Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] Out. Para. 1/4
SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART (SS) (QQ[1]-189)
TREATISE ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (QQ[1]-46)
ON FAITH (QQ[1]-16)
OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)
Having to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with
Faith, secondly we shall speak of Hope, and thirdly, of Charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] Out. Para. 2/4
The treatise on Faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of the
corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding; (3) Of the opposite
vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] Out. Para. 3/4
About faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act; (3)
the habit of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] Out. Para. 4/4
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
(2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex, i.e.
whether it is a thing or a proposition?
(3) Whether anything false can come under faith?
(4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen?
(5) Whether it can be anything known?
(6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a certain
number of articles?
(7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times?
(8) Of the number of articles;
(9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol;
(10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not the First Truth.
For it seems that the object of faith is that which is proposed to us to
be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the Godhead, i.e. the
First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but also things
concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, and
the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the
First Truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since they are
opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things contained in
Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is considered an
unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things contained in Holy
Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning man and other
creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the First Truth, but
also created truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above (FS,
Q[62], A[3]). Now by charity we love not only God, who is the sovereign
Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of Faith is not only
the First Truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is about the
simple and everlasting truth." Now this is the First Truth. Therefore the
object of faith is the First Truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The object of every cognitive habit includes two things:
first, that which is known materially, and is the material object, so to
speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is the formal
aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions
are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of the science is
the mean of demonstration, through which the conclusions are known.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the object,
it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we are
speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it is revealed by
God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If,
however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they
include not only God, but also many other things, which, nevertheless, do
not come under the assent of faith, except as bearing some relation to
God, in as much as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine
operation, man is helped on his journey towards the enjoyment of God.
Consequently from this point of view also the object of faith is, in a
way, the First Truth, in as much as nothing comes under faith except in
relation to God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for it
considers nothing save in relation to health.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments
of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith, in so far as
by them we are directed to God, and in as much as we assent to them on
account of the Divine Truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all things
contained in Holy Writ.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Charity also loves our neighbor on account of God, so that
its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show further on (Q[25]
, A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the object of faith is something complex, by way of a proposition?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not something complex
by way of a proposition. For the object of faith is the First Truth, as
stated above (A[1]). Now the First Truth is something simple. Therefore
the object of faith is not something complex.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the symbol. Now
the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for it is not
stated therein that God is almighty, but: "I believe in God . . .
almighty." Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 1 Cor. 13:12:
"We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face. Now
I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known." But the object
of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is the Divine Essence.
Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now the
mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science and
opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is likewise about
propositions; so that its object is something complex.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The thing known is in the knower according to the mode of
the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to know the
truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in the FP, Q[85], A[5]. Hence
things that are simple in themselves, are known by the intellect with a
certain amount of complexity, just as on the other hand, the Divine
intellect knows, without any complexity, things that are complex in
themselves.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First, as
regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of faith
is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we have faith.
Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the object of
faith is something complex by way of a proposition.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount of
truth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This argument considers the object of faith on the part of
the thing believed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The symbol mentions the things about which faith is, in so
far as the act of the believer is terminated in them, as is evident from
the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the believer does not
terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as in science we do not
form propositions, except in order to have knowledge about things through
their means, so is it in faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The object of the heavenly vision will be the First Truth
seen in itself, according to 1 Jn. 3:2: "We know that when He shall
appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as He is":
hence that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by way of a
simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we do not apprehend
the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether anything false can come under faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that something false can come under faith. For
faith is condivided with hope and charity. Now something false can come
under hope, since many hope to have eternal life, who will not obtain it.
The same may be said of charity, for many are loved as being good, who,
nevertheless, are not good. Therefore something false can be the object
of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Abraham believed that Christ would be born, according to
Jn. 8:56: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see My day: he saw
it, and was glad." But after the time of Abraham, God might not have
taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed that He did, so that
what Abraham believed about Christ would have been false. Therefore the
object of faith can be something false.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the ancients believed in the future birth of Christ, and
many continued so to believe, until they heard the preaching of the
Gospel. Now, when once Christ was born, even before He began to preach,
it was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore something false
can come under faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is a matter of faith, that one should believe that
the true Body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the altar. But
it might happen that the bread was not rightly consecrated, and that
there was not Christ's true Body there, but only bread. Therefore
something false can come under faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, No virtue that perfects the intellect is related to the
false, considered as the evil of the intellect, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith is a virtue that perfects the
intellect, as we shall show further on (Q[4], AA[2],5). Therefore nothing
false can come under it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Nothing comes under any power, habit or act, except by
means of the formal aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen
except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known save through
the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated (A[1]) that the formal
aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so that nothing can
come under faith, save in so far as it stands under the First Truth,
under which nothing false can stand, as neither can non-being stand under
being, nor evil under goodness. It follows therefore that nothing false
can come under faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/3
Reply OBJ 1: Since the true is the good of the intellect, but not of the
appetitive power, it follows that all virtues which perfect the
intellect, exclude the false altogether, because it belongs to the nature
of a virtue to bear relation to the good alone. On the other hand those
virtues which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not entirely exclude the
false, for it is possible to act in accordance with justice or
temperance, while having a false opinion about what one is doing.
Therefore, as faith perfects the intellect, whereas hope and charity
perfect the appetitive part, the comparison between them fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 2/3
Nevertheless neither can anything false come under hope, for a man hopes
to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since this would be an act
of presumption), but with the help of grace; and if he perseveres therein
he will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 3/3
In like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wherever He may be; so
that it matters not to charity, whether God be in the individual whom we
love for God's sake.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That "God would not take flesh," considered in itself was
possible even after Abraham's time, but in so far as it stands in God's
foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of infallibility, as explained
in the FP, Q[14], AA[13],15: and it is thus that it comes under faith.
Hence in so far as it comes under faith, it cannot be false.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: After Christ's birth, to believe in Him, was to believe in
Christ's birth at some time or other. The fixing of the time, wherein
some were deceived was not due to their faith, but to a human conjecture.
For it is possible for a believer to have a false opinion through a human
conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a false opinion to be the
outcome of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The faith of the believer is not directed to such and such
accidents of bread, but to the fact that the true body of Christ is under
the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightly consecrated. Hence
if it be not rightly consecrated, it does not follow that anything false
comes under faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the object of faith can be something seen?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the object of faith is something seen. For Our
Lord said to Thomas (Jn. 20:29): "Because thou hast seen Me, Thomas, thou
hast believed." Therefore vision and faith regard the same object.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle, while speaking of the knowledge of faith,
says (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner."
Therefore what is believed is seen.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now something is seen under
every light. Therefore faith is of things seen.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, "Every sense is a kind of sight," as Augustine states
(De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). But faith is of things heard, according
to Rm. 10:17: "Faith . . . cometh by hearing." Therefore faith is of
things seen.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
evidence of things that appear not."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which is
believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First,
through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known either
by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held by the
habit of understanding), or through something else already known (as in
the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of science). Secondly
the intellect assents to something, not through being sufficiently moved
to this assent by its proper object, but through an act of choice,
whereby it turns voluntarily to one side rather than to the other: and if
this be accompanied by doubt or fear of the opposite side, there will be
opinion, while, if there be certainty and no fear of the other side,
there will be faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Now those things are said to be seen which, of themselves, move the
intellect or the senses to knowledge of them. Wherefore it is evident
that neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen either by the senses
or by the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Thomas "saw one thing, and believed another" [*St. Gregory:
Hom. xxvi in Evang.]: he saw the Man, and believing Him to be God, he
made profession of his faith, saying: "My Lord and my God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Those things which come under faith can be considered in
two ways. First, in particular; and thus they cannot be seen and believed
at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in general, that is, under
the common aspect of credibility; and in this way they are seen by the
believer. For he would not believe unless, on the evidence of signs, or
of something similar, he saw that they ought to be believed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The light of faith makes us see what we believe. For just
as, by the habits of the other virtues, man sees what is becoming to him
in respect of that habit, so, by the habit of faith, the human mind is
directed to assent to such things as are becoming to a right faith, and
not to assent to others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Hearing is of words signifying what is of faith, but not of
the things themselves that are believed; hence it does not follow that
these things are seen.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether those things that are of faith can be an object of science
[*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
demonstration]?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith can be an
object of science. For where science is lacking there is ignorance, since
ignorance is the opposite of science. Now we are not in ignorance of
those things we have to believe, since ignorance of such things savors of
unbelief, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: "I did it ignorantly in unbelief."
Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred writers
employ reasons to inculcate things that are of faith. Therefore such
things can be an object of science.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of science,
since a "demonstration is a syllogism that produces science." Now certain
matters of faith have been demonstrated by the philosophers, such as the
Existence and Unity of God, and so forth. Therefore things that are of
faith can be an object of science.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, opinion is further from science than faith is, since
faith is said to stand between opinion and science. Now opinion and
science can, in a way, be about the same object, as stated in Poster. i.
Therefore faith and science can be about the same object also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that "when a thing
is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, but of perception."
Therefore things that are of faith are not the object of perception,
whereas what is an object of science is the object of perception.
Therefore there can be no faith about things which are an object of
science.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, All science is derived from self-evident and therefore
"seen" principles; wherefore all objects of science must needs be, in a
fashion, seen.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
Now as stated above (A[4]), it is impossible that one and the same thing
should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is equally
impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of science and of
belief for the same person. It may happen, however, that a thing which is
an object of vision or science for one, is believed by another: since we
hope to see some day what we now believe about the Trinity, according to
1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face
to face": which vision the angels possess already; so that what we
believe, they see. In like manner it may happen that what is an object of
vision or scientific knowledge for one man, even in the state of a
wayfarer, is, for another man, an object of faith, because he does not
know it by demonstration.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
Nevertheless that which is proposed to be believed equally by all, is
equally unknown by all as an object of science: such are the things which
are of faith simply. Consequently faith and science are not about the
same things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are of faith,
for neither do they see or know them in themselves, nor do they know them
to be credible. The faithful, on the other hand, know them, not as by
demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes them see that they
ought to believe them, as stated above (A[4], ad 2,3).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that are
of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive arguments
showing that what is proposed to our faith is not impossible, or else
they are proofs drawn from the principles of faith, i.e. from the
authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. ii). Whatever is
based on these principles is as well proved in the eyes of the faithful,
as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in the eyes of all.
Hence again, theology is a science, as we stated at the outset of this
work (FP, Q[1], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Things which can be proved by demonstration are reckoned
among the articles of faith, not because they are believed simply by all,
but because they are a necessary presupposition to matters of faith, so
that those who do not known them by demonstration must know them first of
all by faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), "science and opinion
about the same object can certainly be in different men," as we have
stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for one and the
same man to have science and faith about the same thing relatively, i.e.
in relation to the object, but not in the same respect. For it is
possible for the same person, about one and the same object, to know one
thing and to think another: and, in like manner, one may know by
demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and, by faith, the Trinity. On
the other hand, in one and the same man, about the same object, and in
the same respect, science is incompatible with either opinion or faith,
yet for different reasons. Because science is incompatible with opinion
about the same object simply, for the reason that science demands that
its object should be deemed impossible to be otherwise, whereas it is
essential to opinion, that its object should be deemed possible to be
otherwise. Yet that which is the object of faith, on account of the
certainty of faith, is also deemed impossible to be otherwise; and the
reason why science and faith cannot be about the same object and in the
same respect is because the object of science is something seen whereas
the object of faith is the unseen, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether those things that are of faith should be divided into certain
articles?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith should not be
divided into certain articles. For all things contained in Holy Writ are
matters of faith. But these, by reason of their multitude, cannot be
reduced to a certain number. Therefore it seems superfluous to
distinguish certain articles of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, material differences can be multiplied indefinitely, and
therefore art should take no notice of them. Now the formal aspect of
the object of faith is one and indivisible, as stated above (A[1]), viz.
the First Truth, so that matters of faith cannot be distinguished in
respect of their formal object. Therefore no notice should be taken of a
material division of matters of faith into articles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it has been said by some [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa
Aurea] that "an article is an indivisible truth concerning God, exacting
[arctans] our belief." Now belief is a voluntary act, since, as Augustine
says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), "no man believes against his will."
Therefore it seems that matters of faith should not be divided into
articles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Isidore says: "An article is a glimpse of Divine truth,
tending thereto." Now we can only get a glimpse of Divine truth by way of
analysis, since things which in God are one, are manifold in our
intellect. Therefore matters of faith should be divided into articles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, the word "article" is apparently derived from the Greek;
for the Greek {arthron} [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] which the
Latin renders "articulus," signifies a fitting together of distinct
parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit together are
called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the Greek grammar,
articles are parts of speech which are affixed to words to show their
gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric, articles are parts that fit
together in a sentence, for Tully says (Rhet. iv) that an article is
composed of words each pronounced singly and separately, thus: "Your
passion, your voice, your look, have struck terror into your foes."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
Hence matters of Christian faith are said to contain distinct articles,
in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit together. Now the
object of faith is something unseen in connection with God, as stated
above (A[4]). Consequently any matter that, for a special reason, is
unseen, is a special article; whereas when several matters are known or
not known, under the same aspect, we are not to distinguish various
articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty in seeing that God suffered,
and another in seeing that He rose again from the dead, wherefore the
article of the Resurrection is distinct from the article of the Passion.
But that He suffered, died and was buried, present the same difficulty,
so that if one be accepted, it is not difficult to accept the others;
wherefore all these belong to one article.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some things are proposed to our belief are in themselves of
faith, while others are of faith, not in themselves but only in relation
to others: even as in sciences certain propositions are put forward on
their own account, while others are put forward in order to manifest
others. Now, since the chief object of faith consists in those things
which we hope to see, according to Heb. 11:2: "Faith is the substance of
things to be hoped for," it follows that those things are in themselves
of faith, which order us directly to eternal life. Such are the Trinity
of Persons in Almighty God [*The Leonine Edition reads: The Three
Persons, the omnipotence of God, etc.], the mystery of Christ's
Incarnation, and the like: and these are distinct articles of faith. On
the other hand certain things in Holy Writ are proposed to our belief,
not chiefly on their own account, but for the manifestation of those
mentioned above: for instance, that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man
rose again at the touch of Eliseus' bones, and the like, which are
related in Holy Writ for the purpose of manifesting the Divine mystery or
the Incarnation of Christ: and such things should not form distinct
articles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The formal aspect of the object of faith can be taken in
two ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus there is one
formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First Truth: and from
this point of view there is no distinction of articles. Secondly, the
formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered from our point of
view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter of faith is that it is
something unseen; and from this point of view there are various distinct
articles of faith, as we saw above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This definition of an article is taken from an etymology of
the word as derived from the Latin, rather than in accordance with its
real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it does not carry much
weight. Yet even then it could be said that although faith is exacted of
no man by a necessity of coercion, since belief is a voluntary act, yet
it is exacted of him by a necessity of end, since "he that cometh to God
must believe that He is," and "without faith it is impossible to please
God," as the Apostle declares (Heb. 11:6).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the articles of faith have increased in course of time?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the articles of faith have not increased in
course of time. Because, as the Apostle says (Heb. 11:1), "faith is the
substance of things to be hoped for." Now the same things are to be hoped
for at all times. Therefore, at all times, the same things are to be
believed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, development has taken place, in sciences devised by man,
on account of the lack of knowledge in those who discovered them, as the
Philosopher observes (Metaph. ii). Now the doctrine of faith was not
devised by man, but was delivered to us by God, as stated in Eph. 2:8:
"It is the gift of God." Since then there can be no lack of knowledge in
God, it seems that knowledge of matters of faith was perfect from the
beginning and did not increase as time went on.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the operation of grace proceeds in orderly fashion no
less than the operation of nature. Now nature always makes a beginning
with perfect things, as Boethius states (De Consol. iii). Therefore it
seems that the operation of grace also began with perfect things, so that
those who were the first to deliver the faith, knew it most perfectly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, just as the faith of Christ was delivered to us through
the apostles, so too, in the Old Testament, the knowledge of faith was
delivered by the early fathers to those who came later, according to Dt.
32:7: "Ask thy father, and he will declare to thee." Now the apostles
were most fully instructed about the mysteries, for "they received them
more fully than others, even as they received them earlier," as a gloss
says on Rm. 8:23: "Ourselves also who have the first fruits of the
Spirit." Therefore it seems that knowledge of matters of faith has not
increased as time went on.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech.) that "the knowledge
of the holy fathers increased as time went on . . . and the nearer they
were to Our Savior's coming, the more fully did they received the
mysteries of salvation."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The articles of faith stand in the same relation to the
doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles to a teaching based on
natural reason. Among these principles there is a certain order, so that
some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles are reduced,
as to their first principle, to this one: "The same thing cannot be
affirmed and denied at the same time," as the Philosopher states (Metaph.
iv, text. 9). In like manner all the articles are contained implicitly in
certain primary matters of faith, such as God's existence, and His
providence over the salvation of man, according to Heb. 11: "He that
cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that
seek Him." For the existence of God includes all that we believe to exist
in God eternally, and in these our happiness consists; while belief in
His providence includes all those things which God dispenses in time, for
man's salvation, and which are the way to that happiness: and in this
way, again, some of those articles which follow from these are contained
in others: thus faith in the Redemption of mankind includes belief in the
Incarnation of Christ, His Passion and so forth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards the substance of the
articles of faith, they have not received any increase as time went on:
since whatever those who lived later have believed, was contained, albeit
implicitly, in the faith of those Fathers who preceded them. But there
was an increase in the number of articles believed explicitly, since to
those who lived in later times some were known explicitly which were not
known explicitly by those who lived before them. Hence the Lord said to
Moses (Ex. 6:2,3): "I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of
Jacob [*Vulg.: 'I am the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to
Jacob'] . . . and My name Adonai I did not show them": David also said
(Ps. 118:100): "I have had understanding above ancients": and the Apostle
says (Eph. 3:5) that the mystery of Christ, "in other generations was not
known, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles and prophets."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Among men the same things were always to be hoped for from
Christ. But as they did not acquire this hope save through Christ, the
further they were removed from Christ in point of time, the further they
were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence the Apostle says (Heb.
11:13): "All these died according to faith, not having received the
promises, but beholding them afar off." Now the further off a thing is
the less distinctly is it seen; wherefore those who were nigh to Christ's
advent had a more distinct knowledge of the good things to be hoped for.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Progress in knowledge occurs in two ways. First, on the
part of the teacher, be he one or many, who makes progress in knowledge
as time goes on: and this is the kind of progress that takes place in
sciences devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the learner; thus the
master, who has perfect knowledge of the art, does not deliver it all at
once to his disciple from the very outset, for he would not be able to
take it all in, but he condescends to the disciple's capacity and
instructs him little by little. It is in this way that men made progress
in the knowledge of faith as time went on. Hence the Apostle (Gal. 3:24)
compares the state of the Old Testament to childhood.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Two causes are requisite before actual generation can take
place, an agent, namely, and matter. In the order of the active cause,
the more perfect is naturally first; and in this way nature makes a
beginning with perfect things, since the imperfect is not brought to
perfection, except by something perfect already in existence. On the
other hand, in the order of the material cause, the imperfect comes
first, and in this way nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect.
Now in the manifestation of faith, God is the active cause, having
perfect knowledge from all eternity; while man is likened to matter in
receiving the influx of God's action. Hence, among men, the knowledge of
faith had to proceed from imperfection to perfection; and, although some
men have been after the manner of active causes, through being doctors of
faith, nevertheless the manifestation of the Spirit is given to such men
for the common good, according to 1 Cor. 12:7; so that the knowledge of
faith was imparted to the Fathers who were instructors in the faith, so
far as was necessary at the time for the instruction of the people,
either openly or in figures.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: The ultimate consummation of grace was effected by Christ,
wherefore the time of His coming is called the "time of fulness [*Vulg.:
'fulness of time']" (Gal. 4:4). Hence those who were nearest to Christ,
wherefore before, like John the Baptist, or after, like the apostles, had
a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith; for even with regard to
man's state we find that the perfection of manhood comes in youth, and
that a man's state is all the more perfect, whether before or after, the
nearer it is to the time of his youth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the articles of faith are suitably formulated?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the articles of faith are unsuitably
formulated. For those things, which can be known by demonstration, do not
belong to faith as to an object of belief for all, as stated above (A[5]
). Now it can be known by demonstration that there is one God; hence the
Philosopher proves this (Metaph. xii, text. 52) and many other
philosophers demonstrated the same truth. Therefore that "there is one
God" should not be set down as an article of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as it is necessary to faith that we should believe
God to be almighty, so is it too that we should believe Him to be
"all-knowing" and "provident for all," about both of which points some
have erred. Therefore, among the articles of faith, mention should have
been made of God's wisdom and providence, even as of His omnipotence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to know the Father is the same things as to know the
Son, according to Jn. 14:9: "He that seeth Me, seeth the Father also."
Therefore there ought to be but one article about the Father and Son,
and, for the same reason, about the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the Person of the Father is no less than the Person of
the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Now there are several articles about the
Person of the Holy Ghost, and likewise about the Person of the Son.
Therefore there should be several articles about the Person of the Father.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, just as certain things are said by appropriation, of the
Person of the Father and of the Person of the Holy Ghost, so too is
something appropriated to the Person of the Son, in respect of His
Godhead. Now, among the articles of faith, a place is given to a work
appropriated to the Father, viz. the creation, and likewise, a work
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, viz. that "He spoke by the prophets."
Therefore the articles of faith should contain some work appropriated to
the Son in respect of His Godhead.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, the sacrament of the Eucharist presents a special
difficulty over and above the other articles. Therefore it should have
been mentioned in a special article: and consequently it seems that there
is not a sufficient number of articles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary stands the authority of the Church who formulates the
articles thus.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As stated above (AA[4],6), to faith those things in
themselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal life, and
by which we are brought to eternal life. Now two things are proposed to
us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the Godhead, to see
which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of Christ's Incarnation,
"by Whom we have access" to the glory of the sons of God, according to
Rm. 5:2. Hence it is written (Jn. 17:3): "This is eternal life: that they
may know Thee, the . . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent."
Wherefore the first distinction in matters of faith is that some concern
the majesty of the Godhead, while others pertain to the mystery of
Christ's human nature, which is the "mystery of godliness" (1 Tim. 3:16).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Body Para. 2/4
Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are proposed
to our belief: first, the unity of the Godhead, to which the first
article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons, to which three
articles refer, corresponding to the three Persons; and thirdly, the
works proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers to the order of
nature, in relation to which the article about the creation is proposed
to us; the second refers to the order of grace, in relation to which all
matters concerning the sanctification of man are included in one article;
while the third refers to the order of glory, and in relation to this
another article is proposed to us concerning the resurrection of the dead
and life everlasting. Thus there are seven articles referring to the
Godhead.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Body Para. 3/4
In like manner, with regard to Christ's human nature, there are seven
articles, the first of which refers to Christ's incarnation or
conception; the second, to His virginal birth; the third, to His Passion,
death and burial; the fourth, to His descent into hell; the fifth, to His
resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh, to His coming for
the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen articles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] Body Para. 4/4
Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six pertaining to the
Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one article the
three about the three Persons; because we have one knowledge of the three
Persons: while they divide the article referring to the work of
glorification into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the glory
of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and nativity into one
article.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: By faith we hold many truths about God, which the
philosophers were unable to discover by natural reason, for instance His
providence and omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped, all of
which are contained in the one article of the unity of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The very name of the Godhead implies a kind of watching
over things, as stated in the FP, Q[13], A[8]. Now in beings having an
intellect, power does not work save by the will and knowledge. Hence
God's omnipotence includes, in a way, universal knowledge and providence.
For He would not be able to do all He wills in things here below, unless
He knew them, and exercised His providence over them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: We have but one knowledge of the Father, Son, and Holy
Ghost, as to the unity of the Essence, to which the first article refers:
but, as to the distinction of the Persons, which is by the relations of
origin, knowledge of the Father does indeed, in a way, include knowledge
of the Son, for He would not be Father, had He not a Son; the bond
whereof being the Holy Ghost. From this point of view, there was a
sufficient motive for those who referred one article to the three
Persons. Since, however, with regard to each Person, certain points have
to be observed, about which some happen to fall into error, looking at it
in this way, we may distinguish three articles about the three Persons.
For Arius believed in the omnipotence and eternity of the Father, but did
not believe the Son to be co-equal and consubstantial with the Father;
hence the need for an article about the Person of the Son in order to
settle this point. In like manner it was necessary to appoint a third
article about the Person of the Holy Ghost, against Macedonius. In the
same way Christ's conception and birth, just as the resurrection and life
everlasting, can from one point of view be united together in one
article, in so far as they are ordained to one end; while, from another
point of view, they can be distinct articles, in as much as each one
separately presents a special difficulty.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: It belongs to the Son and Holy Ghost to be sent to sanctify
the creature; and about this several things have to be believed. Hence it
is that there are more articles about the Persons of the Son and Holy
Ghost than about the Person of the Father, Who is never sent, as we
stated in the FP, Q[43], A[4].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The sanctification of a creature by grace, and its
consummation by glory, is also effected by the gift of charity, which is
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, and by the gift of wisdom, which is
appropriated to the Son: so that each work belongs by appropriation, but
under different aspects, both to the Son and to the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[8] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: Two things may be considered in the sacrament of the
Eucharist. One is the fact that it is a sacrament, and in this respect it
is like the other effects of sanctifying grace. The other is that
Christ's body is miraculously contained therein and thus it is included
under God's omnipotence, like all other miracles which are ascribed to
God's almighty power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is suitable for the articles of faith to be embodied in a
symbol?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is unsuitable for the articles of faith to
be embodied in a symbol. Because Holy Writ is the rule of faith, to which
no addition or subtraction can lawfully be made, since it is written (Dt.
4:2): "You shall not add to the word that I speak to you, neither shall
you take away from it." Therefore it was unlawful to make a symbol as a
rule of faith, after the Holy Writ had once been published.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, according to the Apostle (Eph. 4:5) there is but "one
faith." Now the symbol is a profession of faith. Therefore it is not
fitting that there should be more than one symbol.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the confession of faith, which is contained in the
symbol, concerns all the faithful. Now the faithful are not all competent
to believe in God, but only those who have living faith. Therefore it is
unfitting for the symbol of faith to be expressed in the words: "I
believe in one God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the descent into hell is one of the articles of faith,
as stated above (A[8]). But the descent into hell is not mentioned in the
symbol of the Fathers. Therefore the latter is expressed inadequately.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, Augustine (Tract. xxix in Joan.) expounding the passage,
"You believe in God, believe also in Me" (Jn. 14:1) says: "We believe
Peter or Paul, but we speak only of believing 'in' God." Since then the
Catholic Church is merely a created being, it seems unfitting to say: "In
the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] Obj. 6 Para. 1/1
OBJ 6: Further, a symbol is drawn up that it may be a rule of faith. Now
a rule of faith ought to be proposed to all, and that publicly. Therefore
every symbol, besides the symbol of the Fathers, should be sung at Mass.
Therefore it seems unfitting to publish the articles of faith in a symbol.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The universal Church cannot err, since she is governed
by the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit of truth: for such was Our Lord's
promise to His disciples (Jn. 16:13): "When He, the Spirit of truth, is
come, He will teach you all truth." Now the symbol is published by the
authority of the universal Church. Therefore it contains nothing
defective.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6), "he that cometh to God,
must believe that He is." Now a man cannot believe, unless the truth be
proposed to him that he may believe it. Hence the need for the truth of
faith to be collected together, so that it might the more easily be
proposed to all, lest anyone might stray from the truth through ignorance
of the faith. It is from its being a collection of maxims of faith that
the symbol [*The Greek {symballein}] takes its name.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ, diffusely,
under various modes of expression, and sometimes obscurely, so that, in
order to gather the truth of faith from Holy Writ, one needs long study
and practice, which are unattainable by all those who require to know the
truth of faith, many of whom have no time for study, being busy with
other affairs. And so it was necessary to gather together a clear summary
from the sayings of Holy Writ, to be proposed to the belief of all. This
indeed was no addition to Holy Writ, but something taken from it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The same doctrine of faith is taught in all the symbols.
Nevertheless, the people need more careful instruction about the truth of
faith, when errors arise, lest the faith of simple-minded persons be
corrupted by heretics. It was this that gave rise to the necessity of
formulating several symbols, which nowise differ from one another, save
that on account of the obstinacy of heretics, one contains more
explicitly what another contains implicitly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The confession of faith is drawn up in a symbol in the
person, as it were, of the whole Church, which is united together by
faith. Now the faith of the Church is living faith; since such is the
faith to be found in all those who are of the Church not only outwardly
but also by merit. Hence the confession of faith is expressed in a
symbol, in a manner that is in keeping with living faith, so that even if
some of the faithful lack living faith, they should endeavor to acquire
it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: No error about the descent into hell had arisen among
heretics, so that there was no need to be more explicit on that point.
For this reason it is not repeated in the symbol of the Fathers, but is
supposed as already settled in the symbol of the Apostles. For a
subsequent symbol does not cancel a preceding one; rather does it expound
it, as stated above (ad 2).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: If we say: "'In' the holy Catholic Church," this must be
taken as verified in so far as our faith is directed to the Holy Ghost,
Who sanctifies the Church; so that the sense is: "I believe in the Holy
Ghost sanctifying the Church." But it is better and more in keeping with
the common use, to omit the 'in,' and say simply, "the holy Catholic
Church," as Pope Leo [*Rufinus, Comm. in Sym. Apost.] observes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[9] R.O. 6 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 6: Since the symbol of the Fathers is an explanation of the
symbol of the Apostles, and was drawn up after the faith was already
spread abroad, and when the Church was already at peace, it is sung
publicly in the Mass. On the other hand the symbol of the Apostles, which
was drawn up at the time of persecution, before the faith was made
public, is said secretly at Prime and Compline, as though it were against
the darkness of past and future errors.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it does not belong to the Sovereign Pontiff to
draw up a symbol of faith. For a new edition of the symbol becomes
necessary in order to explain the articles of faith, as stated above
(A[9]). Now, in the Old Testament, the articles of faith were more and
more explained as time went on, by reason of the truth of faith becoming
clearer through greater nearness to Christ, as stated above (A[7]). Since
then this reason ceased with the advent of the New Law, there is no need
for the articles of faith to be more and more explicit. Therefore it does
not seem to belong to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a
new edition of the symbol.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no man has the power to do what is forbidden under pain
of anathema by the universal Church. Now it was forbidden under pain of
anathema by the universal Church, to make a new edition of the symbol.
For it is stated in the acts of the first* council of Ephesus (P. ii,
Act. 6) that "after the symbol of the Nicene council had been read
through, the holy synod decreed that it was unlawful to utter, write or
draw up any other creed, than that which was defined by the Fathers
assembled at Nicaea together with the Holy Ghost," and this under pain of
anathema. [*St. Thomas wrote 'first' (expunged by Nicolai) to distinguish
it from the other council, A.D. 451, known as the "Latrocinium" and
condemned by the Pope.] The same was repeated in the acts of the council
of Chalcedon (P. ii, Act. 5). Therefore it seems that the Sovereign
Pontiff has no authority to publish a new edition of the symbol.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Athanasius was not the Sovereign Pontiff, but patriarch
of Alexandria, and yet he published a symbol which is sung in the Church.
Therefore it does not seem to belong to the Sovereign Pontiff any more
than to other bishops, to publish a new edition of the symbol.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The symbol was drawn us by a general council. Now such
a council cannot be convoked otherwise than by the authority of the
Sovereign Pontiff, as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 4,5].
Therefore it belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up
a symbol.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[10] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (OBJ 1), a new edition of the symbol
becomes necessary in order to set aside the errors that may arise.
Consequently to publish a new edition of the symbol belongs to that
authority which is empowered to decide matters of faith finally, so that
they may be held by all with unshaken faith. Now this belongs to the
authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, "to whom the more important and more
difficult questions that arise in the Church are referred," as stated in
the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 5]. Hence our Lord said to Peter whom he
made Sovereign Pontiff (Lk. 22:32): "I have prayed for thee," Peter,
"that thy faith fail not, and thou, being once converted, confirm thy
brethren." The reason of this is that there should be but one faith of
the whole Church, according to 1 Cor. 1:10: "That you all speak the same
thing, and that there be no schisms among you": and this could not be
secured unless any question of faith that may arise be decided by him who
presides over the whole Church, so that the whole Church may hold firmly
to his decision. Consequently it belongs to the sole authority of the
Sovereign Pontiff to publish a new edition of the symbol, as do all other
matters which concern the whole Church, such as to convoke a general
council and so forth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The truth of faith is sufficiently explicit in the teaching
of Christ and the apostles. But since, according to 2 Pt. 3:16, some men
are so evil-minded as to pervert the apostolic teaching and other
doctrines and Scriptures to their own destruction, it was necessary as
time went on to express the faith more explicitly against the errors
which arose.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This prohibition and sentence of the council was intended
for private individuals, who have no business to decide matters of faith:
for this decision of the general council did not take away from a
subsequent council the power of drawing up a new edition of the symbol,
containing not indeed a new faith, but the same faith with greater
explicitness. For every council has taken into account that a subsequent
council would expound matters more fully than the preceding council, if
this became necessary through some heresy arising. Consequently this
belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff, by whose authority the council is
convoked, and its decision confirmed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[1] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Athanasius drew up a declaration of faith, not under the
form of a symbol, but rather by way of an exposition of doctrine, as
appears from his way of speaking. But since it contained briefly the
whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the authority of the Sovereign
Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE ACT OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the act of faith, and (1) the internal act; (2) the
external act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) What is "to believe," which is the internal act of faith?
(2) In how many ways is it expressed?
(3) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in anything above
natural reason?
(4) Whether it is necessary to believe those things that are attainable
by natural reason?
(5) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe certain things
explicitly?
(6) Whether all are equally bound to explicit faith?
(7) Whether explicit faith in Christ is always necessary for salvation?
(8) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity
explicitly?
(9) Whether the act of faith is meritorious?
(10) Whether human reason diminishes the merit of faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to believe is to think with assent?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that to believe is not to think with assent.
Because the Latin word "cogitatio" [thought] implies a research, for
"cogitare" [to think] seems to be equivalent to "coagitare," i.e. "to
discuss together." Now Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv) that faith is
"an assent without research." Therefore thinking has no place in the act
of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, faith resides in the reason, as we shall show further on
(Q[4], A[2]). Now to think is an act of the cogitative power, which
belongs to the sensitive faculty, as stated in the FP, Q[78], A[4].
Therefore thought has nothing to do with faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to believe is an act of the intellect, since its object
is truth. But assent seems to be an act not of the intellect, but of the
will, even as consent is, as stated above (FS, Q[15], A[1], ad 3).
