by the senses.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 5:8): "Whereas . . . He was the Son 
of God, He learned obedience by the things which He suffered," i.e. 
"experienced," says a gloss. Therefore there was in the soul of Christ an 
empiric knowledge, which is acquired knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As is plain from A[1], nothing that God planted in our 
nature was wanting to the human nature assumed by the Word of God. Now it 
is manifest that God planted in human nature not only a passive, but an 
active intellect. Hence it is necessary to say that in the soul of Christ 
there was not merely a passive, but also an active intellect. But if in 
other things God and nature make nothing in vain, as the Philosopher says 
(De Coel. i, 31; ii, 59), still less in the soul of Christ is there 
anything in vain. Now what has not its proper operation is useless, as is 
said in De Coel. ii, 17. Now the proper operation of the active intellect 
is to make intelligible species in act, by abstracting them from 
phantasms; hence, it is said (De Anima iii, 18) that the active intellect 
is that "whereby everything is made actual." And thus it is necessary to 
say that in Christ there were intelligible species received in the 
passive intellect by the action of the active intellect---which means 
that there was acquired knowledge in Him, which some call empiric. And 
hence, although I wrote differently (Sent. iii, D, xiv, A[3]; D, xviii, 
A[3]), it must be said that in  Christ there was acquired knowledge, 
which is properly knowledge in a human fashion, both as regards the 
subject receiving and as regards the active cause. For such knowledge 
springs from Christ's active intellect, which is natural to the human 
soul. But infused knowledge is attributed to the soul, on account of a 
light infused from on high, and this manner of knowing is proportioned to 
the angelic nature. But the beatific knowledge, whereby the very Essence 
of God is seen, is proper and natural to God alone, as was said in the 
FP, Q[12], A[4].

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Since there is a twofold way of acquiring knowledge---by 
discovery and by being taught---the way of discovery is the higher, and 
the way of being taught is secondary. Hence it is said (Ethic. i, 4): "He 
indeed is the best who knows everything by himself: yet he is good who 
obeys him that speaks aright." And hence it was more fitting for Christ 
to possess a knowledge acquired by discovery than by being taught, 
especially since He was given to be the Teacher of all, according to Joel 
2:23: "Be joyful in the Lord your God, because He hath given you a 
Teacher of justice."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The human mind has two relations---one to higher things, 
and in this respect the soul of Christ was full of the infused knowledge. 
The other relation is to lower things, i.e. to phantasms, which naturally 
move the human mind by virtue of the active intellect. Now it was 
necessary that even in this respect the soul of Christ should be filled 
with knowledge, not that the first fulness was insufficient for the human 
mind in itself, but that it behooved it to be also perfected with regard 
to phantasms.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[9] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Acquired and infused habits are not to be classed together; 
for the habit of knowledge is acquired by the relation of the human mind 
to phantasms; hence, another habit of the same kind cannot be again 
acquired. But the habit of infused knowledge is of a different nature, as 
coming down to the soul from on high, and not from phantasms. And hence 
there is no parity between these habits.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] Out. Para. 1/2

OF THE BEATIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST'S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)

 Now we must consider each of the aforesaid knowledges. Since, however, 
we have treated of the Divine knowledge in the FP, Q[14], it now remains 
to speak of the three others: (1) of the beatific knowledge; (2) of the 
infused knowledge; (3) of the acquired knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] Out. Para. 2/2

 But again, because much has been said in the FP, Q[12], of the beatific 
knowledge, which consists in the vision of God, we shall speak here only 
of such things as belong properly to the soul of Christ. Under this head 
there are four points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine 
Essence?

 (2) Whether it knew all things in the Word?

 (3) Whether the soul of Christ knew the infinite in the Word? 

 (4) Whether it saw the Word or the Divine Essence clearer than did any 
other creature?


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine Essence?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ comprehended and 
comprehends the Word or Divine Essence. For Isidore says (De Summo Bono 
i, 3) that "the Trinity is known only to Itself and to the Man assumed." 
Therefore the Man assumed communicates with the Holy Trinity in that 
knowledge of Itself which is proper to the Trinity. Now this is the 
knowledge of comprehension. Therefore the soul of Christ comprehends the 
Divine Essence.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, to be united to God in personal being is greater than to 
be united by vision. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6), "the 
whole Godhead in one Person is united to the human nature in Christ." 
Therefore much more is the whole Divine Nature seen by the soul of 
Christ; and hence it would seem that the soul of Christ comprehended the 
Divine Essence.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, what belongs by nature to the Son of God belongs by 
grace to the Son of Man, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 13). But to 
comprehend the Divine Essence belongs by nature to the Son of God. 
Therefore it belongs by grace to the Son of Man; and thus it seems that 
the soul of Christ comprehended the Divine Essence by grace.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 14): "Whatsoever 
comprehends itself is finite to itself." But the Divine Essence is not 
finite with respect to the soul of Christ, since It infinitely exceeds 
it. Therefore the soul of Christ does not comprehend the Word.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As is plain from Q[2], AA[1],6, the union of the two 
natures in the Person of Christ took place in such a way that the 
properties of both natures remained unconfused, i.e. "the uncreated 
remained uncreated, and the created remained within the limits of the 
creature," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4). Now it is 
impossible for any creature to comprehend the Divine Essence, as was 
shown in the FP, Q[12], AA[1],4,7, seeing that the infinite is not 
comprehended by the finite. And hence it must be said that the soul of 
Christ nowise comprehends the Divine Essence.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The Man assumed is reckoned with the Divine Trinity in the 
knowledge of Itself, not indeed as regards comprehension, but by reason 
of a certain most excellent knowledge above the rest of creatures.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Not even in the union by personal being does the human 
nature comprehend the Word of God or the Divine Nature, for although it 
was wholly united to the human nature in the one Person  of the Son, yet 
the whole power of the Godhead was not circumscribed by the human nature. 
Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "I would have you know 
that it is not the Christian doctrine that God was united to flesh in 
such a manner as to quit or lose the care of the world's government, 
neither did Ne narrow or reduce it when He transferred it to that little 
body." So likewise the soul of Christ sees the whole Essence of God, yet 
does not comprehend It; since it does not see It totally, i.e. not as 
perfectly as It is knowable, as was said in the FP, Q[12], A[7].

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This saying of Augustine is to be understood of the grace 
of union, by reason of which all that is said of the Son of God in His 
Divine Nature is also said of the Son of Man on account of the identity 
of suppositum. And in this way it may be said that the Son of Man is a 
comprehensor of the Divine Essence, not indeed by His soul, but in His 
Divine Nature; even as we may also say that the Son of Man is the Creator.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Son of God knew all things in the Word?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: It would seem that the soul of Christ does not know all things in 
the Word. For it is written (Mk. 13:32): "But of that day or hour no man 
knoweth, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the Father." 
Therefore He does not know all things in the Word.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the more perfectly anyone knows a principle the more he 
knows in the principle. But God sees His Essence more perfectly than the 
soul of Christ does. Therefore He knows more than the soul of Christ 
knows in the Word. Therefore the soul of Christ does not know all things 
in the Word.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the extent depends on the number of things known. If, 
therefore, the soul of Christ knew in the Word all that the Word knows, 
it would follow that the knowledge of the soul of Christ would equal the 
Divine knowledge, i.e. the created would equal the uncreated, which is 
impossible.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, on Apoc. 5:12, "The Lamb that was slain is worthy to 
receive . . . divinity and wisdom," a gloss says, i.e. "the knowledge of 
all things."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, When it is inquired whether Christ knows all things in 
the Word, "all things" may be taken in two ways: First, properly, to 
stand for all that in any way whatsoever is, will be, or was done, said, 
or thought, by whomsoever and at any time. And in this way it must be 
said that the soul of Christ knows all things in the Word. For every 
created intellect knows in the Word, not all simply, but so many more 
things the more perfectly it sees the Word. Yet no beatified intellect 
fails to know in the Word whatever pertains to itself. Now to Christ and 
to His dignity all things to some extent belong, inasmuch as all things 
are subject to Him. Moreover, He has been appointed Judge of all by God, 
"because He is the Son of Man," as is said Jn. 5:27; and therefore the 
soul  of Christ knows in the Word all things existing in whatever time, 
and the thoughts of men, of which He is the Judge, so that what is said 
of Him (Jn. 2:25), "For He knew what was in man," can be understood not 
merely of the Divine knowledge, but also of His soul's knowledge, which 
it had in the Word. Secondly, "all things" may be taken widely, as 
extending not merely to such things as are in act at some time, but even 
to such things as are in potentiality, and never have been nor ever will 
be reduced to act. Now some of these are in the Divine power alone, and 
not all of these does the soul of Christ know in the Word. For this would 
be to comprehend all that God could do, which would be to comprehend the 
Divine power, and, consequently, the Divine Essence. For every power is 
known from the knowledge of all it can do. Some, however, are not only in 
the power of God, but also in the power of the creature; and all of these 
the soul of Christ knows in the Word; for it comprehends in the Word the 
essence of every creature, and, consequently, its power and virtue, and 
all things that are in the power of the creature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 1: Arius and Eunomius understood this saying, not of the 
knowledge of the soul, which they did not hold to be in Christ, as was 
said above (Q[9], A[1]), but of the Divine knowledge of the Son, Whom 
they held to be less than the Father as regards knowledge. But this will 
not stand, since all things were made by the Word of God, as is said Jn. 
1:3, and, amongst other things, all times were made by Him. Now He is not 
ignorant of anything that was made by Him.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2

