Molecular Biology and Evolution: The Crisis and the Challenge
Thomas B. Fowler, SC.D.
<I. Molecular Biology and Evolution>
Molecular biology and its closely related companion, molecular
genetics, have revolutionized our thinking about living organisms.
In the process, they have compelled us to rethink certain
questions which until a century ago had been exclusively the
province of theology. These questions include (1) the uniqueness
of man vis-a-vis the rest of creation; (2) divine intervention
versus purely natural (physico-chemical) processes as responsible
for man; and (3) man's origin and evolution. This latter is
particularly important because physico-chemical knowledge of how
cells and biological organisms grow, develop, and reproduce
inevitably leads to the further question of how it all began.
Indeed, there is now a clear connection between molecular biology
and evolutionary biology which closely parallels the connection
which has emerged over the last 20 years in physical science
between particle physics and cosmology. For example, molecular
clocks based on DNA sequencing are used to work out evolutionary
trees, analogous to the way in which knowledge of fundamental
particles and their interactions is used to work out the early
history of the universe. This tight integration of the theory of
evolution with molecular biology, and the visibility evolution has
attained in both science and the public consciousness at large,
justify concentration on it as a key element in the reintegration
of science and theology. But when I speak of evolution, it is in
the broadest sense, including both the modern version of Darwin's
theory and its theoretical underpinnings in molecular biology,
molecular genetics, and related fields.
The purpose of this essay is to highlight the crisis posed by the
theory of evolution, sketch six possible approaches to resolve it,
and indicate their strengths and weaknesses. The essay does not
attempt to solve the problem of evolution in any definitive way.
<II. The Crisis Posed by Evolution>
Christianity has had to deal with a number of major intellectual
"crises" during the 2000 years of its existence, generally
triggered by the appearance of some new "secular" knowledge which
appeared to be at variance with a doctrine or world-view deemed at
the time to be an integral part of Christian belief. Among the
most famous of these crises was the introduction of Aristotle's
work into the West in the twelfth century, and the development of
the heliocentric theory by Copernicus, culminating with the
celebrated Galileo affair in the early seventeenth century. As
Gilson has documented,1 the former crisis was of enormous
magnitude because Aristotle's work represented a comprehensive
view of the universe which was very compelling in its logical and
empirical structure, which owed nothing to Christianity, and
indeed was at variance with Christianity on some key points such
as the creation of the world. The crisis was met head-on and
defused by Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas, whose work
resulted in what may loosely be termed the "Medieval Synthesis."
That synthesis, though challenged frequently, survived largely
intact for about 400 years, during which time it served as the
primary intellectual framework for Western thought.2 Serious
problems emerged due in part to the latter crisis. The
heliocentric theory was a blow to Christianity for two reasons:
(1) it made clear that the earth was not the center of the
universe, as had been inferred from the Bible; and more
importantly (2) the entire explanation schema of the heavenly
bodies and their motion, based on the idea that they were "more
perfect" than earthly bodies, was destroyed. This idea had deep
roots in Western intellectual tradition; it was part of the
Medieval Synthesis and went back to the Greeks, although its
biblical foundation was perhaps rather shaky.
I mention these two crises because the development of the theory
of evolution and associated work in other disciplines, such as
geology and paleontology, has triggered a new crisis for
Christianity (and other religions as well) which shares some of
the same traits but differs from the earlier crises in key ways.
It is like the medieval situation in that the theory of evolution,
combined with other branches of science, represents a world view
which seems to owe nothing to Christianity, is very compelling,
and is _ or claims to be _ at variance with Christianity on many
points. It is like the heliocentric theory crisis in that long-
held views of man and the world which were thought to have solid
biblical foundation, in particular the chronology in chapter I of
Genesis, have been undermined. Destroyed at the same time was an
explanation schema of how we got here: we (and the animals and the
sun, moon, and stars) were the result of distinct creative acts of
God which took place at a fixed time in the not too distant past.
The new crisis is different for two reasons. First, the theory of
evolution is much more comprehensive than Aristotle's work, since
it can account for the origin and development of all things. As a
result, it has acquired a far-reaching extra-scientific status.
To quote Mary Midgely's fine book, <Evolution as a Religion>:
Evolution is the creation myth of our age. By telling us our
origins, it shapes our views of what we are. It influences not
just our thought, but our feelings and actions too, in a way which
goes far beyond its official function as a biological theory. . .