Therefore to believe is not to think with assent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, This is how "to believe" is defined by Augustine (De
Praedest. Sanct. ii).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, "To think" can be taken in three ways. First, in a
general way for any kind of actual consideration of the intellect, as
Augustine observes (De Trin. xiv, 7): "By understanding I mean now the
faculty whereby we understand when thinking." Secondly, "to think" is
more strictly taken for that consideration of the intellect, which is
accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and which precedes the intellect's
arrival at the stage of perfection that comes with the certitude of
sight. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16) that "the Son of
God is not called the Thought, but the Word of God. When our thought
realizes what we know and takes form therefrom, it becomes our word.
Hence the Word of God must be understood without any thinking on the part
of God, for there is nothing there that can take form, or be unformed."
In this way thought is, properly speaking, the movement of the mind while
yet deliberating, and not yet perfected by the clear sight of truth.
Since, however, such a movement of the mind may be one of deliberation
either about universal notions, which belongs to the intellectual
faculty, or about particular matters, which belongs to the sensitive
part, hence it is that "to think" is taken secondly for an act of the
deliberating intellect, and thirdly for an act of the cogitative power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly, if "to think" be understood broadly according to the first
sense, then "to think with assent," does not express completely what is
meant by "to believe": since, in this way, a man thinks with assent even
when he considers what he knows by science [*Science is certain knowledge
of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration.], or understands.
If, on the other hand, "to think" be understood in the second way, then
this expresses completely the nature of the act of believing. For among
the acts belonging to the intellect, some have a firm assent without any
such kind of thinking, as when a man considers the things that he knows
by science, or understands, for this consideration is already formed. But
some acts of the intellect have unformed thought devoid of a firm assent,
whether they incline to neither side, as in one who "doubts"; or incline
to one side rather than the other, but on account of some slight motive,
as in one who "suspects"; or incline to one side yet with fear of the
other, as in one who "opines." But this act "to believe," cleaves firmly
to one side, in which respect belief has something in common with science
and understanding; yet its knowledge does not attain the perfection of
clear sight, wherein it agrees with doubt, suspicion and opinion. Hence
it is proper to the believer to think with assent: so that the act of
believing is distinguished from all the other acts of the intellect,
which are about the true or the false.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Faith has not that research of natural reason which
demonstrates what is believed, but a research into those things whereby a
man is induced to believe, for instance that such things have been
uttered by God and confirmed by miracles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: "To think" is not taken here for the act of the cogitative
power, but for an act of the intellect, as explained above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The intellect of the believer is determined to one object,
not by the reason, but by the will, wherefore assent is taken here for an
act of the intellect as determined to one object by the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the act of faith is suitably distinguished as believing God,
believing in a God and believing in God?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the act of faith is unsuitably distinguished
as believing God, believing in a God, and believing in God. For one habit
has but one act. Now faith is one habit since it is one virtue. Therefore
it is unreasonable to say that there are three acts of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is common to all acts of faith should not be
reckoned as a particular kind of act of faith. Now "to believe God" is
common to all acts of faith, since faith is founded on the First Truth.
Therefore it seems unreasonable to distinguish it from certain other acts
of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which can be said of unbelievers, cannot be called
an act of faith. Now unbelievers can be said to believe in a God.
Therefore it should not be reckoned an act of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, movement towards the end belongs to the will, whose
object is the good and the end. Now to believe is an act, not of the
will, but of the intellect. Therefore "to believe in God," which implies
movement towards an end, should not be reckoned as a species of that act.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary is the authority of Augustine who makes this distinction
(De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxi---Tract. xxix in Joan.).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The act of any power or habit depends on the relation of
that power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith can be
considered in three ways. For, since "to believe" is an act of the
intellect, in so far as the will moves it to assent, as stated above
(A[1], ad 3), the object of faith can be considered either on the part of
the intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can be
observed in the object of faith, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]). One of
these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of faith is
"to believe in a God"; because, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]) nothing is
proposed to our belief, except in as much as it is referred to God. The
other is the formal aspect of the object, for it is the medium on account
of which we assent to such and such a point of faith; and thus an act of
faith is "to believe God," since, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]) the formal
object of faith is the First Truth, to Which man gives his adhesion, so
as to assent to Its sake to whatever he believes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Thirdly, if the object of faith be considered in so far as the intellect
is moved by the will, an act of faith is "to believe in God." For the
First Truth is referred to the will, through having the aspect of an end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: These three do not denote different acts of faith, but one
and the same act having different relations to the object of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Unbelievers cannot be said "to believe in a God" as we
understand it in relation to the act of faith. For they do not believe
that God exists under the conditions that faith determines; hence they do
not truly imply believe in a God, since, as the Philosopher observes
(Metaph. ix, text. 22) "to know simple things defectively is not to know
them at all."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As stated above (FS, Q[9], A[1]) the will moves the
intellect and the other powers of the soul to the end: and in this
respect an act of faith is "to believe in God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe anything above the
natural reason?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unnecessary for salvation to believe anything above
the natural reason. For the salvation and perfection of a thing seem to
be sufficiently insured by its natural endowments. Now matters of faith,
surpass man's natural reason, since they are things unseen as stated
above (Q[1], A[4]). Therefore to believe seems unnecessary for salvation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is dangerous for man to assent to matters, wherein he
cannot judge whether that which is proposed to him be true or false,
according to Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words?" Now a man
cannot form a judgment of this kind in matters of faith, since he cannot
trace them back to first principles, by which all our judgments are
guided. Therefore it is dangerous to believe in such matters. Therefore
to believe is not necessary for salvation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, man's salvation rests on God, according to Ps. 36:39:
"But the salvation of the just is from the Lord." Now "the invisible
things" of God "are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
made; His eternal power also and Divinity," according to Rm. 1:20: and
those things which are clearly seen by the understanding are not an
object of belief. Therefore it is not necessary for man's salvation, that
he should believe certain things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): "Without faith it is
impossible to please God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Wherever one nature is subordinate to another, we find
that two things concur towards the perfection of the lower nature, one of
which is in respect of that nature's proper movement, while the other is
in respect of the movement of the higher nature. Thus water by its proper
movement moves towards the centre (of the earth), while according to the
movement of the moon, it moves round the centre by ebb and flow. In like
manner the planets have their proper movements from west to east, while
in accordance with the movement of the first heaven, they have a movement
from east to west. Now the created rational nature alone is immediately
subordinate to God, since other creatures do not attain to the universal,
but only to something particular, while they partake of the Divine
goodness either in "being" only, as inanimate things, or also in
"living," and in "knowing singulars," as plants and animals; whereas the
rational nature, in as much as it apprehends the universal notion of good
and being, is immediately related to the universal principle of being.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
Consequently the perfection of the rational creature consists not only
in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also in that which it
acquires through a supernatural participation of Divine goodness. Hence
it was said above (FS, Q[3], A[8]) that man's ultimate happiness consists
in a supernatural vision of God: to which vision man cannot attain unless
he be taught by God, according to Jn. 6:45: "Every one that hath heard of
the Father and hath learned cometh to Me." Now man acquires a share of
this learning, not indeed all at once, but by little and little,
according to the mode of his nature: and every one who learns thus must
needs believe, in order that he may acquire science in a perfect degree;
thus also the Philosopher remarks (De Soph. Elench. i, 2) that "it
behooves a learner to believe."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly
happiness, he must first of all believe God, as a disciple believes the
master who is teaching him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Since man's nature is dependent on a higher nature, natural
knowledge does not suffice for its perfection, and some supernatural
knowledge is necessary, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Just as man assents to first principles, by the natural
light of his intellect, so does a virtuous man, by the habit of virtue,
judge aright of things concerning that virtue; and in this way, by the
light of faith which God bestows on him, a man assents to matters of
faith and not to those which are against faith. Consequently "there is
no" danger or "condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus," and whom
He has enlightened by faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In many respects faith perceives the invisible things of
God in a higher way than natural reason does in proceeding to God from
His creatures. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): "Many things are shown
to thee above the understandings of man."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is necessary to believe those things which can be proved by
natural reason?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unnecessary to believe those things which can be
proved by natural reason. For nothing is superfluous in God's works, much
less even than in the works of nature. Now it is superfluous to employ
other means, where one already suffices. Therefore it would be
superfluous to receive by faith, things that can be known by natural
reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those things must be believed, which are the object of
faith. Now science and faith are not about the same object, as stated
above (Q[1], AA[4],5). Since therefore all things that can be known by
natural reason are an object of science, it seems that there is no need
to believe what can be proved by natural reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all things knowable scientifically [*Science is certain
knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration] would
seem to come under one head: so that if some of them are proposed to man
as objects of faith, in like manner the others should also be believed.
But this is not true. Therefore it is not necessary to believe those
things which can be proved by natural reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is necessary to believe that God is one and
incorporeal: which things philosophers prove by natural reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only
things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by
reason: and this for three motives. First, in order that man may arrive
more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the science to
whose province it belongs to prove the existence of God, is the last of
all to offer itself to human research, since it presupposes many other
sciences: so that it would not by until late in life that man would
arrive at the knowledge of God. The second reason is, in order that the
knowledge of God may be more general. For many are unable to make
progress in the study of science, either through dullness of mind, or
through having a number of occupations, and temporal needs, or even
through laziness in learning, all of whom would be altogether deprived of
the knowledge of God, unless Divine things were brought to their
knowledge under the guise of faith. The third reason is for the sake of
certitude. For human reason is very deficient in things concerning God. A
sign of this is that philosophers in their researches, by natural
investigation, into human affairs, have fallen into many errors, and have
disagreed among themselves. And consequently, in order that men might
have knowledge of God, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary
for Divine matters to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to
them, as it were, by God Himself Who cannot lie.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The researches of natural reason do not suffice mankind for
the knowledge of Divine matters, even of those that can be proved by
reason: and so it is not superfluous if these others be believed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Science and faith cannot be in the same subject and about
the same object: but what is an object of science for one, can be an
object of faith for another, as stated above (Q[1], A[5]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Although all things that can be known by science are of one
common scientific aspect, they do not all alike lead man to beatitude:
hence they are not all equally proposed to our belief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether man is bound to believe anything explicitly?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that man is not bound to believe anything
explicitly. For no man is bound to do what is not in his power. Now it is
not in man's power to believe a thing explicitly, for it is written (Rm.
10:14,15): "How shall they believe Him, of whom they have not heard? And
how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they preach unless
they be sent?" Therefore man is not bound to believe anything explicitly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as we are directed to God by faith, so are we by
charity. Now man is not bound to keep the precepts of charity, and it is
enough if he be ready to fulfil them: as is evidenced by the precept of
Our Lord (Mt. 5:39): "If one strike thee on one [Vulg.: 'thy right']
cheek, turn to him also the other"; and by others of the same kind,
according to Augustine's exposition (De Serm. Dom. in Monte xix).
Therefore neither is man bound to believe anything explicitly, and it is
enough if he be ready to believe whatever God proposes to be believed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the good of faith consists in obedience, according to
Rm. 1:5: "For obedience to the faith in all nations." Now the virtue of
obedience does not require man to keep certain fixed precepts, but it is
enough that his mind be ready to obey, according to Ps. 118:60: "I am
ready and am not troubled; that I may keep Thy commandments." Therefore
it seems enough for faith, too, that man should be ready to believe
whatever God may propose, without his believing anything explicitly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): "He that cometh to God, must
believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The precepts of the Law, which man is bound to fulfil,
concern acts of virtue which are the means of attaining salvation. Now an
act of virtue, as stated above (FS, Q[60], A[5]) depends on the relation
of the habit to its object. Again two things may be considered in the
object of any virtue; namely, that which is the proper and direct object
of that virtue, and that which is accidental and consequent to the object
properly so called. Thus it belongs properly and directly to the object
of fortitude, to face the dangers of death, and to charge at the foe with
danger to oneself, for the sake of the common good: yet that, in a just
war, a man be armed, or strike another with his sword, and so forth, is
reduced to the object of fortitude, but indirectly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly, just as a virtuous act is required for the fulfilment of a
precept, so is it necessary that the virtuous act should terminate in its
proper and direct object: but, on the other hand, the fulfilment of the
precept does not require that a virtuous act should terminate in those
things which have an accidental or secondary relation to the proper and
direct object of that virtue, except in certain places and at certain
times. We must, therefore, say that the direct object of faith is that
whereby man is made one of the Blessed, as stated above (Q[1], A[8]):
while the indirect and secondary object comprises all things delivered by
God to us in Holy Writ, for instance that Abraham had two sons, that
David was the son of Jesse, and so forth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
Therefore, as regards the primary points or articles of faith, man is
bound to believe them, just as he is bound to have faith; but as to other
points of faith, man is not bound to believe them explicitly, but only
implicitly, or to be ready to believe them, in so far as he is prepared
to believe whatever is contained in the Divine Scriptures. Then alone is
he bound to believe such things explicitly, when it is clear to him that
they are contained in the doctrine of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: If we understand those things alone to be in a man's power,
which we can do without the help of grace, then we are bound to do many
things which we cannot do without the aid of healing grace, such as to
love God and our neighbor, and likewise to believe the articles of faith.
But with the help of grace we can do this, for this help "to whomsoever
it is given from above it is mercifully given; and from whom it is
withheld it is justly withheld, as a punishment of a previous, or at
least of original, sin," as Augustine states (De Corr. et Grat. v, vi
[*Cf. Ep. cxc; De Praed. Sanct. viii.]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Man is bound to love definitely those lovable things which
are properly and directly the objects of charity, namely, God and our
neighbor. The objection refers to those precepts of charity which belong,
as a consequence, to the objects of charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The virtue of obedience is seated, properly speaking, in
the will; hence promptness of the will subject to authority, suffices for
the act of obedience, because it is the proper and direct object of
obedience. But this or that precept is accidental or consequent to that
proper and direct object.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether all are equally bound to have explicit faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that all are equally bound to have explicit faith.
For all are bound to those things which are necessary for salvation, as
is evidenced by the precepts of charity. Now it is necessary for
salvation that certain things should be believed explicitly. Therefore
all are equally bound to have explicit faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no one should be put to test in matters that he is not
bound to believe. But simple reasons are sometimes tested in reference to
the slightest articles of faith. Therefore all are bound to believe
everything explicitly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if the simple are bound to have, not explicit but only
implicit faith, their faith must needs be implied in the faith of the
learned. But this seems unsafe, since it is possible for the learned to
err. Therefore it seems that the simple should also have explicit faith;
so that all are, therefore, equally bound to have explicit faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Job 1:14): "The oxen were ploughing, and
the asses feeding beside them," because, as Gregory expounds this passage
(Moral. ii, 17), the simple, who are signified by the asses, ought, in
matters of faith, to stay by the learned, who are denoted by the oxen.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[6] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, The unfolding of matters of faith is the result of Divine
revelation: for matters of faith surpass natural reason. Now Divine
revelation reaches those of lower degree through those who are over them,
in a certain order; to men, for instance, through the angels, and to the
lower angels through the higher, as Dionysius explains (Coel. Hier. iv,
vii). In like manner therefore the unfolding of faith must needs reach
men of lower degree through those of higher degree. Consequently, just as
the higher angels, who enlighten those who are below them, have a fuller
knowledge of Divine things than the lower angels, as Dionysius states
(Coel. Hier. xii), so too, men of higher degree, whose business it is to
teach others, are under obligation to have fuller knowledge of matters of
faith, and to believe them more explicitly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The unfolding of the articles of faith is not equally
necessary for the salvation of all, since those of higher degree, whose
duty it is to teach others, are bound to believe explicitly more things
than others are.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Simple persons should not be put to the test about subtle
questions of faith, unless they be suspected of having been corrupted by
heretics, who are wont to corrupt the faith of simple people in such
questions. If, however, it is found that they are free from obstinacy in
their heterodox sentiments, and that it is due to their simplicity, it is
no fault of theirs.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The simple have no faith implied in that of the learned,
except in so far as the latter adhere to the Divine teaching. Hence the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye followers of me, as I also am of
Christ." Hence it is not human knowledge, but the Divine truth that is
the rule of faith: and if any of the learned stray from this rule, he
does not harm the faith of the simple ones, who think that the learned
believe aright; unless the simple hold obstinately to their individual
errors, against the faith of the universal Church, which cannot err,
since Our Lord said (Lk. 22:32): "I have prayed for thee," Peter, "that
thy faith fail not."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is necessary for the salvation of all, that they should
believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for the salvation of all
that they should believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ. For man is
not bound to believe explicitly what the angels are ignorant about: since
the unfolding of faith is the result of Divine revelation, which reaches
man by means of the angels, as stated above (A[6]; FP, Q[111], A[1]). Now
even the angels were in ignorance of the mystery of the Incarnation:
hence, according to the commentary of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), it is
they who ask (Ps. 23:8): "Who is this king of glory?" and (Is. 63:1):
"Who is this that cometh from Edom?" Therefore men were not bound to
believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ's Incarnation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is evident that John the Baptist was one of the
teachers, and most nigh to Christ, Who said of him (Mt. 11:11) that
"there hath not risen among them that are born of women, a greater than"
he. Now John the Baptist does not appear to have known the mystery of
Christ explicitly, since he asked Christ (Mt. 11:3): "Art Thou He that
art to come, or look we for another?" Therefore even the teachers were
not bound to explicit faith in Christ.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, many gentiles obtained salvation through the ministry of
the angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. ix). Now it would seem that
the gentiles had neither explicit nor implicit faith in Christ, since
they received no revelation. Therefore it seems that it was not necessary
for the salvation of all to believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Corr. et Gratia vii; Ep. cxc): "Our
faith is sound if we believe that no man, old or young is delivered from
the contagion of death and the bonds of sin, except by the one Mediator
of God and men, Jesus Christ."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (A[5]; Q[1], A[8]), the object of faith
includes, properly and directly, that thing through which man obtains
beatitude. Now the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and Passion is the way
by which men obtain beatitude; for it is written (Acts 4:12): "There is
no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved."
Therefore belief of some kind in the mystery of Christ's Incarnation was
necessary at all times and for all persons, but this belief differed
according to differences of times and persons. The reason of this is that
before the state of sin, man believed, explicitly in Christ's
Incarnation, in so far as it was intended for the consummation of glory,
but not as it was intended to deliver man from sin by the Passion and
Resurrection, since man had no foreknowledge of his future sin. He does,
however, seem to have had foreknowledge of the Incarnation of Christ,
from the fact that he said (Gn. 2:24): "Wherefore a man shall leave
father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife," of which the Apostle
says (Eph. 5:32) that "this is a great sacrament . . . in Christ and the
Church," and it is incredible that the first man was ignorant about this
sacrament.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] Body Para. 2/3
But after sin, man believed explicitly in Christ, not only as to the
Incarnation, but also as to the Passion and Resurrection, whereby the
human race is delivered from sin and death: for they would not, else,
have foreshadowed Christ's Passion by certain sacrifices both before and
after the Law, the meaning of which sacrifices was known by the learned
explicitly, while the simple folk, under the veil of those sacrifices,
believed them to be ordained by God in reference to Christ's coming, and
thus their knowledge was covered with a veil, so to speak. And, as stated
above (Q[1], A[7]), the nearer they were to Christ, the more distinct was
their knowledge of Christ's mysteries.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] Body Para. 3/3
After grace had been revealed, both learned and simple folk are bound to
explicit faith in the mysteries of Christ, chiefly as regards those which
are observed throughout the Church, and publicly proclaimed, such as the
articles which refer to the Incarnation, of which we have spoken above
(Q[1], A[8]). As to other minute points in reference to the articles of
the Incarnation, men have been bound to believe them more or less
explicitly according to each one's state and office.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The mystery of the Kingdom of God was not entirely hidden
from the angels, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. v, 19), yet certain
aspects thereof were better known to them when Christ revealed them to
them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: It was not through ignorance that John the Baptist inquired
of Christ's advent in the flesh, since he had clearly professed his
belief therein, saying: "I saw, and I gave testimony, that this is the
Son of God" (Jn. 1:34). Hence he did not say: "Art Thou He that hast
come?" but "Art Thou He that art to come?" thus saying about the future,
not about the past. Likewise it is not to be believed that he was
ignorant of Christ's future Passion, for he had already said (Jn. 1:39):
"Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him who taketh away the sins [Vulg.:
'sin'] of the world," thus foretelling His future immolation; and since
other prophets had foretold it, as may be seen especially in Isaias 53.
We may therefore say with Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that he asked
this question, being in ignorance as to whether Christ would descend into
hell in His own Person. But he did not ignore the fact that the power of
Christ's Passion would be extended to those who were detained in Limbo,
according to Zach. 9:11: "Thou also, by the blood of Thy testament hast
sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein there is no water"; nor
was he bound to believe explicitly, before its fulfilment, that Christ
was to descend thither Himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
It may also be replied that, as Ambrose observes in his commentary on
Lk. 7:19, he made this inquiry, not from doubt or ignorance but from
devotion: or again, with Chrysostom (Hom. xxxvi in Matth.), that he
inquired, not as though ignorant himself, but because he wished his
disciples to be satisfied on that point, through Christ: hence the latter
framed His answer so as to instruct the disciples, by pointing to the
signs of His works.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Many of the gentiles received revelations of Christ, as is
clear from their predictions. Thus we read (Job 19:25): "I know that my
Redeemer liveth." The Sibyl too foretold certain things about Christ, as
Augustine states (Contra Faust. xiii, 15). Moreover, we read in the
history of the Romans, that at the time of Constantine Augustus and his
mother Irene a tomb was discovered, wherein lay a man on whose breast was
a golden plate with the inscription: "Christ shall be born of a virgin,
and in Him, I believe. O sun, during the lifetime of Irene and
Constantine, thou shalt see me again" [*Cf. Baron, Annal., A.D. 780]. If,
however, some were saved without receiving any revelation, they were not
saved without faith in a Mediator, for, though they did not believe in
Him explicitly, they did, nevertheless, have implicit faith through
believing in Divine providence, since they believed that God would
deliver mankind in whatever way was pleasing to Him, and according to the
revelation of the Spirit to those who knew the truth, as stated in Job
35:11: "Who teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe explicitly in the
Trinity?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for salvation to believe
explicitly in the Trinity. For the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6): "He that
cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that
seek Him." Now one can believe this without believing in the Trinity.
Therefore it was not necessary to believe explicitly in the Trinity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further our Lord said (Jn. 17:5,6): "Father, I have manifested
Thy name to men," which words Augustine expounds (Tract. cvi) as follows:
"Not the name by which Thou art called God, but the name whereby Thou art
called My Father," and further on he adds: "In that He made this world,
God is known to all nations; in that He is not to be worshipped together
with false gods, 'God is known in Judea'; but, in that He is the Father
of this Christ, through Whom He takes away the sin of the world, He now
makes known to men this name of His, which hitherto they knew not."
Therefore before the coming of Christ it was not known that Paternity and
Filiation were in the Godhead: and so the Trinity was not believed
explicitly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which we are bound to believe explicitly of God is
the object of heavenly happiness. Now the object of heavenly happiness is
the sovereign good, which can be understood to be in God, without any
distinction of Persons. Therefore it was not necessary to believe
explicitly in the Trinity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, In the Old Testament the Trinity of Persons is
expressed in many ways; thus at the very outset of Genesis it is written
in manifestation of the Trinity: "Let us make man to Our image and
likeness" (Gn. 1:26). Therefore from the very beginning it was necessary
for salvation to believe in the Trinity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, It is impossible to believe explicitly in the mystery of
Christ, without faith in the Trinity, since the mystery of Christ
includes that the Son of God took flesh; that He renewed the world
through the grace of the Holy Ghost; and again, that He was conceived by
the Holy Ghost. Wherefore just as, before Christ, the mystery of Christ
was believed explicitly by the learned, but implicitly and under a veil,
so to speak, by the simple, so too was it with the mystery of the
Trinity. And consequently, when once grace had been revealed, all were
bound to explicit faith in the mystery of the Trinity: and all who are
born again in Christ, have this bestowed on them by the invocation of the
Trinity, according to Mt. 28:19: "Going therefore teach ye all nations,
baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy
Ghost."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Explicit faith in those two things was necessary at all
times and for all people: but it was not sufficient at all times and for
all people.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Before Christ's coming, faith in the Trinity lay hidden in
the faith of the learned, but through Christ and the apostles it was
shown to the world.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: God's sovereign goodness as we understand it now through
its effects, can be understood without the Trinity of Persons: but as
understood in itself, and as seen by the Blessed, it cannot be understood
without the Trinity of Persons. Moreover the mission of the Divine
Persons brings us to heavenly happiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether to believe is meritorious?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that to believe in not meritorious. For the
principle of all merit is charity, as stated above (FS, Q[114], A[4]).
Now faith, like nature, is a preamble to charity. Therefore, just as an
act of nature is not meritorious, since we do not merit by our natural
gifts, so neither is an act of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, belief is a mean between opinion and scientific
knowledge or the consideration of things scientifically known [*Science
is a certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
demonstration.]. Now the considerations of science are not meritorious,
nor on the other hand is opinion. Therefore belief is not meritorious.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, he who assents to a point of faith, either has a
sufficient motive for believing, or he has not. If he has a sufficient
motive for his belief, this does not seem to imply any merit on his part,
since he is no longer free to believe or not to believe: whereas if he
has not a sufficient motive for believing, this is a mark of levity,
according to Ecclus. 19:4: "He that is hasty to give credit, is light of
heart," so that, seemingly, he gains no merit thereby. Therefore to
believe is by no means meritorious.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:33) that the saints "by faith .
. . obtained promises," which would not be the case if they did not merit
by believing. Therefore to believe is meritorious.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[9] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[114], AA[3],4), our actions are
meritorious in so far as they proceed from the free-will moved with grace
by God. Therefore every human act proceeding from the free-will, if it be
referred to God, can be meritorious. Now the act of believing is an act
of the intellect assenting to the Divine truth at the command of the will
moved by the grace of God, so that it is subject to the free-will in
relation to God; and consequently the act of faith can be meritorious.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[9] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Nature is compared to charity which is the principle of
merit, as matter to form: whereas faith is compared to charity as the
disposition which precedes the ultimate form. Now it is evident that the
subject or the matter cannot act save by virtue of the form, nor can a
preceding disposition, before the advent of the form: but after the
advent of the form, both the subject and the preceding disposition act by
virtue of the form, which is the chief principle of action, even as the
heat of fire acts by virtue of the substantial form of fire. Accordingly
neither nature nor faith can, without charity, produce a meritorious act;
but, when accompanied by charity, the act of faith is made meritorious
thereby, even as an act of nature, and a natural act of the free-will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Two things may be considered in science: namely the
scientist's assent to a scientific fact and his consideration of that
fact. Now the assent of science is not subject to free-will, because the
scientist is obliged to assent by force of the demonstration, wherefore
scientific assent is not meritorious. But the actual consideration of
what a man knows scientifically is subject to his free-will, for it is in
his power to consider or not to consider. Hence scientific consideration
may be meritorious if it be referred to the end of charity, i.e. to the
honor of God or the good of our neighbor. On the other hand, in the case
of faith, both these things are subject to the free-will so that in both
respects the act of faith can be meritorious: whereas in the case of
opinion, there is no firm assent, since it is weak and infirm, as the
Philosopher observes (Poster. i, 33), so that it does not seem to proceed
from a perfect act of the will: and for this reason, as regards the
assent, it does not appear to be very meritorious, though it can be as
regards the actual consideration.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The believer has sufficient motive for believing, for he is
moved by the authority of Divine teaching confirmed by miracles, and,
what is more, by the inward instinct of the Divine invitation: hence he
does not believe lightly. He has not, however, sufficient reason for
scientific knowledge, hence he does not lose the merit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether reasons in support of what we believe lessen the merit of faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that reasons in support of what we believe lessen
the merit of faith. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that "there is
no merit in believing what is shown by reason." If, therefore, human
reason provides sufficient proof, the merit of faith is altogether taken
away. Therefore it seems that any kind of human reasoning in support of
matters of faith, diminishes the merit of believing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever lessens the measure of virtue, lessens the
amount of merit, since "happiness is the reward of virtue," as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 9). Now human reasoning seems to diminish
the measure of the virtue of faith, since it is essential to faith to be
about the unseen, as stated above (Q[1], AA[4],5). Now the more a thing
is supported by reasons the less is it unseen. Therefore human reasons in
support of matters of faith diminish the merit of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, contrary things have contrary causes. Now an inducement
in opposition to faith increases the merit of faith whether it consist in
persecution inflicted by one who endeavors to force a man to renounce his
faith, or in an argument persuading him to do so. Therefore reasons in
support of faith diminish the merit of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (1 Pt. 3:15): "Being ready always to
satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that faith [*Vulg.: 'Of
that hope which is in you.' St. Thomas' reading is apparently taken from
Bede.] and hope which is in you." Now the Apostle would not give this
advice, if it would imply a diminution in the merit of faith. Therefore
reason does not diminish the merit of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[10] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[9]), the act of faith can be
meritorious, in so far as it is subject to the will, not only as to the
use, but also as to the assent. Now human reason in support of what we
believe, may stand in a twofold relation to the will of the believer.
First, as preceding the act of the will; as, for instance, when a man
either has not the will, or not a prompt will, to believe, unless he be
moved by human reasons: and in this way human reason diminishes the merit
of faith. In this sense it has been said above (FS, Q[24], A[3], ad 1;
Q[77], A[6], ad 2) that, in moral virtues, a passion which precedes
choice makes the virtuous act less praiseworthy. For just as a man ought
to perform acts of moral virtue, on account of the judgment of his
reason, and not on account of a passion, so ought he to believe matters
of faith, not on account of human reason, but on account of the Divine
authority. Secondly, human reasons may be consequent to the will of the
believer. For when a man's will is ready to believe, he loves the truth
he believes, he thinks out and takes to heart whatever reasons he can
find in support thereof; and in this way human reason does not exclude
the merit of faith but is a sign of greater merit. Thus again, in moral
virtues a consequent passion is the sign of a more prompt will, as stated
above (FS, Q[24], A[3], ad 1). We have an indication of this in the words
of the Samaritans to the woman, who is a type of human reason: "We now
believe, not for thy saying" (Jn. 4:42).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[10] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Gregory is referring to the case of a man who has no will
to believe what is of faith, unless he be induced by reasons. But when a
man has the will to believe what is of faith on the authority of God
alone, although he may have reasons in demonstration of some of them,
e.g. of the existence of God, the merit of his faith is not, for that
reason, lost or diminished.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The reasons which are brought forward in support of the
authority of faith, are not demonstrations which can bring intellectual
vision to the human intellect, wherefore they do not cease to be unseen.
But they remove obstacles to faith, by showing that what faith proposes
is not impossible; wherefore such reasons do not diminish the merit or
the measure of faith. On the other hand, though demonstrative reasons in
support of the preambles of faith [*The Leonine Edition reads: 'in
support of matters of faith which are however, preambles to the articles
of faith, diminish,' etc.], but not of the articles of faith, diminish
the measure of faith, since they make the thing believed to be seen, yet
they do not diminish the measure of charity, which makes the will ready
to believe them, even if they were unseen; and so the measure of merit
is not diminished.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[2] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Whatever is in opposition to faith, whether it consist in a
man's thoughts, or in outward persecution, increases the merit of faith,
in so far as the will is shown to be more prompt and firm in believing.
Hence the martyrs had more merit of faith, through not renouncing faith
on account of persecution; and even the wise have greater merit of faith,
through not renouncing their faith on account of the reasons brought
forward by philosophers or heretics in opposition to faith. On the other
hand things that are favorable to faith, do not always diminish the
promptness of the will to believe, and therefore they do not always
diminish the merit of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE OUTWARD ACT OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the outward act, viz. the confession of faith:
under which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether confession is an act of faith?
(2) Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether confession is an act of faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of faith. For the
same act does not belong to different virtues. Now confession belongs to
penance of which it is a part. Therefore it is not an act of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, man is sometimes deterred by fear or some kind of
confusion, from confessing his faith: wherefore the Apostle (Eph. 6:19)
asks for prayers that it may be granted him "with confidence, to make
known the mystery of the gospel." Now it belongs to fortitude, which
moderates daring and fear, not to be deterred from doing good on account
of confusion or fear. Therefore it seems that confession is not an act of
faith, but rather of fortitude or constancy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as the ardor of faith makes one confess one's faith
outwardly, so does it make one do other external good works, for it is
written (Gal. 5:6) that "faith . . . worketh by charity." But other
external works are not reckoned acts of faith. Therefore neither is
confession an act of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss explains the words of 2 Thess. 1:11, "and the
work of faith in power" as referring to "confession which is a work
proper to faith."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Outward actions belong properly to the virtue to whose
end they are specifically referred: thus fasting is referred specifically
to the end of abstinence, which is to tame the flesh, and consequently it
is an act of abstinence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now confession of those things that are of faith is referred
specifically as to its end, to that which concerns faith, according to 2
Cor. 4:13: "Having the same spirit of faith . . . we believe, and
therefore we speak also." For the outward utterance is intended to
signify the inward thought. Wherefore, just as the inward thought of
matters of faith is properly an act of faith, so too is the outward
confession of them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A threefold confession is commended by the Scriptures. One
is the confession of matters of faith, and this is a proper act of faith,
since it is referred to the end of faith as stated above. Another is the
confession of thanksgiving or praise, and this is an act of "latria," for
its purpose is to give outward honor to God, which is the end of
"latria." The third is the confession of sins, which is ordained to the
blotting out of sins, which is the end of penance, to which virtue it
therefore belongs.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That which removes an obstacle is not a direct, but an
indirect, cause, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 4). Hence
fortitude which removes an obstacle to the confession of faith, viz. fear
or shame, is not the proper and direct cause of confession, but an
indirect cause so to speak.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Inward faith, with the aid of charity, causes all outward
acts of virtue, by means of the other virtues, commanding, but not
eliciting them; whereas it produces the act of confession as its proper
act, without the help of any other virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that confession of faith is not necessary for
salvation. For, seemingly, a thing is sufficient for salvation, if it is
a means of attaining the end of virtue. Now the proper end of faith is
the union of the human mind with Divine truth, and this can be realized
without any outward confession. Therefore confession of faith is not
necessary for salvation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, by outward confession of faith, a man reveals his faith
to another man. But this is unnecessary save for those who have to
instruct others in the faith. Therefore it seems that the simple folk are
not bound to confess the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whatever may tend to scandalize and disturb others, is
not necessary for salvation, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:32): "Be
without offense to the Jews and to the gentiles and to the Church of
God." Now confession of faith sometimes causes a disturbance among
unbelievers. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rm. 10:10): "With the heart we
believe unto justice; but with the mouth, confession is made unto
salvation."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Things that are necessary for salvation come under the
precepts of the Divine law. Now since confession of faith is something
affirmative, it can only fall under an affirmative precept. Hence its
necessity for salvation depends on how it falls under an affirmative
precept of the Divine law. Now affirmative precepts as stated above (FS,
Q[71], A[5], ad 3; FS, Q[88], A[1], ad 2) do not bind for always,
although they are always binding; but they bind as to place and time
according to other due circumstances, in respect of which human acts have
to be regulated in order to be acts of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Thus then it is not necessary for salvation to confess one's faith at
all times and in all places, but in certain places and at certain times,
when, namely, by omitting to do so, we would deprive God of due honor, or
our neighbor of a service that we ought to render him: for instance, if a
man, on being asked about his faith, were to remain silent, so as to make
people believe either that he is without faith, or that the faith is
false, or so as to turn others away from the faith; for in such cases as
these, confession of faith is necessary for salvation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The end of faith, even as of the other virtues, must be
referred to the end of charity, which is the love of God and our
neighbor. Consequently when God's honor and our neighbor's good demand,
man should not be contented with being united by faith to God's truth,
but ought to confess his faith outwardly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In cases of necessity where faith is in danger, every one
is bound to proclaim his faith to others, either to give good example and
encouragement to the rest of the faithful, or to check the attacks of
unbelievers: but at other times it is not the duty of all the faithful to
instruct others in the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[3] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There is nothing commendable in making a public confession
of one's faith, if it causes a disturbance among unbelievers, without any
profit either to the faith or to the faithful. Hence Our Lord said (Mt.