 He is said, therefore, not to know the day and the hour of the Judgment, 
for that He does not make it known, since, on being asked by the apostles 
(Acts 1:7), He was unwilling to reveal it; and, on the contrary, we read 
(Gn. 22:12): "Now I know that thou fearest God," i.e. "Now I have made 
thee know." But the Father is said to know, because He imparted this 
knowledge to the Son. Hence, by saying but the Father, we are given to 
understand that the Son knows, not merely in the Divine Nature, but also 
in the human, because, as Chrysostom argues (Hom. lxxviii in Matth.), if 
it is given to Christ as man to know how to judge---which is 
greater---much more is it given to Him to know the less, viz. the time of 
Judgment. Origen, however (in Matth. Tract. xxx), expounds it of His 
body, which is the Church, which is ignorant of this time. Lastly, some 
say this is to be understood of the adoptive, and not of the natural Son 
of God.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: God knows His Essence so much the more perfectly than the 
soul of Christ, as He comprehends it. And hence He knows all things, not 
merely whatever are in act at any time, which things He is said to know 
by knowledge of vision, but also what ever He Himself can do, which He is 
said to know by simple intelligence, as was shown in the FP, Q[14], A[9]. 
Therefore the soul of Christ knows all things that God knows in Himself 
by the knowledge of vision, but not all that God knows in Himself by 
knowledge of simple intelligence; and thus in Himself God knows many more 
things than the soul of Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 3: The extent of knowledge depends not merely on the number of 
knowable things, but also on the clearness of the knowledge. Therefore, 
although the knowledge of the soul of Christ which He has in the Word is 
equal to the knowledge of vision as regards the number of things known, 
nevertheless the knowledge of God infinitely exceeds the knowledge of the 
soul of Christ in clearness of cognition, since the uncreated light of 
the Divine intellect infinitely exceeds any created light received by the 
soul of Christ; although, absolutely speaking, the Divine knowledge 
exceeds the knowledge of the soul of Christ, not only as regards the mode 
of knowing, but also as regards the number of things known, as was stated 
above.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the soul of Christ can know the infinite in the Word?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ cannot know the infinite in 
the Word. For that the infinite should be known is repugnant to the 
definition of the infinite which (Phys. iii, 63) is said to be that "from 
which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be 
taken." But it is impossible for the definition to be separated from the 
thing defined, since this would mean that contradictories exist together. 
Therefore it is impossible that the soul of Christ knows the infinite.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the knowledge of the infinite is infinite. But the 
knowledge of the soul of Christ cannot be infinite, because its capacity 
is finite, since it is created. Therefore the soul of Christ cannot know 
the infinite.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, there can be nothing greater than the infinite. But more 
is contained in the Divine knowledge, absolutely speaking, than in the 
knowledge of Christ's soul, as stated above (A[2]). Therefore the soul of 
Christ does not know the infinite.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The soul of Christ knows all its power and all it can 
do. Now it can cleanse infinite sins, according to 1 Jn. 2:2: "He is the 
propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of 
the whole world." Therefore the soul of Christ knows the infinite.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Knowledge regards only being, since being and truth are 
convertible. Now a thing is said to be a being in two ways: First, 
simply, i.e. whatever is a being in act; secondly, relatively, i.e. 
whatever is a being in potentiality. And because, as is said Metaph. ix, 
20, everything is known as it is in act, and not as it is in 
potentiality, knowledge primarily and essentially regards being in act, 
and secondarily regards being in potentiality, which is not knowable of 
itself, but inasmuch as that in whose power it exists is known. Hence, 
with regard to the first mode of knowledge, the soul of Christ does not 
know the infinite. Because there is not an infinite number in act, even 
though we were to reckon all that are in act at any time whatsoever, 
since the state of generation and corruption will not last for ever:  
consequently there is a certain number not only of things lacking 
generation and corruption, but also of things capable of generation and 
corruption. But with regard to the other mode of knowing, the soul of 
Christ knows infinite things in the Word, for it knows, as stated above 
(A[2]), all that is in the power of the creature. Hence, since in the 
power of the creature there is an infinite number of things, it knows the 
infinite, as it were, by a certain knowledge of simple intelligence, and 
not by a knowledge of vision.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As we said in the FP, Q[8], A[1], the infinite is taken in 
two ways. First, on the part of a form, and thus we have the negatively 
infinite, i.e. a form or act not limited by being received into matter or 
a subject; and this infinite of itself is most knowable on account of the 
perfection of the act, although it is not comprehensible by the finite 
power of the creature; for thus God is said to be infinite. And this 
infinite the soul of Christ knows, yet does not comprehend. Secondly, 
there is the infinite as regards matter, which is taken privatively, i.e. 
inasmuch as it has not the form it ought naturally to have, and in this 
way we have infinite in quantity. Now such an infinite of itself, is 
unknown: inasmuch as it is, as it were, matter with privation of form as 
is said Phys. iii, 65. But all knowledge is by form or act. Therefore if 
this infinite is to be known according to its mode of being, it cannot be 
known. For its mode is that part be taken after part, as is said Phys. 
iii, 62,63. And in this way it is true that, if we take something from 
it, i.e. taking part after part, there always remains something to be 
taken. But as material things can be received by the intellect 
immaterially, and many things unitedly, so can infinite things be 
received by the intellect, not after the manner of infinite, but 
finitely; and thus what are in themselves infinite are, in the intellect 
of the knower, finite. And in this way the soul of Christ knows an 
infinite number of things, inasmuch as it knows them not by discoursing 
from one to another, but in a certain unity, i.e. in any creature in 
whose potentiality infinite things exist, and principally in the Word 
Himself.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: There is nothing to hinder a thing from being infinite in 
one way and finite in another, as when in quantities we imagine a surface 
infinite in length and finite in breadth. Hence, if there were an 
infinite number of men, they would have a relative infinity, i.e. in 
multitude; but, as regards the essence, they would be finite, since the 
essence of all would be limited to one specific nature. But what is 
simply infinite in its essence is God, as was said in the FP, Q[7], A[2]. 
Now the proper object of the intellect is "what a thing is," as is said 
De Anima iii, 26, to which pertains the notion of the species. And thus 
the soul of Christ, since it has a finite capacity, attains to, but does 
not comprehend, what is simply infinite in essence, as stated above (A[1]
). But the infinite in potentiality which is in creatures can be 
comprehended by the soul of Christ, since it is compared to that soul 
according to its essence, in which respect it is not infinite. For even 
our intellect understands a universal---for example, the nature of a 
genus or species, which in a manner has infinity, inasmuch as it can be 
predicated of an infinite number. 

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: That which is infinite in every way can be but one. Hence 
the Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 2,3,) that, since bodies have 
dimensions in every part, there cannot be several infinite bodies. Yet if 
anything were infinite in one way only, nothing would hinder the 
existence of several such infinite things; as if we were to suppose 
several lines of infinite length drawn on a surface of finite breadth. 
Hence, because infinitude is not a substance, but is accidental to things 
that are said to be infinite, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, 37,38); 
as the infinite is multiplied by different subjects, so, too, a property 
of the infinite must be multiplied, in such a way that it belongs to each 
of them according to that particular subject. Now it is a property of the 
infinite that nothing is greater than it. Hence, if we take one infinite 
line, there is nothing greater in it than the infinite; so, too, if we 
take any one of other infinite lines, it is plain that each has infinite 
parts. Therefore of necessity in this particular line there is nothing 
greater than all these infinite parts; yet in another or a third line 
there will be more infinite parts besides these. We observe this in 
numbers also, for the species of even numbers are infinite, and likewise 
the species of odd numbers are infinite; yet there are more even and odd 
numbers than even. And thus it must be said that nothing is greater than 
the simply and in every way infinite; but than the infinite which is 
limited in some respect, nothing is greater in that order; yet we may 
suppose something greater outside that order. In this way, therefore, 
there are infinite things in the potentiality of the creature, and yet 
there are more in the power of God than in the potentiality of the 
creature. So, too, the soul of Christ knows infinite things by the 
knowledge of simple intelligence; yet God knows more by this manner of 
knowledge or understanding.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the soul of Christ sees the Word or the Divine Essence more 
clearly than does any other creature?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ does not see the Word more 
perfectly than does any other creature. For the perfection of knowledge 
depends upon the medium of knowing; as the knowledge we have by means of 
a demonstrative syllogism is more perfect than that which we have by 
means of a probable syllogism. But all the blessed see the Word 
immediately in the Divine Essence Itself, as was said in the FP, Q[12], 
A[2]. Therefore the soul of Christ does not see the Word more perfectly 
than any other creature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the perfection of vision does not exceed the power of 
seeing. But the rational power of a soul such as is the soul of Christ is 
below the intellective power of an angel, as is plain from Dionysius 
(Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the soul of Christ did not see the Word more 
perfectly than the angels.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, God sees His Word infinitely more perfectly than does 
the soul of Christ. Hence there are infinite possible  mediate degrees 
between the manner in which God sees His Word, and the manner in which 
the soul of Christ sees the Word. Therefore we cannot assert that the 
soul of Christ sees the Word or the Divine Essence more perfectly than 
does every other creature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:20,21) that God set Christ "on 
His right hand in the heavenly places, above all principality and power 
and virtue and dominion and every name that is named not only in this 
world, but also in that which is to come." But in that heavenly glory the 
higher anyone is the more perfectly does he know God. Therefore the soul 
of Christ sees God more perfectly than does any other creature.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, The vision of the Divine Essence is granted to all the 
blessed by a partaking of the Divine light which is shed upon them from 
the fountain of the Word of God, according to Ecclus. 1:5: "The Word of 
God on high is the fountain of Wisdom." Now the soul of Christ, since it 
is united to the Word in person, is more closely joined to the Word of 
God than any other creature. Hence it more fully receives the light in 
which God is seen by the Word Himself than any other creature. And 
therefore more perfectly than the rest of creatures it sees the First 
Truth itself, which is the Essence of God; hence it is written (Jn. 
1:14): "And we saw His glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten 
of the Father," "full" not only of "grace" but also of "truth."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Perfection of knowledge, on the part of the thing known, 
depends on the medium; but as regards the knower, it depends on the power 
or habit. And hence it is that even amongst men one sees a conclusion in 
a medium more perfectly than another does. And in this way the soul of 
Christ, which is filled with a more abundant light, knows the Divine 
Essence more perfectly than do the other blessed, although all see the 
Divine Essence in itself.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The vision of the Divine Essence exceeds the natural power 
of any creature, as was said in the FP, Q[12], A[4]. And hence the 
degrees thereof depend rather on the order of grace in which Christ is 
supreme, than on the order of nature, in which the angelic nature is 
placed before the human.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[10] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[7], A[12]), there cannot be a greater 
grace than the grace of Christ with respect to the union with the Word; 
and the same is to be said of the perfection of the Divine vision; 
although, absolutely speaking, there could be a higher and more sublime 
degree by the infinity of the Divine power.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE KNOWLEDGE IMPRINTED OR INFUSED IN THE SOUL OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the knowledge imprinted or infused in the soul of 
Christ, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether Christ knows all things by this knowledge?

