CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: ETHICS
Ethics
1. Definition
Many writers regard ethics (Gr. <ethike>) as any scientific treatment of the moral order
and divide it into theological, or Christian, ethics (moral theology) and philosophical
ethics (moral philosophy). What is usually understood by ethics, however, is
philosophical ethics, or moral philosophy, and in this sense the present article will treat
the subject. Moral philosophy is a division of practical philosophy. Theoretical, or
speculative, philosophy has to do with being, or with the order of things not dependent
on reason, and its object is to obtain by the natural light of reason a knowledge of this
order in its ultimate causes. Practical philosophy, on the other hand, concerns itself
with what ought to be, or with the order of acts which are human and which therefore
depend upon our reason. It is also divided into logic and ethics. The former rightly
orders the intellectual activities and teaches the proper method in the acquirement of
truth, while the latter directs the activities of the will; the object of the former is the
true; that of the latter is the good. Hence ethics may be defined as the science of the
moral rectitude of human acts in accordance with the first principles of natural reason.
Logic and ethics are normative and practical sciences, because they prescribe norms or
rules for human activities and show how, accordng to these norms, a man ought to
direct his actions. Ethics is pre-eminently practical and directive; for it orders the
activity of the will, and the latter it is which sets all the other faculties of man in motion.
Hence, to order the will is the same as to order the whole man. Moreover, ethics not
only directs a man how to act if he wishes to be morally good, but sets before him the
absolute obligation he is under of doing good and avoiding evil.
A distinction must be made between ethics and morals, or morality. Every people,
even the most uncivilized and uncultured, has its own morality or sum of prescriptions
which govern its moral conduct. Nature had so provided that each man establishes for
himself a code of moral concepts and principles which are applicable to the details of
practical life, without the necessity of awaiting the conclusions of science. Ethics is the
scientific or philosophical treatment of morality. The subject-matter proper of ethics is
the deliberate, free actions of man; for these alone are in our power, and concerning
these alone can rules be prescribed, not concerning those actions which are performed
without deliberation, or through ignorace or coercion. Besides this, the scope of ethics
includes whatever has reference to free human acts, whether as principle or cause of
action (law, conscience, virtue), or as effect or circumstance of action (merit,
punishment, etc.). The particular aspect (formal object) under which ethics considers
free acts is that of their moral goodness or the rectitude of order involved in them as
human acts. A man may be a good artist or orator and at the same time a morally bad
man, or, conversely, a morally good man and a poor artist or technician. Ethics has
merely to do with the order which relates to man as man, and which makes of him a
good man.
Like ethics, moral theology also deals with the moral actions of man; but unlike ethics
it has its origin in supernaturally revealed truth. It presupposes man's elevation to the
supernatural order, and, though it avails itself of the scientific conclusions of ethics, it
draws its knowledge for the most part from Christian Revelation. Ethics is
distinguished from the other natural sciences which deal with moral conduct of man, as
jurisprudence and pedagogy, in this, that the latter do not ascend to first principles, but
borrow their fundamental notions from ethics, and are therefore subordinate to it. To
investigate what constitues good or bad, just orjunjust, waht is virtue, law, conscience,
duty, etc., what obligations are common to all men, does not lie within the scope of
jurisprdence or pedagogy, but of ethics; and yet these principles must be presupposed
by the former, must serve them as a ground-work and guide; hence they are
subordinated to ethics. The same is tre of political economy. The latter is indeed
immediately concerned with man's social activity inasmuch as it treats of the
production, distribution and consumption of material commodities, but this activity is
not independent of ethics; industrial life must develop in accordance with the moral
law and must be dominated by justice, equity, and love. Political economy was wholly
wrong in trying to emancipate itself from the requirements of ethics. Sociology is at the
present day considered by many as a science distinct from ethics. If, however, by
sociology is meant a philosophical treatment of society, it is a division of ethics; for the
enquiry into the nature of society in general, into the origin, nature, object and purpose
of natural societies (the family, the state) and their relations to one another forms an
essential part of Ethics. If, on the other hand, sociology be regarded as the aggregate of
the sciences which have reference to the social life of man, it is not a single science but a
complexus of sciences; and among these, so far as the natural order is concerned, ethics
has the first claim.