7:6): "Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your pearls
before swine . . . lest turning upon you, they tear you." Yet, if there
is hope of profit to the faith, or if there be urgency, a man should
disregard the disturbance of unbelievers, and confess his faith in
public. Hence it is written (Mt. 15:12) that when the disciples had said
to Our Lord that "the Pharisee, when they heard this word, were
scandalized," He answered: "Let them alone, they are blind, and leaders
of the blind."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the virtue itself of faith, and, in the first
place, faith itself; secondly, those who have faith; thirdly, the cause
of faith; fourthly, its effects.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) What is faith?
(2) In what power of the soul does it reside?
(3) Whether its form is charity?
(4) Whether living [formata] faith and lifeless [informis] faith are one
identically?
(5) Whether faith is a virtue?
(6) Whether it is one virtue?
(7) Of its relation to the other virtues;
(8) Of its certitude as compared with the certitude of the intellectual
virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether this is a fitting definition of faith: "Faith is the substance of
things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not?"
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Apostle gives an unfitting definition of
faith (Heb. 11:1) when he says: "Faith is the substance of things to be
hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not." For no quality is a
substance: whereas faith is a quality, since it is a theological virtue,
as stated above (FS, Q[62], A[3]). Therefore it is not a substance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, different virtues have different objects. Now things to
be hoped for are the object of hope. Therefore they should not be
included in a definition of faith, as though they were its object.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, faith is perfected by charity rather than by hope, since
charity is the form of faith, as we shall state further on (A[3]).
Therefore the definition of faith should have included the thing to be
loved rather than the thing to be hoped for.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the same thing should not be placed in different genera.
Now "substance" and "evidence" are different genera, and neither is
subalternate to the other. Therefore it is unfitting to state that faith
is both "substance" and "evidence."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, evidence manifests the truth of the matter for which it
is adduced. Now a thing is said to be apparent when its truth is already
manifest. Therefore it seems to imply a contradiction to speak of
"evidence of things that appear not": and so faith is unfittingly defined.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The authority of the Apostle suffices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, Though some say that the above words of the Apostle are
not a definition of faith, yet if we consider the matter aright, this
definition overlooks none of the points in reference to which faith can
be defined, albeit the words themselves are not arranged in the form of a
definition, just as the philosophers touch on the principles of the
syllogism, without employing the syllogistic form.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Body Para. 2/5
In order to make this clear, we must observe that since habits are known
by their acts, and acts by their objects, faith, being a habit, should
be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper object. Now the
act of faith is to believe, as stated above (Q[2], AA[2],3), which is an
act of the intellect determinate to one object of the will's command.
Hence an act of faith is related both to the object of the will, i.e. to
the good and the end, and to the object of the intellect, i.e. to the
true. And since faith, through being a theological virtues, as stated
above (FS, Q[62], A[2]), has one same thing for object and end, its
object and end must, of necessity, be in proportion to one another. Now
it has been already stated (Q[1], AA[1],4) that the object of faith is
the First Truth, as unseen, and whatever we hold on account thereof: so
that it must needs be under the aspect of something unseen that the First
Truth is the end of the act of faith, which aspect is that of a thing
hoped for, according to the Apostle (Rm. 8:25): "We hope for that which
we see not": because to see the truth is to possess it. Now one hopes not
for what one has already, but for what one has not, as stated above (FS,
Q[67], A[4]). Accordingly the relation of the act of faith to its end
which is the object of the will, is indicated by the words: "Faith is the
substance of things to be hoped for." For we are wont to call by the name
of substance, the first beginning of a thing, especially when the whole
subsequent thing is virtually contained in the first beginning; for
instance, we might say that the first self-evident principles are the
substance of science, because, to wit, these principles are in us the
first beginnings of science, the whole of which is itself contained in
them virtually. In this way then faith is said to be the "substance of
things to be hoped for," for the reason that in us the first beginning of
things to be hoped for is brought about by the assent of faith, which
contains virtually all things to be hoped for. Because we hope to be made
happy through seeing the unveiled truth to which our faith cleaves, as
was made evident when we were speaking of happiness (FS, Q[3], A[8]; FS,
Q[4], A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Body Para. 3/5
The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the intellect,
considered as the object of faith, is indicated by the words, "evidence
of things that appear not," where "evidence" is taken for the result of
evidence. For evidence induces the intellect to adhere to a truth,
wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the non-apparent truth of
faith is called "evidence" here. Hence another reading has "conviction,"
because to wit, the intellect of the believer is convinced by Divine
authority, so as to assent to what it sees not. Accordingly if anyone
would reduce the foregoing words to the form of a definition, he may say
that "faith is a habit of the mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us,
making the intellect assent to what is non-apparent."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Body Para. 4/5
In this way faith is distinguished from all other things pertaining to
the intellect. For when we describe it as "evidence," we distinguish it
from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make the intellect
adhere to anything firmly; when we go on to say, "of things that appear
not," we distinguish it from science and understanding, the object of
which is something apparent; and when we say that it is "the substance of
things to be hoped for," we distinguish the virtue of faith from faith
commonly so called, which has no reference to the beatitude we hope for.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] Body Para. 5/5
Whatever other definitions are given of faith, are explanations of this
one given by the Apostle. For when Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.:
QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39) that "faith is a virtue whereby we believe what we
do not see," and when Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 11) that "faith
is an assent without research," and when others say that "faith is that
certainty of the mind about absent things which surpasses opinion but
falls short of science," these all amount to the same as the Apostle's
words: "Evidence of things that appear not"; and when Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is the solid foundation of the believer,
establishing him in the truth, and showing forth the truth in him," comes
to the same as "substance of things to be hoped for."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: "Substance" here does not stand for the supreme genus
condivided with the other genera, but for that likeness to substance
which is found in each genus, inasmuch as the first thing in a genus
contains the others virtually and is said to be the substance thereof.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since faith pertains to the intellect as commanded by the
will, it must needs be directed, as to its end, to the objects of those
virtues which perfect the will, among which is hope, as we shall prove
further on (Q[18], A[1]). For this reason the definition of faith
includes the object of hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Love may be of the seen and of the unseen, of the present
and of the absent. Consequently a thing to be loved is not so adapted to
faith, as a thing to be hoped for, since hope is always of the absent and
the unseen.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: "Substance" and "evidence" as included in the definition of
faith, do not denote various genera of faith, nor different acts, but
different relationships of one act to different objects, as is clear from
what has been said.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Evidence taken from the proper principles of a thing, make
it apparent, whereas evidence taken from Divine authority does not make a
thing apparent in itself, and such is the evidence referred to in the
definition of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith resides in the intellect?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that faith does not reside in the intellect. For
Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith resides in the
believer's will." Now the will is a power distinct from the intellect.
Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the assent of faith to believe anything, proceeds from
the will obeying God. Therefore it seems that faith owes all its praise
to obedience. Now obedience is in the will. Therefore faith is in the
will, and not in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the intellect is either speculative or practical. Now
faith is not in the speculative intellect, since this is not concerned
with things to be sought or avoided, as stated in De Anima iii, 9, so
that it is not a principle of operation, whereas "faith . . . worketh by
charity" (Gal. 5:6). Likewise, neither is it in the practical intellect,
the object of which is some true, contingent thing, that can be made or
done. For the object of faith is the Eternal Truth, as was shown above
(Q[1], A[1]). Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Faith is succeeded by the heavenly vision, according to
1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face
to face." Now vision is in the intellect. Therefore faith is likewise.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Since faith is a virtue, its act must needs be perfect.
Now, for the perfection of an act proceeding from two active principles,
each of these principles must be perfect: for it is not possible for a
thing to be sawn well, unless the sawyer possess the art, and the saw be
well fitted for sawing. Now, in a power of the soul, which is related to
opposite objects, a disposition to act well is a habit, as stated above
(FS, Q[49], A[4], ad 1,2,3). Wherefore an act that proceeds from two such
powers must be perfected by a habit residing in each of them. Again, it
has been stated above (Q[2], AA[1],2) that to believe is an act of the
intellect inasmuch as the will moves it to assent. And this act proceeds
from the will and the intellect, both of which have a natural aptitude to
be perfected in this way. Consequently, if the act of faith is to be
perfect, there needs to be a habit in the will as well as in the
intellect: even as there needs to be the habit of prudence in the reason,
besides the habit of temperance in the concupiscible faculty, in order
that the act of that faculty be perfect. Now, to believe is immediately
an act of the intellect, because the object of that act is "the true,"
which pertains properly to the intellect. Consequently faith, which is
the proper principle of that act, must needs reside in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine takes faith for the act of faith, which is
described as depending on the believer's will, in so far as his intellect
assents to matters of faith at the command of the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Not only does the will need to be ready to obey but also
the intellect needs to be well disposed to follow the command of the
will, even as the concupiscible faculty needs to be well disposed in
order to follow the command of reason; hence there needs to be a habit of
virtue not only in the commanding will but also in the assenting
intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Faith resides in the speculative intellect, as evidenced by
its object. But since this object, which is the First Truth, is the end
of all our desires and actions, as Augustine proves (De Trin. i, 8), it
follows that faith worketh by charity just as "the speculative intellect
becomes practical by extension" (De Anima iii, 10).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity is the form of faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity is not the form of faith. For each
thing derives its species from its form. When therefore two things are
opposite members of a division, one cannot be the form of the other. Now
faith and charity are stated to be opposite members of a division, as
different species of virtue (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore charity is not the
form of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a form and the thing of which it is the form are in one
subject, since together they form one simply. Now faith is in the
intellect, while charity is in the will. Therefore charity is not the
form of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the form of a thing is a principle thereof. Now
obedience, rather than charity, seems to be the principle of believing,
on the part of the will, according to Rm. 1:5: "For obedience to the
faith in all nations." Therefore obedience rather than charity, is the
form of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Each thing works through its form. Now faith works
through charity. Therefore the love of charity is the form of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As appears from what has been said above (FS, Q[1], A[3];
FS, Q[18], A[6]), voluntary acts take their species from their end which
is the will's object. Now that which gives a thing its species, is after
the manner of a form in natural things. Wherefore the form of any
voluntary act is, in a manner, the end to which that act is directed,
both because it takes its species therefrom, and because the mode of an
action should correspond proportionately to the end. Now it is evident
from what has been said (A[1]), that the act of faith is directed to the
object of the will, i.e. the good, as to its end: and this good which is
the end of faith, viz. the Divine Good, is the proper object of charity.
Therefore charity is called the form of faith in so far as the act of
faith is perfected and formed by charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Charity is called the form of faith because it quickens the
act of faith. Now nothing hinders one act from being quickened by
different habits, so as to be reduced to various species in a certain
order, as stated above (FS, Q[18], AA[6],7; FS, Q[61], A[2]) when we were
treating of human acts in general.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This objection is true of an intrinsic form. But it is not
thus that charity is the form of faith, but in the sense that it quickens
the act of faith, as explained above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Even obedience, and hope likewise, and whatever other
virtue might precede the act of faith, is quickened by charity, as we
shall show further on (Q[23], A[8]), and consequently charity is spoken
of as the form of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether lifeless faith can become living, or living faith, lifeless?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that lifeless faith does not become living, or
living faith lifeless. For, according to 1 Cor. 13:10, "when that which
is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away." Now
lifeless faith is imperfect in comparison with living faith. Therefore
when living faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, so that they are
not one identical habit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a dead thing does not become a living thing. Now
lifeless faith is dead, according to James 2:20: "Faith without works is
dead." Therefore lifeless faith cannot become living.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, God's grace, by its advent, has no less effect in a
believer than in an unbeliever. Now by coming to an unbeliever it causes
the habit of faith. Therefore when it comes to a believer, who hitherto
had the habit of lifeless faith, it causes another habit of faith in him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, as Boethius says (In Categ. Arist. i), "accidents cannot
be altered." Now faith is an accident. Therefore the same faith cannot be
at one time living, and at another, lifeless.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on the words, "Faith without works is dead"
(James 2:20) adds, "by which it lives once more." Therefore faith which
was lifeless and without form hitherto, becomes formed and living.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, There have been various opinions on this question. For
some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 15] have said that living
and lifeless faith are distinct habits, but that when living faith comes,
lifeless faith is done away, and that, in like manner, when a man sins
mortally after having living faith, a new habit of lifeless faith is
infused into him by God. But it seems unfitting that grace should deprive
man of a gift of God by coming to him, and that a gift of God should be
infused into man, on account of a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
Consequently others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. iii, 64] have said
that living and lifeless faith are indeed distinct habits, but that, all
the same, when living faith comes the habit of lifeless faith is not
taken away, and that it remains together with the habit of living faith
in the same subject. Yet again it seems unreasonable that the habit of
lifeless faith should remain inactive in a person having living faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
We must therefore hold differently that living and lifeless faith are
one and the same habit. The reason is that a habit is differentiated by
that which directly pertains to that habit. Now since faith is a
perfection of the intellect, that pertains directly to faith, which
pertains to the intellect. Again, what pertains to the will, does not
pertain directly to faith, so as to be able to differentiate the habit of
faith. But the distinction of living from lifeless faith is in respect of
something pertaining to the will, i.e. charity, and not in respect of
something pertaining to the intellect. Therefore living and lifeless
faith are not distinct habits.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The saying of the Apostle refers to those imperfect things
from which imperfection is inseparable, for then, when the perfect comes
the imperfect must needs be done away. Thus with the advent of clear
vision, faith is done away, because it is essentially "of the things that
appear not." When, however, imperfection is not inseparable from the
imperfect thing, the same identical thing which was imperfect becomes
perfect. Thus childhood is not essential to man and consequently the same
identical subject who was a child, becomes a man. Now lifelessness is not
essential to faith, but is accidental thereto as stated above. Therefore
lifeless faith itself becomes living.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That which makes an animal live is inseparable from an
animal, because it is its substantial form, viz. the soul: consequently a
dead thing cannot become a living thing, and a living and a dead thing
differ specifically. On the other hand that which gives faith its form,
or makes it live, is not essential to faith. Hence there is no comparison.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Grace causes faith not only when faith begins anew to be in
a man, but also as long as faith lasts. For it has been said above (FP,
Q[104], A[1]; FS, Q[109], A[9]) that God is always working man's
justification, even as the sun is always lighting up the air. Hence grace
is not less effective when it comes to a believer than when it comes to
an unbeliever: since it causes faith in both, in the former by confirming
and perfecting it, in the latter by creating it anew.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
We might also reply that it is accidental, namely on account of the
disposition of the subject, that grace does not cause faith in one who
has it already: just as, on the other hand, a second mortal sin does not
take away grace from one who has already lost it through a previous
mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[4] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: When living faith becomes lifeless, faith is not changed,
but its subject, the soul, which at one time has faith without charity,
and at another time, with charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that faith is not a virtue. For virtue is directed
to the good, since "it is virtue that makes its subject good," as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 6). But faith is directed to the true.
Therefore faith is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, infused virtue is more perfect than acquired virtue. Now
faith, on account of its imperfection, is not placed among the acquired
intellectual virtues, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3). Much
less, therefore, can it be considered an infused virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, living and lifeless faith are the same species, as
stated above (A[4]). Now lifeless faith is not a virtue, since it is not
connected with the other virtues. Therefore neither is living faith a
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the gratuitous graces and the fruits are distinct from
the virtues. But faith is numbered among the gratuitous graces (1 Cor.
12:9) and likewise among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore faith is not a
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Man is justified by the virtues, since "justice is all
virtue," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Now man is justified by
faith according to Rm. 5:1: "Being justified therefore by faith let us
have peace," etc. Therefore faith is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As shown above, it is by human virtue that human acts are
rendered good; hence, any habit that is always the principle of a good
act, may be called a human virtue. Such a habit is living faith. For
since to believe is an act of the intellect assenting to the truth at the
command of the will, two things are required that this act may be
perfect: one of which is that the intellect should infallibly tend to its
object, which is the true; while the other is that the will should be
infallibly directed to the last end, on account of which it assents to
the true: and both of these are to be found in the act of living faith.
For it belongs to the very essence of faith that the intellect should
ever tend to the true, since nothing false can be the object of faith, as
proved above (Q[1], A[3]): while the effect of charity, which is the form
of faith, is that the soul ever has its will directed to a good end.
Therefore living faith is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, lifeless faith is not a virtue, because, though the
act of lifeless faith is duly perfect on the part of the intellect, it
has not its due perfection as regards the will: just as if temperance be
in the concupiscible, without prudence being in the rational part,
temperance is not a virtue, as stated above (FS, Q[65], A[1]), because
the act of temperance requires both an act of reason, and an act of the
concupiscible faculty, even as the act of faith requires an act of the
will, and an act of the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The truth is itself the good of the intellect, since it is
its perfection: and consequently faith has a relation to some good in so
far as it directs the intellect to the true. Furthermore, it has a
relation to the good considered as the object of the will, inasmuch as it
is formed by charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The faith of which the Philosopher speaks is based on human
reasoning in a conclusion which does not follow, of necessity, from its
premisses; and which is subject to be false: hence such like faith is not
a virtue. On the other hand, the faith of which we are speaking is based
on the Divine Truth, which is infallible, and consequently its object
cannot be anything false; so that faith of this kind can be a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Living and lifeless faith do not differ specifically, as
though they belonged to different species. But they differ as perfect and
imperfect within the same species. Hence lifeless faith, being imperfect,
does not satisfy the conditions of a perfect virtue, for "virtue is a
kind of perfection" (Phys. vii, text. 18).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 4: Some say that faith which is numbered among the gratuitous
graces is lifeless faith. But this is said without reason, since the
gratuitous graces, which are mentioned in that passage, are not common to
all the members of the Church: wherefore the Apostle says: "There are
diversities of graces," and again, "To one is given" this grace and "to
another" that. Now lifeless faith is common to all members of the Church,
because its lifelessness is not part of its substance, if we consider it
as a gratuitous gift. We must, therefore, say that in that passage, faith
denotes a certain excellency of faith, for instance, "constancy in
faith," according to a gloss, or the "word of faith."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 2/2
Faith is numbered among the fruits, in so far as it gives a certain
pleasure in its act by reason of its certainty, wherefore the gloss on
the fifth chapter to the Galatians, where the fruits are enumerated,
explains faith as being "certainty about the unseen."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith is one virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that faith is not one. For just as faith is a gift
of God according to Eph. 2:8, so also wisdom and knowledge are numbered
among God's gifts according to Is. 11:2. Now wisdom and knowledge differ
in this, that wisdom is about eternal things, and knowledge about
temporal things, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 14,15). Since, then,
faith is about eternal things, and also about some temporal things, it
seems that faith is not one virtue, but divided into several parts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above (Q[3],
A[1]). Now confession of faith is not one and the same for all: since
what we confess as past, the fathers of old confessed as yet to come, as
appears from Is. 7:14: "Behold a virgin shall conceive." Therefore faith
is not one.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, faith is common to all believers in Christ. But one
accident cannot be in many subjects. Therefore all cannot have one faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:5): "One Lord, one faith."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, If we take faith as a habit, we can consider it in two
ways. First on the part of the object, and thus there is one faith.
Because the formal object of faith is the First Truth, by adhering to
which we believe whatever is contained in the faith. Secondly, on the
part of the subject, and thus faith is differentiated according as it is
in various subjects. Now it is evident that faith, just as any other
habit, takes its species from the formal aspect of its object, but is
individualized by its subject. Hence if we take faith for the habit
whereby we believe, it is one specifically, but differs numerically
according to its various subjects.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
If, on the other hand, we take faith for that which is believed, then,
again, there is one faith, since what is believed by all is one same
thing: for though the things believed, which all agree in believing, be
diverse from one another, yet they are all reduced to one.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Temporal matters which are proposed to be believed, do not
belong to the object of faith, except in relation to something eternal,
viz. the First Truth, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]). Hence there is one
faith of things both temporal and eternal. It is different with wisdom
and knowledge, which consider temporal and eternal matters under their
respective aspects.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This difference of past and future arises, not from any
difference in the thing believed, but from the different relationships of
believers to the one thing believed, as also we have mentioned above (FS,
Q[103], A[4]; FS, Q[107], A[1], ad 1).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: This objection considers numerical diversity of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith is the first of the virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that faith is not the first of the virtues. For a
gloss on Lk. 12:4, "I say to you My friends," says that fortitude is the
foundation of faith. Now the foundation precedes that which is founded
thereon. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 36, "Be not emulous," says that hope
"leads on to faith." Now hope is a virtue, as we shall state further on
(Q[17], A[1]). Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it was stated above (A[2]) that the intellect of the
believer is moved, out of obedience to God, to assent to matters of
faith. Now obedience also is a virtue. Therefore faith is not the first
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, not lifeless but living faith is the foundation, as a
gloss remarks on 1 Cor. 3:11 [*Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi.]. Now
faith is formed by charity, as stated above (A[3]). Therefore it is owing
to charity that faith is the foundation: so that charity is the
foundation yet more than faith is (for the foundation is the first part
of a building) and consequently it seems to precede faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, the order of habits is taken from the order of acts.
Now, in the act of faith, the act of the will which is perfected by
charity, precedes the act of the intellect, which is perfected by faith,
as the cause which precedes its effect. Therefore charity precedes faith.
Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
substance of things to be hoped for." Now the substance of a thing is
that which comes first. Therefore faith is first among the virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, One thing can precede another in two ways: first, by its
very nature; secondly, by accident. Faith, by its very nature, precedes
all other virtues. For since the end is the principle in matters of
action, as stated above (FS, Q[13], A[3]; FS, Q[34], A[4], ad 1), the
theological virtues, the object of which is the last end, must needs
precede all the others. Again, the last end must of necessity be present
to the intellect before it is present to the will, since the will has no
inclination for anything except in so far as it is apprehended by the
intellect. Hence, as the last end is present in the will by hope and
charity, and in the intellect, by faith, the first of all the virtues
must, of necessity, be faith, because natural knowledge cannot reach God
as the object of heavenly bliss, which is the aspect under which hope and
charity tend towards Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] Body Para. 2/3
On the other hand, some virtues can precede faith accidentally. For an
accidental cause precedes its effect accidentally. Now that which removes
an obstacle is a kind of accidental cause, according to the Philosopher
(Phys. viii, 4): and in this sense certain virtues may be said to precede
faith accidentally, in so far as they remove obstacles to belief. Thus
fortitude removes the inordinate fear that hinders faith; humility
removes pride, whereby a man refuses to submit himself to the truth of
faith. The same may be said of some other virtues, although there are no
real virtues, unless faith be presupposed, as Augustine states (Contra
Julian. iv, 3).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Hope cannot lead to faith absolutely. For one cannot hope
to obtain eternal happiness, unless one believes this possible, since
hope does not tend to the impossible, as stated above (FS, Q[40], A[1]).
It is, however, possible for one to be led by hope to persevere in faith,
or to hold firmly to faith; and it is in this sense that hope is said to
lead to faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Obedience is twofold: for sometimes it denotes the
inclination of the will to fulfil God's commandments. In this way it is
not a special virtue, but is a general condition of every virtue; since
all acts of virtue come under the precepts of the Divine law, as stated
above (FS, Q[100], A[2]); and thus it is requisite for faith. In another
way, obedience denotes an inclination to fulfil the commandments
considered as a duty. In this way it is a special virtue, and a part of
justice: for a man does his duty by his superior when he obeys him: and
thus obedience follows faith, whereby man knows that God is his superior,
Whom he must obey.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: To be a foundation a thing requires not only to come first,
but also to be connected with the other parts of the building: since the
building would not be founded on it unless the other parts adhered to it.
Now the connecting bond of the spiritual edifice is charity, according to
Col. 3:14: "Above all . . . things have charity which is the bond of
perfection." Consequently faith without charity cannot be the foundation:
and yet it does not follow that charity precedes faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[7] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: Some act of the will is required before faith, but not an
act of the will quickened by charity. This latter act presupposes faith,
because the will cannot tend to God with perfect love, unless the
intellect possesses right faith about Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith is more certain than science and the other intellectual
virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that faith is not more certain than science and the
other intellectual virtues. For doubt is opposed to certitude, wherefore
a thing would seem to be the more certain, through being less doubtful,
just as a thing is the whiter, the less it has of an admixture of black.
Now understanding, science and also wisdom are free of any doubt about
their objects; whereas the believer may sometimes suffer a movement of
doubt, and doubt about matters of faith. Therefore faith is no more
certain than the intellectual virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/2
OBJ 2: Further, sight is more certain than hearing. But "faith is
through hearing" according to Rm. 10:17; whereas understanding, science
and wisdom imply some kind of intellectual sight. Therefore science and
understanding are more certain than faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 2/2
Further, in matters concerning the intellect, the more perfect is the
more certain. Now understanding is more perfect than faith, since faith
is the way to understanding, according to another version [*The
Septuagint] of Is. 7:9: "If you will not believe, you shall not
understand [Vulg.: 'continue']": and Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1)
that "faith is strengthened by science." Therefore it seems that science
or understanding is more certain than faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:15): "When you had
received of us the word of the hearing," i.e. by faith . . . "you
received it not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word of
God." Now nothing is more certain than the word of God. Therefore science
is not more certain than faith; nor is anything else.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[8] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[57], A[4], ad 2) two of the
intellectual virtues are about contingent matter, viz. prudence and art;
to which faith is preferable in point of certitude, by reason of its
matter, since it is about eternal things, which never change, whereas the
other three intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science [*In English the
corresponding 'gift' is called knowledge] and understanding, are about
necessary things, as stated above (FS, Q[57], A[5], ad 3). But it must be
observed that wisdom, science and understanding may be taken in two ways:
first, as intellectual virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi,
2,3); secondly, for the gifts of the Holy Ghost. If we consider them in
the first way, we must note that certitude can be looked at in two ways.
First, on the part of its cause, and thus a thing which has a more
certain cause, is itself more certain. In this way faith is more certain
than those three virtues, because it is founded on the Divine truth,
whereas the aforesaid three virtues are based on human reason. Secondly,
certitude may be considered on the part of the subject, and thus the more
a man's intellect lays hold of a thing, the more certain it is. In this
way, faith is less certain, because matters of faith are above the human
intellect, whereas the objects of the aforesaid three virtues are not.
Since, however, a thing is judged simply with regard to its cause, but
relatively, with respect to a disposition on the part of the subject, it
follows that faith is more certain simply, while the others are more
certain relatively, i.e. for us. Likewise if these three be taken as
gifts received in this present life, they are related to faith as to
their principle which they presuppose: so that again, in this way, faith
is more certain.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This doubt is not on the side of the cause of faith, but on
our side, in so far as we do not fully grasp matters of faith with our
intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Other things being equal sight is more certain than
hearing; but if (the authority of) the person from whom we hear greatly
surpasses that of the seer's sight, hearing is more certain than sight:
thus a man of little science is more certain about what he hears on the
authority of an expert in science, than about what is apparent to him
according to his own reason: and much more is a man certain about what he
hears from God, Who cannot be deceived, than about what he sees with his
own reason, which can be mistaken.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[4] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The gifts of understanding and knowledge are more perfect
than the knowledge of faith in the point of their greater clearness, but
not in regard to more certain adhesion: because the whole certitude of
the gifts of understanding and knowledge, arises from the certitude of
faith, even as the certitude of the knowledge of conclusions arises from
the certitude of premisses. But in so far as science, wisdom and
understanding are intellectual virtues, they are based upon the natural
light of reason, which falls short of the certitude of God's word, on
which faith is founded.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THOSE WHO HAVE FAITH (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider those who have faith: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original
state?
(2) Whether the demons have faith?
(3) Whether those heretics who err in one article, have faith in others?
(4) Whether among those who have faith, one has it more than another?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original state?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there was no faith, either in the angels, or
in man, in their original state. For Hugh St. Victor says in his
Sentences (De Sacram. i, 10) that "man cannot see God or things that are
in God, because he closes his eyes to contemplation." Now the angels, in
their original state, before they were either confirmed in grace, or had
fallen from it, had their eyes opened to contemplation, since "they saw
things in the Word," according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8).
Likewise the first man, while in the state of innocence, seemingly had
his eyes open to contemplation; for Hugh St. Victor says (De Sacram. i,
6) that "in his original state man knew his Creator, not by the mere
outward perception of hearing, but by inward inspiration, not as now
believers seek an absent God by faith, but by seeing Him clearly present
to their contemplation." Therefore there was no faith in the angels and
man in their original state.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the knowledge of faith is dark and obscure, according to
1 Cor. 13:13: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner." Now in their
original state there was not obscurity either in the angels or in man,
because it is a punishment of sin. Therefore there could be no faith in
the angels or in man, in their original state.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rm. 10:17) that "faith . . . cometh by
hearing." Now this could not apply to angels and man in their original
state; for then they could not hear anything from another. Therefore, in
that state, there was no faith either in man or in the angels.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): "He that cometh to God, must
believe." Now the original state of angels and man was one of approach to
God. Therefore they had need of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Some say that there was no faith in the angels before
they were confirmed in grace or fell from it, and in man before he
sinned, by reason of the manifest contemplation that they had of Divine
things. Since, however, "faith is the evidence of things that appear
not," according to the Apostle (Heb. 11:2), and since "by faith we
believe what we see not," according to Augustine (Tract. xl in Joan.; QQ.
Evang. ii, qu. 39), that manifestation alone excludes faith, which
renders apparent or seen the principal object of faith. Now the principal
object of faith is the First Truth, the sight of which gives the
happiness of heaven and takes the place of faith. Consequently, as the
angels before their confirmation in grace, and man before sin, did not
possess the happiness whereby God is seen in His Essence, it is evident
that the knowledge they possessed was not such as to exclude faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
It follows then, that the absence of faith in them could only be
explained by their being altogether ignorant of the object of faith. And
if man and the angels were created in a purely natural state, as some
[*St. Bonaventure, Sent. ii, D, 29] hold, perhaps one might hold that
there was no faith in the angels before their confirmation in grace, or
in man before sin, because the knowledge of faith surpasses not only a
man's but even an angel's natural knowledge about God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Since, however, we stated in the FP, Q[62], A[3]; FP, Q[95], A[1] that
man and the angels were created with the gift of grace, we must needs say
that there was in them a certain beginning of hoped-for happiness, by
reason of grace received but not yet consummated, which happiness was
begun in their will by hope and charity, and in the intellect by faith,
as stated above (Q[4], A[7]). Consequently we must hold that the angels
had faith before they were confirmed, and man, before he sinned.
Nevertheless we must observe that in the object of faith, there is
something formal, as it were, namely the First Truth surpassing all the
natural knowledge of a creature, and something material, namely, the
thing to which we assent while adhering to the First Truth. With regard
to the former, before obtaining the happiness to come, faith is common to
all who have knowledge of God, by adhering to the First Truth: whereas
with regard to the things which are proposed as the material object of
faith, some are believed by one, and known manifestly by another, even in
the present state, as we have shown above (Q[1], A[5]; Q[2], A[4], ad 2).
In this respect, too, it may be said that the angels before being
confirmed, and man, before sin, possessed manifest knowledge about
certain points in the Divine mysteries, which now we cannot know except
by believing them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although the words of Hugh of St. Victor are those of a
master, and have the force of an authority, yet it may be said that the
contemplation which removes the need of faith is heavenly contemplation,
whereby the supernatural truth is seen in its essence. Now the angels did
not possess this contemplation before they were confirmed, nor did man
before he sinned: yet their contemplation was of a higher order than
ours, for by its means they approached nearer to God, and had manifest
knowledge of more of the Divine effects and mysteries than we can have
knowledge of. Hence faith was not in them so that they sought an absent
God as we seek Him: since by the light of wisdom He was more present to
them than He is to us, although He was not so present to them as He is to
the Blessed by the light of glory.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There was no darkness of sin or punishment in the original
state of man and the angels, but there was a certain natural obscurity in
the human and angelic intellect, in so far as every creature is darkness
in comparison with the immensity of the Divine light: and this obscurity
suffices for faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In the original state there was no hearing anything from
man speaking outwardly, but there was from God inspiring inwardly: thus
the prophets heard, as expressed by the Ps. 84:9: "I will hear what the
Lord God will speak in me."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the demons there is faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the demons have no faith. For Augustine says
(De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith depends on the believer's will": and
this is a good will, since by it man wishes to believe in God. Since then
no deliberate will of the demons is good, as stated above (FP, Q[64],
A[2], ad 5), it seems that in the demons there is no faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, faith is a gift of Divine grace, according to Eph. 2:8:
"By grace you are saved through faith . . . for it is the gift of God."
Now, according to a gloss on Osee 3:1, "They look to strange gods, and
love the husks of the grapes," the demons lost their gifts of grace by
sinning. Therefore faith did not remain in the demons after they sinned.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, unbelief would seem to be graver than other sins, as
Augustine observes (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) on Jn. 15:22, "If I had not
come and spoken to them, they would not have sin: but now they have no
excuse for their sin." Now the sin of unbelief is in some men.