 (2) Whether He could use this knowledge by turning to  phantasms?

 (3) Whether this knowledge was collative?

 (4) Of the comparison of this knowledge with the angelic knowledge;

 (5) Whether it was a habitual knowledge?

 (6) Whether it was distinguished by various habits?


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether by this imprinted or infused knowledge Christ knew all things?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that by this knowledge Christ did not know all 
things. For this knowledge is imprinted upon Christ for the perfection of 
the passive intellect. Now the passive intellect of the human soul does 
not seem to be in potentiality to all things simply, but only to those 
things with regard to which it can be reduced to act by the active 
intellect, which is its proper motor; and these are knowable by natural 
reason. Therefore by this knowledge Christ did not know what exceeded the 
natural reason.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, phantasms are to the human intellect as colors to sight, 
as is said De Anima iii, 18,31,39. But it does not pertain to the 
perfection of the power of seeing to know what is without color. 
Therefore it does not pertain to the perfection of human intellect to 
know things of which there are no phantasms, such as separate substances. 
Hence, since this knowledge was in Christ for the perfection of His 
intellective soul, it seems that by this knowledge He did not know 
separate substances.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, it does not belong to the perfection of the intellect to 
know singulars. Hence it would seem that by this knowledge the soul of 
Christ did not know singulars.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2) that "the Spirit of wisdom and 
understanding, of knowledge and counsel shall fill Him [*Vulg.: 'The 
Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him, the Spirit of wisdom and 
understanding, the Spirit of counsel . . . the Spirit of knowledge . . . 
'; cf. Ecclus. 15:5]," under which are included all that may be known; 
for the knowledge of all Divine things belongs to wisdom, the knowledge 
of all immaterial things to understanding, the knowledge of all 
conclusions to knowledge [scientia], the knowledge of all practical 
things to counsel. Hence it would seem that by this knowledge Christ had 
the knowledge of all things.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As was said above (Q[9], A[1]), it was fitting that the 
soul of Christ should be wholly perfected by having each of its powers 
reduced to act. Now it must be borne in mind that in the human soul, as 
in every creature, there is a double passive power: one in comparison 
with a natural agent; the other in comparison with the first agent, which 
can reduce any creature to a higher act than a natural agent can reduce 
it, and this is usually called the obediential power of a creature. Now 
both powers of Christ's soul were reduced to act by this divinely 
imprinted knowledge. And hence, by it the soul of Christ knew: First, 
whatever can be known  by force of a man's active intellect, e.g. 
whatever pertains to human sciences; secondly, by this knowledge Christ 
knew all things made known to man by Divine revelation, whether they 
belong to the gift of wisdom or the gift of prophecy, or any other gift 
of the Holy Ghost; since the soul of Christ knew these things more fully 
and completely than others. Yet He did not know the Essence of God by 
this knowledge, but by the first alone, of which we spoke above (Q[10]).

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This reason refers to the natural power of an intellective 
soul in comparison with its natural agent, which is the active intellect.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The human soul in the state of this life, since it is 
somewhat fettered by the body, so as to be unable to understand without 
phantasms, cannot understand separate substances. But after the state of 
this life the separated soul will be able, in a measure, to know separate 
substances by itself, as was said in the FP, Q[89], AA[1],2, and this is 
especially clear as regards the souls of the blessed. Now before His 
Passion, Christ was not merely a wayfarer but also a comprehensor; hence 
His soul could know separate substances in the same way that a separated 
soul could.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The knowledge of singulars pertains to the perfection of 
the intellective soul, not in speculative knowledge, but in practical 
knowledge, which is imperfect without the knowledge of singulars, in 
which operations exist, as is said Ethic. vi, 7. Hence for prudence are 
required the remembrance of past things, knowledge of present things, and 
foresight of future things, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Therefore, 
since Christ had the fulness of prudence by the gift of counsel, He 
consequently knew all singular things---present, past, and future.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether Christ could use this knowledge by turning to phantasms?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ could not understand by 
this knowledge except by turning to phantasms, because, as is stated De 
Anima iii, 18,31,39, phantasms are compared to man's intellective soul as 
colors to sight. But Christ's power of seeing could not become actual 
save by turning to colors. Therefore His intellective soul could 
understand nothing except by turning to phantasms.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Christ's soul is of the same nature as ours. otherwise 
He would not be of the same species as we, contrary to what the Apostle 
says (Phil. 2:7) " . . . being made in the likeness of men." But our soul 
cannot understand except by turning to phantasms. Hence, neither can 
Christ's soul otherwise understand.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, senses are given to man to help his intellect. Hence, if 
the soul of Christ could understand without turning to  phantasms, which 
arise in the senses, it would follow that in the soul of Christ the 
senses were useless, which is not fitting. Therefore it seems that the 
soul of Christ can only understand by turning to phantasms.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The soul of Christ knew certain things which could not 
be known by the senses, viz. separate substances. Therefore it could 
understand without turning to phantasms.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, In the state before His Passion Christ was at the same 
time a wayfarer and a comprehensor, as will be more clearly shown (Q[15], 
A[10]). Especially had He the conditions of a wayfarer on the part of the 
body, which was passible; but the conditions of a comprehensor He had 
chiefly on the part of the soul. Now this is the condition of the soul of 
a comprehensor, viz. that it is nowise subject to its body, or dependent 
upon it, but wholly dominates it. Hence after the resurrection glory will 
flow from the soul to the body. But the soul of man on earth needs to 
turn to phantasms, because it is fettered by the body and in a measure 
subject to and dependent upon it. And hence the blessed both before and 
after the resurrection can understand without turning to phantasms. And 
this must be said of the soul of Christ, which had fully the capabilities 
of a comprehensor.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This likeness which the Philosopher asserts is not with 
regard to everything. For it is manifest that the end of the power of 
seeing is to know colors; but the end of the intellective power is not to 
know phantasms, but to know intelligible species, which it apprehends 
from and in phantasms, according to the state of the present life. 
Therefore there is a likeness in respect of what both powers regard, but 
not in respect of that in which the condition of both powers is 
terminated. Now nothing prevents a thing in different states from 
reaching its end by different ways: albeit there is never but one proper 
end of a thing. Hence, although the sight knows nothing without color; 
nevertheless in a certain state the intellect can know without phantasms, 
but not without intelligible species.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although the soul of Christ was of the same nature as our 
souls, yet it had a state which our souls have not yet in fact, but only 
in hope, i.e. the state of comprehension.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Although the soul of Christ could understand without 
turning to phantasms, yet it could also understand by turning to 
phantasms. Hence the senses were not useless in it; especially as the 
senses are not afforded to man solely for intellectual knowledge, but for 
the need of animal life.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether this knowledge is collative?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had not this knowledge by 
way of comparison. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): "We do not 
uphold counsel or choice in Christ." Now these  things are withheld from 
Christ only inasmuch as they imply comparison and discursion. Therefore 
it seems that there was no collative or discursive knowledge in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, man needs comparison and discursion of reason in order 
to find out the unknown. But the soul of Christ knew everything, as was 
said above (Q[10], A[2]). Hence there was no discursive or collative 
knowledge in Him.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the knowledge in Christ's soul was like that of 
comprehensors, who are likened to the angels, according to Mt. 22:30. Now 
there is no collative or discursive knowledge in the angels, as Dionysius 
shows (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore there was no discursive or collative 
knowledge in the soul of Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Christ had a rational soul, as was shown (Q[5], A[4]). 
Now the proper operation of a rational soul consists in comparison and 
discursion from one thing to another. Therefore there was collative and 
discursive knowledge in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Knowledge may be discursive or collative in two ways. 
First, in the acquisition of the knowledge, as happens to us, who proceed 
from one thing to the knowledge of another, as from causes to effects, 
and conversely. And in this way the knowledge in Christ's soul was not 
discursive or collative, since this knowledge which we are now 
considering was divinely infused, and not acquired by a process of 
reasoning. Secondly, knowledge may be called discursive or collative in 
use; as at times those who know, reason from cause to effect, not in 
order to learn anew, but wishing to use the knowledge they have. And in 
this way the knowledge in Christ's soul could be collative or discursive; 
since it could conclude one thing from another, as it pleased, as in Mt. 
17:24,25, when our Lord asked Peter: "Of whom do the kings of the earth 
receive tribute, of their own children, or of strangers?" On Peter 
replying: "Of strangers," He concluded: "Then the children are free."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: From Christ is excluded that counsel which is with doubt; 
and consequently choice, which essentially includes such counsel; but the 
practice of using counsel is not excluded from Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This reason rests upon discursion and comparison, as used 
to acquire knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The blessed are likened to the angels in the gifts of 
graces; yet there still remains the difference of natures. And hence to 
use comparison and discursion is connatural to the souls of the blessed, 
but not to angels.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether in Christ this knowledge was greater than the knowledge of the 
angels?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 1: It would seem that this knowledge was not greater in Christ than 
in the angels. For perfection is proportioned to the thing perfected. But 
the human soul in the order of nature is below the angelic nature. 
Therefore since the knowledge we are now speaking of is imprinted upon 
Christ's soul for its perfection, it seems that this knowledge is less 
than the knowledge by which the angelic nature is perfected.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the knowledge of Christ's soul was in a measure 
comparative and discursive, which cannot be said of the angelic 
knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of Christ's soul was less than the 
knowledge of the angels.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the more immaterial knowledge is, the greater it is. But 
the knowledge of the angels is more immaterial than the knowledge of 
Christ's soul, since the soul of Christ is the act of a body, and turns 
to phantasms, which cannot be said of the angels. Therefore the knowledge 
of angels is greater than the knowledge of Christ's soul.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 2:9): "For we see Jesus, Who was 
made a little lower than the angels, for the suffering of death, crowned 
with glory and honor"; from which it is plain that Christ is said to be 
lower than the angels only in regard to the suffering of death. And 
hence, not in knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[4] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, The knowledge imprinted on Christ's soul may be looked at 
in two ways: First, as regards what it has from the inflowing cause; 
secondly, as regards what it has from the subject receiving it. Now with 
regard to the first, the knowledge imprinted upon the soul of Christ was 
more excellent than the knowledge of the angels, both in the number of 
things known and in the certainty of the knowledge; since the spiritual 
light, which is imprinted on the soul of Christ, is much more excellent 
than the light which pertains to the angelic nature. But as regards the 
second, the knowledge imprinted on the soul of Christ is less than the 
angelic knowledge, in the manner of knowing that is natural to the human 
soul, i.e. by turning to phantasms, and by comparison and discursion.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[4] Body Para. 2/2