. a surprising number of the elements which used to belong to
traditional religion have regrouped themselves under the heading
of science, mainly around the concept of evolution.3
Indeed, the surrogate religion that evolution has become often
wants to "loot and plunder" orthodox religion, i.e., to divert the
"spiritual assets" of religion to the service of science; these
include the zeal of its members, their willingness to sacrifice
for it, and the presentation of science as humanity's ultimate
quest (the holy Grail).
The crisis is different for a second reason as well, and that is
the widespread _ almost universal _ knowledge of evolution by the
public, and specifically their knowledge of it as a "crisis" for
religion. The analogous situation clearly did not obtain in the
Middle Ages, and was much less of a problem in the Renaissance.
Now to be sure, the general public's knowledge of details and
mechanisms of evolution is weak; but their knowledge that
evolution "explains" the origin of man and other living creatures,
coupled with their knowledge that other branches of science have
"explained" the origin of the solar system and universe, has
seriously undermined their belief in the Bible and religious
authority generally. This, of course, is due to the fact that
these sources are perceived to have been wrong on so many matters
of fact. The situation has been exacerbated by highly publicized
affairs such as the famous debate between Thomas Huxley and Bishop
Wilberforce, the "Scopes Monkey Trial," and more recently the
media and court battles of the creationists, all of which seem to
pit religion against science and highlight the "crisis" situation,
with the inevitable result that religion is equated to
obscurantism and anti-intellectualism. As Barzun has so aptly
remarked, the general public has traded their absolute faith in
the men in black coats for absolute faith in the men in white
coats.
<III. The Problem of Scientific (Empirical) Truth and Religious
Truth>
Before embarking on a discussion of possible approaches to
resolving the problems posed by evolution, let us examine an
important question which frames those approaches. That question
concerns the empirical content of religious statements, and
consequently the extent to which they are verifiable or refutable.
It is clear that until recently, the fundamental dogmas of
Christianity were assumed to have considerable empirical content,
viz. Christ was a man who lived in Palestine in the first century,
He was a carpenter's son, He led a band of disciples, He was
arrested, tried, and executed on the Cross, and His death was for
the forgiveness of our sins and for our redemption. Indeed, St.
Paul says, "But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is
Christ not risen: and if Christ not be risen, then is our
preaching vain, and your faith is also vain." (1 Cor 15:14-15, AV)
But if the statements have empirical content, they become subject
to refutation; thus _ as St. Paul has clearly indicated _ the
religion itself becomes subject to refutation. The problem this
poses became acute with the development of the theory of evolution
and even more so with the development of molecular biology,
because these two directly concern subjects which touch the heart
of religious doctrine in ways that theories of the heavens do not:
who we are, how we got here and what is unique about us. So if
one wishes to interpret a doctrine, dogma, or biblical passage in
such a way that it has definite empirical content, such as the
creation of the world in seven days, the flood narrative, or the
nature of man as an essentially spiritual being, one will be
making statements which fall under the competence of some branch
of empirical science; and thus the truth of Christianity will
become contingent upon the truth or falsity of particular
scientific theories. Or at least it will if one has an <a priori>
understanding of what those interpretations must be. Creationism
rather vividly exemplifies this situation: the creationists (to
their credit) clearly state what they think one must believe in
order to be a Christian, and among them is the literal truth of
Bible passages such as those of chapter I of Genesis. The result,
of course, is a direct contradiction of not just evolution, but
large parts of geology, geophysics, astronomy, cosmology, and
numerous other branches of science.
But even if one wishes to dismiss the creationists' approach as
too naive, the problem does not go away; it just surfaces at
another level. Is there something unique about man as a spiritual
being? If so, is there some point in the sequence of hominids at
which natural processes are insufficient to lead to the next
member? Or at the level of molecular biology, when a sperm
fertilizes an ovum, is there something in that or subsequent
development processes which is not explainable by science? Or is
there something in the behavior of man which is not reducible to
physico-chemical processes in his brain or elsewhere in his body?
If the answer is no, then reductionism's triumph would seem to be
complete; if the answer is yes, then there should be an empirical
test at some point.
One can, of course, restrict interpretation of theological and
biblical statements to the level of metaphor and symbol, stripping
them of direct empirical content; there would then be no possible
collision with science. But as I see it there are problems with
such an approach: (1) it would confirm the reductionists' claim
that religion is essentially useless and unnecessary because it
doesn't really say anything; (2) it would be at variance with the
traditional understanding of Christian doctrine and belief as
being about what goes on in the world _ certainly one of its
principal sources of strength; and (3) it would negate the true
symbolic meaning of things such as the Cross, which are important
as symbols precisely <because> they refer to events which actually
occurred.