Consequently, if the demons have faith, some men would be guilty of a sin
graver than that of the demons, which seems unreasonable. Therefore in
the demons there is no faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (James 2:19): "The devils . . . believe
and tremble."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[1], A[4]; Q[2], A[1]), the believer's
intellect assents to that which he believes, not because he sees it
either in itself, or by resolving it to first self-evident principles,
but because his will commands his intellect to assent. Now, that the
will moves the intellect to assent, may be due to two causes. First,
through the will being directed to the good, and in this way, to believe
is a praiseworthy action. Secondly, because the intellect is convinced
that it ought to believe what is said, though that conviction is not
based on objective evidence. Thus if a prophet, while preaching the word
of God, were to foretell something, and were to give a sign, by raising a
dead person to life, the intellect of a witness would be convinced so as
to recognize clearly that God, Who lieth not, was speaking, although the
thing itself foretold would not be evident in itself, and consequently
the essence of faith would not be removed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly we must say that faith is commended in the first sense in
the faithful of Christ: and in this way faith is not in the demons, but
only in the second way, for they see many evident signs, whereby they
recognize that the teaching of the Church is from God, although they do
not see the things themselves that the Church teaches, for instance that
there are three Persons in God, and so forth.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The demons are, in a way, compelled to believe, by the
evidence of signs, and so their will deserves no praise for their belief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Faith, which is a gift of grace, inclines man to believe,
by giving him a certain affection for the good, even when that faith is
lifeless. Consequently the faith which the demons have, is not a gift of
grace. Rather are they compelled to believe through their natural
intellectual acumen.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The very fact that the signs of faith are so evident, that
the demons are compelled to believe, is displeasing to them, so that
their malice is by no means diminished by their believe.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man who disbelieves one article of faith, can have lifeless
faith in the other articles?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a heretic who disbelieves one article of
faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles. For the natural
intellect of a heretic is not more able than that of a catholic. Now a
catholic's intellect needs the aid of the gift of faith in order to
believe any article whatever of faith. Therefore it seems that heretics
cannot believe any articles of faith without the gift of lifeless faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as faith contains many articles, so does one
science, viz. geometry, contain many conclusions. Now a man may possess
the science of geometry as to some geometrical conclusions, and yet be
ignorant of other conclusions. Therefore a man can believe some articles
of faith without believing the others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as man obeys God in believing the articles of
faith, so does he also in keeping the commandments of the Law. Now a man
can obey some commandments, and disobey others. Therefore he can believe
some articles, and disbelieve others.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Just as mortal sin is contrary to charity, so is
disbelief in one article of faith contrary to faith. Now charity does not
remain in a man after one mortal sin. Therefore neither does faith, after
a man disbelieves one article.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a heretic
who disbelieves one article of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
The reason of this is that the species of every habit depends on the
formal aspect of the object, without which the species of the habit
cannot remain. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, as
manifested in Holy Writ and the teaching of the Church, which proceeds
from the First Truth. Consequently whoever does not adhere, as to an
infallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the Church, which proceeds
from the First Truth manifested in Holy Writ, has not the habit of faith,
but holds that which is of faith otherwise than by faith. Even so, it is
evident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion without knowing how it
is proved, has not scientific knowledge, but merely an opinion about it.
Now it is manifest that he who adheres to the teaching of the Church, as
to an infallible rule, assents to whatever the Church teaches; otherwise,
if, of the things taught by the Church, he holds what he chooses to hold,
and rejects what he chooses to reject, he no longer adheres to the
teaching of the Church as to an infallible rule, but to his own will.
Hence it is evident that a heretic who obstinately disbelieves one
article of faith, is not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in
all things; but if he is not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but
only in error. Therefore it is clear that such a heretic with regard to
one article has no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of
opinion in accordance with his own will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A heretic does not hold the other articles of faith, about
which he does not err, in the same way as one of the faithful does,
namely by adhering simply to the Divine Truth, because in order to do so,
a man needs the help of the habit of faith; but he holds the things that
are of faith, by his own will and judgment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The various conclusions of a science have their respective
means of demonstration, one of which may be known without another, so
that we may know some conclusions of a science without knowing the
others. On the other hand faith adheres to all the articles of faith by
reason of one mean, viz. on account of the First Truth proposed to us in
Scriptures, according to the teaching of the Church who has the right
understanding of them. Hence whoever abandons this mean is altogether
lacking in faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The various precepts of the Law may be referred either to
their respective proximate motives, and thus one can be kept without
another; or to their primary motive, which is perfect obedience to God,
in which a man fails whenever he breaks one commandment, according to
James 2:10: "Whosoever shall . . . offend in one point is become guilty
of all."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith can be greater in one man than in another?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that faith cannot be greater in one man than in
another. For the quantity of a habit is taken from its object. Now
whoever has faith believes everything that is of faith, since by failing
in one point, a man loses his faith altogether, as stated above (A[3]).
Therefore it seems that faith cannot be greater in one than in another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, those things which consist in something supreme cannot
be "more" or "less." Now faith consists in something supreme, because it
requires that man should adhere to the First Truth above all things.
Therefore faith cannot be "more" or "less."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, faith is to knowledge by grace, as the understanding of
principles is to natural knowledge, since the articles of faith are the
first principles of knowledge by grace, as was shown above (Q[1], A[7]).
Now the understanding of principles is possessed in equal degree by all
men. Therefore faith is possessed in equal degree by all the faithful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Wherever we find great and little, there we find more
or less. Now in the matter of faith we find great and little, for Our
Lord said to Peter (Mt. 14:31): "O thou of little faith, why didst thou
doubt?" And to the woman he said (Mt. 15: 28): "O woman, great is thy
faith!" Therefore faith can be greater in one than in another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[52], AA[1],2; FS, Q[112], A[4]),
the quantity of a habit may be considered from two points of view: first,
on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of its participation by
the subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
Now the object of faith may be considered in two ways: first, in respect
of its formal aspect; secondly, in respect of the material object which
is proposed to be believed. Now the formal object of faith is one and
simple, namely the First Truth, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]). Hence in
this respect there is no diversity of faith among believers, but it is
specifically one in all, as stated above (Q[4], A[6]). But the things
which are proposed as the matter of our belief are many and can be
received more or less explicitly; and in this respect one man can believe
explicitly more things than another, so that faith can be greater in one
man on account of its being more explicit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
If, on the other hand, we consider faith from the point of view of its
participation by the subject, this happens in two ways, since the act of
faith proceeds both from the intellect and from the will, as stated above
(Q[2], AA[1],2; Q[4], A[2]). Consequently a man's faith may be described
as being greater, in one way, on the part of his intellect, on account of
its greater certitude and firmness, and, in another way, on the part of
his will, on account of his greater promptitude, devotion, or confidence.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: A man who obstinately disbelieves a thing that is of faith,
has not the habit of faith, and yet he who does not explicitly believe
all, while he is prepared to believe all, has that habit. In this
respect, one man has greater faith than another, on the part of the
object, in so far as he believes more things, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It is essential to faith that one should give the first
place to the First Truth. But among those who do this, some submit to it
with greater certitude and devotion than others; and in this way faith is
greater in one than in another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: The understanding of principles results from man's very
nature, which is equally shared by all: whereas faith results from the
gift of grace, which is not equally in all, as explained above (FS,
Q[112], A[4]). Hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[5] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
Nevertheless the truth of principles is more known to one than to
another, according to the greater capacity of intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE CAUSE OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of faith, under which head there are two
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether faith is infused into man by God?
(2) Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith is infused into man by God?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that faith is not infused into man by God. For
Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that "science begets faith in us, and
nourishes, defends and strengthens it." Now those things which science
begets in us seem to be acquired rather than infused. Therefore faith
does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that to which man attains by hearing and seeing, seems
to be acquired by him. Now man attains to belief, both by seeing
miracles, and by hearing the teachings of faith: for it is written (Jn.
4:53): "The father . . . knew that it was at the same hour, that Jesus
said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed, and his whole house";
and (Rm. 10:17) it is said that "faith is through hearing." Therefore man
attains to faith by acquiring it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, that which depends on a man's will can be acquired by
him. But "faith depends on the believer's will," according to Augustine
(De Praedest. Sanct. v). Therefore faith can be acquired by man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 2:8,9): "By grace you are saved
through faith, and that not of yourselves . . . that no man may glory . .
. for it is the gift of God."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Two things are requisite for faith. First, that the
things which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is necessary in
order that man believe anything explicitly. The second thing requisite
for faith is the assent of the believer to the things which are proposed
to him. Accordingly, as regards the first of these, faith must needs be
from God. Because those things which are of faith surpass human reason,
hence they do not come to man's knowledge, unless God reveal them. To
some, indeed, they are revealed by God immediately, as those things which
were revealed to the apostles and prophets, while to some they are
proposed by God in sending preachers of the faith, according to Rm.
10:15: "How shall they preach, unless they be sent?"
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
As regards the second, viz. man's assent to the things which are of
faith, we may observe a twofold cause, one of external inducement, such
as seeing a miracle, or being persuaded by someone to embrace the faith:
neither of which is a sufficient cause, since of those who see the same
miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some believe, and some do not.
Hence we must assert another internal cause, which moves man inwardly to
assent to matters of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
The Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else than man's
free-will: and consequently they said that the beginning of faith is from
ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, it is in our power to be ready to assent
to things which are of faith, but that the consummation of faith is from
God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe. But this is false,
for, since man, by assenting to matters of faith, is raised above his
nature, this must needs accrue to him from some supernatural principle
moving him inwardly; and this is God. Therefore faith, as regards the
assent which is the chief act of faith, is from God moving man inwardly
by grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Science begets and nourishes faith, by way of external
persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper cause of faith
is that which moves man inwardly to assent.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument again refers to the cause that proposes
outwardly the things that are of faith, or persuades man to believe by
words or deeds.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To believe does indeed depend on the will of the believer:
but man's will needs to be prepared by God with grace, in order that he
may be raised to things which are above his nature, as stated above (Q[2]
, A[3]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that lifeless faith is not a gift of God. For it is
written (Dt. 32:4) that "the works of God are perfect." Now lifeless
faith is something imperfect. Therefore it is not the work of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, just as an act is said to be deformed through lacking
its due form, so too is faith called lifeless [informis] when it lacks
the form due to it. Now the deformed act of sin is not from God, as
stated above (FS, Q[79], A[2], ad 2). Therefore neither is lifeless faith
from God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, whomsoever God heals, He heals wholly: for it is written
(Jn. 7:23): "If a man receive circumcision on the sabbath-day, that the
law of Moses may not be broken; are you angry at Me because I have healed
the whole man on the sabbath-day?" Now faith heals man from unbelief.
Therefore whoever receives from God the gift of faith, is at the same
time healed from all his sins. But this is not done except by living
faith. Therefore living faith alone is a gift of God: and consequently
lifeless faith is not from God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 13:2 says that "the faith which lacks
charity is a gift of God." Now this is lifeless faith. Therefore lifeless
faith is a gift of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Lifelessness is a privation. Now it must be noted that
privation is sometimes essential to the species, whereas sometimes it is
not, but supervenes in a thing already possessed of its proper species:
thus privation of the due equilibrium of the humors is essential to the
species of sickness, while darkness is not essential to a diaphanous
body, but supervenes in it. Since, therefore, when we assign the cause of
a thing, we intend to assign the cause of that thing as existing in its
proper species, it follows that what is not the cause of privation,
cannot be assigned as the cause of the thing to which that privation
belongs as being essential to its species. For we cannot assign as the
cause of a sickness, something which is not the cause of a disturbance in
the humors: though we can assign as cause of a diaphanous body, something
which is not the cause of the darkness, which is not essential to the
diaphanous body.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now the lifelessness of faith is not essential to the species of faith,
since faith is said to be lifeless through lack of an extrinsic form, as
stated above (Q[4], A[4]). Consequently the cause of lifeless faith is
that which is the cause of faith strictly so called: and this is God, as
stated above (A[1]). It follows, therefore, that lifeless faith is a gift
of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Lifeless faith, though it is not simply perfect with the
perfection of a virtue, is, nevertheless, perfect with a perfection that
suffices for the essential notion of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 2: The deformity of an act is essential to the act's species,
considered as a moral act, as stated above (FP, Q[48], A[1], ad 2; FS,
Q[18], A[5]): for an act is said to be deformed through being deprived of
an intrinsic form, viz. the due commensuration of the act's
circumstances. Hence we cannot say that God is the cause of a deformed
act, for He is not the cause of its deformity, though He is the cause of
the act as such.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 2/2
We may also reply that deformity denotes not only privation of a due
form, but also a contrary disposition, wherefore deformity is compared to
the act, as falsehood is to faith. Hence, just as the deformed act is not
from God, so neither is a false faith; and as lifeless faith is from God,
so too, acts that are good generically, though not quickened by charity,
as is frequently the case in sinners, are from God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[6] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He who receives faith from God without charity, is healed
from unbelief, not entirely (because the sin of his previous unbelief is
not removed) but in part, namely, in the point of ceasing from committing
such and such a sin. Thus it happens frequently that a man desists from
one act of sin, through God causing him thus to desist, without desisting
from another act of sin, through the instigation of his own malice. And
in this way sometimes it is granted by God to a man to believe, and yet
he is not granted the gift of charity: even so the gift of prophecy, or
the like, is given to some without charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE EFFECTS OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of faith: under which head there are
two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear is an effect of faith?
(2) Whether the heart is purified by faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether fear is an effect of faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that fear is not an effect of faith. For an effect
does not precede its cause. Now fear precedes faith: for it is written
(Ecclus. 2:8): "Ye that fear the Lord, believe in Him." Therefore fear is
not an effect of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. Now fear
and hope are contraries, as stated above (FS, Q[23], A[2]): and faith
begets hope, as a gloss observes on Mt. 1:2. Therefore fear is not an
effect of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, one contrary does not cause another. Now the object of
faith is a good, which is the First Truth, while the object of fear is an
evil, as stated above (FS, Q[42], A[1]). Again, acts take their species
from the object, according to what was stated above (FS, Q[18], A[2]).
Therefore faith is not a cause of fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (James 2:19): "The devils . . . believe
and tremble."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Fear is a movement of the appetitive power, as stated
above (FS, Q[41], A[1]). Now the principle of all appetitive movements is
the good or evil apprehended: and consequently the principle of fear and
of every appetitive movement must be an apprehension. Again, through
faith there arises in us an apprehension of certain penal evils, which
are inflicted in accordance with the Divine judgment. In this way, then,
faith is a cause of the fear whereby one dreads to be punished by God;
and this is servile fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
It is also the cause of filial fear, whereby one dreads to be separated
from God, or whereby one shrinks from equalling oneself to Him, and holds
Him in reverence, inasmuch as faith makes us appreciate God as an
unfathomable and supreme good, separation from which is the greatest
evil, and to which it is wicked to wish to be equalled. Of the first
fear, viz. servile fear, lifeless faith is the cause, while living faith
is the cause of the second, viz. filial fear, because it makes man adhere
to God and to be subject to Him by charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Fear of God cannot altogether precede faith, because if we
knew nothing at all about Him, with regard to rewards and punishments,
concerning which faith teaches us, we should nowise fear Him. If,
however, faith be presupposed in reference to certain articles of faith,
for example the Divine excellence, then reverential fear follows, the
result of which is that man submits his intellect to God, so as to
believe in all the Divine promises. Hence the text quoted continues: "And
your reward shall not be made void."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The same thing in respect of contraries can be the cause of
contraries, but not under the same aspect. Now faith begets hope, in so
far as it enables us to appreciate the prize which God awards to the
just, while it is the cause of fear, in so far as it makes us appreciate
the punishments which He intends to inflict on sinners.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The primary and formal object of faith is the good which is
the First Truth; but the material object of faith includes also certain
evils; for instance, that it is an evil either not to submit to God, or
to be separated from Him, and that sinners will suffer penal evils from
God: in this way faith can be the cause of fear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith has the effect of purifying the heart?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that faith does not purify the heart. For purity of
the heart pertains chiefly to the affections, whereas faith is in the
intellect. Therefore faith has not the effect of purifying the heart.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which purifies the heart is incompatible with
impurity. But faith is compatible with the impurity of sin, as may be
seen in those who have lifeless faith. Therefore faith does not purify
the heart.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if faith were to purify the human heart in any way, it
would chiefly purify the intellect of man. Now it does not purify the
intellect from obscurity, since it is a veiled knowledge. Therefore faith
nowise purifies the heart.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Peter said (Acts 15:9): "Purifying their hearts by
faith."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, A thing is impure through being mixed with baser things:
for silver is not called impure, when mixed with gold, which betters it,
but when mixed with lead or tin. Now it is evident that the rational
creature is more excellent than all transient and corporeal creatures; so
that it becomes impure through subjecting itself to transient things by
loving them. From this impurity the rational creature is purified by
means of a contrary movement, namely, by tending to that which is above
it, viz. God. The first beginning of this movement is faith: since "he
that cometh to God must believe that He is," according to Heb. 11:6.
Hence the first beginning of the heart's purifying is faith; and if this
be perfected through being quickened by charity, the heart will be
perfectly purified thereby.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Things that are in the intellect are the principles of
those which are in the appetite, in so far as the apprehended good moves
the appetite.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even lifeless faith excludes a certain impurity which is
contrary to it, viz. that of error, and which consists in the human
intellect, adhering inordinately to things below itself, through wishing
to measure Divine things by the rule of sensible objects. But when it is
quickened by charity, then it is incompatible with any kind of impurity,
because "charity covereth all sins" (Prov. 10:12).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[7] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The obscurity of faith does not pertain to the impurity of
sin, but rather to the natural defect of the human intellect, according
to the present state of life.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gifts of understand and knowledge, which
respond to the virtue of faith. With regard to the gift of understanding
there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
(2) Whether it can be together with faith in the same person?
(3) Whether the understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is only
speculative, or practical also?
(4) Whether all who are in a state of grace have the gift of
understanding?
(5) Whether this gift is to be found in those who are without grace?
(6) Of the relationship of the gift of understanding to the other gifts;
(7) Which of the beatitudes corresponds to this gift?
(8) Which of the fruits?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that understanding is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
For the gifts of grace are distinct from the gifts of nature, since they
are given in addition to the latter. Now understanding is a natural habit
of the soul, whereby self-evident principles are known, as stated in
Ethic. vi, 6. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the gifts of the
Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Divine gifts are shared by creatures according to
their capacity and mode, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now the mode
of human nature is to know the truth, not simply (which is a sign of
understanding), but discursively (which is a sign of reason), as
Dionysius explains (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the Divine knowledge which
is bestowed on man, should be called a gift of reason rather than a gift
of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, in the powers of the soul the understanding is
condivided with the will (De Anima iii, 9,10). Now no gift of the Holy
Ghost is called after the will. Therefore no gift of the Holy Ghost
should receive the name of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord shall
rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom of understanding."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Understanding implies an intimate knowledge, for
"intelligere" [to understand] is the same as "intus legere" [to read
inwardly]. This is clear to anyone who considers the difference between
intellect and sense, because sensitive knowledge is concerned with
external sensible qualities, whereas intellective knowledge penetrates
into the very essence of a thing, because the object of the intellect is
"what a thing is," as stated in De Anima iii, 6.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden within, to find which
human knowledge has to penetrate within so to speak. Thus, under the
accidents lies hidden the nature of the substantial reality, under words
lies hidden their meaning; under likenesses and figures the truth they
denote lies hidden (because the intelligible world is enclosed within as
compared with the sensible world, which is perceived externally), and
effects lie hidden in their causes, and vice versa. Hence we may speak of
understanding with regard to all these things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
Since, however, human knowledge begins with the outside of things as it
were, it is evident that the stronger the light of the understanding,
the further can it penetrate into the heart of things. Now the natural
light of our understanding is of finite power; wherefore it can reach to
a certain fixed point. Consequently man needs a supernatural light in
order to penetrate further still so as to know what it cannot know by its
natural light: and this supernatural light which is bestowed on man is
called the gift of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The natural light instilled within us, manifests only
certain general principles, which are known naturally. But since man is
ordained to supernatural happiness, as stated above (Q[2], A[3]; FS, Q[3]
, A[8]), man needs to reach to certain higher truths, for which he
requires the gift of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The discourse of reason always begins from an understanding
and ends at an understanding; because we reason by proceeding from
certain understood principles, and the discourse of reason is perfected
when we come to understand what hitherto we ignored. Hence the act of
reasoning proceeds from something previously understood. Now a gift of
grace does not proceed from the light of nature, but is added thereto as
perfecting it. Wherefore this addition is not called "reason" but
"understanding," since the additional light is in comparison with what we
know supernaturally, what the natural light is in regard to those things
which we known from the first.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: "Will" denotes simply a movement of the appetite without
indicating any excellence; whereas "understanding" denotes a certain
excellence of a knowledge that penetrates into the heart of things. Hence
the supernatural gift is called after the understanding rather than after
the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gift of understanding is compatible with faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is incompatible with
faith. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 15) that "the thing which is
understood is bounded by the comprehension of him who understands it."
But the thing which is believed is not comprehended, according to the
word of the Apostle to the Philippians 3:12: "Not as though I had already
comprehended [Douay: 'attained'], or were already perfect." Therefore it
seems that faith and understanding are incompatible in the same subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is understood is seen by the understanding. But
faith is of things that appear not, as stated above (Q[1], A[4]; Q[4],
A[1]). Therefore faith is incompatible with understanding in the same
subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, understanding is more certain than science. But science
and faith are incompatible in the same subject, as stated above (Q[1],
AA[4],5). Much less, therefore, can understanding and faith be in the
same subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding
enlightens the mind concerning the things it has heard." Now one who has
faith can be enlightened in his mind concerning what he has heard; thus
it is written (Lk. 24:27,32) that Our Lord opened the scriptures to His
disciples, that they might understand them. Therefore understanding is
compatible with faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[2] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, We need to make a twofold distinction here: one on the
side of faith, the other on the part of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[2] Body Para. 2/5
On the side of faith the distinction to be made is that certain things,
of themselves, come directly under faith, such as the mystery to three
Persons in one God, and the incarnation of God the Son; whereas other
things come under faith, through being subordinate, in one way or
another, to those just mentioned, for instance, all that is contained in
the Divine Scriptures.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[2] Body Para. 3/5
On the part of understanding the distinction to be observed is that
there are two ways in which we may be said to understand. In one way, we
understand a thing perfectly, when we arrive at knowing the essence of
the thing we understand, and the very truth considered in itself of the
proposition understood. In this way, so long as the state of faith lasts,
we cannot understand those things which are the direct object of faith:
although certain other things that are subordinate to faith can be
understood even in this way.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[2] Body Para. 4/5
In another way we understand a thing imperfectly, when the essence of a
thing or the truth of a proposition is not known as to its quiddity or
mode of being, and yet we know that whatever be the outward appearances,
they do not contradict the truth, in so far as we understand that we
ought not to depart from matters of faith, for the sake of things that
appear externally. In this way, even during the state of faith, nothing
hinders us from understanding even those things which are the direct
object of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[2] Body Para. 5/5
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first three
argue in reference to perfect understanding, while the last refers to the
understanding of matters subordinate to faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gift of understanding is merely speculative or also practical?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that understanding, considered as a gift of the
Holy Ghost, is not practical, but only speculative. For, according to
Gregory (Moral. i, 32), "understanding penetrates certain more exalted
things." But the practical intellect is occupied, not with exalted, but
with inferior things, viz. singulars, about which actions are concerned.
Therefore understanding, considered as a gift, is not practical.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the gift of understanding is something more excellent
than the intellectual virtue of understanding. But the intellectual
virtue of understanding is concerned with none but necessary things,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 6). Much more, therefore, is the
gift of understanding concerned with none but necessary matters. Now the
practical intellect is not about necessary things, but about things which
may be otherwise than they are, and which may result from man's activity.
Therefore the gift of understanding is not practical.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the gift of understanding enlightens the mind in matters
which surpass natural reason. Now human activities, with which the
practical intellect is concerned, do not surpass natural reason, which is
the directing principle in matters of action, as was made clear above
(FS, Q[58], A[2]; FS, Q[71], A[6]). Therefore the gift of understanding
is not practical.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 110:10): "A good understanding to
all that do it."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[3] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[2]), the gift of understanding is not
only about those things which come under faith first and principally, but
also about all things subordinate to faith. Now good actions have a
certain relationship to faith: since "faith worketh through charity,"
according to the Apostle (Gal. 5:6). Hence the gift of understanding
extends also to certain actions, not as though these were its principal
object, but in so far as the rule of our actions is the eternal law, to
which the higher reason, which is perfected by the gift of understanding,
adheres by contemplating and consulting it, as Augustine states (De Trin.
xii, 7).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The things with which human actions are concerned are not
surpassingly exalted considered in themselves, but, as referred to the
rule of the eternal law, and to the end of Divine happiness, they are
exalted so that they can be the matter of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The excellence of the gift of understanding consists
precisely in its considering eternal or necessary matters, not only as
they are rules of human actions, because a cognitive virtue is the more
excellent, according to the greater extent of its object.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The rule of human actions is the human reason and the
eternal law, as stated above (FS, Q[71], A[6]). Now the eternal law
surpasses human reason: so that the knowledge of human actions, as ruled
by the eternal law, surpasses the natural reason, and requires the
supernatural light of a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gift of understanding is in all who are in a state of grace?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not in all who
are in a state of grace. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the gift
of understanding is given as a remedy against dulness of mind." Now many
who are in a state of grace suffer from dulness of mind. Therefore the
gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, of all the things that are connected with knowledge,
faith alone seems to be necessary for salvation, since by faith Christ
dwells in our hearts, according to Eph. 3:17. Now the gift of
understanding is not in everyone that has faith; indeed, those who have
faith ought to pray that they may understand, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xv, 27). Therefore the gift of understanding is not necessary for
salvation: and, consequently, is not in all who are in a state of grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, those things which are common to all who are in a state
of grace, are never withdrawn from them. Now the grace of understanding
and of the other gifts sometimes withdraws itself profitably, for, at
times, "when the mind is puffed up with understanding sublime things, it
becomes sluggish and dull in base and vile things," as Gregory observes
(Moral. ii, 49). Therefore the gift of understanding is not in all who
are in a state of grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 81:5): "They have not known or
understood, they walk on in darkness." But no one who is in a state of
grace walks in darkness, according to Jn. 8:12: "He that followeth Me,
walketh not in darkness." Therefore no one who is in a state of grace is
without the gift of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In all who are in a state of grace, there must needs be
rectitude of the will, since grace prepares man's will for good,
according to Augustine (Contra Julian. Pelag. iv, 3). Now the will cannot
be rightly directed to good, unless there be already some knowledge of
the truth, since the object of the will is good understood, as stated in
De Anima iii, 7. Again, just as the Holy Ghost directs man's will by the
gift of charity, so as to move it directly to some supernatural good; so
also, by the gift of understanding, He enlightens the human mind, so that
it knows some supernatural truth, to which the right will needs to tend.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Therefore, just as the gift of charity is in all of those who have
sanctifying grace, so also is the gift of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some who have sanctifying grace may suffer dulness of mind
with regard to things that are not necessary for salvation; but with
regard to those that are necessary for salvation, they are sufficiently
instructed by the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Jn. 2:27: "His unction
teacheth you of all things."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Although not all who have faith understand fully the things
that are proposed to be believed, yet they understand that they ought to
believe them, and that they ought nowise to deviate from them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: With regard to things necessary for salvation, the gift of
understanding never withdraws from holy persons: but, in order that they
may have no incentive to pride, it does withdraw sometimes with regard to
other things, so that their mind is unable to penetrate all things
clearly.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gift of understanding is found also in those who have not
sanctifying grace?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is found also in
those who have not sanctifying grace. For Augustine, in expounding the
words of Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to long for Thy
justifications," says: "Understanding flies ahead, and man's will is weak
and slow to follow." But in all who have sanctifying grace, the will is
prompt on account of charity. Therefore the gift of understanding can be
in those who have not sanctifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 10:1) that "there is need of
understanding in a" prophetic "vision," so that, seemingly, there is no
prophecy without the gift of understanding. But there can be prophecy
without sanctifying grace, as evidenced by Mt. 7:22, where those who say:
"We have prophesied in Thy name [*Vulg.: 'Have we not prophesied in Thy
name?]," are answered with the words: "I never knew you." Therefore the
gift of understanding can be without sanctifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the gift of understanding responds to the virtue of
faith, according to Is. 7:9, following another reading [*The Septuagint]:
"If you will not believe you shall not understand." Now faith can be
without sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of understanding can be
without it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 6:45): "Every one that hath heard of
the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." Now it is by the intellect,
as Gregory observes (Moral. i, 32), that we learn or understand what we
hear. Therefore whoever has the gift of understanding, cometh to Christ,
which is impossible without sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of
understanding cannot be without sanctifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[68], AA[1],2) the gifts of the
Holy Ghost perfect the soul, according as it is amenable to the motion of
the Holy Ghost. Accordingly then, the intellectual light of grace is
called the gift of understanding, in so far as man's understanding is
easily moved by the Holy Ghost, the consideration of which movement
depends on a true apprehension of the end. Wherefore unless the human
intellect be moved by the Holy Ghost so far as to have a right estimate
of the end, it has not yet obtained the gift of understanding, however
much the Holy Ghost may have enlightened it in regard to other truths
that are preambles to the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Now to have a right estimate about the last end one must not be in error
about the end, and must adhere to it firmly as to the greatest good: and
no one can do this without sanctifying grace; even as in moral matters a
man has a right estimate about the end through a habit of virtue.
Therefore no one has the gift of understanding without sanctifying grace.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: By understanding Augustine means any kind of intellectual
light, that, however, does not fulfil all the conditions of a gift,
unless the mind of man be so far perfected as to have a right estimate
about the end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The understanding that is requisite for prophecy, is a kind
of enlightenment of the mind with regard to the things revealed to the
prophet: but it is not an enlightenment of the mind with regard to a
right estimate about the last end, which belongs to the gift of
understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Faith implies merely assent to what is proposed but
understanding implies a certain perception of the truth, which
perception, except in one who has sanctifying grace, cannot regard the
end, as stated above. Hence the comparison fails between understanding
and faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not distinct from
the other gifts. For there is no distinction between things whose
opposites are not distinct. Now "wisdom is contrary to folly,
understanding is contrary to dulness, counsel is contrary to rashness,
knowledge is contrary to ignorance," as Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49).
But there would seem to be no difference between folly, dulness,
ignorance and rashness. Therefore neither does understanding differ from
the other gifts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the intellectual virtue of understanding differs from
the other intellectual virtues in that it is proper to it to be about
self-evident principles. But the gift of understanding is not about any
self-evident principles, since the natural habit of first principles
suffices in respect of those matters which are naturally self-evident:
while faith is sufficient in respect of such things as are supernatural,
since the articles of faith are like first principles in supernatural
knowledge, as stated above (Q[1], A[7]). Therefore the gift of
understanding does not differ from the other intellectual gifts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all intellectual knowledge is either speculative or
practical. Now the gift of understanding is related to both, as stated
above (A[3]). Therefore it is not distinct from the other intellectual
gifts, but comprises them all.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, When several things are enumerated together they must
be, in some way, distinct from one another, because distinction is the
origin of number. Now the gift of understanding is enumerated together
with the other gifts, as appears from Is. 11:2. Therefore the gift of
understanding is distinct from the other gifts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, The difference between the gift of understanding and
three of the others, viz. piety, fortitude, and fear, is evident, since
the gift of understanding belongs to the cognitive power, while the three
belong to the appetitive power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] Body Para. 2/4
But the difference between this gift of understanding and the remaining
three, viz. wisdom, knowledge, and counsel, which also belong to the
cognitive power, is not so evident. To some [*William of Auxerre, Sum.
Aur. III, iii, 8], it seems that the gift of understanding differs from
the gifts of knowledge and counsel, in that these two belong to practical
knowledge, while the gift of understanding belongs to speculative
knowledge; and that it differs from the gift of wisdom, which also
belongs to speculative knowledge, in that wisdom is concerned with
judgment, while understanding renders the mind apt to grasp the things
that are proposed, and to penetrate into their very heart. And in this
sense we have assigned the number of the gifts, above (FS, Q[68], A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] Body Para. 3/4
But if we consider the matter carefully, the gift of understanding is
concerned not only with speculative, but also with practical matters, as
stated above (A[3]), and likewise, the gift of knowledge regards both
matters, as we shall show further on (Q[9], A[3]), and consequently, we
must take their distinction in some other way. For all these four gifts
are ordained to supernatural knowledge, which, in us, takes its
foundation from faith. Now "faith is through hearing" (Rm. 10:17). Hence
some things must be proposed to be believed by man, not as seen, but as
heard, to which he assents by faith. But faith, first and principally, is
about the First Truth, secondarily, about certain considerations
concerning creatures, and furthermore extends to the direction of human
actions, in so far as it works through charity, as appears from what has
been said above (Q[4], A[2], ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] Body Para. 4/4
Accordingly on the part of the things proposed to faith for belief, two
things are requisite on our part: first that they be penetrated or
grasped by the intellect, and this belongs to the gift of understanding.
Secondly, it is necessary that man should judge these things aright, that
he should esteem that he ought to adhere to these things, and to withdraw
from their opposites: and this judgment, with regard to Divine things
belong to the gift of wisdom, but with regard to created things, belongs
to the gift of knowledge, and as to its application to individual
actions, belongs to the gift of counsel.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The foregoing difference between those four gifts is
clearly in agreement with the distinction of those things which Gregory
assigns as their opposites. For dulness is contrary to sharpness, since
an intellect is said, by comparison, to be sharp, when it is able to
penetrate into the heart of the things that are proposed to it. Hence it
is dulness of mind that renders the mind unable to pierce into the heart
of a thing. A man is said to be a fool if he judges wrongly about the
common end of life, wherefore folly is properly opposed to wisdom, which
makes us judge aright about the universal cause. Ignorance implies a
defect in the mind, even about any particular things whatever, so that it
is contrary to knowledge, which gives man a right judgment about
particular causes, viz. about creatures. Rashness is clearly opposed to
counsel, whereby man does not proceed to action before deliberating with
his reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The gift of understanding is about the first principles of
that knowledge which is conferred by grace; but otherwise than faith,
because it belongs to faith to assent to them, while it belongs to the
gift of understanding to pierce with the mind the things that are said.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The gift of understanding is related to both kinds of
knowledge, viz. speculative and practical, not as to the judgment, but as
to apprehension, by grasping what is said.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the clean of heart," etc.,
responds to the gift of understanding?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the clean of
heart, for they shall see God," does not respond to the gift of
understanding. Because cleanness of heart seems to belong chiefly to the
appetite. But the gift of understanding belongs, not to the appetite, but
rather to the intellectual power. Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does
not respond to the gift of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is written (Acts 15:9): "Purifying their hearts by
faith." Now cleanness of heart is acquired by the heart being purified.
Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is related to the virtue of faith
rather than to the gift of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in the present
state of life. But the sight of God does not belong to the present life,
since it is that which gives happiness to the Blessed, as stated above
(FS, Q[3], A[8]). Therefore the sixth beatitude which comprises the sight
of God, does not respond to the gift of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The
sixth work of the Holy Ghost which is understanding, is applicable to the
clean of heart, whose eye being purified, they can see what eye hath not
seen."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[7] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Two things are contained in the sixth beatitude, as also
in the others, one by way of merit, viz. cleanness of heart; the other by
way of reward, viz. the sight of God, as stated above (FS, Q[69], AA[2]
,4), and each of these, in some way, responds to the gift of
understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[7] Body Para. 2/4
For cleanness is twofold. One is a preamble and a disposition to seeing
God, and consists in the heart being cleansed of inordinate affections:
and this cleanness of heart is effected by the virtues and gifts
belonging to the appetitive power. The other cleanness of heart is a kind
of complement to the sight of God; such is the cleanness of the mind that
is purged of phantasms and errors, so as to receive the truths which are
proposed to it about God, no longer by way of corporeal phantasms, nor
infected with heretical misrepresentations: and this cleanness is the
result of the gift of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[7] Body Para. 3/4
Again, the sight of God is twofold. One is perfect, whereby God's
Essence is seen: the other is imperfect, whereby, though we see not what
God is, yet we see what He is not; and whereby, the more perfectly do we
know God in this life, the more we understand that He surpasses all that
the mind comprehends. Each of these visions of God belongs to the gift of
understanding; the first, to the gift of understanding in its state of
perfection, as possessed in heaven; the second, to the gift of
understanding in its state of inchoation, as possessed by wayfarers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[7] Body Para. 4/4
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first two
arguments refer to the first kind of cleanness; while the third refers to
the perfect vision of God. Moreover the gifts both perfect us in this
life by way of inchoation, and will be fulfilled, as stated above (FS,
Q[69], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that, among the fruits, faith does not respond to
the gift of understanding. For understanding is the fruit of faith, since
it is written (Is. 7:9) according to another reading [*The Septuagint]:
"If you will not believe you shall not understand," where our version
has: "If you will not believe, you shall not continue." Therefore fruit
is not the fruit of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which precedes is not the fruit of what follows.
But faith seems to precede understanding, since it is the foundation of
the entire spiritual edifice, as stated above (Q[4], AA[1],7). Therefore
faith is not the fruit of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, more gifts pertain to the intellect than to the
appetite. Now, among the fruits, only one pertains to the intellect;
namely, faith, while all the others pertain to the appetite. Therefore
faith, seemingly, does not pertain to understanding more than to wisdom,
knowledge or counsel.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The end of a thing is its fruit. Now the gift of
understanding seems to be ordained chiefly to the certitude of faith,
which certitude is reckoned a fruit. For a gloss on Gal. 5:22 says that
the "faith which is a fruit, is certitude about the unseen." Therefore
faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The fruits of the Spirit, as stated above (FS, Q[70],
A[1]), when we were discussing them, are so called because they are
something ultimate and delightful, produced in us by the power of the
Holy Ghost. Now the ultimate and delightful has the nature of an end,
which is the proper object of the will: and consequently that which is
ultimate and delightful with regard to the will, must be, after a
fashion, the fruit of all the other things that pertain to the other
powers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly, therefore, to this kind of gift of virtue that perfects a
power, we may distinguish a double fruit: one, belonging to the same
power; the other, the last of all as it were, belonging to the will. In
this way we must conclude that the fruit which properly responds to the
gift of understanding is faith, i.e. the certitude of faith; while the
fruit that responds to it last of all is joy, which belongs to the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Understanding is the fruit of faith, taken as a virtue. But
we are not taking faith in this sense here, but for a kind of certitude
of faith, to which man attains by the gift of understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Faith cannot altogether precede understanding, for it would
be impossible to assent by believing what is proposed to be believed,
without understanding it in some way. However, the perfection of
understanding follows the virtue of faith: which perfection of
understanding is itself followed by a kind of certainty of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[8] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The fruit of practical knowledge cannot consist in that
very knowledge, since knowledge of that kind is known not for its own
sake, but for the sake of something else. On the other hand, speculative
knowledge has its fruit in its very self, which fruit is the certitude
about the thing known. Hence the gift of counsel, which belongs only to
practical knowledge, has no corresponding fruit of its own: while the
gifts of wisdom, understanding and knowledge, which can belongs also to
speculative knowledge, have but one corresponding fruit, which is
certainly denoted by the name of faith. The reason why there are several
fruits pertaining to the appetitive faculty, is because, as already
stated, the character of end, which the word fruit implies, pertains to
the appetitive rather than to the intellective part.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift of knowledge, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether knowledge is a gift?
(2) Whether it is about Divine things?
(3) Whether it is speculative or practical?
(4) Which beatitude responds to it?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether knowledge is a gift?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a gift. For the gifts of the
Holy Ghost surpass the natural faculty. But knowledge implies an effect
of natural reason: for the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that a
"demonstration is a syllogism which produces knowledge." Therefore
knowledge is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are common to all holy
persons, as stated above (Q[8], A[4]; FS, Q[68], A[5]). Now Augustine
says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the faithful lack knowledge though
they have faith." Therefore knowledge is not a gift.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as stated
above (FS, Q[68], A[8]). Therefore one gift suffices for the perfection
of one virtue. Now the gift of understanding responds to the virtue of
faith, as stated above (Q[8], A[2]). Therefore the gift of knowledge does
not respond to that virtue, nor does it appear to which other virtue it
can respond. Since, then, the gifts are perfections of virtues, as stated
above (FS, Q[68], AA[1],2), it seems that knowledge is not a gift.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Knowledge is reckoned among the seven gifts (Is. 11:2).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Grace is more perfect than nature, and, therefore, does
not fail in those things wherein man can be perfected by nature. Now,
when a man, by his natural reason, assents by his intellect to some
truth, he is perfected in two ways in respect of that truth: first,
because he grasps it; secondly, because he forms a sure judgment on it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Accordingly, two things are requisite in order that the human intellect
may perfectly assent to the truth of the faith: one of these is that he
should have a sound grasp of the things that are proposed to be believed,
and this pertains to the gift of understanding, as stated above (Q[8],
A[6]): while the other is that he should have a sure and right judgment
on them, so as to discern what is to be believed, from what is not to be
believed, and for this the gift of knowledge is required.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Certitude of knowledge varies in various natures, according
to the various conditions of each nature. Because man forms a sure
judgment about a truth by the discursive process of his reason: and so
human knowledge is acquired by means of demonstrative reasoning. On the
other hand, in God, there is a sure judgment of truth, without any
discursive process, by simple intuition, as was stated in the FP, Q[14],
A[7]; wherefore God's knowledge is not discursive, or argumentative, but
absolute and simple, to which that knowledge is likened which is a gift
of the Holy Ghost, since it is a participated likeness thereof.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A twofold knowledge may be had about matters of belief. One
is the knowledge of what one ought to believe by discerning things to be
believed from things not to be believe: in this way knowledge is a gift
and is common to all holy persons. The other is a knowledge about matters
of belief, whereby one knows not only what one ought to believe, but also
how to make the faith known, how to induce others to believe, and confute
those who deny the faith. This knowledge is numbered among the gratuitous
graces, which are not given to all, but to some. Hence Augustine, after
the words quoted, adds: "It is one thing for a man merely to know what he
ought to believe, and another to know how to dispense what he believes to
the godly, and to defend it against the ungodly."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The gifts are more perfect than the moral and intellectual
virtues; but they are not more perfect than the theological virtues;
rather are all the gifts ordained to the perfection of the theological
virtues, as to their end. Hence it is not unreasonable if several gifts
are ordained to one theological virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gift of knowledge is about Divine things?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the gift of knowledge is about Divine things.
For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "knowledge begets, nourishes
and strengthens faith." Now faith is about Divine things, because its
object is the First Truth, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]). Therefore the
gift of knowledge also is about Divine things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the gift of knowledge is more excellent than acquired
knowledge. But there is an acquired knowledge about Divine things, for
instance, the science of metaphysics. Much more therefore is the gift of
knowledge about Divine things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to Rm. 1:20, "the invisible things of God . .
. are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." If
therefore there is knowledge about created things, it seems that there is
also knowledge of Divine things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1): "The knowledge of
Divine things may be properly called wisdom, and the knowledge of human
affairs may properly receive the name of knowledge."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, A sure judgment about a thing formed chiefly from its
cause, and so the order of judgments should be according to the order of
causes. For just as the first cause is the cause of the second, so ought
the judgment about the second cause to be formed through the first cause:
nor is it possible to judge of the first cause through any other cause;
wherefore the judgment which is formed through the first cause, is the
first and most perfect judgment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Now in those things where we find something most perfect, the common
name of the genus is appropriated for those things which fall short of
the most perfect, and some special name is adapted to the most perfect
thing, as is the case in Logic. For in the genus of convertible terms,
that which signifies "what a thing is," is given the special name of
"definition," but the convertible terms which fall short of this, retain
the common name, and are called "proper" terms.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Accordingly, since the word knowledge implies certitude of judgment as
stated above (A[1]), if this certitude of the judgment is derived from
the highest cause, the knowledge has a special name, which is wisdom: for
a wise man in any branch of knowledge is one who knows the highest cause
of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge of all matters by that
cause: and a wise man "absolutely," is one who knows the cause which is
absolutely highest, namely God. Hence the knowledge of Divine things is
called "wisdom," while the knowledge of human things is called
"knowledge," this being the common name denoting certitude of judgment,
and appropriated to the judgment which is formed through second causes.
Accordingly, if we take knowledge in this way, it is a distinct gift from
the gift of wisdom, so that the gift of knowledge is only about human or
created things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although matters of faith are Divine and eternal, yet faith
itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer. Hence to know
what one ought to believe, belongs to the gift of knowledge, but to know
in themselves the very things we believe, by a kind of union with them,
belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the gift of wisdom corresponds
more to charity which unites man's mind to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument takes knowledge in the generic acceptation of
the term: it is not thus that knowledge is a special gift, but according
as it is restricted to judgments formed through created things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As stated above (Q[1], A[1]), every cognitive habit regards
formally the mean through which things are known, and materially, the
things that are known through the mean. And since that which is formal,
is of most account, it follows that those sciences which draw conclusions
about physical matter from mathematical principles, are reckoned rather
among the mathematical sciences, though, as to their matter they have
more in common with physical sciences: and for this reason it is stated
in Phys. ii, 2 that they are more akin to physics. Accordingly, since man
knows God through His creatures, this seems to pertain to "knowledge," to
which it belongs formally, rather than to "wisdom," to which it belongs
materially: and, conversely, when we judge of creatures according to
Divine things, this pertains to "wisdom" rather than to "knowledge."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the gift of knowledge is practical knowledge?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the knowledge, which is numbered among the
gifts, is practical knowledge. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14) that
"knowledge is concerned with the actions in which we make use of external
things." But the knowledge which is concerned about actions is practical.
Therefore the gift of knowledge is practical.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge is nought if it
hath not its use for piety . . . and piety is very useless if it lacks
the discernment of knowledge." Now it follows from this authority that
knowledge directs piety. But this cannot apply to a speculative science.
Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative but practical.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are only in the righteous,
as stated above (Q[9], A[5]). But speculative knowledge can be also in
the unrighteous, according to James 4:17: "To him . . . who knoweth to do
good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Therefore the gift of
knowledge is not speculative but practical.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge on her own day
prepares a feast, because she overcomes the fast of ignorance in the
mind." Now ignorance is not entirely removed, save by both kinds of
knowledge, viz. speculative and practical. Therefore the gift of
knowledge is both speculative and practical.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[9], A[8]), the gift of knowledge, like
the gift of understanding, is ordained to the certitude of faith. Now
faith consists primarily and principally in speculation, in as much as it
is founded on the First Truth. But since the First Truth is also the last
end for the sake of which our works are done, hence it is that faith
extends to works, according to Gal. 5:6: "Faith . . . worketh by charity."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
The consequence is that the gift of knowledge also, primarily and
principally indeed, regards speculation, in so far as man knows what he
ought to hold by faith; yet, secondarily, it extends to works, since we
are directed in our actions by the knowledge of matters of faith, and of
conclusions drawn therefrom.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 1: Augustine is speaking of the gift of knowledge, in so far
as it extends to works; for action is ascribed to knowledge, yet not
action solely, nor primarily: and in this way it directs piety.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 2/2
Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is clear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As we have already stated (Q[8], A[5]) about the gift of
understanding, not everyone who understands, has the gift of
understanding, but only he that understands through a habit of grace: and
so we must take note, with regard to the gift of knowledge, that they
alone have the gift of knowledge, who judge aright about matters of
faith and action, through the grace bestowed on them, so as never to
wander from the straight path of justice. This is the knowledge of holy
things, according to Wis. 10:10: "She conducted the just . . . through
the right ways . . . and gave him the knowledge of holy things."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that mourn," etc.
corresponds to the gift of knowledge?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that
mourn," does not correspond to the gift of knowledge. For, even as evil
is the cause of sorrow and grief, so is good the cause of joy. Now
knowledge brings good to light rather than evil, since the latter is
known through evil: for "the straight line rules both itself and the
crooked line" (De Anima i, 5). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not
suitably correspond to the gift of knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, consideration of truth is an act of knowledge. Now there
is no sorrow in the consideration of truth; rather is there joy, since it
is written (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her
company any tediousness, but joy and gladness." Therefore the aforesaid
beatitude does not suitably correspond with the gift of knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the gift of knowledge consists in speculation, before
operation. Now, in so far as it consists in speculation, sorrow does not
correspond to it, since "the speculative intellect is not concerned about
things to be sought or avoided" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore the
aforesaid beatitude is not suitably reckoned to correspond with the gift
of knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte iv): "Knowledge
befits the mourner, who has discovered that he has been mastered by the
evil which he coveted as though it were good."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Right judgment about creatures belongs properly to
knowledge. Now it is through creatures that man's aversion from God is
occasioned, according to Wis. 14:11: "Creatures . . . are turned to an
abomination . . . and a snare to the feet of the unwise," of those,
namely, who do not judge aright about creatures, since they deem the
perfect good to consist in them. Hence they sin by placing their last end
in them, and lose the true good. It is by forming a right judgment of
creatures that man becomes aware of the loss (of which they may be the
occasion), which judgment he exercises through the gift of knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Hence the beatitude of sorrow is said to correspond to the gift of
knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Created goods do not cause spiritual joy, except in so far
as they are referred to the Divine good, which is the proper cause of
spiritual joy. Hence spiritual peace and the resulting joy correspond
directly to the gift of wisdom: but to the gift of knowledge there
corresponds, in the first place, sorrow for past errors, and, in
consequence, consolation, since, by his right judgment, man directs
creatures to the Divine good. For this reason sorrow is set forth in this
beatitude, as the merit, and the resulting consolation, as the reward;
which is begun in this life, and is perfected in the life to come.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Man rejoices in the very consideration of truth; yet he may
sometimes grieve for the thing, the truth of which he considers: it is
thus that sorrow is ascribed to knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[9] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: No beatitude corresponds to knowledge, in so far as it
consists in speculation, because man's beatitude consists, not in
considering creatures, but in contemplating God. But man's beatitude does
consist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in well-ordered love
of them: and this I say with regard to the beatitude of a wayfarer. Hence
beatitude relating to contemplation is not ascribed to knowledge, but to
understanding and wisdom, which are about Divine things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] Out. Para. 1/3
OF UNBELIEF IN GENERAL (TWELVE ARTICLES)
In due sequence we must consider the contrary vices: first, unbelief,
which is contrary to faith; secondly, blasphemy, which is opposed to
confession of faith; thirdly, ignorance and dulness of mind, which are
contrary to knowledge and understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] Out. Para. 2/3
As to the first, we must consider (1) unbelief in general; (2) heresy;
(3) apostasy from the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] Out. Para. 3/3
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether unbelief is a sin?
(2) What is its subject?
(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?
(4) Whether every action of unbelievers is a sin?
(5) Of the species of unbelief;
(6) Of their comparison, one with another;
(7) Whether we ought to dispute about faith with unbelievers?
(8) Whether they ought to be compelled to the faith?
(9) Whether we ought to have communications with them?
(10) Whether unbelievers can have authority over Christians?
(11) Whether the rites of unbelievers should be tolerated?
(12) Whether the children of unbelievers are to be baptized against
their parents' will?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether unbelief is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that unbelief is not a sin. For every sin is
contrary to nature, as Damascene proves (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). Now
unbelief seems not to be contrary to nature; for Augustine says (De
Praedest. Sanct. v) that "to be capable to having faith, just as to be
capable of having charity, is natural to all men; whereas to have faith,
even as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful."
Therefore not to have faith, which is to be an unbeliever, is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no one sins that which he cannot avoid, since every sin
is voluntary. Now it is not in a man's power to avoid unbelief, for he
cannot avoid it unless he have faith, because the Apostle says (Rm.
10:14): "How shall they believe in Him, of Whom they have not heard? And
how shall they hear without a preacher?" Therefore unbelief does not seem
to be a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, as stated above (FS, Q[84], A[4]), there are seven
capital sins, to which all sins are reduced. But unbelief does not seem
to be comprised under any of them. Therefore unbelief is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Vice is opposed to virtue. Now faith is a virtue, and
unbelief is opposed to it. Therefore unbelief is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Unbelief may be taken in two ways: first, by way of pure
negation, so that a man be called an unbeliever, merely because he has
not the faith. Secondly, unbelief may be taken by way of opposition to
the faith; in which sense a man refuses to hear the faith, or despises
it, according to Is. 53:1: "Who hath believed our report?" It is this
that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is in this sense that
unbelief is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
If, however, we take it by way of pure negation, as we find it in those
who have heard nothing about the faith, it bears the character, not of
sin, but of punishment, because such like ignorance of Divine things is a
result of the sin of our first parent. If such like unbelievers are
damned, it is on account of other sins, which cannot be taken away
without faith, but not on account of their sin of unbelief. Hence Our
Lord said (Jn. 15:22) "If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would
not have sin"; which Augustine expounds (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) as
"referring to the sin whereby they believed not in Christ."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: To have the faith is not part of human nature, but it is
part of human nature that man's mind should not thwart his inner
instinct, and the outward preaching of the truth. Hence, in this way,
unbelief is contrary to nature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument takes unbelief as denoting a pure negation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: Unbelief, in so far as it is a sin, arises from pride,
through which man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the rules of
faith, and to the sound interpretation of the Fathers. Hence Gregory says
(Moral. xxxi, 45) that "presumptuous innovations arise from vainglory."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
It might also be replied that just as the theological virtues are not
reduced to the cardinal virtues, but precede them, so too, the vices
opposed to the theological virtues are not reduced to the capital vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether unbelief is in the intellect as its subject?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that unbelief is not in the intellect as its
subject. For every sin is in the will, according to Augustine (De Duabus
Anim. x, xi). Now unbelief is a sin, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore
unbelief resides in the will and not in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, unbelief is sinful through contempt of the preaching of
the faith. But contempt pertains to the will. Therefore unbelief is in
the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a gloss [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx.] on 2 Cor. 11:14
"Satan . . . transformeth himself into an angel of light," says that if
"a wicked angel pretend to be a good angel, and be taken for a good
angel, it is not a dangerous or an unhealthy error, if he does or says
what is becoming to a good angel." This seems to be because of the
rectitude of the will of the man who adheres to the angel, since his
intention is to adhere to a good angel. Therefore the sin of unbelief
seems to consist entirely in a perverse will: and, consequently, it does
not reside in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Things which are contrary to one another are in the
same subject. Now faith, to which unbelief is opposed, resides in the
intellect. Therefore unbelief also is in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[74], AA[1],2), sin is said to be
in the power which is the principle of the sinful act. Now a sinful act
may have two principles: one is its first and universal principle, which
commands all acts of sin; and this is the will, because every sin is
voluntary. The other principle of the sinful act is the proper and
proximate principle which elicits the sinful act: thus the concupiscible
is the principle of gluttony and lust, wherefore these sins are said to
be in the concupiscible. Now dissent, which is the act proper to
unbelief, is an act of the intellect, moved, however, by the will, just
as assent is.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
Therefore unbelief, like faith, is in the intellect as its proximate
subject. But it is in the will as its first moving principle, in which
way every sin is said to be in the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The will's contempt causes the intellect's dissent, which
completes the notion of unbelief. Hence the cause of unbelief is in the
will, while unbelief itself is in the intellect.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He that believes a wicked angel to be a good one, does not
dissent from a matter of faith, because "his bodily senses are deceived,
while his mind does not depart from a true and right judgment" as the
gloss observes [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx]. But, according to the same
authority, to adhere to Satan when he begins to invite one to his abode,
i.e. wickedness and error, is not without sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether unbelief is the greatest of sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that unbelief is not the greatest of sins. For
Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. iv, 20): "I should hesitate to
decide whether a very wicked Catholic ought to be preferred to a heretic,
in whose life one finds nothing reprehensible beyond the fact that he is
a heretic." But a heretic is an unbeliever. Therefore we ought not to say
absolutely that unbelief is the greatest of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which diminishes or excuses a sin is not,
seemingly, the greatest of sins. Now unbelief excuses or diminishes sin:
for the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12,13): "I . . . before was a blasphemer,
and a persecutor and contumelious; but I obtained . . . mercy . . .
because I did it ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore unbelief is not the
greatest of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the greater sin deserves the greater punishment,
according to Dt. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the
measure also of the stripes be." Now a greater punishment is due to
believers than to unbelievers, according to Heb. 10:29: "How much more,
do you think, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden under foot
the Son of God, and hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, by
which he was sanctified?" Therefore unbelief is not the greatest of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Jn. 15:22, "If I had not come,
and spoken to them, they would not have sin," says (Tract. lxxxix in
Joan.): "Under the general name, He refers to a singularly great sin. For
this," viz. infidelity, "is the sin to which all others may be traced."
Therefore unbelief is the greatest of sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Every sin consists formally in aversion from God, as
stated above (FS, Q[71], A[6]; FS, Q[73], A[3]). Hence the more a sin
severs man from God, the graver it is. Now man is more than ever
separated from God by unbelief, because he has not even true knowledge of
God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not approach Him, but is
severed from Him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know Him
in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God.
Therefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any sin
that occurs in the perversion of morals. This does not apply to the sins
that are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall stated further
on (Q[20], A[3]; Q[34], A[2], ad 2; Q[39], A[2], ad 3).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Nothing hinders a sin that is more grave in its genus from
being less grave in respect of some circumstances. Hence Augustine
hesitated to decide between a bad Catholic, and a heretic not sinning
otherwise, because although the heretic's sin is more grave generically,
it can be lessened by a circumstance, and conversely the sin of the
Catholic can, by some circumstance, be aggravated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Unbelief includes both ignorance, as an accessory thereto,
and resistance to matters of faith, and in the latter respect it is a
most grave sin. In respect, however, of this ignorance, it has a certain
reason for excuse, especially when a man sins not from malice, as was the
case with the Apostle.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: An unbeliever is more severely punished for his sin of
unbelief than another sinner is for any sin whatever, if we consider the
kind of sin. But in the case of another sin, e.g. adultery, committed by
a believer, and by an unbeliever, the believer, other things being equal,
sins more gravely than the unbeliever, both on account of his knowledge
of the truth through faith, and on account of the sacraments of faith
with which he has been satiated, and which he insults by committing sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether every act of an unbeliever is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that each act of an unbeliever is a sin. Because a
gloss on Rm. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin," says: "The whole
life of unbelievers is a sin." Now the life of unbelievers consists of
their actions. Therefore every action of an unbeliever is a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, faith directs the intention. Now there can be no good
save what comes from a right intention. Therefore, among unbelievers, no
action can be good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, when that which precedes is corrupted, that which
follows is corrupted also. Now an act of faith precedes the acts of all
the virtues. Therefore, since there is no act of faith in unbelievers,
they can do no good work, but sin in every action of theirs.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is said of Cornelius, while yet an unbeliever (Acts
10:4,31), that his alms were acceptable to God. Therefore not every
action of an unbeliever is a sin, but some of his actions are good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[4] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[85], AA[2],4) mortal sin takes
away sanctifying grace, but does not wholly corrupt the good of nature.
Since therefore, unbelief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are without grace
indeed, yet some good of nature remains in them. Consequently it is
evident that unbelievers cannot do those good works which proceed from
grace, viz. meritorious works; yet they can, to a certain extent, do
those good works for which the good of nature suffices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[4] Body Para. 2/2
Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do; but
whenever they do anything out of their unbelief, then they sin. For even
as one who has the faith, can commit an actual sin, venial or even
mortal, which he does not refer to the end of faith, so too, an
unbeliever can do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to the
end of his unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The words quoted must be taken to mean either that the life
of unbelievers cannot be sinless, since without faith no sin is taken
away, or that whatever they do out of unbelief, is a sin. Hence the same
authority adds: "Because every one that lives or acts according to his
unbelief, sins grievously."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Faith directs the intention with regard to the supernatural
last end: but even the light of natural reason can direct the intention
in respect of a connatural good.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Unbelief does not so wholly destroy natural reason in
unbelievers, but that some knowledge of the truth remains in them,
whereby they are able to do deeds that are generically good. With regard,
however, to Cornelius, it is to be observed that he was not an
unbeliever, else his works would not have been acceptable to God, whom
none can please without faith. Now he had implicit faith, as the truth of
the Gospel was not yet made manifest: hence Peter was sent to him to give
him fuller instruction in the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether there are several species of unbelief?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that there are not several species of unbelief.
For, since faith and unbelief are contrary to one another, they must be
about the same thing. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth,
whence it derives its unity, although its matter contains many points of
belief. Therefore the object of unbelief also is the First Truth; while
the things which an unbeliever disbelieves are the matter of his
unbelief. Now the specific difference depends not on material but on
formal principles. Therefore there are not several species of unbelief,
according to the various points which the unbeliever disbelieves.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, it is possible to stray from the truth of faith in an
infinite number of ways. If therefore the various species of unbelief
correspond to the number of various errors, it would seem to follow that
there is an infinite number of species of unbelief, and consequently,
that we ought not to make these species the object of our consideration.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the same thing does not belong to different species. Now
a man may be an unbeliever through erring about different points of
truth. Therefore diversity of errors does not make a diversity of species
of unbelief: and so there are not several species of unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Several species of vice are opposed to each virtue,
because "good happens in one way, but evil in many ways," according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now faith is
a virtue. Therefore several species of vice are opposed to it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[55], A[4]; FS, Q[64], A[1]), every
virtue consists in following some rule of human knowledge or operation.
Now conformity to a rule happens one way in one matter, whereas a breach
of the rule happens in many ways, so that many vices are opposed to one
virtue. The diversity of the vices that are opposed to each virtue may be
considered in two ways, first, with regard to their different relations
to the virtue: and in this way there are determinate species of vices
contrary to a virtue: thus to a moral virtue one vice is opposed by
exceeding the virtue, and another, by falling short of the virtue.
Secondly, the diversity of vices opposed to one virtue may be considered
in respect of the corruption of the various conditions required for that
virtue. In this way an infinite number of vices are opposed to one
virtue, e.g. temperance or fortitude, according to the infinite number of
ways in which the various circumstances of a virtue may be corrupted, so
that the rectitude of virtue is forsaken. For this reason the
Pythagoreans held evil to be infinite.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly we must say that if unbelief be considered in comparison to
faith, there are several species of unbelief, determinate in number. For,
since the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the faith, this may
happen in two ways: either the faith is resisted before it has been
accepted, and such is the unbelief of pagans or heathens; or the
Christian faith is resisted after it has been accepted, and this either
in the figure, and such is the unbelief of the Jews, or in the very
manifestation of truth, and such is the unbelief of heretics. Hence we
may, in a general way, reckon these three as species of unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] Body Para. 3/3
If, however, the species of unbelief be distinguished according to the
various errors that occur in matters of faith, there are not determinate
species of unbelief: for errors can be multiplied indefinitely, as
Augustine observes (De Haeresibus).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The formal aspect of a sin can be considered in two ways.
First, according to the intention of the sinner, in which case the thing
to which the sinner turns is the formal object of his sin, and determines
the various species of that sin. Secondly, it may be considered as an
evil, and in this case the good which is forsaken is the formal object of
the sin; which however does not derive its species from this point of
view, in fact it is a privation. We must therefore reply that the object
of unbelief is the First Truth considered as that which unbelief
forsakes, but its formal aspect, considered as that to which unbelief
turns, is the false opinion that it follows: and it is from this point of
view that unbelief derives its various species. Hence, even as charity
is one, because it adheres to the Sovereign Good, while there are various
species of vice opposed to charity, which turn away from the Sovereign
Good by turning to various temporal goods, and also in respect of various
inordinate relations to God, so too, faith is one virtue through adhering
to the one First Truth, yet there are many species of unbelief, because
unbelievers follow many false opinions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers the various species of unbelief
according to various points in which errors occur.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Since faith is one because it believes in many things in
relation to one, so may unbelief, although it errs in many things, be one
in so far as all those things are related to one. Yet nothing hinders one
man from erring in various species of unbelief, even as one man may be
subject to various vices, and to various bodily diseases.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the unbelief of pagans or heathens is graver than other kinds?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the unbelief of heathens or pagans is graver
than other kinds. For just as bodily disease is graver according as it
endangers the health of a more important member of the body, so does sin
appear to be graver, according as it is opposed to that which holds a
more important place in virtue. Now that which is most important in
faith, is belief in the unity of God, from which the heathens deviate by
believing in many gods. Therefore their unbelief is the gravest of all.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, among heresies, the more detestable are those which
contradict the truth of faith in more numerous and more important points:
thus, the heresy of Arius, who severed the Godhead, was more detestable
than that of Nestorius who severed the humanity of Christ from the Person
of God the Son. Now the heathens deny the faith in more numerous and more
important points than Jews and heretics; since they do not accept the
faith at all. Therefore their unbelief is the gravest.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every good diminishes evil. Now there is some good in
the Jews, since they believe in the Old Testament as being from God, and
there is some good in heretics, since they venerate the New Testament.
Therefore they sin less grievously than heathens, who receive neither
Testament.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (2 Pt. 2:21): "It had been better for
them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it,
to turn back." Now the heathens have not known the way of justice,
whereas heretics and Jews have abandoned it after knowing it in some way.
Therefore theirs is the graver sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[6] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As stated above (A[5]), two things may be considered in
unbelief. One of these is its relation to faith: and from this point of
view, he who resists the faith after accepting it, sins more grievously
against faith, than he who resists it without having accepted it, even as
he who fails to fulfil what he has promised, sins more grievously than if
he had never promised it. In this way the unbelief of heretics, who
confess their belief in the Gospel, and resist that faith by corrupting
it, is a more grievous sin than that of the Jews, who have never accepted
the Gospel faith. Since, however, they accepted the figure of that faith
in the Old Law, which they corrupt by their false interpretations, their
unbelief is a more grievous sin than that of the heathens, because the
latter have not accepted the Gospel faith in any way at all.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[6] Body Para. 2/4
The second thing to be considered in unbelief is the corruption of
matters of faith. In this respect, since heathens err on more points than
Jews, and these in more points than heretics, the unbelief of heathens is
more grievous than the unbelief of the Jews, and that of the Jews than
that of the heretics, except in such cases as that of the Manichees, who,
in matters of faith, err even more than heathens do.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[6] Body Para. 3/4
Of these two gravities the first surpasses the second from the point of
view of guilt; since, as stated above (A[1]) unbelief has the character
of guilt, from its resisting faith rather than from the mere absence of
faith, for the latter as was stated (A[1]) seems rather to bear the
character of punishment. Hence, speaking absolutely, the unbelief of
heretics is the worst.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[6] Body Para. 4/4
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one ought to dispute with unbelievers in public?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one ought not to dispute with unbelievers in
public. For the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:14): "Contend not in words, for it
is to no profit, but to the subverting of the hearers." But it is
impossible to dispute with unbelievers publicly without contending in
words. Therefore one ought not to dispute publicly with unbelievers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the law of Martianus Augustus confirmed by the canons
[*De Sum. Trin. Cod. lib. i, leg. Nemo] expresses itself thus: "It is an
insult to the judgment of the most religious synod, if anyone ventures to
debate or dispute in public about matters which have once been judged and
disposed of." Now all matters of faith have been decided by the holy
councils. Therefore it is an insult to the councils, and consequently a
grave sin to presume to dispute in public about matters of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, disputations are conducted by means of arguments. But an
argument is a reason in settlement of a dubious matter: whereas things
that are of faith, being most certain, ought not to be a matter of doubt.
Therefore one ought not to dispute in public about matters of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Acts 9:22,29) that "Saul increased much
more in strength, and confounded the Jews," and that "he spoke . . . to
the gentiles and disputed with the Greeks."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[7] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, In disputing about the faith, two things must be
observed: one on the part of the disputant; the other on the part of his
hearers. On the part of the disputant, we must consider his intention.
For if he were to dispute as though he had doubts about the faith, and
did not hold the truth of faith for certain, and as though he intended to
probe it with arguments, without doubt he would sin, as being doubtful of
the faith and an unbeliever. On the other hand, it is praiseworthy to
dispute about the faith in order to confute errors, or for practice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[7] Body Para. 2/2
On the part of the hearers we must consider whether those who hear the
disputation are instructed and firm in the faith, or simple and wavering.
As to those who are well instructed and firm in the faith, there can be
no danger in disputing about the faith in their presence. But as to
simple-minded people, we must make a distinction; because either they are
provoked and molested by unbelievers, for instance, Jews or heretics, or
pagans who strive to corrupt the faith in them, or else they are not
subject to provocation in this matter, as in those countries where there
are not unbelievers. In the first case it is necessary to dispute in
public about the faith, provided there be those who are equal and adapted
to the task of confuting errors; since in this way simple people are
strengthened in the faith, and unbelievers are deprived of the
opportunity to deceive, while if those who ought to withstand the
perverters of the truth of faith were silent, this would tend to
strengthen error. Hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 4): "Even as a
thoughtless speech gives rise to error, so does an indiscreet silence
leave those in error who might have been instructed." On the other hand,
in the second case it is dangerous to dispute in public about the faith,
in the presence of simple people, whose faith for this very reason is
more firm, that they have never heard anything differing from what they
believe. Hence it is not expedient for them to hear what unbelievers have
to say against the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle does not entirely forbid disputations, but such
as are inordinate, and consist of contentious words rather than of sound
speeches.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: That law forbade those public disputations about the faith,
which arise from doubting the faith, but not those which are for the
safeguarding thereof.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: One ought to dispute about matters of faith, not as though
one doubted about them, but in order to make the truth known, and to
confute errors. For, in order to confirm the faith, it is necessary
sometimes to dispute with unbelievers, sometimes by defending the faith,
according to 1 Pt. 3:15: "Being ready always to satisfy everyone that
asketh you a reason of that hope and faith which is in you [*Vulg.: 'Of
that hope which is in you' St. Thomas' reading is apparently taken from
Bede]." Sometimes again, it is necessary, in order to convince those who
are in error, according to Titus 1:9: "That he may be able to exhort in
sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether unbelievers ought to be compelled to the faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that unbelievers ought by no means to be compelled
to the faith. For it is written (Mt. 13:28) that the servants of the
householder, in whose field cockle had been sown, asked him: "Wilt thou
that we go and gather it up?" and that he answered: "No, lest perhaps
gathering up the cockle, you root up the wheat also together with it": on
which passage Chrysostom says (Hom. xlvi in Matth.): "Our Lord says this
so as to forbid the slaying of men. For it is not right to slay heretics,
because if you do you will necessarily slay many innocent persons."