 And hereby the reply to the objections is made clear.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether this knowledge was habitual?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no habitual knowledge. For 
it has been said (Q[9], A[1]) that the highest perfection of knowledge 
befitted Christ's soul. But the perfection of an actually existing 
knowledge is greater than that of a potentially or habitually existing 
knowledge. Therefore it was fitting for Him to know all things actually. 
Therefore He had not habitual knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, since habits are ordained to acts, a habitual  knowledge 
which is never reduced to act would seem useless. Now, since Christ knew 
all things, as was said Q[10], A[2], He could not have considered all 
things actually, thinking over one after another, since the infinite 
cannot be passed over by enumeration. Therefore the habitual knowledge of 
certain things would have been useless to Him---which is unfitting. 
Therefore He had an actual and not a habitual knowledge of what He knew.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, habitual knowledge is a perfection of the knower. But 
perfection is more noble than the thing perfected. If, therefore, in the 
soul of Christ there was any created habit of knowledge, it would follow 
that this created thing was nobler than the soul of Christ. Therefore 
there was no habitual knowledge in Christ's soul.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The knowledge of Christ we are now speaking about was 
univocal with our knowledge, even as His soul was of the same species as 
ours. But our knowledge is in the genus of habit. Therefore the knowledge 
of Christ was habitual.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[5] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[4]), the mode of the knowledge 
impressed on the soul of Christ befitted the subject receiving it. For 
the received is in the recipient after the mode of the recipient. Now the 
connatural mode of the human soul is that it should understand sometimes 
actually, and sometimes potentially. But the medium between a pure power 
and a completed act is a habit: and extremes and medium are of the same 
genus. Thus it is plain that it is the connatural mode of the human soul 
to receive knowledge as a habit. Hence it must be said that the knowledge 
imprinted on the soul of Christ was habitual, for He could use it when He 
pleased.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: In Christ's soul there was a twofold knowledge---each most 
perfect of its kind: the first exceeding the mode of human nature, as by 
it He saw the Essence of God, and other things in It, and this was the 
most perfect, simply. Nor was this knowledge habitual, but actual with 
respect to everything He knew in this way. But the second knowledge was 
in Christ in a manner proportioned to human nature, i.e. inasmuch as He 
knew things by species divinely imprinted upon Him, and of this knowledge 
we are now speaking. Now this knowledge was not most perfect, simply, but 
merely in the genus of human knowledge; hence it did not behoove it to be 
always in act.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Habits are reduced to act by the command of the will, since 
a habit is that "with which we act when we wish." Now the will is 
indeterminate in regard to infinite things. Yet it is not useless, even 
when it does not actually tend to all; provided it actually tends to 
everything in fitting place and time. And hence neither is a habit 
useless, even if all that it extends to is not reduced to act; provided 
that that which befits the due end of the will be reduced to act 
according as the matter in hand and the time require.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 

 Reply OBJ 3: Goodness and being are taken in two ways: First, simply; 
and thus a substance, which subsists in its being and goodness, is a good 
and a being; secondly, being and goodness are taken relatively, and in 
this way an accident is a being and a good, not that it has being and 
goodness, but that its subject is a being and a good. And hence habitual 
knowledge is not simply better or more excellent than the soul of Christ; 
but relatively, since the whole goodness of habitual knowledge is added 
to the goodness of the subject.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether this knowledge was distinguished by divers habits?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that in the soul of Christ there was only one habit 
of knowledge. For the more perfect knowledge is, the more united it is; 
hence the higher angels understand by the more universal forms, as was 
said in the FP, Q[55], A[3]. Now Christ's knowledge was most perfect. 
Therefore it was most one. Therefore it was not distinguished by several 
habits.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, our faith is derived from Christ's knowledge; hence it 
is written (Heb. 12:2): "Looking on Jesus the author and finisher of 
faith." But there is only one habit of faith about all things believed, 
as was said in the SS, Q[4], A[6]. Much more, therefore, was there only 
one habit of knowledge in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, knowledge is distinguished by the divers formalities of 
knowable things. But the soul of Christ knew everything under one 
formality, i.e. by a divinely infused light. Therefore in Christ there 
was only one habit of knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Zach. 3:9) that on "one" stone, i.e. 
Christ, "there are seven eyes." Now by the eye is understood knowledge. 
Therefore it would seem that in Christ there were several habits of 
knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[6] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (AA[4],5), the knowledge imprinted on 
Christ's soul has a mode connatural to a human soul. Now it is connatural 
to a human soul to receive species of a lesser universality than the 
angels receive; so that it knows different specific natures by different 
intelligible species. But it so happens that we have different habits of 
knowledge, because there are different classes of knowable things, 
inasmuch as what are in one genus are known by one habit; thus it is said 
(Poster. i, 42) that "one science is of one class of object." And hence 
the knowledge imprinted on Christ's soul was distinguished by different 
habits.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As was said (A[4]), the knowledge of Christ's soul is most 
perfect, and exceeds the knowledge of angels with regard to what is in it 
on the part of God's gift; but it is below the angelic knowledge as 
regards the mode of the recipient. And it pertains to this mode that this 
knowledge is distinguished by various habits, inasmuch as it regards more 
particular species. 

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Our faith rests upon the First Truth; and hence Christ is 
the author of our faith by the Divine knowledge, which is simply one.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[11] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The divinely infused light is the common formality for 
understanding what is divinely revealed, as the light of the active 
intellect is with regard to what is naturally known. Hence, in the soul 
of Christ there must be the proper species of singular things, in order 
to know each with proper knowledge; and in this way there must be divers 
habits of knowledge in Christ's soul, as stated above.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE ACQUIRED OR EMPIRIC KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST'S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the acquired or empiric knowledge of Christ's soul; 
and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether Christ knew all things by this knowledge?

 (2) Whether He advanced in this knowledge?

 (3) Whether He learned anything from man?

 (4) Whether He received anything from angels?