Traditionally there has been a mix of the two alternatives in most
religious belief systems, so that some doctrines are interpreted
literally and others symbolically or metaphorically, with
particular items being moved from one category (usually the first)
to the other as necessary. Thus the belief that the earth is the
center of the universe, and that God created the world in seven
days, which at one time were universally held to be "empirical,"
are now almost universally held to be symbolic or metaphorical.
The <problem> with this procedure, of course, is that it appears
to be backtracking, and if done too often, the faithful will begin
to doubt whether <any> of their doctrines are safe. Since as a
rule religion is strong only when it deals in absolutes, this
perception can undermine the faith of many, as I believe it has
already done in the West, especially as a consequence of the
evolution controversy.
Ideally, then, one would like to resolve the problem once and for
all by determining where the dividing line between the two lies,
and suitably interpreting the doctrines with empirical content so
that they retain their religious meaning but are not going to be
in conflict with scientific developments. Truth, after all,
should be one. We shall next consider some possible approaches to
accomplish this.
<IV. Approaches to the Problems Posed by the Theory of Evolution>
As I see it, there are basically six approaches to the theological
problems outlined above.
(1) <Science is incomplete with respect to man>. Stated
positively, this approach maintains that there is some fact about
man which cannot be explained by science. There is no
contradiction with any physical law; only a fundamental
incompleteness which could be manifested as the occurrence of a
long series of extremely improbable events, or a type of
indeterminism which precludes prediction of subsequent events. An
example would be the forces of evolution leading to a certain
point of hominid development, beyond which they could not go of
themselves. Zubiri's very profound meditation on evolution
encompasses this approach:
The human psychic constitution is <determined> in its evolutional
origin by the germinal transformations, but it is not <produced>
by them only. Here the causal determination is not effectuation.
Mere sensation cannot produce of itself an intelligence: there
exists between the two an essential, not a gradual, difference.
No matter how complicated the mere stimuli and their form of
apprehension are, they can never arrive at constituting
stimulating realities and intellective apprehension. At this
point the appearance of an intellective psyche is not only a
matter of degree but is essentially something new.4
For Zubiri, the hallmark of intelligence is the ability to
apprehend things as realities, and respond to them as such, not as
mere stimuli. This, in his view, is the unbridgeable gap, which
required an external cause:
. . . the psyche of the first hominized is essentially distinct
from the animal psyche of the hominid ancestor of man. As such,
the human psyche is <determined> by the transformation (by the
germinal changes) of the mere hominid into man but is not <brought
about> by the transformation. Because of this it can only be an
effect of the first cause, just as at its time the appearance of
matter was: it is the effect of a creation <ex nihilo.>5
It should be noted, however, that this first cause does not
operate here by some type of insufflation of "spirit" into matter;
rather, the creation in question is a type of causal "mechanism"
intrinsic to evolution. This general approach has received a
boost in recent years from the recognition that the forces of
natural selection as envisioned by Darwin may be inadequate to
explain the course, rate, and other features of evolution. It
corresponds to a view of evolution somewhere between what I have
elsewhere6 termed "Weak Darwinian evolution" and "Strong Darwinian
evolution."
(2) <The problem is not correctly in focus.> That is, we are not
looking at it in the proper way because we have <a la> Descartes
assumed a dichotomy between "spiritual" and "material" realms
which in fact does not exist. Thus we seek some illusory break
between the animal ancestors of man and man himself, <Homo
sapiens>. This might by styled the "Eastern approach," because of
its affinity with certain ideas of Eastern religions.
An analogy may perhaps clarify the position. Considering space,
for example, one might ask if it is infinite or finite, i.e., Does
space have an "end"? There should be a yes-or-no answer. Or
should there? Note that the question as framed assumes a flat
Euclidean space; if space is curved in an appropriate way, it can
be both finite yet not have an "end." So the question may not be
appropriate because it is based on a fundamental underlying
assumption which is gratuitous. In a similar way, if one's notion
of "matter" is suitably modified, the problem of man evolving from
lower animals may not really be a "problem" at all, because that
"matter" already has "spiritual" characteristics built-in.