Therefore it seems that for the same reason unbelievers ought not to be
compelled to the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, we read in the Decretals (Dist. xlv can., De Judaeis):
"The holy synod prescribes, with regard to the Jews, that for the future,
none are to be compelled to believe." Therefore, in like manner, neither
should unbelievers be compelled to the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) that "it is
possible for a man to do other things against his will, but he cannot
believe unless he is willing." Therefore it seems that unbelievers ought
not to be compelled to the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: It is said in God's person (Ezech. 18:32 [*Ezech. 33:11]): "I
desire not the death of the sinner [Vulg.: 'of him that dieth']." Now we
ought to conform our will to the Divine will, as stated above (FS, Q[19],
AA[9],10). Therefore we should not even wish unbelievers to be put to
death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 14:23): "Go out into the highways
and hedges; and compel them to come in." Now men enter into the house of
God, i.e. into Holy Church, by faith. Therefore some ought to be
compelled to the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Among unbelievers there are some who have never received
the faith, such as the heathens and the Jews: and these are by no means
to be compelled to the faith, in order that they may believe, because to
believe depends on the will: nevertheless they should be compelled by the
faithful, if it be possible to do so, so that they do not hinder the
faith, by their blasphemies, or by their evil persuasions, or even by
their open persecutions. It is for this reason that Christ's faithful
often wage war with unbelievers, not indeed for the purpose of forcing
them to believe, because even if they were to conquer them, and take them
prisoners, they should still leave them free to believe, if they will,
but in order to prevent them from hindering the faith of Christ.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, there are unbelievers who at some time have accepted
the faith, and professed it, such as heretics and all apostates: such
should be submitted even to bodily compulsion, that they may fulfil what
they have promised, and hold what they, at one time, received.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Some have understood the authority quoted to forbid, not
the excommunication but the slaying of heretics, as appears from the
words of Chrysostom. Augustine too, says (Ep. ad Vincent. xciii) of
himself: "It was once my opinion that none should be compelled to union
with Christ, that we should deal in words, and fight with arguments.
However this opinion of mine is undone, not by words of contradiction,
but by convincing examples. Because fear of the law was so profitable,
that many say: Thanks be to the Lord Who has broken our chains asunder."
Accordingly the meaning of Our Lord's words, "Suffer both to grow until
the harvest," must be gathered from those which precede, "lest perhaps
gathering up the cockle, you root the wheat also together with it." For,
Augustine says (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2) "these words show that when
this is not to be feared, that is to say, when a man's crime is so
publicly known, and so hateful to all, that he has no defenders, or none
such as might cause a schism, the severity of discipline should not
slacken."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Those Jews who have in no way received the faith, ought not
by no means to be compelled to the faith: if, however, they have received
it, they ought to be compelled to keep it, as is stated in the same
chapter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as taking a vow is a matter of will, and keeping a
vow, a matter of obligation, so acceptance of the faith is a matter of
the will, whereas keeping the faith, when once one has received it, is a
matter of obligation. Wherefore heretics should be compelled to keep the
faith. Thus Augustine says to the Count Boniface (Ep. clxxxv): "What do
these people mean by crying out continually: 'We may believe or not
believe just as we choose. Whom did Christ compel?' They should remember
that Christ at first compelled Paul and afterwards taught Him."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[8] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: As Augustine says in the same letter, "none of us wishes
any heretic to perish. But the house of David did not deserve to have
peace, unless his son Absalom had been killed in the war which he had
raised against his father. Thus if the Catholic Church gathers together
some of the perdition of others, she heals the sorrow of her maternal
heart by the delivery of so many nations."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers.
For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:27): "If any of them that believe not,
invite you, and you be willing to go, eat of anything that is set before
you." And Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv super Epist. ad Heb.): "If you wish
to go to dine with pagans, we permit it without any reservation." Now to
sit at table with anyone is to communicate with him. Therefore it is
lawful to communicate with unbelievers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:12): "What have I to do to
judge them that are without?" Now unbelievers are without. When,
therefore, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with certain
people, it seems that they ought not to be forbidden to communicate with
unbelievers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, a master cannot employ his servant, unless he
communicate with him, at least by word, since the master moves his
servant by command. Now Christians can have unbelievers, either Jews, or
pagans, or Saracens, for servants. Therefore they can lawfully
communicate with them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 7:2,3): "Thou shalt make no league
with them, nor show mercy to them; neither shalt thou make marriages with
them": and a gloss on Lev. 15:19, "The woman who at the return of the
month," etc. says: "It is so necessary to shun idolatry, that we should
not come in touch with idolaters or their disciples, nor have any
dealings with them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Communication with a particular person is forbidden to
the faithful, in two ways: first, as a punishment of the person with whom
they are forbidden to communicate; secondly, for the safety of those who
are forbidden to communicate with others. Both motives can be gathered
from the Apostle's words (1 Cor. 5:6). For after he had pronounced
sentence of excommunication, he adds as his reason: "Know you not that a
little leaven corrupts the whole lump?" and afterwards he adds the reason
on the part of the punishment inflicted by the sentence of the Church
when he says (1 Cor. 5:12): "Do not you judge them that are within?"
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] Body Para. 2/4
Accordingly, in the first way the Church does not forbid the faithful to
communicate with unbelievers, who have not in any way received the
Christian faith, viz. with pagans and Jews, because she has not the right
to exercise spiritual judgment over them, but only temporal judgment, in
the case when, while dwelling among Christians they are guilty of some
misdemeanor, and are condemned by the faithful to some temporal
punishment. On the other hand, in this way, i.e. as a punishment, the
Church forbids the faithful to communicate with those unbelievers who
have forsaken the faith they once received, either by corrupting the
faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the faith, as apostates,
because the Church pronounces sentence of excommunication on both.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] Body Para. 3/4
With regard to the second way, it seems that one ought to distinguish
according to the various conditions of persons, circumstances and time.
For some are firm in the faith; and so it is to be hoped that their
communicating with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of the latter
rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith. These are not
to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers who have not received
the faith, such as pagans or Jews, especially if there be some urgent
necessity for so doing. But in the case of simple people and those who
are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared as a probable
result, they should be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers, and
especially to be on very familiar terms with them, or to communicate with
them without necessity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] Body Para. 4/4
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The Church does not exercise judgment against unbelievers
in the point of inflicting spiritual punishment on them: but she does
exercise judgment over some of them in the matter of temporal punishment.
It is under this head that sometimes the Church, for certain special
sins, withdraws the faithful from communication with certain unbelievers.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 1/2
Reply OBJ 3: There is more probability that a servant who is ruled by
his master's commands, will be converted to the faith of his master who
is a believer, than if the case were the reverse: and so the faithful are
not forbidden to have unbelieving servants. If, however, the master were
in danger, through communicating with such a servant, he should send him
away, according to Our Lord's command (Mt. 18:8): "If . . . thy foot
scandalize thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[9] R.O. 3 Para. 2/2
With regard to the argument in the contrary [*The Leonine Edition gives
this solution before the Reply OBJ 2] sense the reply is that the Lord
gave this command in reference to those nations into whose territory the
Jews were about to enter. For the latter were inclined to idolatry, so
that it was to be feared lest, through frequent dealings with those
nations, they should be estranged from the faith: hence the text goes on
(Dt. 7:4): "For she will turn away thy son from following Me."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that unbelievers may have authority or dominion
over the faithful. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:1): "Whosoever are
servants under the yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all
honor": and it is clear that he is speaking of unbelievers, since he adds
(1 Tim. 6:2): "But they that have believing masters, let them not despise
them." Moreover it is written (1 Pt. 2:18): "Servants be subject to your
masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the
froward." Now this command would not be contained in the apostolic
teaching unless unbelievers could have authority over the faithful.
Therefore it seems that unbelievers can have authority over the faithful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, all the members of a prince's household are his
subjects. Now some of the faithful were members of unbelieving princes'
households, for we read in the Epistle to the Philippians (4:22): "All
the saints salute you, especially they that are of Caesar's household,"
referring to Nero, who was an unbeliever. Therefore unbelievers can have
authority over the faithful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2) a slave is
his master's instrument in matters concerning everyday life, even as a
craftsman's laborer is his instrument in matters concerning the working
of his art. Now, in such matters, a believer can be subject to an
unbeliever, for he may work on an unbeliever's farm. Therefore
unbelievers may have authority over the faithful even as to dominion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Those who are in authority can pronounce judgment on
those over whom they are placed. But unbelievers cannot pronounce
judgment on the faithful, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:1): "Dare any of
you, having a matter against another, go to be judged before the unjust,"
i.e. unbelievers, "and not before the saints?" Therefore it seems that
unbelievers cannot have authority over the faithful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] Body Para. 1/5
I answer that, That this question may be considered in two ways. First,
we may speak of dominion or authority of unbelievers over the faithful as
of a thing to be established for the first time. This ought by no means
to be allowed, since it would provoke scandal and endanger the faith, for
subjects are easily influenced by their superiors to comply with their
commands, unless the subjects are of great virtue: moreover unbelievers
hold the faith in contempt, if they see the faithful fall away. Hence the
Apostle forbade the faithful to go to law before an unbelieving judge.
And so the Church altogether forbids unbelievers to acquire dominion over
believers, or to have authority over them in any capacity whatever.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] Body Para. 2/5
Secondly, we may speak of dominion or authority, as already in force:
and here we must observe that dominion and authority are institutions of
human law, while the distinction between faithful and unbelievers arises
from the Divine law. Now the Divine law which is the law of grace, does
not do away with human law which is the law of natural reason. Wherefore
the distinction between faithful and unbelievers, considered in itself,
does not do away with dominion and authority of unbelievers over the
faithful.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] Body Para. 3/5
Nevertheless this right of dominion or authority can be justly done away
with by the sentence or ordination of the Church who has the authority of
God: since unbelievers in virtue of their unbelief deserve to forfeit
their power over the faithful who are converted into children of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] Body Para. 4/5
This the Church does sometimes, and sometimes not. For among those
unbelievers who are subject, even in temporal matters, to the Church and
her members, the Church made the law that if the slave of a Jew became a
Christian, he should forthwith receive his freedom, without paying any
price, if he should be a "vernaculus," i.e. born in slavery; and
likewise if, when yet an unbeliever, he had been bought for his service:
if, however, he had been bought for sale, then he should be offered for
sale within three months. Nor does the Church harm them in this, because
since those Jews themselves are subject to the Church, she can dispose of
their possessions, even as secular princes have enacted many laws to be
observed by their subjects, in favor of liberty. On the other hand, the
Church has not applied the above law to those unbelievers who are not
subject to her or her members, in temporal matters, although she has the
right to do so: and this, in order to avoid scandal, for as Our Lord
showed (Mt. 17:25,26) that He could be excused from paying the tribute,
because "the children are free," yet He ordered the tribute to be paid in
order to avoid giving scandal. Thus Paul too, after saying that servants
should honor their masters, adds, "lest the name of the Lord and His
doctrine be blasphemed."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] Body Para. 5/5
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The authority of Caesar preceded the distinction of
faithful from unbelievers. Hence it was not cancelled by the conversion
of some to the faith. Moreover it was a good thing that there should be a
few of the faithful in the emperor's household, that they might defend
the rest of the faithful. Thus the Blessed Sebastian encouraged those
whom he saw faltering under torture, and, the while, remained hidden
under the military cloak in the palace of Diocletian.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[10] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Slaves are subject to their masters for their whole
lifetime, and are subject to their overseers in everything: whereas the
craftsman's laborer is subject to him for certain special works. Hence it
would be more dangerous for unbelievers to have dominion or authority
over the faithful, than that they should be allowed to employ them in
some craft. Wherefore the Church permits Christians to work on the land
of Jews, because this does not entail their living together with them.
Thus Solomon besought the King of Tyre to send master workmen to hew the
trees, as related in 3 Kgs. 5:6. Yet, if there be reason to fear that the
faithful will be perverted by such communications and dealings, they
should be absolutely forbidden.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[11] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the rites of unbelievers ought to be tolerated?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[11] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that rites of unbelievers ought not to be
tolerated. For it is evident that unbelievers sin in observing their
rites: and not to prevent a sin, when one can, seems to imply consent
therein, as a gloss observes on Rm. 1:32: "Not only they that do them,
but they also that consent to them that do them." Therefore it is a sin
to tolerate their rites.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[11] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the rites of the Jews are compared to idolatry, because
a gloss on Gal. 5:1, "Be not held again under the yoke of bondage," says:
"The bondage of that law was not lighter than that of idolatry." But it
would not be allowable for anyone to observe the rites of idolatry, in
fact Christian princes at first caused the temples of idols to be closed,
and afterwards, to be destroyed, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii,
54). Therefore it follows that even the rites of Jews ought not to be
tolerated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[11] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins, as stated above (A[3]
). Now other sins such as adultery, theft and the like, are not
tolerated, but are punishable by law. Therefore neither ought the rites
of unbelievers to be tolerated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[11] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory [*Regist. xi, Ep. 15: cf. Decret., dist. xlv,
can., Qui sincera] says, speaking of the Jews: "They should be allowed to
observe all their feasts, just as hitherto they and their fathers have
for ages observed them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[11] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Human government is derived from the Divine government,
and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful and supremely
good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take place in the universe,
which He might prevent, lest, without them, greater goods might be
forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly in human government also,
those who are in authority, rightly tolerate certain evils, lest certain
goods be lost, or certain greater evils be incurred: thus Augustine says
(De Ordine ii, 4): "If you do away with harlots, the world will be
convulsed with lust." Hence, though unbelievers sin in their rites, they
may be tolerated, either on account of some good that ensues therefrom,
or because of some evil avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe
their rites, which, of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith which we
hold, there follows this good---that our very enemies bear witness to our
faith, and that our faith is represented in a figure, so to speak. For
this reason they are tolerated in the observance of their rites.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[11] Body Para. 2/3
On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither
truthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated, except perchance
in order to avoid an evil, e.g. the scandal or disturbance that might
ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who if they were
unmolested might gradually be converted to the faith. For this reason the
Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of heretics and pagans,
when unbelievers were very numerous.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[11] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the children of Jews and other unbelievers ought to be baptized
against their parents' will?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the children of Jews and of other unbelievers
ought to be baptized against their parents' will. For the bond of
marriage is stronger than the right of parental authority over children,
since the right of parental authority can be made to cease, when a son is
set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot be severed by man,
according to Mt. 19:6: "What . . . God hath joined together let no man
put asunder." And yet the marriage bond is broken on account of unbelief:
for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:15): "If the unbeliever depart, let him
depart. For a brother or sister is not under servitude in such cases":
and a canon [*Can. Uxor legitima, and Idololatria, qu. i] says that "if
the unbelieving partner is unwilling to abide with the other, without
insult to their Creator, then the other partner is not bound to
cohabitation." Much more, therefore, does unbelief abrogate the right of
unbelieving parents' authority over their children: and consequently
their children may be baptized against their parents' will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, one is more bound to succor a man who is in danger of
everlasting death, than one who is in danger of temporal death. Now it
would be a sin, if one saw a man in danger of temporal death and failed
to go to his aid. Since, then, the children of Jews and other unbelievers
are in danger of everlasting death, should they be left to their parents
who would imbue them with their unbelief, it seems that they ought to be
taken away from them and baptized, and instructed in the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the children of a bondsman are themselves bondsmen, and
under the power of his master. Now the Jews are bondsmen of kings and
princes: therefore their children are also. Consequently kings and
princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish children.
Therefore no injustice is committed if they baptize them against their
parents' wishes.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has his
soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body. Therefore it
is not unjust if Jewish children be taken away from their parents, and
consecrated to God in Baptism.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, Baptism avails for salvation more than preaching does,
since Baptism removes forthwith the stain of sin and the debt of
punishment, and opens the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue through not
preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted to preach, according to the
words of Ezech. 33:6 about the man who "sees the sword coming and sounds
not the trumpet." Much more therefore, if Jewish children are lost
through not being baptized are they accounted guilty of sin, who could
have baptized them and did not.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would be an
injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against their
will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority over their
children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore these should not be
baptized against their parents' will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The custom of the Church has very great authority and
ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very doctrine of
catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church. Hence we ought to
abide by the authority of the Church rather than by that of an Augustine
or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it was never the custom of the
Church to baptize the children of the Jews against the will of their
parents, although at times past there have been many very powerful
catholic princes like Constantine and Theodosius, with whom most holy
bishops have been on most friendly terms, as Sylvester with Constantine,
and Ambrose with Theodosius, who would certainly not have failed to
obtain this favor from them if it had been at all reasonable. It seems
therefore hazardous to repeat this assertion, that the children of Jews
should be baptized against their parents' wishes, in contradiction to the
Church's custom observed hitherto.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] Body Para. 2/3
There are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger
to the faith. For children baptized before coming to the use of reason,
afterwards when they come to perfect age, might easily be persuaded by
their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly embraced; and this
would be detrimental to the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] Body Para. 3/3
The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child is
by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct from its
parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its mother's
womb; and later on after birth, and before it has the use of its
free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is like a
spiritual womb, for so long as man has not the use of reason, he differs
not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a horse belongs
to someone who, according to the civil law, can use them when he likes,
as his own instrument, so, according to the natural law, a son, before
coming to the use of reason, is under his father's care. Hence it would
be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before coming to the use of
reason, were to be taken away from its parents' custody, or anything done
to it against its parents' wish. As soon, however, as it begins to have
the use of its free-will, it begins to belong to itself, and is able to
look after itself, in matters concerning the Divine or the natural law,
and then it should be induced, not by compulsion but by persuasion, to
embrace the faith: it can then consent to the faith, and be baptized,
even against its parents' wish; but not before it comes to the use of
reason. Hence it is said of the children of the fathers of old that they
were saved in the faith of their parents; whereby we are given to
understand that it is the parents' duty to look after the salvation of
their children, especially before they come to the use of reason.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the marriage bond, both husband and wife have the use of
the free-will, and each can assent to the faith without the other's
consent. But this does not apply to a child before it comes to the use of
reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child has come to the use
of reason, if it is willing to be converted.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: No one should be snatched from natural death against the
order of civil law: for instance, if a man were condemned by the judge to
temporal death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence: hence no one
ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby a child is in the
custody of its father, in order to rescue it from the danger of
everlasting death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Jews are bondsmen of princes by civil bondage, which does
not exclude the order of natural or Divine law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he can know
Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the natural
order of things, is directed to God by its parents' reason, under whose
care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose of the child in all
matters relating to God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[10] A[12] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: The peril that ensues from the omission of preaching,
threatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of preaching. Hence
it had already been said (Ezech. 3:17): "I have made thee a watchman to
the children [Vulg.: 'house'] of Israel." On the other hand, to provide
the sacraments of salvation for the children of unbelievers is the duty
of their parents. Hence it is they whom the danger threatens, if through
being deprived of the sacraments their children fail to obtain salvation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] Out. Para. 1/1
OF HERESY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider heresy: under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether heresy is a kind of unbelief?
(2) Of the matter about which it is;
(3) Whether heretics should be tolerated?
(4) Whether converts should be received?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether heresy is a species of unbelief?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that heresy is not a species of unbelief. For
unbelief is in the understanding, as stated above (Q[10], A[2]). Now
heresy would seem not to pertain to the understanding, but rather to the
appetitive power; for Jerome says on Gal. 5:19: [*Cf. Decretals xxiv, qu.
iii, cap. 27] "The works of the flesh are manifest: Heresy is derived
from a Greek word meaning choice, whereby a man makes choice of that
school which he deems best." But choice is an act of the appetitive
power, as stated above (FS, Q[13], A[1]). Therefore heresy is not a
species of unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, vice takes its species chiefly from its end; hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who commits adultery that he may
steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer." Now the end of heresy is
temporal profit, especially lordship and glory, which belong to the vice
of pride or covetousness: for Augustine says (De Util. Credendi i) that
"a heretic is one who either devises or follows false and new opinions,
for the sake of some temporal profit, especially that he may lord and be
honored above others." Therefore heresy is a species of pride rather than
of unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, since unbelief is in the understanding, it would seem
not to pertain to the flesh. Now heresy belongs to the works of the
flesh, for the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh are
manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness," and among the others, he
adds, "dissensions, sects," which are the same as heresies. Therefore
heresy is not a species of unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Falsehood is contrary to truth. Now a heretic is one
who devises or follows false or new opinions. Therefore heresy is opposed
to the truth, on which faith is founded; and consequently it is a species
of unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, The word heresy as stated in the first objection denotes
a choosing. Now choice as stated above (FS, Q[13], A[3]) is about things
directed to the end, the end being presupposed. Now, in matters of faith,
the will assents to some truth, as to its proper good, as was shown above
(Q[4], A[3]): wherefore that which is the chief truth, has the character
of last end, while those which are secondary truths, have the character
of being directed to the end.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] Body Para. 2/4
Now, whoever believes, assents to someone's words; so that, in every
form of unbelief, the person to whose words assent is given seems to hold
the chief place and to be the end as it were; while the things by holding
which one assents to that person hold a secondary place. Consequently he
that holds the Christian faith aright, assents, by his will, to Christ,
in those things which truly belong to His doctrine.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] Body Para. 3/4
Accordingly there are two ways in which a man may deviate from the
rectitude of the Christian faith. First, because he is unwilling to
assent to Christ: and such a man has an evil will, so to say, in respect
of the very end. This belongs to the species of unbelief in pagans and
Jews. Secondly, because, though he intends to assent to Christ, yet he
fails in his choice of those things wherein he assents to Christ, because
he chooses not what Christ really taught, but the suggestions of his own
mind.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] Body Para. 4/4
Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, belonging to those who
profess the Christian faith, but corrupt its dogmas.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Choice regards unbelief in the same way as the will regards
faith, as stated above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Vices take their species from their proximate end, while,
from their remote end, they take their genus and cause. Thus in the case
of adultery committed for the sake of theft, there is the species of
adultery taken from its proper end and object; but the ultimate end shows
that the act of adultery is both the result of the theft, and is included
under it, as an effect under its cause, or a species under its genus, as
appears from what we have said about acts in general (FS, Q[18], A[7]).
Wherefore, as to the case in point also, the proximate end of heresy is
adherence to one's own false opinion, and from this it derives its
species, while its remote end reveals its cause, viz. that it arises
from pride or covetousness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Just as heresy is so called from its being a choosing
[*From the Greek {airein} [hairein], to cut off], so does sect derive its
name from its being a cutting off [secando], as Isidore states (Etym.
viii, 3). Wherefore heresy and sect are the same thing, and each belongs
to the works of the flesh, not indeed by reason of the act itself of
unbelief in respect of its proximate object, but by reason of its cause,
which is either the desire of an undue end in which way it arises from
pride or covetousness, as stated in the second objection, or some
illusion of the imagination (which gives rise to error, as the
Philosopher states in Metaph. iv; Ed. Did. iii, 5), for this faculty has
a certain connection with the flesh, in as much as its act is independent
on a bodily organ.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether heresy is properly about matters of faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that heresy is not properly about matters of faith.
For just as there are heresies and sects among Christians, so were there
among the Jews, and Pharisees, as Isidore observes (Etym. viii, 3,4,5).
Now their dissensions were not about matters of faith. Therefore heresy
is not about matters of faith, as though they were its proper matter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the matter of faith is the thing believed. Now heresy is
not only about things, but also about works, and about interpretations of
Holy Writ. For Jerome says on Gal. 5:20 that "whoever expounds the
Scriptures in any sense but that of the Holy Ghost by Whom they were
written, may be called a heretic, though he may not have left the
Church": and elsewhere he says that "heresies spring up from words spoken
amiss." [*St. Thomas quotes this saying elsewhere, in Sent. iv, D, 13,
and TP, Q[16], A[8], but it is not to be found in St. Jerome's works.]
Therefore heresy is not properly about the matter of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, we find the holy doctors differing even about matters
pertaining to the faith, for example Augustine and Jerome, on the
question about the cessation of the legal observances: and yet this was
without any heresy on their part. Therefore heresy is not properly about
the matter of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says against the Manichees [*Cf. De Civ. Dei
xviii, 51]: "In Christ's Church, those are heretics, who hold mischievous
and erroneous opinions, and when rebuked that they may think soundly and
rightly, offer a stubborn resistance, and, refusing to mend their
pernicious and deadly doctrines, persist in defending them." Now
pernicious and deadly doctrines are none but those which are contrary to
the dogmas of faith, whereby "the just man liveth" (Rm. 1:17). Therefore
heresy is about matters of faith, as about its proper matter.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, We are speaking of heresy now as denoting a corruption of
the Christian faith. Now it does not imply a corruption of the Christian
faith, if a man has a false opinion in matters that are not of faith, for
instance, in questions of geometry and so forth, which cannot belong to
the faith by any means; but only when a person has a false opinion about
things belonging to the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now a thing may be of the faith in two ways, as stated above (FP, Q[32],
A[4]; FS, Q[1], A[6], ad 1; FS, Q[2], A[5]), in one way, directly and
principally, e.g. the articles of faith; in another way, indirectly and
secondarily, e.g. those matters, the denial of which leads to the
corruption of some article of faith; and there may be heresy in either
way, even as there can be faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as the heresies of the Jews and Pharisees were about
opinions relating to Judaism or Pharisaism, so also heresies among
Christians are about matter touching the Christian faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A man is said to expound Holy Writ in another sense than
that required by the Holy Ghost, when he so distorts the meaning of Holy
Writ, that it is contrary to what the Holy Ghost has revealed. Hence it
is written (Ezech. 13:6) about the false prophets: "They have persisted
to confirm what they have said," viz. by false interpretations of
Scripture. Moreover a man professes his faith by the words that he
utters, since confession is an act of faith, as stated above (Q[3], A[1]
). Wherefore inordinate words about matters of faith may lead to
corruption of the faith; and hence it is that Pope Leo says in a letter
to Proterius, Bishop of Alexandria: "The enemies of Christ's cross lie in
wait for our every deed and word, so that, if we but give them the
slightest pretext, they may accuse us mendaciously of agreeing with
Nestorius."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: As Augustine says (Ep. xliii) and we find it stated in the
Decretals (xxiv, qu. 3, can. Dixit Apostolus): "By no means should we
accuse of heresy those who, however false and perverse their opinion may
be, defend it without obstinate fervor, and seek the truth with careful
anxiety, ready to mend their opinion, when they have found the truth,"
because, to wit, they do not make a choice in contradiction to the
doctrine of the Church. Accordingly, certain doctors seem to have
differed either in matters the holding of which in this or that way is of
no consequence, so far as faith is concerned, or even in matters of
faith, which were not as yet defined by the Church; although if anyone
were obstinately to deny them after they had been defined by the
authority of the universal Church, he would be deemed a heretic. This
authority resides chiefly in the Sovereign Pontiff. For we read [*Decret.
xxiv, qu. 1, can. Quoties]: "Whenever a question of faith is in dispute,
I think, that all our brethren and fellow bishops ought to refer the
matter to none other than Peter, as being the source of their name and
honor, against whose authority neither Jerome nor Augustine nor any of
the holy doctors defended their opinion." Hence Jerome says (Exposit.
Symbol [*Among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]): "This, most
blessed Pope, is the faith that we have been taught in the Catholic
Church. If anything therein has been incorrectly or carelessly expressed,
we beg that it may be set aright by you who hold the faith and see of
Peter. If however this, our profession, be approved by the judgment of
your apostleship, whoever may blame me, will prove that he himself is
ignorant, or malicious, or even not a catholic but a heretic."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether heretics ought to be tolerated?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that heretics ought to be tolerated. For the Apostle
says (2 Tim. 2:24,25): "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle . . .
with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth, if peradventure God
may give them repentance to know the truth, and they may recover
themselves from the snares of the devil." Now if heretics are not
tolerated but put to death, they lose the opportunity of repentance.
Therefore it seems contrary to the Apostle's command.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever is necessary in the Church should be tolerated.
Now heresies are necessary in the Church, since the Apostle says (1 Cor.
11:19): "There must be . . . heresies, that they . . . who are reproved,
may be manifest among you." Therefore it seems that heretics should be
tolerated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Master commanded his servants (Mt. 13:30) to suffer
the cockle "to grow until the harvest," i.e. the end of the world, as a
gloss explains it. Now holy men explain that the cockle denotes heretics.
Therefore heretics should be tolerated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Titus 3:10,11): "A man that is a
heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid: knowing that he,
that is such an one, is subverted."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, With regard to heretics two points must be observed: one,
on their own side; the other, on the side of the Church. On their own
side there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be separated from
the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed from the world by
death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt the faith which quickens
the soul, than to forge money, which supports temporal life. Wherefore if
forgers of money and other evil-doers are forthwith condemned to death by
the secular authority, much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as
they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put
to death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the
conversion of the wanderer, wherefore she condemns not at once, but
"after the first and second admonition," as the Apostle directs: after
that, if he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for his
conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excommunicating him and
separating him from the Church, and furthermore delivers him to the
secular tribunal to be exterminated thereby from the world by death. For
Jerome commenting on Gal. 5:9, "A little leaven," says: "Cut off the
decayed flesh, expel the mangy sheep from the fold, lest the whole house,
the whole paste, the whole body, the whole flock, burn, perish, rot, die.
Arius was but one spark in Alexandria, but as that spark was not at once
put out, the whole earth was laid waste by its flame."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This very modesty demands that the heretic should be
admonished a first and second time: and if he be unwilling to retract, he
must be reckoned as already "subverted," as we may gather from the words
of the Apostle quoted above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The profit that ensues from heresy is beside the intention
of heretics, for it consists in the constancy of the faithful being put
to the test, and "makes us shake off our sluggishness, and search the
Scriptures more carefully," as Augustine states (De Gen. cont. Manich. i,
1). What they really intend is the corruption of the faith, which is to
inflict very great harm indeed. Consequently we should consider what they
directly intend, and expel them, rather than what is beside their
intention, and so, tolerate them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: According to Decret. (xxiv, qu. iii, can. Notandum), "to be
excommunicated is not to be uprooted." A man is excommunicated, as the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:5) that his "spirit may be saved in the day of Our
Lord." Yet if heretics be altogether uprooted by death, this is not
contrary to Our Lord's command, which is to be understood as referring to
the case when the cockle cannot be plucked up without plucking up the
wheat, as we explained above (Q[10], A[8], ad 1), when treating of
unbelievers in general.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the Church should receive those who return from heresy?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the Church ought in all cases to receive those
who return from heresy. For it is written (Jer. 3:1) in the person of the
Lord: "Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers; nevertheless return
to Me saith the Lord." Now the sentence of the Church is God's sentence,
according to Dt. 1:17: "You shall hear the little as well as the great:
neither shall you respect any man's person, because it is the judgment of
God." Therefore even those who are guilty of the prostitution of unbelief
which is spiritual prostitution, should be received all the same.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Our Lord commanded Peter (Mt. 18:22) to forgive his
offending brother "not" only "till seven times, but till seventy times
seven times," which Jerome expounds as meaning that "a man should be
forgiven, as often as he has sinned." Therefore he ought to be received
by the Church as often as he has sinned by falling back into heresy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, heresy is a kind of unbelief. Now other unbelievers who
wish to be converted are received by the Church. Therefore heretics also
should be received.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Decretal Ad abolendam (De Haereticis, cap. ix) says
that "those who are found to have relapsed into the error which they had
already abjured, must be left to the secular tribunal." Therefore they
should not be received by the Church.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, In obedience to Our Lord's institution, the Church
extends her charity to all, not only to friends, but also to foes who
persecute her, according to Mt. 5:44: "Love your enemies; do good to them
that hate you." Now it is part of charity that we should both wish and
work our neighbor's good. Again, good is twofold: one is spiritual,
namely the health of the soul, which good is chiefly the object of
charity, since it is this chiefly that we should wish for one another.
Consequently, from this point of view, heretics who return after falling
no matter how often, are admitted by the Church to Penance whereby the
way of salvation is opened to them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
The other good is that which charity considers secondarily, viz.
temporal good, such as life of the body, worldly possessions, good
repute, ecclesiastical or secular dignity, for we are not bound by
charity to wish others this good, except in relation to the eternal
salvation of them and of others. Hence if the presence of one of these
goods in one individual might be an obstacle to eternal salvation in
many, we are not bound out of charity to wish such a good to that person,
rather should we desire him to be without it, both because eternal
salvation takes precedence of temporal good, and because the good of the
many is to be preferred to the good of one. Now if heretics were always
received on their return, in order to save their lives and other temporal
goods, this might be prejudicial to the salvation of others, both because
they would infect others if they relapsed again, and because, if they
escaped without punishment, others would feel more assured in lapsing
into heresy. For it is written (Eccles. 8:11): "For because sentence is
not speedily pronounced against the evil, the children of men commit
evils without any fear."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
For this reason the Church not only admits to Penance those who return
from heresy for the first time, but also safeguards their lives, and
sometimes by dispensation, restores them to the ecclesiastical dignities
which they may have had before, should their conversion appear to be
sincere: we read of this as having frequently been done for the good of
peace. But when they fall again, after having been received, this seems
to prove them to be inconstant in faith, wherefore when they return
again, they are admitted to Penance, but are not delivered from the pain
of death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In God's tribunal, those who return are always received,
because God is a searcher of hearts, and knows those who return in
sincerity. But the Church cannot imitate God in this, for she presumes
that those who relapse after being once received, are not sincere in
their return; hence she does not debar them from the way of salvation,
but neither does she protect them from the sentence of death.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Our Lord was speaking to Peter of sins committed against
oneself, for one should always forgive such offenses and spare our
brother when he repents. These words are not to be applied to sins
committed against one's neighbor or against God, for it is not left to
our discretion to forgive such offenses, as Jerome says on Mt. 18:15, "If
thy brother shall offend against thee." Yet even in this matter the law
prescribes limits according as God's honor or our neighbor's good demands.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[11] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: When other unbelievers, who have never received the faith
are converted, they do not as yet show signs of inconstancy in faith, as
relapsed heretics do; hence the comparison fails.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] Out. Para. 1/1
OF APOSTASY (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider apostasy: about which there are two points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?