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether Christ knew all things by this acquired or empiric knowledge?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that Christ did not know everything by this 
knowledge. For this knowledge is acquired by experience. But Christ did 
not experience everything. Therefore He did not know everything by this 
knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, man acquires knowledge through the senses. But not all 
sensible things were subjected to Christ's bodily senses. Therefore 
Christ did not know everything by this knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the extent of knowledge depends on the things knowable. 
Therefore if Christ knew all things by this knowledge, His acquired 
knowledge would have been equal to His infused and beatific knowledge; 
which is not fitting. Therefore Christ did not know all things by this 
knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Nothing imperfect was in Christ's soul. Now this 
knowledge of His would have been imperfect if He had not known all things 
by it, since the imperfect is that to which addition may be made. Hence 
Christ knew all things by this knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Acquired knowledge is held to be in Christ's soul, as we 
have said Q[9], A[4], by reason of the active intellect, lest its action, 
which is to make things actually intelligible, should be wanting; even as 
imprinted or infused knowledge is held to be in Christ's soul for the 
perfection of the passive intellect. Now as the passive intellect is that 
by which "all things are in  potentiality," so the active intellect is 
that by which "all are in act," as is said De Anima iii, 18. And hence, 
as the soul of Christ knew by infused knowledge all things to which the 
passive intellect is in any way in potentiality, so by acquired knowledge 
it knew whatever can be known by the action of the active intellect.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The knowledge of things may be acquired not merely by 
experiencing the things themselves, but by experiencing other things; 
since by virtue of the light of the active intellect man can go on to 
understand effects from causes, and causes from effects, like from like, 
contrary from contrary. Therefore Christ, though He did not experience 
all things, came to the knowledge of all things from what He did 
experience.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although all sensible things were not subjected to Christ's 
bodily senses, yet other sensible things were subjected to His senses; 
and from this He could come to know other things by the most excellent 
force of His reason, in the manner described in the previous reply; just 
as in seeing heavenly bodies He could comprehend their powers and the 
effects they have upon things here below, which were not subjected to His 
senses; and for the same reason, from any other things whatsoever, He 
could come to the knowledge of yet other things.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: By this knowledge the soul of Christ did not know all 
things simply, but all such as are knowable by the light of man's active 
intellect. Hence by this knowledge He did not know the essences of 
separate substances, nor past, present, or future singulars, which, 
nevertheless, He knew by infused knowledge, as was said above (Q[11]).


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether Christ advanced in acquired or empiric knowledge?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that Christ did not advance in this knowledge. For 
even as Christ knew all things by His beatific and His infused knowledge, 
so also did He by this acquired knowledge, as is plain from what has been 
said (A[1]). But He did not advance in these knowledges. Therefore 
neither in this.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, to advance belongs to the imperfect, since the perfect 
cannot be added to. Now we cannot suppose an imperfect knowledge in 
Christ. Therefore Christ did not advance in this knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 22): "Whoever say 
that Christ advanced in wisdom and grace, as if receiving additional 
sensations, do not venerate the union which is in hypostasis." But it is 
impious not to venerate this union. Therefore it is impious to say that 
His knowledge received increase.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 2:52): "Jesus advanced in wisdom and 
age and grace with God and men"; and Ambrose says (De  Incar. Dom. vii) 
that "He advanced in human wisdom." Now human wisdom is that which is 
acquired in a human manner, i.e. by the light of the active intellect. 
Therefore Christ advanced in this knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, There is a twofold advancement in knowledge: one in 
essence, inasmuch as the habit of knowledge is increased; the other in 
effect---e.g. if someone were with one and the same habit of knowledge to 
prove to someone else some minor truths at first, and afterwards greater 
and more subtle conclusions. Now in this second way it is plain that 
Christ advanced in knowledge and grace, even as in age, since as His age 
increased He wrought greater deeds, and showed greater knowledge and 
grace.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 But as regards the habit of knowledge, it is plain that His habit of 
infused knowledge did not increase, since from the beginning He had 
perfect infused knowledge of all things; and still less could His 
beatific knowledge increase; while in the FP, Q[14], A[15], we have 
already said that His Divine knowledge could not increase. Therefore, if 
in the soul of Christ there was no habit of acquired knowledge, beyond 
the habit of infused knowledge, as appears to some [*Blessed Albert the 
Great, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure], and sometime appeared to me 
(Sent. iii, D, xiv), no knowledge in Christ increased in essence, but 
merely by experience, i.e. by comparing the infused intelligible species 
with phantasms. And in this way they maintain that Christ's knowledge 
grew in experience, e.g. by comparing the infused intelligible species 
with what He received through the senses for the first time. But because 
it seems unfitting that any natural intelligible action should be wanting 
to Christ, and because to extract intelligible species from phantasms is 
a natural action of man's active intellect, it seems becoming to place 
even this action in Christ. And it follows from this that in the soul of 
Christ there was a habit of knowledge which could increase by this 
abstraction of species; inasmuch as the active intellect, after 
abstracting the first intelligible species from phantasms, could abstract 
others, and others again.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Both the infused knowledge and the beatific knowledge of 
Christ's soul were the effects of an agent of infinite power, which could 
produce the whole at once; and thus in neither knowledge did Christ 
advance; since from the beginning He had them perfectly. But the acquired 
knowledge of Christ is caused by the active intellect which does not 
produce the whole at once, but successively; and hence by this knowledge 
Christ did not know everything from the beginning, but step by step, and 
after a time, i.e. in His perfect age; and this is plain from what the 
Evangelist says, viz. that He increased in "knowledge and age" together.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Even this knowledge was always perfect for the time being, 
although it was not always perfect, simply and in comparison to the 
nature; hence it could increase.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: This saying of Damascene regards those who say absolutely 
that addition was made to Christ's knowledge, i.e. as  regards any 
knowledge of His, and especially as regards the infused knowledge which 
is caused in Christ's soul by union with the Word; but it does not regard 
the increase of knowledge caused by the natural agent.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether Christ learned anything from man?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that Christ learned something from man. For it is 
written (Lk. 2:46,47) that, "They found Him in the temple in the midst of 
the doctors, hearing them, and asking them questions." But to ask 
questions and to reply pertains to a learner. Therefore Christ learned 
something from man.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, to acquire knowledge from a man's teaching seems more 
noble than to acquire it from sensible things, since in the soul of the 
man who teaches the intelligible species are in act; but in sensible 
things the intelligible species are only in potentiality. Now Christ 
received empiric knowledge from sensible things, as stated above (A[2]). 
Much more, therefore, could He receive knowledge by learning from men.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, by empiric knowledge Christ did not know everything from 
the beginning, but advanced in it, as was said above (A[2]). But anyone 
hearing words which mean something, may learn something he does not know. 
Therefore Christ could learn from men something He did not know by this 
knowledge.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 45:4): "Behold, I have given Him for 
a witness to the people, for a leader and a master to the Gentiles." Now 
a master is not taught, but teaches. Therefore Christ did not receive any 
knowledge by the teaching of any man.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, In every genus that which is the first mover is not moved 
according to the same species of movement; just as the first alterative 
is not itself altered. Now Christ is established by God the Head of the 
Church---yea, of all men, as was said above (Q[8], A[3]), so that not 
only all might receive grace through Him, but that all might receive the 
doctrine of Truth from Him. Hence He Himself says (Jn. 18:37): "For this 
was I born, and for this came I into the world; that I should give 
testimony to the truth." And thus it did not befit His dignity that He 
should be taught by any man.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As Origen says (Hom. xix in Luc.): "Our Lord asked 
questions not in order to learn anything, but in order to teach by 
questioning. For from the same well of knowledge came the question and 
the wise reply." Hence the Gospel goes on to say that "all that heard Him 
were astonished at His wisdom and His answers."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Whoever learns from man does not receive knowledge 
immediately from the intelligible species which are in his mind, but 
through sensible words, which are signs of intelligible concepts. Now as 
words formed by a man are signs of  his intellectual knowledge; so are 
creatures, formed by God, signs of His wisdom. Hence it is written 
(Ecclus. 1:10) that God "poured" wisdom "out upon all His works." Hence, 
just as it is better to be taught by God than by man, so it is better to 
receive our knowledge from sensible creatures and not by man's teaching.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Jesus advanced in empiric knowledge, as in age, as stated 
above (A[2]). Now as a fitting age is required for a man to acquire 
knowledge by discovery, so also that he may acquire it by being taught. 
But our Lord did nothing unbecoming to His age; and hence He did not give 
ear to hearing the lessons of doctrine until such time as He was able to 
have reached that grade of knowledge by way of experience. Hence Gregory 
says (Sup. Ezech. Lib. i, Hom. ii): "In the twelfth year of His age He 
deigned to question men on earth, since in the course of reason, the word 
of doctrine is not vouchsafed before the age of perfection."


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether Christ received knowledge from the angels?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that Christ received knowledge from the angels. For 
it is written (Lk. 22:43) that "there appeared to Him an angel from 
heaven, strengthening Him." But we are strengthened by the comforting 
words of a teacher, according to Job 4:3,4: "Behold thou hast taught many 
and hast strengthened the weary hand. Thy words have confirmed them that 
were staggering." Therefore Christ was taught by angels.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "For I see that even 
Jesus---the super-substantial substance of supercelestial 
substances---when without change He took our substance upon Himself, was 
subject in obedience to the instructions of the Father and God by the 
angels." Hence it seems that even Christ wished to be subject to the 
ordinations of the Divine law, whereby men are taught by means of angels.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, as in the natural order the human body is subject to the 
celestial bodies, so likewise is the human mind to angelic minds. Now 
Christ's body was subject to the impressions of the heavenly bodies, for 
He felt the heat in summer and the cold in winter, and other human 
passions. Therefore His human mind was subject to the illuminations of 
supercelestial spirits.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that "the highest 
angels question Jesus, and learn the knowledge of His Divine work, and of 
the flesh assumed for us; and Jesus teaches them directly." Now to teach 
and to be taught do not belong to the same. Therefore Christ did not 
receive knowledge from the angels.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Since the human soul is midway between spiritual 
substances and corporeal things, it is perfected naturally in two ways. 
First by knowledge received from sensible things; secondly, by knowledge 
imprinted or infused by the illumination of spiritual substances. Now in 
both these ways the  soul of Christ was perfected; first by empirical 
knowledge of sensible things, for which there is no need of angelic 
light, since the light of the active intellect suffices; secondly, by the 
higher impression of infused knowledge, which He received directly from 
God. For as His soul was united to the Word above the common mode, in 
unity of person, so above the common manner of men was it filled with 
knowledge and grace by the Word of God Himself; and not by the medium of 
angels, who in their beginning received the knowledge of things by the 
influence of the Word, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8).