With this approach, man's somatic structures are an exigent cause
of his consciousness, which is thus a part of the "material"
world; or if one prefers, the material world is an extension of
the "spiritual" world. This general approach has received a boost
in the twentieth century from an unexpected corner: modern
physics. The development of quantum mechanics has shown that
matter is much different than the atomic spheres of nineteenth
century determinism; indeed, in many ways it behaves in distinctly
"un-materialistic" fashion, to the degree that many people have
seen distinct parallels between modern physics and Eastern
religious and philosophical thought (e.g. <The Tao of Physics7>).
Whether such an approach can be successfully integrated into
Christian thought is not clear, however. The language of the New
Testament often speaks of a clear distinction between matter and
spirit, e.g. Mt 28:41, "The spirit indeed is willing, but the
flesh is weak," and Jn 3:6, "That which is born of the flesh is
flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit." There is,
moreover, the problem of understanding the immortality of the soul
when a clear distinction between matter and spirit is lacking.
(3) <Existence of or evolution toward man would violate physical
laws>. This is an approach much favored by the creationists, who
typically center their critique of evolution on the second law of
thermodynamics, claiming that it forbids the type of order seen in
biological organisms from arising naturally. However, as I have
discussed at length elsewhere,8 the proponents of this view
invariably seem to misunderstand and misinterpret the scientific
laws and principles to which they appeal. As a result they set up
a strawman to knock down which bears no relation to the true laws
and the physical reality they describe. Nonetheless if one
<could> demonstrate that man (or living creatures generally)
violated some physical law; or that any type of evolution would
violate such a law, then at one stroke reductionism would be
discredited and religion would score a triumphant victory. This
type of "silver bullet" approach to complex intellectual problems
rarely succeeds, however.
(4) <Physical laws have been misinterpreted and misapplied.> This
is another creationist approach, encompassing their "flood
geology" theory. According to this approach, evolution did not
occur, established geological history is incorrect, and everything
happened in accordance with physical laws as "correctly" applied
and in accordance with a literal reading of the Bible. Thus the
world was created 6000 years ago, the flood of Noah's time
accounts for observed deposits of fossils, and so forth. The
problem with such an approach is twofold: (1) as Kitcher9 has
pointed out, the creationists' theories have no predictive value;
and (2) it compels them to declare war not just on the theory of
evolution, but on scientific disciplines such as astrophysics,
geophysics, and now even particle physics, all of which are
irrevocably committed to time spans of billions of years. Modern
science is a tightly interlocked intellectual system with
extremely wide-ranging empirical confirmation and explanatory
power; the flick of a light switch and the passing of an
automobile exemplify the same laws used in working out the
chronology of the universe. It cannot be dismantled and <ad hoc>
substitutions made as advocated in this approach. Every attempt
in the past to make science conform to preestablished conclusions
has failed; there is no reason to assume this one will fare any
better. And ironically it is being advocated at a time when many
of the major findings of science are in fact quite favorable to
Christianity, such as the development of the Big Band theory and
the dethroning of strictly deterministic hypotheses about the
universe.
(5) <Reinterpret Controversial Doctrines as Metaphorical or
Symbolic.> Included here are theories such as Dobzhansky's, that
science deals with fact and religion with <meaning>. To be sure,
symbols play an important part in our lives, and we could scarcely
have a functioning society without them; the flag as a symbol of
our country is a perfect example. However as discussed above,
religious symbols _ at least in Catholicism _ have meaning
precisely because they refer to events which actually took place;
consider, for example, the Eucharist. To paraphrase St. Paul, if
Christ did not physically die on the Cross for our sins, then the
Eucharist loses all meaning except perhaps as a gesture of
friendship, as a metaphor of Christ's friendship with us perhaps.
Therefore if one is going to attribute <only> symbolic or
metaphorical meaning to any doctrine or dogma which causes
problems, there will be a real danger of emptying religion of its
deepest meaning, that which stems from events which actually took
place in the world. On the other hand if the reinterpretation is
selective, it may well leave us with the same problem, viz. how to
integrate those statements having empirical content with
scientific knowledge. The reinterpretation approach therefore may
not be capable of resolving the evolution problem without
eviscerating the very religion it is supposed to serve.
Specifically with regard to evolution and Genesis, if one wishes
to claim that accounts in the Bible are symbolic or metaphorical,
and that science tells us what <really> happened, then one is left
with a suite of problems: the uniqueness of man (is he different
than the animals?), the immortality of the soul (also a
metaphor?), and God's care for us as individuals (a metaphor for
Mother Nature?), just to name a few. The reinterpretation
approach may be a useful adjunct to theology, but does not seem
capable of entirely solving the evolution problem.