(2) Whether, on account of apostasy from the faith, subjects are
absolved from allegiance to an apostate prince?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that apostasy does not pertain to unbelief. For
that which is the origin of all sins, does not, seemingly, pertain to
unbelief, since many sins there are without unbelief. Now apostasy seems
to be the origin of every sin, for it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): "The
beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from
God," and further on, (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning of all
sin." Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, unbelief is an act of the understanding: whereas
apostasy seems rather to consist in some outward deed or utterance, or
even in some inward act of the will, for it is written (Prov. 6:12-14):
"A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man walketh with a perverse
mouth. He winketh with the eyes, presseth with the foot, speaketh with
the finger. With a wicked heart he deviseth evil, and at all times he
soweth discord." Moreover if anyone were to have himself circumcised, or
to worship at the tomb of Mahomet, he would be deemed an apostate.
Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, heresy, since it pertains to unbelief, is a determinate
species of unbelief. If then, apostasy pertained to unbelief, it would
follow that it is a determinate species of unbelief, which does not seem
to agree with what has been said (Q[10], A[5]). Therefore apostasy does
not pertain to unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:67): "Many of his disciples went
back," i.e. apostatized, of whom Our Lord had said previously (Jn. 6:65):
"There are some of you that believe not." Therefore apostasy pertains to
unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Apostasy denotes a backsliding from God. This may happen
in various ways according to the different kinds of union between man and
God. For, in the first place, man is united to God by faith; secondly, by
having his will duly submissive in obeying His commandments; thirdly, by
certain special things pertaining to supererogation such as the religious
life, the clerical state, or Holy Orders. Now if that which follows be
removed, that which precedes, remains, but the converse does not hold.
Accordingly a man may apostatize from God, by withdrawing from the
religious life to which he was bound by profession, or from the Holy
Order which he had received: and this is called "apostasy from religious
life" or "Orders." A man may also apostatize from God, by rebelling in
his mind against the Divine commandments: and though man may apostatize
in both the above ways, he may still remain united to God by faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
But if he give up the faith, then he seems to turn away from God
altogether: and consequently, apostasy simply and absolutely is that
whereby a man withdraws from the faith, and is called "apostasy of
perfidy." In this way apostasy, simply so called, pertains to unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This objection refers to the second kind of apostasy, which
denotes an act of the will in rebellion against God's commandments, an
act that is to be found in every mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: It belongs to faith not only that the heart should believe,
but also that external words and deeds should bear witness to the inward
faith, for confession is an act of faith. In this way too, certain
external words or deeds pertain to unbelief, in so far as they are signs
of unbelief, even as a sign of health is said itself to be healthy. Now
although the authority quoted may be understood as referring to every
kind of apostate, yet it applies most truly to an apostate from the
faith. For since faith is the first foundation of things to be hoped for,
and since, without faith it is "impossible to please God"; when once
faith is removed, man retains nothing that may be useful for the
obtaining of eternal salvation, for which reason it is written (Prov.
6:12): "A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man": because faith is
the life of the soul, according to Rm. 1:17: "The just man liveth by
faith." Therefore, just as when the life of the body is taken away, man's
every member and part loses its due disposition, so when the life of
justice, which is by faith, is done away, disorder appears in all his
members. First, in his mouth, whereby chiefly his mind stands revealed;
secondly, in his eyes; thirdly, in the instrument of movement; fourthly,
in his will, which tends to evil. The result is that "he sows discord,"
endeavoring to sever others from the faith even as he severed himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The species of a quality or form are not diversified by the
fact of its being the term "wherefrom" or "whereto" of movement: on the
contrary, it is the movement that takes its species from the terms. Now
apostasy regards unbelief as the term "whereto" of the movement of
withdrawal from the faith; wherefore apostasy does not imply a special
kind of unbelief, but an aggravating circumstance thereof, according to 2
Pt. 2:21: "It had been better for them not to know the truth [Vulg.: 'the
way of justice'], than after they had known it, to turn back."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a prince forfeits his dominion over his subjects, on account of
apostasy from the faith, so that they no longer owe him allegiance?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a prince does not so forfeit his dominion over
his subjects, on account of apostasy from the faith, that they no longer
owe him allegiance. For Ambrose [*St. Augustine, Super Ps. 124:3] says
that the Emperor Julian, though an apostate, nevertheless had under him
Christian soldiers, who when he said to them, "Fall into line for the
defense of the republic," were bound to obey. Therefore subjects are not
absolved from their allegiance to their prince on account of his apostasy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, an apostate from the faith is an unbeliever. Now we find
that certain holy men served unbelieving masters; thus Joseph served
Pharaoh, Daniel served Nabuchodonosor, and Mardochai served Assuerus.
Therefore apostasy from the faith does not release subjects from
allegiance to their sovereign.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, just as by apostasy from the faith, a man turns away
from God, so does every sin. Consequently if, on account of apostasy from
the faith, princes were to lose their right to command those of their
subjects who are believers, they would equally lose it on account of
other sins: which is evidently not the case. Therefore we ought not to
refuse allegiance to a sovereign on account of his apostatizing from the
faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory VII says (Council, Roman V): "Holding to the
institutions of our holy predecessors, we, by our apostolic authority,
absolve from their oath those who through loyalty or through the sacred
bond of an oath owe allegiance to excommunicated persons: and we
absolutely forbid them to continue their allegiance to such persons,
until these shall have made amends." Now apostates from the faith, like
heretics, are excommunicated, according to the Decretal [*Extra, De
Haereticis, cap. Ad abolendam]. Therefore princes should not be obeyed
when they have apostatized from the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[2] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (Q[10], A[10]), unbelief, in itself, is
not inconsistent with dominion, since dominion is a device of the law of
nations which is a human law: whereas the distinction between believers
and unbelievers is of Divine right, which does not annul human right.
Nevertheless a man who sins by unbelief may be sentenced to the loss of
his right of dominion, as also, sometimes, on account of other sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[2] Body Para. 2/2
Now it is not within the competency of the Church to punish unbelief in
those who have never received the faith, according to the saying of the
Apostle (1 Cor. 5:12): "What have I to do to judge them that are
without?" She can, however, pass sentence of punishment on the unbelief
of those who have received the faith: and it is fitting that they should
be punished by being deprived of the allegiance of their subjects: for
this same allegiance might conduce to great corruption of the faith,
since, as was stated above (A[1], OBJ[2]), "a man that is an apostate . .
. with a wicked heart deviseth evil, and . . . soweth discord," in order
to sever others from the faith. Consequently, as soon as sentence of
excommunication is passed on a man on account of apostasy from the faith,
his subjects are "ipso facto" absolved from his authority and from the
oath of allegiance whereby they were bound to him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: At that time the Church was but recently instituted, and
had not, as yet, the power of curbing earthly princes; and so she allowed
the faithful to obey Julian the apostate, in matters that were not
contrary to the faith, in order to avoid incurring a yet greater danger.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: As stated in the article, it is not a question of those
unbelievers who have never received the faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[12] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Apostasy from the faith severs man from God altogether, as
stated above (A[1]), which is not the case in any other sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] Out. Para. 1/2
OF THE SIN OF BLASPHEMY, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the sin of blasphemy, which is opposed to the
confession of faith; and (1) blasphemy in general, (2) that blasphemy
which is called the sin against the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith?
(2) Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin?
(3) Whether blasphemy is the most grievous sin?
(4) Whether blasphemy is in the damned?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that blasphemy is not opposed to the confession of
faith. Because to blaspheme is to utter an affront or insult against the
Creator. Now this pertains to ill-will against God rather than to
unbelief. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to the confession of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, on Eph. 4:31, "Let blasphemy . . . be put away from
you," a gloss says, "that which is committed against God or the saints."
But confession of faith, seemingly, is not about other things than those
pertaining to God, Who is the object of faith. Therefore blasphemy is not
always opposed to the confession of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, according to some, there are three kinds of blasphemy.
The first of these is when something unfitting is affirmed of God; the
second is when something fitting is denied of Him; and the third, when
something proper to God is ascribed to a creature, so that, seemingly,
blasphemy is not only about God, but also about His creatures. Now the
object of faith is God. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to confession
of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12,13): "I . . . before was
a blasphemer and a persecutor," and afterwards, "I did it ignorantly in"
my "unbelief." Hence it seems that blasphemy pertains to unbelief.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The word blasphemy seems to denote the disparagement of
some surpassing goodness, especially that of God. Now God, as Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. i), is the very essence of true goodness. Hence whatever
befits God, pertains to His goodness, and whatever does not befit Him, is
far removed from the perfection of goodness which is His Essence.
Consequently whoever either denies anything befitting God, or affirms
anything unbefitting Him, disparages the Divine goodness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Now this may happen in two ways. In the first way it may happen merely
in respect of the opinion in the intellect; in the second way this
opinion is united to a certain detestation in the affections, even as, on
the other hand, faith in God is perfected by love of Him. Accordingly
this disparagement of the Divine goodness is either in the intellect
alone, or in the affections also. If it is in thought only, it is
blasphemy of the heart, whereas if it betrays itself outwardly in speech
it is blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: He that speaks against God, with the intention of reviling
Him, disparages the Divine goodness, not only in respect of the falsehood
in his intellect, but also by reason of the wickedness of his will,
whereby he detests and strives to hinder the honor due to God, and this
is perfect blasphemy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even as God is praised in His saints, in so far as praise
is given to the works which God does in His saints, so does blasphemy
against the saints, redound, as a consequence, against God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Properly speaking, the sin of blasphemy is not in this way
divided into three species: since to affirm unfitting things, or to deny
fitting things of God, differ merely as affirmation and negation. For
this diversity does not cause distinct species of habits, since the
falsehood of affirmations and negations is made known by the same
knowledge, and it is the same ignorance which errs in either way, since
negatives are proved by affirmatives, according to Poster. i, 25. Again
to ascribe to creatures things that are proper to God, seems to amount to
the same as affirming something unfitting of Him, since whatever is
proper to God is God Himself: and to ascribe to a creature, that which is
proper to God, is to assert that God is the same as a creature.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that blasphemy is not always a mortal sin. Because
a gloss on the words, "Now lay you also all away," etc. (Col. 3:8) says:
"After prohibiting greater crimes he forbids lesser sins": and yet among
the latter he includes blasphemy. Therefore blasphemy is comprised among
the lesser, i.e. venial, sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to one of the precepts of
the decalogue. But, seemingly, blasphemy is not contrary to any of them.
Therefore blasphemy is not a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, sins committed without deliberation, are not mortal:
hence first movements are not mortal sins, because they precede the
deliberation of the reason, as was shown above (FS, Q[74], AA[3],10). Now
blasphemy sometimes occurs without deliberation of the reason. Therefore
it is not always a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 24:16): "He that blasphemeth the
name of the Lord, dying let him die." Now the death punishment is not
inflicted except for a mortal sin. Therefore blasphemy is a mortal sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[72], A[5]), a mortal sin is one
whereby a man is severed from the first principle of spiritual life,
which principle is the charity of God. Therefore whatever things are
contrary to charity, are mortal sins in respect of their genus. Now
blasphemy, as to its genus, is opposed to Divine charity, because, as
stated above (A[1]), it disparages the Divine goodness, which is the
object of charity. Consequently blasphemy is a mortal sin, by reason of
its genus.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: This gloss is not to be understood as meaning that all the
sins which follow, are mortal, but that whereas all those mentioned
previously are more grievous sins, some of those mentioned afterwards are
less grievous; and yet among the latter some more grievous sins are
included.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Since, as stated above (A[1]), blasphemy is contrary to the
confession of faith, its prohibition is comprised under the prohibition
of unbelief, expressed by the words: "I am the Lord thy God," etc. (Ex.
20:1). Or else, it is forbidden by the words: "Thou shalt not take the
name of . . . God in vain" (Ex. 20:7). Because he who asserts something
false about God, takes His name in vain even more than he who uses the
name of God in confirmation of a falsehood.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: There are two ways in which blasphemy may occur unawares
and without deliberation. In the first way, by a man failing to advert to
the blasphemous nature of his words, and this may happen through his
being moved suddenly by passion so as to break out into words suggested
by his imagination, without heeding to the meaning of those words: this
is a venial sin, and is not a blasphemy properly so called. In the second
way, by adverting to the meaning of his words, and to their blasphemous
nature: in which case he is not excused from mortal sin, even as neither
is he who, in a sudden movement of anger, kills one who is sitting beside
him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sin of blasphemy is the greatest sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the sin of blasphemy is not the greatest sin.
For, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), a thing is said to be evil
because it does harm. Now the sin of murder, since it destroys a man's
life, does more harm than the sin of blasphemy, which can do no harm to
God. Therefore the sin of murder is more grievous than that of blasphemy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a perjurer calls upon God to witness to a falsehood, and
thus seems to assert that God is false. But not every blasphemer goes so
far as to say that God is false. Therefore perjury is a more grievous sin
than blasphemy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, on Ps. 74:6, "Lift not up your horn on high," a gloss
says: "To excuse oneself for sin is the greatest sin of all." Therefore
blasphemy is not the greatest sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, On Is. 18:2, "To a terrible people," etc. a gloss says:
"In comparison with blasphemy, every sin is slight."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), blasphemy is opposed to the
confession of faith, so that it contains the gravity of unbelief: while
the sin is aggravated if the will's detestation is added thereto, and yet
more, if it breaks out into words, even as love and confession add to the
praise of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Therefore, since, as stated above (Q[10], A[3]), unbelief is the
greatest of sins in respect of its genus, it follows that blasphemy also
is a very great sin, through belonging to the same genus as unbelief and
being an aggravated form of that sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: If we compare murder and blasphemy as regards the objects
of those sins, it is clear that blasphemy, which is a sin committed
directly against God, is more grave than murder, which is a sin against
one's neighbor. On the other hand, if we compare them in respect of the
harm wrought by them, murder is the graver sin, for murder does more harm
to one's neighbor, than blasphemy does to God. Since, however, the
gravity of a sin depends on the intention of the evil will, rather than
on the effect of the deed, as was shown above (FS, Q[73], A[8]), it
follows that, as the blasphemer intends to do harm to God's honor,
absolutely speaking, he sins more grievously that the murderer.
Nevertheless murder takes precedence, as to punishment, among sins
committed against our neighbor.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: A gloss on the words, "Let . . . blasphemy be put away from
you" (Eph. 4:31) says: "Blasphemy is worse than perjury." The reason is
that the perjurer does not say or think something false about God, as the
blasphemer does: but he calls God to witness to a falsehood, not that he
deems God a false witness, but in the hope, as it were, that God will not
testify to the matter by some evident sign.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To excuse oneself for sin is a circumstance that aggravates
every sin, even blasphemy itself: and it is called the most grievous sin,
for as much as it makes every sin more grievous.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the damned blaspheme?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the damned do not blaspheme. Because some
wicked men are deterred from blaspheming now, on account of the fear of
future punishment. But the damned are undergoing these punishments, so
that they abhor them yet more. Therefore, much more are they restrained
from blaspheming.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, since blasphemy is a most grievous sin, it is most
demeritorious. Now in the life to come there is no state of meriting or
demeriting. Therefore there will be no place for blasphemy.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, it is written (Eccles. 11:3) that "the tree . . . in
what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be": whence it clearly
follows that, after this life, man acquires neither merit nor sin, which
he did not already possess in this life. Now many will be damned who were
not blasphemous in this life. Neither, therefore, will they blaspheme in
the life to come.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 16:9): "The men were scorched with
great heat, and they blasphemed the name of God, Who hath power over
these plagues," and a gloss on these words says that "those who are in
hell, though aware that they are deservedly punished, will nevertheless
complain that God is so powerful as to torture them thus." Now this would
be blasphemy in their present state: and consequently it will also be in
their future state.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[4] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (AA[1],3), detestation of the Divine
goodness is a necessary condition of blasphemy. Now those who are in hell
retain their wicked will which is turned away from God's justice, since
they love the things for which they are punished, would wish to use them
if they could, and hate the punishments inflicted on them for those same
sins. They regret indeed the sins which they have committed, not because
they hate them, but because they are punished for them. Accordingly this
detestation of the Divine justice is, in them, the interior blasphemy of
the heart: and it is credible that after the resurrection they will
blaspheme God with the tongue, even as the saints will praise Him with
their voices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the present life men are deterred from blasphemy through
fear of punishment which they think they can escape: whereas, in hell,
the damned have no hope of escape, so that, in despair, they are borne
towards whatever their wicked will suggests to them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Merit and demerit belong to the state of a wayfarer,
wherefore good is meritorious in them, while evil is demeritorious. In
the blessed, on the other hand, good is not meritorious, but is part of
their blissful reward, and, in like manner, in the damned, evil is not
demeritorious, but is part of the punishment of damnation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[13] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Whoever dies in mortal sin, bears with him a will that
detests the Divine justice with regard to a certain thing, and in this
respect there can be blasphemy in him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] Out. Para. 1/1
OF BLASPHEMY AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider in particular blasphemy against the Holy Ghost:
under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether blasphemy or the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same as
the sin committed through certain malice?
(2) Of the species of this sin;
(3) Whether it can be forgiven?
(4) Whether it is possible to begin by sinning against the Holy Ghost
before committing other sins?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same as the sin committed
through certain malice?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same
as the sin committed through certain malice. Because the sin against the
Holy Ghost is the sin of blasphemy, according to Mt. 12:32. But not every
sin committed through certain malice is a sin of blasphemy: since many
other kinds of sin may be committed through certain malice. Therefore the
sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through
certain malice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the sin committed through certain malice is condivided
with sin committed through ignorance, and sin committed through weakness:
whereas the sin against the Holy Ghost is condivided with the sin against
the Son of Man (Mt. 12:32). Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is
not the same as the sin committed through certain malice, since things
whose opposites differ, are themselves different.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is itself a generic sin,
having its own determinate species: whereas sin committed through certain
malice is not a special kind of sin, but a condition or general
circumstance of sin, which can affect any kind of sin at all. Therefore
the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed
through certain malice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Master says (Sent. ii, D, 43) that "to sin against
the Holy Ghost is to take pleasure in the malice of sin for its own
sake." Now this is to sin through certain malice. Therefore it seems that
the sin committed through certain malice is the same as the sin against
the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Three meanings have been given to the sin against the
Holy Ghost. For the earlier doctors, viz. Athanasius (Super Matth. xii,
32), Hilary (Can. xii in Matth.), Ambrose (Super Luc. xii, 10), Jerome
(Super Matth. xii), and Chrysostom (Hom. xli in Matth.), say that the sin
against the Holy Ghost is literally to utter a blasphemy against the Holy
Spirit, whether by Holy Spirit we understand the essential name
applicable to the whole Trinity, each Person of which is a Spirit and is
holy, or the personal name of one of the Persons of the Trinity, in which
sense blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is distinct from the blasphemy
against the Son of Man (Mt. 12:32), for Christ did certain things in
respect of His human nature, by eating, drinking, and such like actions,
while He did others in respect of His Godhead, by casting out devils,
raising the dead, and the like: which things He did both by the power of
His own Godhead and by the operation of the Holy Ghost, of Whom He was
full, according to his human nature. Now the Jews began by speaking
blasphemy against the Son of Man, when they said (Mt. 11:19) that He was
"a glutton . . . a wine drinker," and a "friend of publicans": but
afterwards they blasphemed against the Holy Ghost, when they ascribed to
the prince of devils those works which Christ did by the power of His own
Divine Nature and by the operation of the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] Body Para. 2/4
Augustine, however (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi), says that blasphemy or
the sin against the Holy Ghost, is final impenitence when, namely, a man
perseveres in mortal sin until death, and that it is not confined to
utterance by word of mouth, but extends to words in thought and deed, not
to one word only, but to many. Now this word, in this sense, is said to
be uttered against the Holy Ghost, because it is contrary to the
remission of sins, which is the work of the Holy Ghost, Who is the
charity both of the Father and of the Son. Nor did Our Lord say this to
the Jews, as though they had sinned against the Holy Ghost, since they
were not yet guilty of final impenitence, but He warned them, lest by
similar utterances they should come to sin against the Holy Ghost: and it
is in this sense that we are to understand Mark 3:29,30, where after Our
Lord had said: "But he that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost," etc.
the Evangelist adds, "because they said: He hath an unclean spirit."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] Body Para. 3/4
But others understand it differently, and say that the sin of blasphemy
against the Holy Ghost, is a sin committed against that good which is
appropriated to the Holy Ghost: because goodness is appropriated to the
Holy Ghost, just a power is appropriated to the Father, and wisdom to the
Son. Hence they say that when a man sins through weakness, it is a sin
"against the Father"; that when he sins through ignorance, it is a sin
"against the Son"; and that when he sins through certain malice, i.e.
through the very choosing of evil, as explained above (FS, Q[78], AA[1]
,3), it is a sin "against the Holy Ghost."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] Body Para. 4/4
Now this may happen in two ways. First by reason of the very inclination
of a vicious habit which we call malice, and, in this way, to sin through
malice is not the same as to sin against the Holy Ghost. In another way
it happens that by reason of contempt, that which might have prevented
the choosing of evil, is rejected or removed; thus hope is removed by
despair, and fear by presumption, and so on, as we shall explain further
on (QQ[20],21). Now all these things which prevent the choosing of sin
are effects of the Holy Ghost in us; so that, in this sense, to sin
through malice is to sin against the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Just as the confession of faith consists in a protestation
not only of words but also of deeds, so blasphemy against the Holy Ghost
can be uttered in word, thought and deed.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: According to the third interpretation, blasphemy against
the Holy Ghost is condivided with blasphemy against the Son of Man,
forasmuch as He is also the Son of God, i.e. the "power of God and the
wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24). Wherefore, in this sense, the sin against
the Son of Man will be that which is committed through ignorance, or
through weakness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Sin committed through certain malice, in so far as it
results from the inclination of a habit, is not a special sin, but a
general condition of sin: whereas, in so far as it results from a special
contempt of an effect of the Holy Ghost in us, it has the character of a
special sin. According to this interpretation the sin against the Holy
Ghost is a special kind of sin, as also according to the first
interpretation: whereas according to the second, it is not a species of
sin, because final impenitence may be a circumstance of any kind of sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether it is fitting to distinguish six kinds of sin against the Holy
Ghost?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish six kinds of sin against
the Holy Ghost, viz. despair, presumption, impenitence, obstinacy,
resisting the known truth, envy of our brother's spiritual good, which
are assigned by the Master (Sent. ii, D, 43). For to deny God's justice
or mercy belongs to unbelief. Now, by despair, a man rejects God's mercy,
and by presumption, His justice. Therefore each of these is a kind of
unbelief rather than of the sin against the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, impenitence, seemingly, regards past sins, while
obstinacy regards future sins. Now past and future time do not diversify
the species of virtues or vices, since it is the same faith whereby we
believe that Christ was born, and those of old believed that He would be
born. Therefore obstinacy and impenitence should not be reckoned as two
species of sin against the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "grace and truth came by Jesus Christ" (Jn. 1:17).
Therefore it seem that resistance of the known truth, and envy of a
brother's spiritual good, belong to blasphemy against the Son rather than
against the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, Bernard says (De Dispens. et Praecept. xi) that "to
refuse to obey is to resist the Holy Ghost." Moreover a gloss on Lev.
10:16, says that "a feigned repentance is a blasphemy against the Holy
Ghost." Again, schism is, seemingly, directly opposed to the Holy Ghost
by Whom the Church is united together. Therefore it seems that the
species of sins against the Holy Ghost are insufficiently enumerated.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius] (De Fide ad Petrum iii) says
that "those who despair of pardon for their sins, or who without merits
presume on God's mercy, sin against the Holy Ghost," and (Enchiridion
lxxxiii) that "he who dies in a state of obstinacy is guilty of the sin
against the Holy Ghost," and (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that
"impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost," and (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte xxii), that "to resist fraternal goodness with the brands of envy
is to sin against the Holy Ghost," and in his book De unico Baptismo (De
Bap. contra Donat. vi, 35) he says that "a man who spurns the truth, is
either envious of his brethren to whom the truth is revealed, or
ungrateful to God, by Whose inspiration the Church is taught," and
therefore, seemingly, sins against the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, The above species are fittingly assigned to the sin
against the Holy Ghost taken in the third sense, because they are
distinguished in respect of the removal of contempt of those things
whereby a man can be prevented from sinning through choice. These things
are either on the part of God's judgment, or on the part of His gifts, or
on the part of sin. For, by consideration of the Divine judgment, wherein
justice is accompanied with mercy, man is hindered from sinning through
choice, both by hope, arising from the consideration of the mercy that
pardons sins and rewards good deeds, which hope is removed by "despair";
and by fear, arising from the consideration of the Divine justice that
punishes sins, which fear is removed by "presumption," when, namely, a
man presumes that he can obtain glory without merits, or pardon without
repentance.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] Body Para. 2/3
God's gifts whereby we are withdrawn from sin, are two: one is the
acknowledgment of the truth, against which there is the "resistance of
the known truth," when, namely, a man resists the truth which he has
acknowledged, in order to sin more freely: while the other is the
assistance of inward grace, against which there is "envy of a brother's
spiritual good," when, namely, a man is envious not only of his brother's
person, but also of the increase of Divine grace in the world.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] Body Para. 3/3
On the part of sin, there are two things which may withdraw man
therefrom: one is the inordinateness and shamefulness of the act, the
consideration of which is wont to arouse man to repentance for the sin he
has committed, and against this there is "impenitence," not as denoting
permanence in sin until death, in which sense it was taken above (for
thus it would not be a special sin, but a circumstance of sin), but as
denoting the purpose of not repenting. The other thing is the smallness
or brevity of the good which is sought in sin, according to Rm. 6:21:
"What fruit had you therefore then in those things, of which you are now
ashamed?" The consideration of this is wont to prevent man's will from
being hardened in sin, and this is removed by "obstinacy," whereby man
hardens his purpose by clinging to sin. Of these two it is written (Jer.
8:6): "There is none that doth penance for his sin, saying: What have I
done?" as regards the first; and, "They are all turned to their own
course, as a horse rushing to the battle," as regards the second.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The sins of despair and presumption consist, not in
disbelieving in God's justice and mercy, but in contemning them.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Obstinacy and impenitence differ not only in respect of
past and future time, but also in respect of certain formal aspects by
reason of the diverse consideration of those things which may be
considered in sin, as explained above.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Grace and truth were the work of Christ through the gifts
of the Holy Ghost which He gave to men.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: To refuse to obey belongs to obstinacy, while a feigned
repentance belongs to impenitence, and schism to the envy of a brother's
spiritual good, whereby the members of the Church are united together.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost can be
forgiven. For Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi): "We should
despair of no man, so long as Our Lord's patience brings him back to
repentance." But if any sin cannot be forgiven, it would be possible to
despair of some sinners. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost can be
forgiven.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no sin is forgiven, except through the soul being healed
by God. But "no disease is incurable to an all-powerful physician," as a
gloss says on Ps. 102:3, "Who healeth all thy diseases." Therefore the
sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the free-will is indifferent to either good or evil.
Now, so long as man is a wayfarer, he can fall away from any virtue,
since even an angel fell from heaven, wherefore it is written (Job
4:18,19): "In His angels He found wickedness: how much more shall they
that dwell in houses of clay?" Therefore, in like manner, a man can
return from any sin to the state of justice. Therefore the sin against
the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 12:32): "He that shall speak against
the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor
in the world to come": and Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 22)
that "so great is the downfall of this sin that it cannot submit to the
humiliation of asking for pardon."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, According to the various interpretations of the sin
against the Holy Ghost, there are various ways in which it may be said
that it cannot be forgiven. For if by the sin against the Holy Ghost we
understand final impenitence, it is said to be unpardonable, since in no
way is it pardoned: because the mortal sin wherein a man perseveres until
death will not be forgiven in the life to come, since it was not remitted
by repentance in this life.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] Body Para. 2/3
According to the other two interpretations, it is said to be
unpardonable, not as though it is nowise forgiven, but because,
considered in itself, it deserves not to be pardoned: and this in two
ways. First, as regards the punishment, since he that sins through
ignorance or weakness, deserves less punishment, whereas he that sins
through certain malice, can offer no excuse in alleviation of his
punishment. Likewise those who blasphemed against the Son of Man before
His Godhead was revealed, could have some excuse, on account of the
weakness of the flesh which they perceived in Him, and hence, they
deserved less punishment; whereas those who blasphemed against His very
Godhead, by ascribing to the devil the works of the Holy Ghost, had no
excuse in diminution of their punishment. Wherefore, according to
Chrysostom's commentary (Hom. xlii in Matth.), the Jews are said not to
be forgiven this sin, neither in this world nor in the world to come,
because they were punished for it, both in the present life, through the
Romans, and in the life to come, in the pains of hell. Thus also
Athanasius adduces the example of their forefathers who, first of all,
wrangled with Moses on account of the shortage of water and bread; and
this the Lord bore with patience, because they were to be excused on
account of the weakness of the flesh: but afterwards they sinned more
grievously when, by ascribing to an idol the favors bestowed by God Who
had brought them out of Egypt, they blasphemed, so to speak, against the
Holy Ghost, saying (Ex. 32:4): "These are thy gods, O Israel, that have
brought thee out of the land of Egypt." Therefore the Lord both inflicted
temporal punishment on them, since "there were slain on that day about
three and twenty thousand men" (Ex. 32:28), and threatened them with
punishment in the life to come, saying, (Ex. 32:34): "I, in the day of
revenge, will visit this sin . . . of theirs."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] Body Para. 3/3
Secondly, this may be understood to refer to the guilt: thus a disease
is said to be incurable in respect of the nature of the disease, which
removes whatever might be a means of cure, as when it takes away the
power of nature, or causes loathing for food and medicine, although God
is able to cure such a disease. So too, the sin against the Holy Ghost is
said to be unpardonable, by reason of its nature, in so far as it removes
those things which are a means towards the pardon of sins. This does not,
however, close the way of forgiveness and healing to an all-powerful and
merciful God, Who, sometimes, by a miracle, so to speak, restores
spiritual health to such men.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: We should despair of no man in this life, considering God's
omnipotence and mercy. But if we consider the circumstances of sin, some
are called (Eph. 2:2) "children of despair" [*'Filios diffidentiae,'
which the Douay version renders 'children of unbelief.'].
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers the question on the part of God's
omnipotence, not on that of the circumstances of sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: In this life the free-will does indeed ever remain subject
to change: yet sometimes it rejects that whereby, so far as it is
concerned, it can be turned to good. Hence considered in itself this sin
is unpardonable, although God can pardon it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man can sin first of all against the Holy Ghost?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that a man cannot sin first of all against the Holy
Ghost, without having previously committed other sins. For the natural
order requires that one should be moved to perfection from imperfection.
This is evident as regards good things, according to Prov. 4:18: "The
path of the just, as a shining light, goeth forwards and increases even
to perfect day." Now, in evil things, the perfect is the greatest evil,
as the Philosopher states (Metaph. v, text. 21). Since then the sin
against the Holy Ghost is the most grievous sin, it seems that man comes
to commit this sin through committing lesser sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, to sin against the Holy Ghost is to sin through certain
malice, or through choice. Now man cannot do this until he has sinned
many times; for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6,9) that "although a man
is able to do unjust deeds, yet he cannot all at once do them as an
unjust man does," viz. from choice. Therefore it seems that the sin
against the Holy Ghost cannot be committed except after other sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, repentance and impenitence are about the same object.
But there is no repentance, except about past sins. Therefore the same
applies to impenitence which is a species of the sin against the Holy
Ghost. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost presupposes other sins.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, "It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to make a
poor man rich" (Ecclus. 11:23). Therefore, conversely, it is possible for
a man, according to the malice of the devil who tempts him, to be led to
commit the most grievous of sins which is that against the Holy Ghost.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), in one way, to sin against the
Holy Ghost is to sin through certain malice. Now one may sin through
certain malice in two ways, as stated in the same place: first, through
the inclination of a habit; but this is not, properly speaking, to sin
against the Holy Ghost, nor does a man come to commit this sin all at
once, in as much as sinful acts must precede so as to cause the habit
that induces to sin. Secondly, one may sin through certain malice, by
contemptuously rejecting the things whereby a man is withdrawn from sin.
This is, properly speaking, to sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated
above (A[1]); and this also, for the most part, presupposes other sins,
for it is written (Prov. 18:3) that "the wicked man, when he is come into
the depth of sins, contemneth."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] Body Para. 2/4
Nevertheless it is possible for a man, in his first sinful act, to sin
against the Holy Ghost by contempt, both on account of his free-will, and
on account of the many previous dispositions, or again, through being
vehemently moved to evil, while but feebly attached to good. Hence never
or scarcely ever does it happen that the perfect sin all at once against
the Holy Ghost: wherefore Origen says (Peri Archon. i, 3): "I do not
think that anyone who stands on the highest step of perfection, can fail
or fall suddenly; this can only happen by degrees and bit by bit."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] Body Para. 3/4
The same applies, if the sin against the Holy Ghost be taken literally
for blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. For such blasphemy as Our Lord
speaks of, always proceeds from contemptuous malice.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] Body Para. 4/4
If, however, with Augustine (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) we understand
the sin against the Holy Ghost to denote final impenitence, it does not
regard the question in point, because this sin against the Holy Ghost
requires persistence in sin until the end of life.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Movement both in good and in evil is made, for the most
part, from imperfect to perfect, according as man progresses in good or
evil: and yet in both cases, one man can begin from a greater (good or
evil) than another man does. Consequently, that from which a man begins
can be perfect in good or evil according to its genus, although it may be
imperfect as regards the series of good or evil actions whereby a man
progresses in good or evil.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers the sin which is committed through
certain malice, when it proceeds from the inclination of a habit.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[14] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: If by impenitence we understand with Augustine (De Verb.
Dom., Serm. lxxi) persistence in sin until the end, it is clear that it
presupposes sin, just as repentance does. If, however, we take it for
habitual impenitence, in which sense it is a sin against the Holy Ghost,
it is evident that it can precede sin: for it is possible for a man who
has never sinned to have the purpose either of repenting or of not
repenting, if he should happen to sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to knowledge and understanding.
Since, however, we have treated of ignorance which is opposed to
knowledge, when we were discussing the causes of sins (FS, Q[76]), we
must now inquire about blindness of mind and dulness of sense, which are
opposed to the gift of understanding; and under this head there are three
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether blindness of mind is a sin?
(2) Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of mind?