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This strengthening by the angel was for the purpose not of 
instructing Him, but of proving the truth of His human nature. Hence Bede 
says (on Lk. 22:43): "In testimony of both natures are the angels said to 
have ministered to Him and to have strengthened Him. For the Creator did 
not need help from His creature; but having become man, even as it was 
for our sake that He was sad, so was it for our sake that He was 
strengthened," i.e. in order that our faith in the Incarnation might be 
strengthened.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Dionysius says that Christ was subject to the angelic 
instructions, not by reason of Himself, but by reason of what happened at 
His Incarnation, and as regards the care of Him whilst He was a child. 
Hence in the same place he adds that "Jesus' withdrawal to Egypt decreed 
by the Father is announced to Joseph by angels, and again His return to 
Judaea from Egypt."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[12] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: The Son of God assumed a passible body (as will be said 
hereafter (Q[14], A[1])) and a soul perfect in knowledge and grace (Q[14]
, A[1], ad 1; A[4]). Hence His body was rightly subject to the impression 
of heavenly bodies; but His soul was not subject to the impression of 
heavenly spirits.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] Out. Para. 1/1

OF THE POWER OF CHRIST'S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the power of Christ's soul; and under this head 
there are four points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether He had omnipotence simply?

 (2) Whether He had omnipotence with regard to corporeal creatures?

 (3) Whether He had omnipotence with regard to His own body?

 (4) Whether He had omnipotence as regards the execution of His own will?


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had omnipotence. For 
Ambrose [*Gloss, Ord.] says on Lk. 1:32: "The power which the Son of God 
had naturally, the Man was about to receive in time." Now this would seem 
to regard the soul principally, since it is the chief part of man. Hence 
since the Son of God had omnipotence from all eternity, it would seem 
that the soul of Christ received omnipotence in time. 

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, as the power of God is infinite, so is His knowledge. 
But the soul of Christ in a manner had the knowledge of all that God 
knows, as was said above (Q[10], A[2]). Therefore He had all power; and 
thus He was omnipotent.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the soul of Christ has all knowledge. Now knowledge is 
either practical or speculative. Therefore He has a practical knowledge 
of what He knows, i.e. He knew how to do what He knows; and thus it seems 
that He can do all things.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, What is proper to God cannot belong to any creature. 
But it is proper to God to be omnipotent, according to Ex. 15:2,3: "He is 
my God and I will glorify Him," and further on, "Almighty is His name." 
Therefore the soul of Christ, as being a creature, has not omnipotence.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[1] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, As was said above (Q[2], A[1]; Q[10], A[1]) in the 
mystery of the Incarnation the union in person so took place that there 
still remained the distinction of natures, each nature still retaining 
what belonged to it. Now the active principle of a thing follows its 
form, which is the principle of action. But the form is either the very 
nature of the thing, as in simple things; or is the constituent of the 
nature of the thing; as in such as are composed of matter and form.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[1] Body Para. 2/2

 And it is in this way that omnipotence flows, so to say, from the Divine 
Nature. For since the Divine Nature is the very uncircumscribed Being of 
God, as is plain from Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), it has an active power 
over everything that can have the nature of being; and this is to have 
omnipotence; just as every other thing has an active power over such 
things as the perfection of its nature extends to; as what is hot gives 
heat. Therefore since the soul of Christ is a part of human nature, it 
cannot possibly have omnipotence.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: By union with the Person, the Man receives omnipotence in 
time, which the Son of God had from eternity; the result of which union 
is that as the Man is said to be God, so is He said to be omnipotent; not 
that the omnipotence of the Man is distinct (as neither is His Godhead) 
from that of the Son of God, but because there is one Person of God and 
man.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2

 Reply OBJ 2: According to some, knowledge and active power are not in 
the same ratio; for an active power flows from the very nature of the 
thing, inasmuch as action is considered to come forth from the agent; but 
knowledge is not always possessed by the very essence or form of the 
knower, since it may be had by assimilation of the knower to the thing 
known by the aid of received species. But this reason seems not to 
suffice, because even as we may understand by a likeness obtained from 
another, so also may we act by a form obtained from another, as water or 
iron heats, by heat borrowed from fire. Hence there would be no reason 
why the soul of Christ, as it can know all things by the similitudes of 
all things  impressed upon it by God, cannot do these things by the same 
similitudes.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2

 It has, therefore, to be further considered that what is received in the 
lower nature from the higher is possessed in an inferior manner; for heat 
is not received by water in the perfection and strength it had in fire. 
Therefore, since the soul of Christ is of an inferior nature to the 
Divine Nature, the similitudes of things are not received in the soul of 
Christ in the perfection and strength they had in the Divine Nature. And 
hence it is that the knowledge of Christ's soul is inferior to Divine 
knowledge as regards the manner of knowing, for God knows (things) more 
perfectly than the soul of Christ; and also as regards the number of 
things known, since the soul of Christ does not know all that God can do, 
and these God knows by the knowledge of simple intelligence; although it 
knows all things present, past, and future, which God knows by the 
knowledge of vision. So, too, the similitudes of things infused into 
Christ's soul do not equal the Divine power in acting, i.e. so as to do 
all that God can do, or to do in the same manner as God does, Who acts 
with an infinite might whereof the creature is not capable. Now there is 
no thing, to know which in some way an infinite power is needed, although 
a certain kind of knowledge belongs to an infinite power; yet there are 
things which can be done only by an infinite power, as creation and the 
like, as is plain from what has been said in the FP, Q[45]. Hence 
Christ's soul which, being a creature, is finite in might, can know, 
indeed, all things, but not in every way; yet it cannot do all things, 
which pertains to the nature of omnipotence; and, amongst other things, 
it is clear it cannot create itself.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Christ's soul has practical and speculative knowledge; yet 
it is not necessary that it should have practical knowledge of those 
things of which it has speculative knowledge. Because for speculative 
knowledge a mere conformity or assimilation of the knower to the thing 
known suffices; whereas for practical knowledge it is required that the 
forms of the things in the intellect should be operative. Now to have a 
form and to impress this form upon something else is more than merely to 
have the form; as to be lightsome and to enlighten is more than merely to 
be lightsome. Hence the soul of Christ has a speculative knowledge of 
creation (for it knows the mode of God's creation), but it has no 
practical knowledge of this mode, since it has no knowledge operative of 
creation.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to the 
transmutation of creatures?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard 
to the transmutation of creatures. For He Himself says (Mt. 28:18): "All 
power is given to Me in heaven and on earth." Now by the words "heaven 
and earth" are meant all creatures, as is plain from Gn. 1:1: "In the 
beginning God created heaven and earth." Therefore it seems that the soul 
of Christ had omnipotence  with regard to the transmutation of creatures.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the soul of Christ is the most perfect of all creatures. 
But every creature can be moved by another creature; for Augustine says 
(De Trin. iii, 4) that "even as the denser and lower bodies are ruled in 
a fixed way by the subtler and stronger bodies; so are all bodies by the 
spirit of life, and the irrational spirit of life by the rational spirit 
of life, and the truant and sinful rational spirit of life by the 
rational, loyal, and righteous spirit of life." But the soul of Christ 
moves even the highest spirits, enlightening them, as Dionysius says 
(Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it seems that the soul of Christ has 
omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Christ's soul had in its highest degree the "grace of 
miracles" or works of might. But every transmutation of the creature can 
belong to the grace of miracles; since even the heavenly bodies were 
miraculously changed from their course, as Dionysius proves (Ep. ad 
Polycarp). Therefore Christ's soul had omnipotence with regard to the 
transmutation of creatures.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, To transmute creatures belongs to Him Who preserves 
them. Now this belongs to God alone, according to Heb. 1:3: "Upholding 
all things by the word of His power." Therefore God alone has omnipotence 
with regard to the transmutation of creatures. Therefore this does not 
belong to Christ's soul.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[2] Body Para. 1/2

 I answer that, Two distinctions are here needed. of these the first is 
with respect to the transmutation of creatures, which is three-fold. The 
first is natural, being brought about by the proper agent naturally; the 
second is miraculous, being brought about by a supernatural agent above 
the wonted order and course of nature, as to raise the dead; the third is 
inasmuch as every creature may be brought to nothing.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[2] Body Para. 2/2

