Aquin.: SMT FS Prologue Para. 1/1 FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART (FS) (QQ[1]-114) TREATISE ON THE LAST END (QQ[1]-5) PROLOGUE Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be made in God's image, in so far as the image implies "an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement": now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of His image, i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] Out. Para. 1/2 OF MAN'S LAST END (EIGHT ARTICLES) In this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life; and secondly, those things by means of which man may advance towards this end, or stray from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever is ordained to the end. And since the last end of human life is stated to be happiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general; (2) happiness. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] Out. Para. 2/2 Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end? (2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature? (3) Whether a man's actions are specified by their end? (4) Whether there is any last end of human life? (5) Whether one man can have several last ends? (6) Whether man ordains all to the last end? (7) Whether all men have the same last end? (8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end? Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1 Whether it belongs to man to act for an end? Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1 OBJ 1: It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for an end. For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name, implies something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But that for which a man acts, is the cause of his action; since this preposition "for" indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it does not belong to man to act for an end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1 OBJ 2: Further, that which is itself the last end is not for an end. But in some cases the last end is an action, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do everything for an end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 OBJ 3: Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when he acts deliberately. But man does many things without deliberation, sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, while intent on something else. Therefore man does not do everything for an end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1 On the contrary, All things contained in a genus are derived from the principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human operations, as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it belongs to man to do everything for an end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] Body Para. 1/1 I answer that, Of actions done by man those alone are properly called "human," which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from irrational animals in this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is master. Now man is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as "the faculty and will of reason." Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions "of a man," but not properly "human" actions, since they are not proper to man as man. Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power, are caused by that power in accordance with the nature of its object. But the object of the will is the end and the good. Therefore all human actions must be for an end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 1: Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is this way that it is a cause. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 2: If any human action be the last end, it must be voluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action is voluntary in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by the will, e.g. to walk, or to speak; secondly, because it is elicited by the will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is impossible for the very act elicited by the will to be the last end. For the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is color: wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of seeing, because every act of seeing is directed to a visible object; so the first appetible, i.e. the end, cannot be the very act of willing. Consequently it follows that if a human action be the last end, it must be an action commanded by the will: so that there, some action of man, at least the act of willing, is for the end. Therefore whatever a man does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even when he does that action in which the last end consists. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 3: Such like actions are not properly human actions; since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an imaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1 Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end? Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1 OBJ 1: It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end, never acts for an unknown end. On the other hand, there are many things that have no knowledge of an end; either because they are altogether without knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because they do not apprehend the idea of an end as such, as irrational animals. Therefore it seems proper to the rational nature to act for an end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1 OBJ 2: Further, to act for an end is to order one's action to an end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not belong to things that lack reason. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 OBJ 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But "the will is in the reason" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore to act for an end belongs to none but a rational nature. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1 On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that "not only mind but also nature acts for an end." Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 1/2 I answer that, Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause. The reason of which is that matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end. And just as this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite." Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] Body Para. 2/2 Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing, moving itself to the end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as an arrow tends to a determinate end through being moved by the archer who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that are possessed of reason, move themselves to an end; because they have dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the "faculty of will and reason." But those things that lack reason tend to an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by another and not by themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such, and consequently cannot ordain anything to an end, but can be ordained to an end only by another. For the entire irrational nature is in comparison to God as an instrument to the principal agent, as stated above (FP, Q[22], A[2], ad 4; FP, Q[103], A[1], ad 3). Consequently it is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end, as directing [agens] and leading itself to the end: whereas it is proper to the irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by another, whether it apprehend the end, as do irrational animals, or do not apprehend it, as is the case of those things which are altogether void of knowledge. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 1: When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows the end: but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when he acts at another's command, or when he is moved under another's compulsion, it is not necessary that he should know the end. And it is thus with irrational creatures. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 2: To ordain towards an end belongs to that which directs itself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to that which is directed by another to an end. And this can belong to an irrational nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 3: The object of the will is the end and the good in universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, determinate to some particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are moved by a universal cause: thus the governor of a city, who intends the common good, moves, by his command, all the particular departments of the city. Consequently all things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some rational will which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine will. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1 Whether human acts are specified by their end? Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1 OBJ 1: It would seem that human acts are not specified by their end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified by an intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by their end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1 OBJ 2: Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist before it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. Therefore a human act does not derive its species from the end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 OBJ 3: Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But one and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends. Therefore the end does not give the species to human acts. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich. ii, 13): "According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds worthy of blame or praise." Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] Body Para. 1/1 I answer that Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed of matter and form are established in their respective species by their own forms. And this is also to be observed in proper movements. For since movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each of these receives its species from an act; action indeed from the act which is the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is the terminus of the movement. Wherefore heating, as an action, is nothing else than a certain movement proceeding from heat, while heating as a passion is nothing else than a movement towards heat: and it is the definition that shows the specific nature. And either way, human acts, whether they be considered as actions, or as passions, receive their species from the end. For human acts can be considered in both ways, since man moves himself, and is moved by himself. Now it has been stated above (A[1]) that acts are called human, inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the object of the will is the good and the end. And hence it is clear that the principle of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the end. In like manner it is their terminus: for the human act terminates at that which the will intends as the end; thus in natural agents the form of the thing generated is conformed to the form of the generator. And since, as Ambrose says (Prolog. super Luc.) "morality is said properly of man," moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end, for moral acts are the same as human acts. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 1: The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it just this that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something, considered as action, and to proceed towards something, considered as passion. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 2: The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the intention, pertains to the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). And it is thus that it gives the species to the human or moral act. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 3: One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which it has its species: but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of which one is the end of the other. It is possible, however, that an act which is one in respect of its natural species, be ordained to several ends of the will: thus this act "to kill a man," which is but one act in respect of its natural species, can be ordained, as to an end, to the safeguarding of justice, and to the satisfying of anger: the result being that there would be several acts in different species of morality: since in one way there will be an act of virtue, in another, an act of vice. For a movement does not receive its species from that which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that which is its "per se" terminus. Now moral ends are accidental to a natural thing, and conversely the relation to a natural end is accidental to morality. Consequently there is no reason why acts which are the same considered in their natural species, should not be diverse, considered in their moral species, and conversely. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] Thes. Para. 1/1 Whether there is one last end of human life? Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1 OBJ 1: It would seem that there is no last end of human life, but that we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which proceeds from good is itself good, the latter must needs diffuse some other good: so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has the nature of an end. Therefore there is an indefinite series of ends. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1 OBJ 2: Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the same reason the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number, the reason can think of one yet greater. But desire of the end is consequent on the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that there is also an infinite series of ends. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 OBJ 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But the will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for I can will something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely. Therefore there is an infinite series of ends of the human will, and there is no last end of the human will. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] OTC Para. 1/1 On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that "to suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good." But the good is that which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore it is necessary to fix one last end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] Body Para. 1/2 I answer that, Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in whatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another, if the first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must of necessity be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of movement, because then there would be no first mover, without which neither can the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first mover. Now there is to be observed a twofold order in ends---the order of intention and the order of execution: and in either of these orders there must be something first. For that which is first in the order of intention, is the principle, as it were, moving the appetite; consequently, if you remove this principle, there will be nothing to move the appetite. On the other hand, the principle in execution is that wherein operation has its beginning; and if this principle be taken away, no one will begin to work. Now the principle in the intention is the last end; while the principle in execution is the first of the things which are ordained to the end. Consequently, on neither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any action have its term, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there is no first thing among those that are ordained to the end, none would begin to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would continue indefinitely. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] Body Para. 2/2 On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; for accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things ordained to the end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 1: The very nature of good is that something flows from it, but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore, good has the nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this argument does not prove that there is no last end; but that from the end, already supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards those things that are ordained to the end. And this would be true if we considered but the power of the First Good, which is infinite. But, since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect, to which it is proper to flow forth into its effects according to a certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the flow of good things from the First Good from Which all other goods share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods does not proceed indefinitely but, as it is written (Wis. 11:21), God disposes all things "in number, weight and measure." Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 2: In things which are of themselves, reason begins from principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no infinite process in demonstrations, because there we find a process of things having an essential, not an accidental, connection with one another. But in those things which are accidentally connected, nothing hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely. Now it is accidental to a stated quantity or number, as such, that quantity or unity be added to it. Wherefore in such like things nothing hinders the reason from an indefinite process. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[4] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 3: This multiplication of acts of the will reacting on itself, is accidental to the order of ends. This is clear from the fact that in regard to one and the same end, the will reacts on itself indifferently once or several times. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Thes. Para. 1/1 Whether one man can have several last ends? Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1 OBJ 1: It would seem possible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four things, viz. "in pleasure, repose, the gifts of nature, and virtue." But these are clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place the last end of his will in many things. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1 OBJ 2: Further, things not in opposition to one another do not exclude one another. Now there are many things which are not in opposition to one another. Therefore the supposition that one thing is the last end of the will does not exclude others. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 OBJ 3: Further, by the fact that it places its last end in one thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed its last end in that thing, e.g. pleasure, it could place it in something else, e.g. riches. Therefore even after having placed his last end in pleasure, a man can at the same time place his last end in riches. Therefore it is possible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] OTC Para. 1/1 On the contrary, That in which a man rests as in his last end, is master of his affections, since he takes therefrom his entire rule of life. Hence of gluttons it is written (Phil. 3:19): "Whose god is their belly": viz. because they place their last end in the pleasures of the belly. Now according to Mt. 6:24, "No man can serve two masters," such, namely, as are not ordained to one another. Therefore it is impossible for one man to have several last ends not ordained to one another. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 1/3 I answer that, It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to diverse things, as last ends. Three reasons may be assigned for this. First, because, since everything desires its own perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which he desires as his perfect and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "In speaking of the end of good we mean now, not that it passes away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be complete." It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to desire. Which is not possible, if something else be required for his perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite so to tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 2/3 The second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning, the principle is that which is naturally known, so in the process of the rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that which is naturally desired. Now this must needs be one: since nature tends to one thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational appetite is the last end. Therefore that to which the will tends, as to its last end, is one. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] Body Para. 3/3 The third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their species from the end, as stated above (A[3]), they must needs receive their genus from the last end, which is common to them all: just as natural things are placed in a genus according to a common form. Since, then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong, as such, to one genus, the last end must needs be one. And all the more because in every genus there is one first principle; and the last end has the nature of a first principle, as stated above. Now as the last end of man, simply as man, is to the whole human race, so is the last end of any individual man to that individual. Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 1: All these several objects were considered as one perfect good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the last end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 2: Although it is possible to find several things which are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a thing's perfect good, that anything besides be required for that thing's perfection. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[5] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 3: The power of the will does not extend to making opposites exist at the same time. Which would be the case were it to tend to several diverse objects as last ends, as has been shown above (ad 2). Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] Thes. Para. 1/1 Whether man will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end? Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1 OBJ 1: It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are said to be serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to serious matter. Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains not to the last end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1 OBJ 2: Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his Metaphysics 1,[2] that speculative science is sought for its own sake. Now it cannot be said that each speculative science is the last end. Therefore man does not desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 OBJ 3: Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of that end. But man does not always think of the last end in all that he desires or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for the last end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] OTC Para. 1/1 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "That is the end of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas we love it for its own sake." Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] Body Para. 1/1 I answer that, Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons. First, because whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good. And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end, he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because the beginning of anything is always ordained to its completion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of art. Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved through the last end. Secondly, because the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements. Now it is clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite, which is the last end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 1: Actions done jestingly are not directed to any external end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they afford him pleasure or relaxation. But man's consummate good is his last end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 2: The same applies to speculative science; which is desired as the scientist's good, included in complete and perfect good, which is the ultimate end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[6] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 3: One need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first intention, which was in respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed to any object whatever, even though one's thoughts be not actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every step. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] Thes. Para. 1/1 Whether all men have the same last end? Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1 OBJ 1: It would seem that all men have not the same last end. For before all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end of man. But some turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore all men have not the same last end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1 OBJ 2: Further, man's entire life is ruled according to his last end. If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not have various pursuits in life. Which is evidently false. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 OBJ 3: Further, the end is the term of action. But actions are of individuals. Now although men agree in their specific nature, yet they differ in things pertaining to individuals. Therefore all men have not the same last end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] OTC Para. 1/1 On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] Body Para. 1/1 I answer that, We can speak of the last end in two ways: first, considering only the aspect of last end; secondly, considering the thing in which the aspect of last end is realized. So, then, as to the aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since all desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated above (A[5]). But as to the thing in which this aspect is realized, all men are not agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure; others, something else. Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to others, the sweetness of honey, or of something similar. Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in which he who has the best taste takes most pleasure. In like manner that good is most complete which the man with well disposed affections desires for his last end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 1: Those who sin turn from that in which their last end really consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of the last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 2: Various pursuits in life are found among men by reason of the various things in which men seek to find their last end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[7] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 3: Although actions are of individuals, yet their first principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing, as stated above (A[5]). Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Thes. Para. 1/1 Whether other creatures concur in that last end? Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1 OBJ 1: It would seem that all other creatures concur in man's last end. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's beginning---i.e. God---is also the beginning of all else. Therefore all other things concur in man's last end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1 OBJ 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all things to Himself as to their last end." But He is also man's last end; because He alone is to be enjoyed by man, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore other things, too, concur in man's last end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 OBJ 3: Further, man's last end is the object of the will. But the object of the will is the universal good, which is the end of all. Therefore other things, too, concur in man's last end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] OTC Para. 1/1 On the contrary, man's last end is happiness; which all men desire, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3,4). But "happiness is not possible for animals bereft of reason," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 5). Therefore other things do not concur in man's last end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Body Para. 1/3 I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the end is twofold---the end "for which" and the end "by which"; viz. the thing itself in which is found the aspect of good, and the use or acquisition of that thing. Thus we say that the end of the movement of a weighty body is either a lower place as "thing," or to be in a lower place, as "use"; and the end of the miser is money as "thing," or possession of money as "use." Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Body Para. 2/3 If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the end, thus all other things concur in man's last end, since God is the last end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of man's last end, as of the acquisition of the end, then irrational creatures do not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational creatures attain to their last end by knowing and loving God: this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end, in so far as they share in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, or live, or even know. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[1] A[8] Body Para. 3/3 Hence it is evident how the objections are solved: since happiness means the acquisition of the last end. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] Out. Para. 1/2 OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS (EIGHT ARTICLES) We have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2) what it is; (3) how we can obtain it. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] Out. Para. 2/2 Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether happiness consists in wealth? (2) Whether in honor? (3) Whether in fame or glory? (4) Whether in power? (5) Whether in any good of the body? (6) Whether in pleasure? (7) Whether in any good of the soul? (8) Whether in any created good? Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Thes. Para. 1/1 Whether man's happiness consists in wealth? Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1 OBJ 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in wealth. For since happiness is man's last end, it must consist in that which has the greatest hold on man's affections. Now this is wealth: for it is written (Eccles. 10:19): "All things obey money." Therefore man's happiness consists in wealth. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1 OBJ 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), happiness is "a state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." Now money seems to be the means of possessing all things: for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), money was invented, that it might be a sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man desires. Therefore happiness consists in wealth. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 OBJ 3: Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never fails, it seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more than anything else; since "a covetous man shall not be satisfied with riches" (Eccles. 5:9). Therefore happiness consists in wealth. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] OTC Para. 1/1 On the contrary, Man's good consists in retaining happiness rather than in spreading it. But as Boethius says (De Consol. ii), "wealth shines in giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas the generous man is applauded." Therefore man's happiness does not consist in wealth. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Body Para. 1/3 I answer that, It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3), viz. natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man as a remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink, clothing, cars, dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a direct help to nature, as money, but is invented by the art of man, for the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things salable. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Body Para. 2/3 Now it is evident that man's happiness cannot consist in natural wealth. For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of something else, viz. as a support of human nature: consequently it cannot be man's last end, rather is it ordained to man as to its end. Wherefore in the order of nature, all such things are below man, and made for him, according to Ps. 8:8: "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet." Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] Body Para. 3/3 And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sake of natural wealth; since man would not seek it except because, by its means, he procures for himself the necessaries of life. Consequently much less can it be considered in the light of the last end. Therefore it is impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to consist in wealth. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 1: All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise: just as it is for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 2: All things salable can be had for money: not so spiritual things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is written (Prov. 17:16): "What doth it avail a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy wisdom." Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[1] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 3: The desire for natural riches is not infinite: because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear (Polit. i, 3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly the sovereign good is possessed, the more it is loved, and other things despised: because the more we possess it, the more we know it. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 24:29): "They that eat me shall yet hunger." Whereas in the desire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods, the contrary is the case: for when we already possess them, we despise them, and seek others: which is the sense of Our Lord's words (Jn. 4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of this water," by which temporal goods are signified, "shall thirst again." The reason of this is that we realize more their insufficiency when we possess them: and this very fact shows that they are imperfect, and the sovereign good does not consist therein. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] Thes. Para. 1/1 Whether man's happiness consists in honors? Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1 OBJ 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in honors. For happiness or bliss is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore happiness consists especially in honor. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1 OBJ 2: Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect good. But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Moreover, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:17): "To . . . the only God be honor and glory." Therefore happiness consists in honor. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 OBJ 3: Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers loss in all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor. Therefore happiness consists in honor. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] OTC Para. 1/1 On the contrary, Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore happiness does not consist in honor. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] Body Para. 1/1 I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion, especially to his happiness, which is man's perfect good; and to its parts, i.e. those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot principally consist therein. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work: but they receive honor from men by way of reward, "as from those who have nothing greater to offer." But virtue's true reward is happiness itself, for which the virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be a virtue, but ambition. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 2: Honor is due to God and to persons of great excellence as a sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not that honor makes them excellent. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[2] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 3: That man desires honor above all else, arises from his natural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as stated above. Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on whose judgment he believes himself to be excellent or happy. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] Thes. Para. 1/1 Whether man's happiness consists in fame or glory? Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] Obj. 1 Para. 1/1 OBJ 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in glory. For happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints for the trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: for the Apostle says (Rm. 8:18): "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us." Therefore happiness consists in glory. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] Obj. 2 Para. 1/1 OBJ 2: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But man's good is spread abroad in the knowledge of others by glory more than by anything else: since, according to Ambrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13], glory consists "in being well known and praised." Therefore man's happiness consists in glory. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] Obj. 3 Para. 1/1 OBJ 3: Further, happiness is the most enduring good. Now this seems to be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity after a fashion. Hence Boethius says (De Consol. ii): "You seem to beget unto yourselves eternity, when you think of your fame in future time." Therefore man's happiness consists in fame or glory. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] OTC Para. 1/1 On the contrary, Happiness is man's true good. But it happens that fame or glory is false: for as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "many owe their renown to the lying reports spread among the people. Can anything be more shameful? For those who receive false fame, must needs blush at their own praise." Therefore man's happiness does not consist in fame or glory. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 1/2 I answer that, Man's happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory. For glory consists "in being well known and praised," as Ambrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13] says. Now the thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to God's knowledge: for human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God's knowledge is the cause of the things known. Wherefore the perfection of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human knowledge: but rather human knowledge of another's happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently man's happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the other hand, man's good depends on God's knowledge as its cause. And therefore man's beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God; according to Ps. 90:15,16: "I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I will fill him with length of days, and I will show him my salvation." Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] Body Para. 2/2 Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. For this reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true; hence it is written (2 Cor. 10:18): "He . . . is approved . . . whom God commendeth." Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] R.O. 1 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 1: The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Hence it is written (Mk. 8:38): "The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of His Father, before His angels" [*St. Thomas joins Mk. 8:38 with Lk. 12:8 owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the fact that he was quoting from memory]. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] R.O. 2 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 2: A man's good which, through fame or glory, is in the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived from good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false, it does not harmonize with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that fame can nowise make man happy. Aquin.: SMT FS Q[2] A[3] R.O. 3 Para. 1/1 Reply OBJ 3: Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But happiness endures of itself, and for ever.