(3) Whether these vices arise from sins of the flesh?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether blindness of mind is a sin?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that blindness of mind is not a sin. Because,
seemingly, that which excuses from sin is not itself a sin. Now blindness
of mind excuses from sin; for it is written (Jn. 9:41): "If you were
blind, you should not have sin." Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, punishment differs from guilt. But blindness of mind is
a punishment as appears from Is. 6:10, "Blind the heart of this people,"
for, since it is an evil, it could not be from God, were it not a
punishment. Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera
Relig. xiv). Now blindness of mind is not voluntary, since, as Augustine
says (Confess. x), "all love to know the resplendent truth," and as we
read in Eccles. 11:7, "the light is sweet and it is delightful for the
eyes to see the sun." Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons blindness of mind
among the vices arising from lust.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Just as bodily blindness is the privation of the
principle of bodily sight, so blindness of mind is the privation of the
principle of mental or intellectual sight. Now this has a threefold
principle. One is the light of natural reason, which light, since it
pertains to the species of the rational soul, is never forfeit from the
soul, and yet, at times, it is prevented from exercising its proper act,
through being hindered by the lower powers which the human intellect
needs in order to understand, for instance in the case of imbeciles and
madmen, as stated in the FP, Q[84], AA[7],8.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] Body Para. 2/3
Another principle of intellectual sight is a certain habitual light
superadded to the natural light of reason, which light is sometimes
forfeit from the soul. This privation is blindness, and is a punishment,
in so far as the privation of the light of grace is a punishment. Hence
it is written concerning some (Wis. 2:21): "Their own malice blinded
them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] Body Para. 3/3
A third principle of intellectual sight is an intelligible principle,
through which a man understands other things; to which principle a man
may attend or not attend. That he does not attend thereto happens in two
ways. Sometimes it is due to the fact that a man's will is deliberately
turned away from the consideration of that principle, according to Ps.
35:4, "He would not understand, that he might do well": whereas sometimes
it is due to the mind being more busy about things which it loves more,
so as to be hindered thereby from considering this principle, according
to Ps. 57:9, "Fire," i.e. of concupiscence, "hath fallen on them and they
shall not see the sun." In either of these ways blindness of mind is a
sin.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The blindness that excuses from sin is that which arises
from the natural defect of one who cannot see.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: This argument considers the second kind of blindness which
is a punishment.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To understand the truth is, in itself, beloved by all; and
yet, accidentally it may be hateful to someone, in so far as a man is
hindered thereby from having what he loves yet more.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of mind?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It seems that dulness of sense is not a distinct sin from
blindness of mind. Because one thing has one contrary. Now dulness is
opposed to the gift of understanding, according to Gregory (Moral. ii,
49); and so is blindness of mind, since understanding denotes a principle
of sight. Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness of mind.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) in speaking of dulness
describes it as "dullness of sense in respect of understanding." Now
dulness of sense in respect of understanding seems to be the same as a
defect in understanding, which pertains to blindness of mind. Therefore
dulness of sense is the same as blindness of mind.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, if they differ at all, it seems to be chiefly in the
fact that blindness of mind is voluntary, as stated above (A[1]), while
dulness of sense is a natural defect. But a natural defect is not a sin:
so that, accordingly, dulness of sense would not be a sin, which is
contrary to what Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), where he reckons it
among the sins arising from gluttony.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Different causes produce different effects. Now Gregory
says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense arises from gluttony, and
that blindness of mind arises from lust. Now these others are different
vices. Therefore those are different vices also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Dull is opposed to sharp: and a thing is said to be sharp
because it can pierce; so that a thing is called dull through being
obtuse and unable to pierce. Now a bodily sense, by a kind of metaphor,
is said to pierce the medium, in so far as it perceives its object from a
distance or is able by penetration as it were to perceive the smallest
details or the inmost parts of a thing. Hence in corporeal things the
senses are said to be acute when they can perceive a sensible object from
afar, by sight, hearing, or scent, while on the other hand they are said
to be dull, through being unable to perceive, except sensible objects
that are near at hand, or of great power.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
Now, by way of similitude to bodily sense, we speak of sense in
connection with the intellect; and this latter sense is in respect of
certain primals and extremes, as stated in Ethic. vi, even as the senses
are cognizant of sensible objects as of certain principles of knowledge.
Now this sense which is connected with understanding, does not perceive
its object through a medium of corporeal distance, but through certain
other media, as, for instance, when it perceives a thing's essence
through a property thereof, and the cause through its effect.
Consequently a man is said to have an acute sense in connection with his
understanding, if, as soon as he apprehends a property or effect of a
thing, he understands the nature or the thing itself, and if he can
succeed in perceiving its slightest details: whereas a man is said to
have a dull sense in connection with his understanding, if he cannot
arrive at knowing the truth about a thing, without many explanations; in
which case, moreover, he is unable to obtain a perfect perception of
everything pertaining to the nature of that thing.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
Accordingly dulness of sense in connection with understanding denotes a
certain weakness of the mind as to the consideration of spiritual goods;
while blindness of mind implies the complete privation of the knowledge
of such things. Both are opposed to the gift of understanding, whereby a
man knows spiritual goods by apprehending them, and has a subtle
penetration of their inmost nature. This dulness has the character of
sin, just as blindness of mind has, that is, in so far as it is
voluntary, as evidenced in one who, owing to his affection for carnal
things, dislikes or neglects the careful consideration of spiritual
things.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether blindness of mind and dulness of sense arise from sins of the
flesh?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that blindness of mind and dulness of sense do not
arise from sins of the flesh. For Augustine (Retract. i, 4) retracts what
he had said in his Soliloquies i, 1, "God Who didst wish none but the
clean to know the truth," and says that one might reply that "many, even
those who are unclean, know many truths." Now men become unclean chiefly
by sins of the flesh. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness of sense
are not caused by sins of the flesh.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, blindness of mind and dulness of sense are defects in
connection with the intellective part of the soul: whereas carnal sins
pertain to the corruption of the flesh. But the flesh does not act on the
soul, but rather the reverse. Therefore the sins of the flesh do not
cause blindness of mind and dulness of sense.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, all things are more passive to what is near them than to
what is remote. Now spiritual vices are nearer the mind than carnal vices
are. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness of sense are caused by
spiritual rather than by carnal vices.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense
arises from gluttony and blindness of mind from lust.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, The perfect intellectual operation in man consists in an
abstraction from sensible phantasms, wherefore the more a man's intellect
is freed from those phantasms, the more thoroughly will it be able to
consider things intelligible, and to set in order all things sensible.
Thus Anaxagoras stated that the intellect requires to be "detached" in
order to command, and that the agent must have power over matter, in
order to be able to move it. Now it is evident that pleasure fixes a
man's attention on that which he takes pleasure in: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4,5) that we all do best that which we take
pleasure in doing, while as to other things, we do them either not at
all, or in a faint-hearted fashion.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
Now carnal vices, namely gluttony and lust, are concerned with pleasures
of touch in matters of food and sex; and these are the most impetuous of
all pleasures of the body. For this reason these vices cause man's
attention to be very firmly fixed on corporeal things, so that in
consequence man's operation in regard to intelligible things is weakened,
more, however, by lust than by gluttony, forasmuch as sexual pleasures
are more vehement than those of the table. Wherefore lust gives rise to
blindness of mind, which excludes almost entirely the knowledge of
spiritual things, while dulness of sense arises from gluttony, which
makes a man weak in regard to the same intelligible things. On the other
hand, the contrary virtues, viz. abstinence and chastity, dispose man
very much to the perfection of intellectual operation. Hence it is
written (Dan. 1:17) that "to these children" on account of their
abstinence and continency, "God gave knowledge and understanding in every
book, and wisdom."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Although some who are the slaves of carnal vices are at
times capable of subtle considerations about intelligible things, on
account of the perfection of their natural genius, or of some habit
superadded thereto, nevertheless, on account of the pleasures of the
body, it must needs happen that their attention is frequently withdrawn
from this subtle contemplation: wherefore the unclean can know some
truths, but their uncleanness is a clog on their knowledge.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The flesh acts on the intellective faculties, not by
altering them, but by impeding their operation in the aforesaid manner.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[15] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: It is owing to the fact that the carnal vices are further
removed from the mind, that they distract the mind's attention to more
remote things, so that they hinder the mind's contemplation all the more.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE PRECEPTS OF FAITH, KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the precepts pertaining to the aforesaid, and under
this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) The precepts concerning faith;
(2) The precepts concerning the gifts of knowledge and understanding.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether in the Old Law there should have been given precepts of faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that, in the Old Law, there should have been given
precepts of faith. Because a precept is about something due and
necessary. Now it is most necessary for man that he should believe,
according to Heb. 11:6, "Without faith it is impossible to please God."
Therefore there was very great need for precepts of faith to be given.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, the New Testament is contained in the Old, as the
reality in the figure, as stated above (FS, Q[107], A[3]). Now the New
Testament contains explicit precepts of faith, for instance Jn. 14:1:
"You believe in God; believe also in Me." Therefore it seems that some
precepts of faith ought to have been given in the Old Law also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, to prescribe the act of a virtue comes to the same as to
forbid the opposite vices. Now the Old Law contained many precepts
forbidding unbelief: thus (Ex. 20:3): "Thou shalt not have strange gods
before Me," and (Dt. 13:1-3) they were forbidden to hear the words of the
prophet or dreamer who might wish to turn them away from their faith in
God. Therefore precepts of faith should have been given in the Old Law
also.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above (Q[3],
A[1]). Now the Old Law contained precepts about the confession and the
promulgation of faith: for they were commanded (Ex. 12:27) that, when
their children should ask them, they should tell them the meaning of the
paschal observance, and (Dt. 13:9) they were commanded to slay anyone who
disseminated doctrine contrary to faith. Therefore the Old Law should
have contained precepts of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] Obj. 5 Para. 1/1
OBJ 5: Further, all the books of the Old Testament are contained in the
Old Law; wherefore Our Lord said (Jn. 15:25) that it was written in the
Law: "They have hated Me without cause," although this is found written
in Ps. 34 and 68. Now it is written (Ecclus. 2:8): "Ye that fear the
Lord, believe Him." Therefore the Old Law should have contained precepts
of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle (Rm. 3:27) calls the Old Law the "law of
works" which he contrasts with the "law of faith." Therefore the Old Law
ought not to have contained precepts of faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A master does not impose laws on others than his
subjects; wherefore the precepts of a law presuppose that everyone who
receives the law is subject to the giver of the law. Now the primary
subjection of man to God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6: "He that
cometh to God, must believe that He is." Hence faith is presupposed to
the precepts of the Law: for which reason (Ex. 20:2) that which is of
faith, is set down before the legal precepts, in the words, "I am the
Lord thy God, Who brought thee out of the land of Egypt," and, likewise
(Dt. 6:4), the words, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy [Vulg.: 'our'] God is
one," precede the recording of the precepts.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] Body Para. 2/2
Since, however, faith contains many things subordinate to the faith
whereby we believe that God is, which is the first and chief of all
articles of faith, as stated above (Q[1], AA[1],7), it follows that, if
we presuppose faith in God, whereby man's mind is subjected to Him, it is
possible for precepts to be given about other articles of faith. Thus
Augustine expounding the words: "This is My commandment" (Jn. 15:12) says
(Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.) that we have received many precepts of faith.
In the Old Law, however, the secret things of faith were not to be set
before the people, wherefore, presupposing their faith in one God, no
other precepts of faith were given in the Old Law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Faith is necessary as being the principle of spiritual
life, wherefore it is presupposed before the receiving of the Law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Even then Our Lord both presupposed something of faith,
namely belief in one God, when He said: "You believe in God," and
commanded something, namely, belief in the Incarnation whereby one Person
is God and man. This explanation of faith belongs to the faith of the New
Testament, wherefore He added: "Believe also in Me."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The prohibitive precepts regard sins, which corrupt virtue.
Now virtue is corrupted by any particular defect, as stated above (FS,
Q[18], A[4], ad 3; FS, Q[19], A[6], ad 1, A[7], ad 3). Therefore faith in
one God being presupposed, prohibitive precepts had to be given in the
Old Law, so that men might be warned off those particular defects whereby
their faith might be corrupted.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Confession of faith and the teaching thereof also
presuppose man's submission to God by faith: so that the Old Law could
contain precepts relating to the confession and teaching of faith, rather
than to faith itself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[1] R.O. 5 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 5: In this passage again that faith is presupposed whereby we
believe that God is; hence it begins, "Ye that fear the Lord," which is
not possible without faith. The words which follow---"believe Him"---must
be referred to certain special articles of faith, chiefly to those things
which God promises to them that obey Him, wherefore the passage
concludes---"and your reward shall not be made void."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether the precepts referring to knowledge and understanding were
fittingly set down in the Old Law?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that the precepts referring to knowledge and
understanding were unfittingly set down in the Old Law. For knowledge and
understanding pertain to cognition. Now cognition precedes and directs
action. Therefore the precepts referring to knowledge and understanding
should precede the precepts of the Law referring to action. Since, then,
the first precepts of the Law are those of the decalogue, it seems that
precepts of knowledge and understanding should have been given a place
among the precepts of the decalogue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, learning precedes teaching, for a man must learn from
another before he teaches another. Now the Old Law contains precepts
about teaching---both affirmative precepts as, for example, (Dt. 4:9),
"Thou shalt teach them to thy sons"---and prohibitive precepts, as, for
instance, (Dt. 4:2), "You shall not add to the word that I speak to you,
neither shall you take away from it." Therefore it seems that man ought
to have been given also some precepts directing him to learn.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, knowledge and understanding seem more necessary to a
priest than to a king, wherefore it is written (Malachi 2:7): "The lips
of the priest shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law at his
mouth," and (Osee 4:6): "Because thou hast rejected knowledge, I will
reject thee, that thou shalt not do the office of priesthood to Me." Now
the king is commanded to learn knowledge of the Law (Dt. 17:18,19). Much
more therefore should the Law have commanded the priests to learn the Law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, it is not possible while asleep to meditate on things
pertaining to knowledge and understanding: moreover it is hindered by
extraneous occupations. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded (Dt. 6:7):
"Thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house, and walking on thy
journey, sleeping and rising." Therefore the precepts relating to
knowledge and understanding are unfittingly set down in the Law.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:6): "That, hearing all these
precepts, they may say, Behold a wise and understanding people."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] Body Para. 1/4
I answer that, Three things may be considered in relation to knowledge
and understanding: first, the reception thereof; secondly, the use; and
thirdly, their preservation. Now the reception of knowledge or
understanding, is by means of teaching and learning, and both are
prescribed in the Law. For it is written (Dt. 6:6): "These words which I
command thee . . . shall be in thy heart." This refers to learning, since
it is the duty of a disciple to apply his mind to what is said, while the
words that follow---"and thou shalt tell them to thy children"---refer to
teaching.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] Body Para. 2/4
The use of knowledge and understanding is the meditation on those things
which one knows or understands. In reference to this, the text goes on:
"thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house," etc.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] Body Para. 3/4
Their preservation is effected by the memory, and, as regards this, the
text continues---"and thou shalt bind them as a sign on thy hand, and
they shall be and shall move between thy eyes. And thou shalt write them
in the entry, and on the doors of thy house." Thus the continual
remembrance of God's commandments is signified, since it is impossible
for us to forget those things which are continually attracting the notice
of our senses, whether by touch, as those things we hold in our hands, or
by sight, as those things which are ever before our eyes, or to which we
are continually returning, for instance, to the house door. Moreover it
is clearly stated (Dt. 4:9): "Forget not the words that thy eyes have
seen and let them not go out of thy heart all the days of thy life."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] Body Para. 4/4
We read of these things also being commanded more notably in the New
Testament, both in the teaching of the Gospel and in that of the apostles.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: According to Dt. 4:6, "this is your wisdom and
understanding in the sight of the nations." By this we are given to
understand that the wisdom and understanding of those who believe in God
consist in the precepts of the Law. Wherefore the precepts of the Law had
to be given first, and afterwards men had to be led to know and
understand them, and so it was not fitting that the aforesaid precepts
should be placed among the precepts of the decalogue which take the first
place.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: There are also in the Law precepts relating to learning, as
stated above. Nevertheless teaching was commanded more expressly than
learning, because it concerned the learned, who were not under any other
authority, but were immediately under the law, and to them the precepts
of the Law were given. On the other hand learning concerned the people of
lower degree, and these the precepts of the Law have to reach through the
learned.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Knowledge of the Law is so closely bound up with the
priestly office that being charged with the office implies being charged
to know the Law: hence there was no need for special precepts to be given
about the training of the priests. On the other hand, the doctrine of
God's law is not so bound up with the kingly office, because a king is
placed over his people in temporal matters: hence it is especially
commanded that the king should be instructed by the priests about things
pertaining to the law of God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[16] A[2] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: That precept of the Law does not mean that man should
meditate on God's law of sleeping, but during sleep, i.e. that he should
meditate on the law of God when he is preparing to sleep, because this
leads to his having better phantasms while asleep, in so far as our
movements pass from the state of vigil to the state of sleep, as the
Philosopher explains (Ethic. i, 13). In like manner we are commanded to
meditate on the Law in every action of ours, not that we are bound to be
always actually thinking about the Law, but that we should regulate all
our actions according to it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] Out. Para. 1/2
ON HOPE (QQ[17]-22)
OF HOPE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)
After treating of faith, we must consider hope and (1) hope itself; (2)
the gift of fear; (3) the contrary vices; (4) the corresponding precepts.
The first of these points gives rise to a twofold consideration: (1)
hope, considered in itself; (2) its subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] Out. Para. 2/2
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether hope is a virtue?
(2) Whether its object is eternal happiness?
(3) Whether, by the virtue of hope, one man may hope for another's
happiness?
(4) Whether a man may lawfully hope in man?
(5) Whether hope is a theological virtue?
(6) Of its distinction from the other theological virtues?
(7) Of its relation to faith;
(8) Of its relation to charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hope is a virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For "no man makes ill
use of a virtue," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18). But one may
make ill use of hope, since the passion of hope, like the other passions,
is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore hope is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, no virtue results from merits, since "God works virtue
in us without us," as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. xvii). But
hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the Master (Sent. iii,
D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing" (Phys.
vii, text. 17,18). But hope is the disposition of an imperfect thing, of
one, namely, that lacks what it hopes to have. Therefore hope is not a
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three daughters of
Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and charity. Therefore hope
is a virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "the virtue
of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work good
likewise." Consequently wherever we find a good human act, it must
correspond to some human virtue. Now in all things measured and ruled,
the good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say that a coat
is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its proper measurement.
But, as we stated above (Q[8], A[3], ad 3) human acts have a twofold
measure; one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the reason, while the
other is remote and excelling, viz. God: wherefore every human act is
good, which attains reason or God Himself. Now the act of hope, whereof
we speak now, attains God. For, as we have already stated (FS, Q[40],
A[1]), when we were treating of the passion of hope, the object of hope
is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Now a thing is
possible to us in two ways: first, by ourselves; secondly, by means of
others, as stated in Ethic. iii. Wherefore, in so far as we hope for
anything as being possible to us by means of the Divine assistance, our
hope attains God Himself, on Whose help it leans. It is therefore evident
that hope is a virtue, since it causes a human act to be good and to
attain its due rule.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: In the passions, the mean of virtue depends on right reason
being attained, wherein also consists the essence of virtue. Wherefore in
hope too, the good of virtue depends on a man's attaining, by hoping, the
due rule, viz. God. Consequently man cannot make ill use of hope which
attains God, as neither can he make ill use of moral virtue which attains
the reason, because to attain thus is to make good use of virtue.
Nevertheless, the hope of which we speak now, is not a passion but a
habit of the mind, as we shall show further on (A[5]; Q[18], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Hope is said to arise from merits, as regards the thing
hoped for, in so far as we hope to obtain happiness by means of grace and
merits; or as regards the act of living hope. The habit itself of hope,
whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from our merits, but
from grace alone.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: He who hopes is indeed imperfect in relation to that which
he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet he is perfect, in so far as
he already attains his proper rule, viz. God, on Whose help he leans.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether eternal happiness is the proper object of hope?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that eternal happiness is not the proper object of
hope. For a man does not hope for that which surpasses every movement of
the soul, since hope itself is a movement of the soul. Now eternal
happiness surpasses every movement of the human soul, for the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 2:9) that it hath not "entered into the heart of man."
Therefore happiness is not the proper object of hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, prayer is an expression of hope, for it is written (Ps.
36:5): "Commit thy way to the Lord, and trust in Him, and He will do it."
Now it is lawful for man to pray God not only for eternal happiness, but
also for the goods, both temporal and spiritual, of the present life,
and, as evidenced by the Lord's Prayer, to be delivered from evils which
will no longer be in eternal happiness. Therefore eternal happiness is
not the proper object of hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the object of hope is something difficult. Now many
things besides eternal happiness are difficult to man. Therefore eternal
happiness is not the proper object of hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 6:19) that we have hope "which
entereth in," i.e. maketh us to enter . . . "within the veil," i.e. into
the happiness of heaven, according to the interpretation of a gloss on
these words. Therefore the object of hope is eternal happiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[2] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As stated above (A[1]), the hope of which we speak now,
attains God by leaning on His help in order to obtain the hoped for good.
Now an effect must be proportionate to its cause. Wherefore the good
which we ought to hope for from God properly and chiefly is the infinite
good, which is proportionate to the power of our divine helper, since it
belongs to an infinite power to lead anyone to an infinite good. Such a
good is eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of God Himself. For
we should hope from Him for nothing less than Himself, since His
goodness, whereby He imparts good things to His creature, is no less than
His Essence. Therefore the proper and principal object of hope is
eternal happiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Eternal happiness does not enter into the heart of man
perfectly, i.e. so that it be possible for a wayfarer to know its nature
and quality; yet, under the general notion of the perfect good, it is
possible for it to be apprehended by a man, and it is in this way that
the movement of hope towards it arises. Hence the Apostle says pointedly
(Heb. 6:19) that hope "enters in, even within the veil," because that
which we hope for is as yet veiled, so to speak.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: We ought not to pray God for any other goods, except in
reference to eternal happiness. Hence hope regards eternal happiness
chiefly, and other things, for which we pray God, it regards secondarily
and as referred to eternal happiness: just as faith regards God
principally, and, secondarily, those things which are referred to God, as
stated above (Q[1], A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: To him that longs for something great, all lesser things
seem small; wherefore to him that hopes for eternal happiness, nothing
else appears arduous, as compared with that hope; although, as compared
with the capability of the man who hopes, other things besides may be
arduous to him, so that he may have hope for such things in reference to
its principal object.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether one man may hope for another's eternal happiness?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that one may hope for another's eternal happiness.
For the Apostle says (Phil. 1:6): "Being confident of this very thing,
that He Who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it unto the day
of Jesus Christ." Now the perfection of that day will be eternal
happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another's eternal happiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, whatever we ask of God, we hope to obtain from Him. But
we ask God to bring others to eternal happiness, according to James 5:16:
"Pray for one another that you may be saved." Therefore we can hope for
another's eternal happiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, hope and despair are about the same object. Now it is
possible to despair of another's eternal happiness, else Augustine would
have no reason for saying (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that we should not
despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one can also hope for
another's eternal salvation.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "hope is only of
such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for them."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[3] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, We can hope for something in two ways: first, absolutely,
and thus the object of hope is always something arduous and pertaining to
the person who hopes. Secondly, we can hope for something, through
something else being presupposed, and in this way its object can be
something pertaining to someone else. In order to explain this we must
observe that love and hope differ in this, that love denotes union
between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a movement or a stretching
forth of the appetite towards an arduous good. Now union is of things
that are distinct, wherefore love can directly regard the other whom a
man unites to himself by love, looking upon him as his other self:
whereas movement is always towards its own term which is proportionate to
the subject moved. Therefore hope regards directly one's own good, and
not that which pertains to another. Yet if we presuppose the union of
love with another, a man can hope for and desire something for another
man, as for himself; and, accordingly, he can hope for another eternal's
life, inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is the same
virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, himself, and his neighbor, so
too it is the same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes for himself and
for another.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[3] Body Para. 2/2
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether a man can lawfully hope in man?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It wold seem that one may lawfully hope in man. For the object of
hope is eternal happiness. Now we are helped to obtain eternal happiness
by the patronage of the saints, for Gregory says (Dial. i, 8) that
"predestination is furthered by the saints' prayers." Therefore one may
hope in man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, if a man may not hope in another man, it ought not to be
reckoned a sin in a man, that one should not be able to hope in him. Yet
this is reckoned a vice in some, as appears from Jer. 9:4: "Let every man
take heed of his neighbor, and let him not trust in any brother of his."
Therefore it is lawful to trust in a man.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, prayer is the expression of hope, as stated above (A[2],
OBJ[2]). But it is lawful to pray to a man for something. Therefore it is
lawful to trust in him.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 17:5): "Cursed be the man that
trusteth in man."
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[4] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Hope, as stated above (A[1]; FS, Q[40], A[7]), regards
two things, viz. the good which it intends to obtain, and the help by
which that good is obtained. Now the good which a man hopes to obtain,
has the aspect of a final cause, while the help by which one hopes to
obtain that good, has the character of an efficient cause. Now in each of
these kinds of cause we find a principal and a secondary cause. For the
principal end is the last end, while the secondary end is that which is
referred to an end. In like manner the principal efficient cause is the
first agent, while the secondary efficient cause is the secondary and
instrumental agent. Now hope regards eternal happiness as its last end,
and the Divine assistance as the first cause leading to happiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[4] Body Para. 2/3
Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save
happiness, as one's last end, but only as something referred to final
happiness, so too, it is unlawful to hope in any man, or any creature, as
though it were the first cause of movement towards happiness. It is,
however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as being the secondary and
instrumental agent through whom one is helped to obtain any goods that
are ordained to happiness. It is in this way that we turn to the saints,
and that we ask men also for certain things; and for this reason some are
blamed in that they cannot be trusted to give help.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[4] Body Para. 3/3
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hope is a theological virtue?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For a
theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now hope has for
its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to obtain from
God. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two vices, as
stated above (FS, Q[64], A[4]). But hope is a mean between presumption
and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a species of
fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it seems that hope
is not a theological, but a moral virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] Obj. 4 Para. 1/1
OBJ 4: Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it belongs
to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the arduous.
Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) together with faith and
charity, which are theological virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, Since specific differences, by their very nature, divide
a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place hope, we
must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] Body Para. 2/2
Now it has been stated above (A[1]) that hope has the character of
virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human actions:
and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as much as it
leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause, in as much as it
expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is evident that God
is the principal object of hope, considered as a virtue. Since, then, the
very idea of a theological virtue is one that has God for its object, as
stated above (FS, Q[62], A[1]), it is evident that hope is a theological
virtue.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes for it in
reference to God as the last end, or as the first efficient cause, as
stated above (A[4]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: In things measured and ruled the mean consists in the
measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is
excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the
rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes. Now
a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and these things
are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to follow the mean as
regards its proper object. On the other hand, a theological virtue is
concerned with the First Rule not ruled by another rule, and that Rule is
its proper object. Wherefore it is not proper for a theological virtue,
with regard to its proper object, to follow the mean, although this may
happen to it accidentally with regard to something that is referred to
its principal object. Thus faith can have no mean or extremes in the
point of trusting to the First Truth, in which it is impossible to trust
too much; whereas on the part of the things believed, it may have a mean
and extremes; for instance one truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So
too, hope has no mean or extremes, as regards its principal object, since
it is impossible to trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet it may
have a mean and extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to obtain,
in so far as he either presumes above his capability, or despairs of
things of which he is capable.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The expectation which is mentioned in the definition of
hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which belongs to
longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine assistance, whether
that which we hope for be delayed or not.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[5] R.O. 4 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 4: Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the hope of
obtaining something that is within one's power, wherefore its proper
object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as a
theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by
another's help, as stated above (A[1]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hope is distinct from the other theological virtues?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hope is not distinct from the other
theological virtues. For habits are distinguished by their objects, as
stated above (FS, Q[54], A[2]). Now the object of hope is the same as of
the other theological virtues. Therefore hope is not distinct from the
other theological virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby we make profession of
faith, we say: "I expect the resurrection of the dead and the life of the
world to come." Now expectation of future happiness belongs to hope, as
stated above (A[5]). Therefore hope is not distinct from faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, by hope man tends to God. But this belongs properly to
charity. Therefore hope is not distinct from charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, There cannot be number without distinction. Now hope is
numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory says (Moral. i,
16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity. Therefore hope
is distinct from the theological virtues.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[6] Body Para. 1/2
I answer that, A virtue is said to be theological from having God for
the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in two
ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else is
attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to God for His own
sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[6] Body Para. 2/2
On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to God as to a
principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from God
both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness.
Accordingly faith makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive
the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God tells us is true:
while hope makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive perfect
goodness, i.e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to the Divine assistance
for obtaining happiness.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: God is the object of these virtues under different aspects,
as stated above: and a different aspect of the object suffices for the
distinction of habits, as stated above (FS, Q[54], A[2]).
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Expectation is mentioned in the symbol of faith, not as
though it were the proper act of faith, but because the act of hope
presupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further on (A[7]). Hence
an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hope makes us tend to God, as to a good to be obtained
finally, and as to a helper strong to assist: whereas charity, properly
speaking, makes us tend to God, by uniting our affections to Him, so that
we live, not for ourselves, but for God.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hope precedes faith?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hope precedes faith. Because a gloss on Ps.
36:3, "Trust in the Lord, and do good," says: "Hope is the entrance to
faith and the beginning of salvation." But salvation is by faith whereby
we are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, that which is included in a definition should precede
the thing defined and be more known. But hope is included in the
definition of faith (Heb. 11:1): "Faith is the substance of things to be
hoped for." Therefore hope precedes faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, hope precedes a meritorious act, for the Apostle says
(1 Cor. 9:10): "He that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to receive
fruit." But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore hope precedes
faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 1:2): "Abraham begot Isaac," i.e.
"Faith begot hope," according to a gloss.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[7] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, Absolutely speaking, faith precedes hope. For the object
of hope is a future good, arduous but possible to obtain. In order,
therefore, that we may hope, it is necessary for the object of hope to be
proposed to us as possible. Now the object of hope is, in one way,
eternal happiness, and in another way, the Divine assistance, as
explained above (A[2]; A[6], ad 3): and both of these are proposed to us
by faith, whereby we come to know that we are able to obtain eternal
life, and that for this purpose the Divine assistance is ready for us,
according to Heb. 11:6: "He that cometh to God, must believe that He is,
and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." Therefore it is evident that
faith precedes hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: As the same gloss observes further on, "hope" is called
"the entrance" to faith, i.e. of the thing believed, because by hope we
enter in to see what we believe. Or we may reply that it is called the
"entrance to faith," because thereby man begins to be established and
perfected in faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: The thing to be hoped for is included in the definition of
faith, because the proper object of faith, is something not apparent in
itself. Hence it was necessary to express it in a circumlocution by
something resulting from faith.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: Hope does not precede every meritorious act; but it
suffices for it to accompany or follow it.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether charity precedes hope?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that charity precedes hope. For Ambrose says on Lk.
27:6, "If you had faith like to a grain of mustard seed," etc.: "Charity
flows from faith, and hope from charity." But faith precedes charity.
Therefore charity precedes hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "good emotions
and affections proceed from love and holy charity." Now to hope,
considered as an act of hope, is a good emotion of the soul. Therefore it
flows from charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. iii, D, 26) that hope proceeds
from merits, which precede not only the thing hoped for, but also hope
itself, which, in the order of nature, is preceded by charity. Therefore
charity precedes hope.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the
commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience," i.e.
"from hope," according to a gloss. Therefore hope precedes charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[8] Body Para. 1/3
I answer that, Order is twofold. One is the order of generation and of
matter, in respect of which the imperfect precedes the perfect: the other
is the order of perfection and form, in respect of which the perfect
naturally precedes the imperfect. In respect of the first order hope
precedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that hope and all
movements of the appetite flow from love, as stated above (FS, Q[27],
A[4]; FS, Q[28], A[6], ad 2; FS, Q[40], A[7]) in the treatise on the
passions.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[8] Body Para. 2/3
Now there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Perfect love is that
whereby a man is loved in himself, as when someone wishes a person some
good for his own sake; thus a man loves his friend. Imperfect love is
that whereby a man love something, not for its own sake, but that he may
obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves what he desires. The first
love of God pertains to charity, which adheres to God for His own sake;
while hope pertains to the second love, since he that hopes, intends to
obtain possession of something for himself.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[8] Body Para. 3/3
Hence in the order of generation, hope precedes charity. For just as a
man is led to love God, through fear of being punished by Him for his
sins, as Augustine states (In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so too,
hope leads to charity, in as much as a man through hoping to be rewarded
by God, is encouraged to love God and obey His commandments. On the other
hand, in the order of perfection charity naturally precedes hope,
wherefore, with the advent of charity, hope is made more perfect, because
we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this sense that Ambrose states
(OBJ[1]) that charity flows from hope: so that this suffices for the
Reply to the First Objection.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[8] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Hope and every movement of the appetite proceed from some
kind of love, whereby the expected good is loved. But not every kind of
hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of living hope, viz.
that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God, as from a friend.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[17] A[8] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The Master is speaking of living hope, which is naturally
preceded by charity and the merits caused by charity.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] Out. Para. 1/1
OF THE SUBJECT OF HOPE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subject of hope, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject?
(2) Whether it is in the blessed?
(3) Whether it is in the damned?
(4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of the wayfarer?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1
Whether hope is in the will as its subject?
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1
OBJ 1: It would seem that hope is not in the will as its subject. For
the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above (Q[17], A[1]; FS,
Q[40], A[1]). Now the arduous is the object, not of the will, but of the
irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will but in the irascible.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1
OBJ 2: Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add another. Now
charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which is the most
perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1
OBJ 3: Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at the same
time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things simultaneously.
Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act of charity. Since,
then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the will, it follows that
the act of hope does not belong to that power: so that, therefore, hope
is not in the will.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1
On the contrary, The soul is not apprehensive of God save as regards the
mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine declares (De
Trin. xiv, 3,6). Now hope is a theological virtue having God for its
object. Since therefore it is neither in the memory, nor in the
intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty, it follows that it is
in the will as its subject.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[1] Body Para. 1/1
I answer that, As shown above (FP, Q[87], A[2]), habits are known by
their acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive faculty,
since its object is a good. And, since there is a twofold appetite in
man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into irascible and
concupiscible, and the intellective appetite, called the will, as stated
in the FP, Q[82], A[5], those movements which occur in the lower
appetite, are with passion, while those in the higher appetite are
without passion, as shown above (FP, Q[87], A[2], ad 1; FS, Q[22], A[3],
ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope cannot belong to the sensitive
appetite, since the good which is the principal object of this virtue, is
not a sensible but a Divine good. Therefore hope resides in the higher
appetite called the will, and not in the lower appetite, of which the
irascible is a part.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 1: The object of the irascible is an arduous sensible: whereas
the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous intelligible, or rather
superintelligible.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 2: Charity perfects the will sufficiently with regard to one
act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is required in order
to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is that of hoping.
Aquin.: SMT SS Q[18] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1
Reply OBJ 3: The movement of hope and the movement of charity are
mutually related, as was shown above (Q[17], A[8]). Hence there is no
reason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the same
power: even as the intellect can understand many things at the same time
if they be related to one another, as stated in the FP, Q[85], A[4].