 The second distinction has to do with Christ's soul, which may be looked 
at in two ways: first in its proper nature and with its power of nature 
or of grace; secondly, as it is the instrument of the Word of God, 
personally united to Him. Therefore if we speak of the soul of Christ in 
its proper nature and with its power of nature or of grace, it had power 
to cause those effects proper to a soul (e.g. to rule the body and direct 
human acts, and also, by the fulness of grace and knowledge to enlighten 
all rational creatures falling short of its perfection), in a manner 
befitting a rational creature. But if we speak of the soul of Christ as 
it is the instrument of the Word united to Him, it had an instrumental 
power to effect all the miraculous transmutations ordainable to the end 
of the Incarnation, which is "to re-establish all things that are in 
heaven and on earth" [*Eph. 1:10]. But the transmutation of creatures, 
inasmuch as they may be brought to nothing, corresponds to their 
creation, whereby they were brought from nothing. And hence even as God 
alone can create, so, too, He alone can bring creatures to nothing, and 
He alone upholds them in being, lest they fall back to nothing. And thus 
it must be said that the soul of  Christ had not omnipotence with regard 
to the transmutation of creatures.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As Jerome says (on the text quoted): "Power is given Him," 
i.e. to Christ as man, "Who a little while before was crucified, buried 
in the tomb, and afterwards rose again." But power is said to have been 
given Him, by reason of the union whereby it was brought about that a Man 
was omnipotent, as was said above (A[1], ad 1). And although this was 
made known to the angels before the Resurrection, yet after the 
Resurrection it was made known to all men, as Remigius says (cf. Catena 
Aurea). Now, "things are said to happen when they are made known" [*Hugh 
of St. Victor: Qq. in Ep. ad Philip.]. Hence after the Resurrection our 
Lord says "that all power is given" to Him "in heaven and on earth."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: Although every creature is transmutable by some other 
creature, except, indeed, the highest angel, and even it can be 
enlightened by Christ's soul; yet not every transmutation that can be 
made in a creature can be made by a creature; since some transmutations 
can be made by God alone. Yet all transmutations that can be made in 
creatures can be made by the soul of Christ, as the instrument of the 
Word, but not in its proper nature and power, since some of these 
transmutations pertain to the soul neither in the order of nature nor in 
the order of grace.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: As was said in the SS, Q[178], A[1], ad 1, the grace of 
mighty works or miracles is given to the soul of a saint, so that these 
miracles are wrought not by his own, but by Divine power. Now this grace 
was bestowed on Christ's soul most excellently, i.e. not only that He 
might work miracles, but also that He might communicate this grace to 
others. Hence it is written (Mt. 10:1) that, "having called His twelve 
disciples together, He gave them power over unclean spirits, to cast them 
out, and to heal all manner of diseases, and all manner of infirmities."


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to His own body?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that Christ's soul had omnipotence with regard to 
His own body. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 20,23) that "all 
natural things were voluntary to Christ; He willed to hunger, He willed 
to thirst, He willed to fear, He willed to die." Now God is called 
omnipotent because "He hath done all things whatsoever He would" (Ps. 
113:11). Therefore it seems that Christ's soul had omnipotence with 
regard to the natural operations of the body.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, human nature was more perfect in Christ than in Adam, 
who had a body entirely subject to the soul, so that nothing could happen 
to the body against the will of the soul---and this on account of the 
original justice which it had in the state of innocence. Much more, 
therefore, had Christ's soul omnipotence with regard to His body. 

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, the body is naturally changed by the imaginations of the 
soul; and so much more changed, the stronger the soul's imagination, as 
was said in the FP, Q[117], A[3], ad 3. Now the soul of Christ had most 
perfect strength as regards both the imagination and the other powers. 
Therefore the soul of Christ was omnipotent with regard to His own body.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 2:17) that "it behooved Him in all 
things to be made like unto His brethren," and especially as regards what 
belongs to the condition of human nature. But it belongs to the condition 
of human nature that the health of the body and its nourishment and 
growth are not subject to the bidding of reason or will, since natural 
things are subject to God alone Who is the author of nature. Therefore 
they were not subject in Christ. Therefore Christ's soul was not 
omnipotent with regard to His own body.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), Christ's soul may be viewed in 
two ways. First, in its proper nature and power; and in this way, as it 
was incapable of making exterior bodies swerve from the course and order 
of nature, so, too, was it incapable of changing its own body from its 
natural disposition, since the soul, of its own nature, has a determinate 
relation to its body. Secondly, Christ's soul may be viewed as an 
instrument united in person to God's Word; and thus every disposition of 
His own body was wholly subject to His power. Nevertheless, since the 
power of an action is not properly attributed to the instrument, but to 
the principal agent, this omnipotence is attributed to the Word of God 
rather than to Christ's soul.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: This saving of Damascene refers to the Divine will of 
Christ, since, as he says in the preceding chapter (De Fide Orth. xix, 
14,15), it was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was 
allowed to suffer and do what was proper to it.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: It was no part of the original justice which Adam had in 
the state of innocence that a man's soul should have the power of 
changing his own body to any form, but that it should keep it from any 
hurt. Yet Christ could have assumed even this power if He had wished. But 
since man has three states---viz. innocence, sin, and glory, even as from 
the state of glory He assumed comprehension and from the state of 
innocence, freedom from sin---so also from the state of sin did He assume 
the necessity of being under the penalties of this life, as will be said 
(Q[14], A[2]).

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: If the imagination be strong, the body obeys naturally in 
some things, e.g. as regards falling from a beam set on high, since the 
imagination was formed to be a principle of local motion, as is said De 
Anima iii, 9,10. So, too, as regards alteration in heat and cold, and 
their consequences; for the passions of the soul, wherewith the heart is 
moved, naturally follow the imagination, and thus by commotion of the 
spirits the whole body is altered. But the other corporeal dispositions 
which  have no natural relation to the imagination are not transmuted by 
the imagination, however strong it is, e.g. the shape of the hand, or 
foot, or such like.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence as regards the execution of 
His will?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had not omnipotence as 
regards the execution of His own will. For it is written (Mk. 7:24) that 
"entering into a house, He would that no man should know it, and He could 
not be hid." Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of His will in 
all things.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, a command is a sign of will, as was said in the FP, 
Q[19], A[12]. But our Lord commanded certain things to be done, and the 
contrary came to pass, for it is written (Mt. 9:30, 31) that Jesus 
strictly charged them whose eyes had been opened, saying: "See that no 
man know this. But they going out spread His fame abroad in all that 
country." Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of His will in 
everything.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, a man does not ask from another for what he can do 
himself. But our Lord besought the Father, praying for what He wished to 
be done, for it is written (Lk. 6:12): "He went out into a mountain to 
pray, and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God." Therefore He 
could not carry out the purpose of His will in all things.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., qu. 77): "It is 
impossible for the will of the Saviour not to be fulfilled: nor is it 
possible for Him to will what He knows ought not to come to pass."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[4] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Christ's soul willed things in two ways. First, what was 
to be brought about by Himself; and it must be said that He was capable 
of whatever He willed thus, since it would not befit His wisdom if He 
willed to do anything of Himself that was not subject to His will. 
Secondly, He wished things to be brought about by the Divine power, as 
the resurrection of His own body and such like miraculous deeds, which He 
could not effect by His own power, except as the instrument of the 
Godhead, as was said above (A[2]).

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., qu. 77): "What 
came to pass, this Christ must be said to have willed. For it must be 
remarked that this happened in the country of the Gentiles, to whom it 
was not yet time to preach. Yet it would have been invidious not to 
welcome such as came spontaneously for the faith. Hence He did not wish 
to be heralded by His own, and yet He wished to be sought; and so it came 
to pass." Or it may be said that this will of Christ was not with regard 
to what was to be carried out by it, but with regard to what was to be 
done by others, which did not come under His human will. Hence in the 
letter of Pope Agatho, which was approved in the Sixth Council  [*Third 
Council of Constantinople, Act. iv], we read: "When He, the Creator and 
Redeemer of all, wished to be hid and could not, must not this be 
referred only to His human will which He deigned to assume in time?"

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: As Gregory says (Moral. xix), by the fact that "Our Lord 
charged His mighty works to be kept secret, He gave an example to His 
servants coming after Him that they should wish their miracles to be 
hidden; and yet, that others may profit by their example, they are made 
public against their will." And thus this command signified His will to 
fly from human glory, according to Jn. 8:50, "I seek not My own glory." 
Yet He wished absolutely, and especially by His Divine will, that the 
miracle wrought should be published for the good of others.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[13] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Christ prayed both for things that were to be brought about 
by the Divine power, and for what He Himself was to do by His human will, 
since the power and operation of Christ's soul depended on God, "Who 
works in all [Vulg.: 'you'], both to will and to accomplish" (Phil. 2:13).


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] Out. Para. 1/2

OF THE DEFECTS OF BODY ASSUMED BY THE SON OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

 We must now consider the defects Christ assumed in the human nature; and 
first, of the defects of body; secondly, of the defects of soul.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] Out. Para. 2/2

 Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

 (1) Whether the Son of God should have assumed in human nature defects 
of body?

 (2) Whether He assumed the obligation of being subject to these defects?

 (3) Whether He contracted these defects?

 (4) Whether He assumed all these defects?