(6) <Evolution occurred as described by science>. This may also
be termed the theory of <fundamental wholeness.> According to
this approach, physical laws and initial conditions on planet
Earth were sufficient to produce man after 5 billion years of
evolution, assuming natural selection and possibly other (natural)
forces at work. God's governance and creative power are always
present, sustaining life. This approach can be similar or even
identical to the previous one, or it can be quite different. For
example, one can assume that since God created the universe and
the laws operative in it, He therefore created the earth and
caused it _ through secondary causes, the laws of nature _ "to
bring forth vegetation . . . to bring forth living creatures," in
the words of Genesis. In favor of this approach, it should be
recognized that Genesis, written 3000 years ago, could not
possibly have told the story of the creation of the universe and
the earth and the development of life as we currently understand
those things because the underlying concepts were completely
unknown. Consider a sentence such as, "Amino acids in the
primordial oceans 5 billion years ago were combined through energy
provided by sunlight into proteins, and some of the proteins
spontaneously formed DNA though reactions favored by entropy."
This sentence would have been unintelligible to someone in Europe
or America a hundred years ago; it most certainly could not have
been expressed in ancient Hebrew because neither the words nor the
requisite conceptual infrastructure existed at that time. Any
attempt to explain cosmology, astrophysics, paleontology, or
evolutionary biology to the Hebrews would have been regarded as
total gibberish. Therefore we cannot possibly expect the Bible to
tell the story of creation in the terms to which our science has
accustomed us; it is equally absurd to expect the Bible to serve
as a scientific textbook.
On the other hand, this approach to the evolution question does
pose many problems, among them the following: (1) By Ockham's
razor, religious explanations of the world and man should be
discarded because we have at least one good explanation, the
scientific one; i.e., has too much been conceded to the
reductionists? (2) Does this approach sufficiently differentiate
man from other creatures; i.e., is he sufficiently unique? (3) Is
God too remote? Too Deistic? Does He only operate the universe
by remote control, so to speak? (4) Is there enough interaction of
God with the world? How do Christ and the incarnation fit in? (5)
What about miracles? Do they really occur? and (6) What becomes
of the soul and its immortality?
These problems need to be resolved before this approach can be
made viable, but that may well be possible.
<V. The Future>
Resolution of the crisis stemming from developments in molecular
biology and the theory of evolution will likely require a
substantial investment of time and effort, and will probably come
as part of a new world view, one that is more comprehensive and
subtle than what we currently possess, and perhaps more dynamic in
some ways as well. I suspect that it will be a combination of
some of the foregoing approaches, especially in view of the fact
that they are not all mutually exclusive. But there is
unfortunately no guarantee that the current state of science will
permit us to devise such a world view. Nonetheless the goal is
clear: to preserve the empirical content of important religious
doctrines, give science free reign to continue exploring the world
accessible to it, and permit us to understand how the two interact
and yield one version of the truth. This is a rather tall order I
admit, but one to which I believe we are all committed and which
will no doubt be one of the great legacies of our time.
ENDNOTES
1 Etienne Gilson, <Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages> (New
York: Scribners, 1938).
2 E. J. Dijkterhuis, <The Mechanization of the World Picture>, tr.
by C. Dikshoorn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986),
<passim>.
3 Mary Midgley, <Evolution as a Religion> (New York: Methuen &
Company, 1985), pp. 30-31.
4 Xavier Zubiri, "The Origin of Man" in <Contemporary Spanish
Philosophy>, ed. by A. R. Caponigri (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre
Dame Press, 1967), pp. 65-66.
5 Ibid., p. 66.
6 Thomas Fowler, "Thermodynamics and Evolution: Contradiction,
Constraint, or Cooperation?" in <Faith & Reason>, Vol. X, No. 2,
pp. 101-148.
7 F. Capra, <The Tao of Physics> (Boston: Shambhala Publications,
1975).
8 Fowler, op. cit.
9 Philip Kitcher, <Abusing Science, The Case Against Creationism>
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982).
This article was taken from the Summer 1993 issue of "Faith &
Reason". Subscriptions available from Christendom Press, 2101
Shenandoah Shores Road, Ft. Royal, VA 22630, 703-636-2900, Fax
703-636-1655. Published quarterly at $20.00 per year.
Copyright (c) 1996 EWTN
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