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether the Son of God in human nature ought to have assumed defects of 
body?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought not to have assumed human 
nature with defects of body. For as His soul is personally united to the 
Word of God, so also is His body. But the soul of Christ had every 
perfection, both of grace and truth, as was said above (Q[7], A[9]; Q[9], 
seqq.). Hence, His body also ought to have been in every way perfect, not 
having any imperfection in it.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, the soul of Christ saw the Word of God by the vision 
wherein the blessed see, as was said above (Q[9], A[2]), and thus the 
soul of Christ was blessed. Now by the beatification of the soul the body 
is glorified; since, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dios. cxviii), "God made 
the soul of a nature so strong that from the fulness of its blessedness 
there pours over even into the lower nature" (i.e. the body), "not indeed 
the bliss proper to the beatific fruition and vision, but the fulness of 
health" (i.e. the  vigor of incorruptibility). Therefore the body of 
Christ was incorruptible and without any defect.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, penalty is the consequence of fault. But there was no 
fault in Christ, according to 1 Pt. 2:22: "Who did no guile." Therefore 
defects of body, which are penalties, ought not to have been in Him.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 4: Further, no reasonable man assumes what keeps him from his proper 
end. But by such like bodily defects, the end of the Incarnation seems to 
be hindered in many ways. First, because by these infirmities men were 
kept back from knowing Him, according to Is. 53:2,3: "[There was no 
sightliness] that we should be desirous of Him. Despised and the most 
abject of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with infirmity, and His 
look was, as it were, hidden and despised, whereupon we esteemed Him 
not." Secondly, because the de. sire of the Fathers would not seem to be 
fulfilled, in whose person it is written (Is. 51:9): "Arise, arise, put 
on Thy strength, O Thou Arm of the Lord." Thirdly, because it would seem 
more fitting for the devil's power to be overcome and man's weakness 
healed, by strength than by weakness. Therefore it does not seem to have 
been fitting that the Son of God assumed human nature with infirmities or 
defects of body.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 2:18): "For in that, wherein He 
Himself hath suffered and been tempted, He is able to succor them also 
that are tempted." Now He came to succor us. hence David said of Him (Ps. 
120:1): "I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains, from whence help 
shall come to me." Therefore it was fitting for the Son of God to assume 
flesh subject to human infirmities, in order to suffer and be tempted in 
it and so bring succor to us.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[1] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, It was fitting for the body assumed by the Son of God to 
be subject to human infirmities and defects; and especially for three 
reasons. First, because it was in order to satisfy for the sin of the 
human race that the Son of God, having taken flesh, came into the world. 
Now one satisfies for another's sin by taking on himself the punishment 
due to the sin of the other. But these bodily defects, to wit, death, 
hunger, thirst, and the like, are the punishment of sin, which was 
brought into the world by Adam, according to Rm. 5:12: "By one man sin 
entered into this world, and by sin death." Hence it was useful for the 
end of the Incarnation that He should assume these penalties in our flesh 
and in our stead, according to Is. 53:4, "Surely He hath borne our 
infirmities." Secondly, in order to cause belief in the Incarnation. For 
since human nature is known to men only as it is subject to these 
defects, if the Son of God had assumed human nature without these 
defects, He would not have seemed to be true man, nor to have true, but 
imaginary, flesh, as the Manicheans held. And so, as is said, Phil. 2:7: 
"He . . . emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in 
the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man." Hence, Thomas, by the 
sight of His wounds, was recalled to the faith, as related Jn. 20:26. 
Thirdly,  in order to show us an example of patience by valiantly bearing 
up against human passibility and defects. Hence it is said (Heb. 12:3) 
that He "endured such opposition from sinners against Himself, that you 
be not wearied. fainting in your minds."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The penalties one suffers for another's sin are the matter, 
as it were, of the satisfaction for that sin; but the principle is the 
habit of soul, whereby one is inclined to wish to satisfy for another, 
and from which the satisfaction has its efficacy, for satisfaction would 
not be efficacious unless it proceeded from charity, as will be explained 
(XP, Q[14], A[2]). Hence, it behooved the soul of Christ to be perfect as 
regards the habit of knowledge and virtue, in order to have the power of 
satisfying; but His body was subject to infirmities, that the matter of 
satisfaction should not be wanting.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: From the natural relationship which is between the soul and 
the body, glory flows into the body from the soul's glory. Yet this 
natural relationship in Christ was subject to the will of His Godhead, 
and thereby it came to pass that the beatitude remained in the soul, and 
did not flow into the body; but the flesh suffered what belongs to a 
passible nature; thus Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15) that, "it 
was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was allowed to 
suffer and do what belonged to it."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Punishment always follows sin actual or original, sometimes 
of the one punished, sometimes of the one for whom he who suffers the 
punishment satisfies. And so it was with Christ, according to Is. 53:5: 
"He was wounded for our iniquities, He was bruised for our sins."

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 4: The infirmity assumed by Christ did not impede, but greatly 
furthered the end of the Incarnation, as above stated. And although these 
infirmities concealed His Godhead, they made known His Manhood, which is 
the way of coming to the Godhead, according to Rm. 5:1,2: "By Jesus 
Christ we have access to God." Moreover, the ancient Fathers did not 
desire bodily strength in Christ, but spiritual strength, wherewith He 
vanquished the devil and healed human weakness.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether Christ was of necessity subject to these defects?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that Christ was not of necessity subject to these 
defects. For it is written (Is. 53:7): "He was offered because it was His 
own will"; and the prophet is speaking of the offering of the Passion. 
But will is opposed to necessity. Therefore Christ was not of necessity 
subject to bodily defects.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 20): "Nothing 
obligatory is seen in Christ: all is voluntary." Now what is voluntary is 
not necessary. Therefore these defects were not of necessity in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 

 OBJ 3: Further, necessity is induced by something more powerful. But no 
creature is more powerful than the soul of Christ, to which it pertained 
to preserve its own body. Therefore these defects were not of necessity 
in Christ.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 8:3) that "God" sent "His own Son 
in the likeness of sinful flesh." Now it is a condition of sinful flesh 
to be under the necessity of dying, and suffering other like passions. 
Therefore the necessity of suffering these defects was in Christ's flesh.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[2] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, Necessity is twofold. one is a necessity of "constraint," 
brought about by an external agent; and this necessity is contrary to 
both nature and will, since these flow from an internal principle. The 
other is "natural" necessity, resulting from the natural 
principles---either the form (as it is necessary for fire to heat), or 
the matter (as it is necessary for a body composed of contraries to be 
dissolved). Hence, with this necessity, which results from the matter, 
Christ's body was subject to the necessity of death and other like 
defects, since, as was said (A[1], ad 2), "it was by the consent of the 
Divine will that the flesh was allowed to do and suffer what belonged to 
it." And this necessity results from the principles of human nature, as 
was said above in this article. But if we speak of necessity of 
constraint, as repugnant to the bodily nature, thus again was Christ's 
body in its own natural condition subject to necessity in regard to the 
nail that pierced and the scourge that struck. Yet inasmuch as such 
necessity is repugnant to the will, it is clear that in Christ these 
defects were not of necessity as regards either the Divine will, or the 
human will of Christ considered absolutely, as following the deliberation 
of reason; but only as regards the natural movement of the will, inasmuch 
as it naturally shrinks from death and bodily hurt.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: Christ is said to be "offered because it was His own will," 
i.e. Divine will and deliberate human will; although death was contrary 
to the natural movement of His human will, as Damascene says (De Fide 
Orth. iii, 23,24).

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: This is plain from what has been said.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Nothing was more powerful than Christ's soul, absolutely; 
yet there was nothing to hinder a thing being more powerful in regard to 
this or that effect, as a nail for piercing. And this I say, in so far as 
Christ's soul is considered in its own proper nature and power.


Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1

Whether Christ contracted these defects?

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 1: It would seem that Christ contracted bodily defects. For we are 
said to contract what we derive with our nature from birth. But Christ, 
together with human nature, derived His bodily defects and infirmities 
through His birth from His mother, whose  flesh was subject to these 
defects. Therefore it seems that He contracted these defects.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 2: Further, what is caused by the principles of nature is derived 
together with nature, and hence is contracted. Now these penalties are 
caused by the principles of human nature. Therefore Christ contracted 
them.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1

 OBJ 3: Further, Christ is likened to other men in these defects, as is 
written Heb. 2:17. But other men contract these defects. Therefore it 
seems that Christ contracted these defects.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1

 On the contrary, These defects are contracted through sin, according to 
Rm. 5:12: "By one man sin entered into this world and by sin, death." Now 
sin had no place in Christ. Therefore Christ did not contract these 
defects.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[3] Body Para. 1/1

 I answer that, In the verb "to contract" is understood the relation of 
effect to cause, i.e. that is said to be contracted which is derived of 
necessity together with its cause. Now the cause of death and such like 
defects in human nature is sin, since "by sin death entered into this 
world," according to Rm. 5:12. And hence they who incur these defects, as 
due to sin, are properly said to contract them. Now Christ had not these 
defects, as due to sin, since, as Augustine [*Alcuin in the Gloss, Ord.], 
expounding Jn. 3:31, "He that cometh from above, is above all," says: 
"Christ came from above, i.e. from the height of human nature, which it 
had before the fall of the first man." For He received human nature 
without sin, in the purity which it had in the state of innocence. In the 
same way He might have assumed human nature without defects. Thus it is 
clear that Christ did not contract these defects as if taking them upon 
Himself as due to sin, but by His own will.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 1: The flesh of the Virgin was conceived in original sin, 
[*See introductory note to Q[27]] and therefore contracted these defects. 
But from the Virgin, Christ's flesh assumed the nature without sin, and 
He might likewise have assumed the nature without its penalties. But He 
wished to bear its penalties in order to carry out the work of our 
redemption, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore He had these defects---not 
that He contracted them, but that He assumed them.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 2: The cause of death and other corporeal defects of human 
nature is twofold: the first is remote, and results from the material 
principles of the human body, inasmuch as it is made up of contraries. 
But this cause was held in check by original justice. Hence the proximate 
cause of death and other defects is sin, whereby original justice is 
withdrawn. And thus, because Christ was without sin, He is said not to 
have contracted these defects, but to have assumed them.

Aquin.: SMT TP Q[14] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1

 Reply OBJ 3: Christ was made like to other men in the quality and not in 
the cause of these defects; and hence, unlike others, He did not contract 
them.