II. Sources and Methods of Ethics
The sources of ethics are partly man's own experience and partly the principles and
truts proposed by other philosophical disciplines (logic and mataphysics). Ethics taes
its origin from the empirical fact that certain general principles and concepts of the
moral orderare common to all people at all times. This fact has indeed been frequently
disputed, but recent ethnological research has placd it beyond the possibility of doubt.
All nations distinguish between what is good and what is bad, between good men and
bad men, between virtue and vice; they are all agreed in this: that the good is worth
striving for , and that evil must be shuned, that the one deserves praise, the other,
blame. Though in individual cases they may not be one in denominating the same
thing good or evil, they are neverthless agreed as to the general principle, that good is
to be done and evil avoided. Vice everywhereseeks to hide itself or to put on the mask
of virtue; it is a universally recognized principle, that we should not do to others what
we would not wish them to do to us. With the aid of the truths laid down in logic and
mataphysics, ethics proceeds to give a thorough explanationof the this undeniable fact,
to trace it back to its ultimate causes, then to gather from fundamental moral principles
certain conclusions which will direct man, in the various circumstances and relations of
life, how to shape his own conduct towards the attainment of the end for which he was
created. Thus the proper method of ethics is at once speculative and empirical; it draws
upon experience and metaphysics. Supernatural Christian Revelation is not a proper
source of ethics. Only those conclusions properly belong to ethics which can be
reached with the help of experience and philosophical principles. The Christian
philosopher, howeer, may not ignore supernatural revelation, but must at least
recognise itas a negative norm, inasmuch as he is not to advance any assertion in
evident contradiction to the revealed truth of Christianity. God is the fountain-head of
all truth - whether natural as made known by Creation, or supernatural as revealed
through Christ and the Prophets. As our intellect is an image of the Divine Intellect, so
is all certain scientific knowledge the reflex and interpretation of the Creator's thoughts
embodied in His creatures, a participation in His eternal wisdom. God cannot reveal
supernaturally and command us to believe on His authority anything that contradicts
the thoughts expreseed by Him in his creatures, and which, with the aid of the faculty
of reason which he has given us, we can discern in His works. To assert the contrary
would be to deny God's omniscience and veracity, or to suppose that God was not the
source of all truth. A conflict, therefore, between faith and science is impossible, and
hence the Christian philosopher has to refrain from advancing any assertion which
would be evidently antagonistic to certain revealed truth. Should his researches lead to
conclusions out of harmony with faith, he is to take it for granted that some error has
crept into his deductions, just as the mathematician whose calculations openly
contradict the facts of experience must be satisfied that his demonstration is at fault.
After what has been said the following methods of ethics must be rejected as unsound.
Pure Rationalism. - This system makes reason the sole source of truth, and thereforse at
the very otset excludes every reference to Christian Revelation, branding any such
reference as degrading and hampering free scientific investigation. The supreme law
of science is not freedom, but truth. It is not derogatory to the true dignity and
freedom of science to abstain from asserting what, according to Christian Revelation, is
manifestly erroneous. Pure Empiricism, which would erect the entire structure of
ethics exclusively on the foundation of experience, must also be rejected. Experience
can tell us merely of present or past phenomena; but as to what, of necessity, and
universall, must, or ought to, happen in the future, experience can give us no clue
without bringing in the aid of necessary and universal principles. Closely alied to
Empiricism is Historicism, which considers history as the exclusive source of ethics.
What has been said of Empiricism may also be applied to Historicism. History is
concered with what has happened in the past and only too often has to rehearse the
moral aberrations of mankind. Positivism is a variety of Empiricism; it seeks to
emancipate ethics from metaphysics and base it on facts alone. No science can be
constructed on the mere foundation of facts, and independently of metaphysics. Every
sciencemust set out from evident principles, which form the basis of all certain
cognition. Ethics especially is impossible without metaphysics, since it is according to
the metaphysical view we take of the world that ethics shapes itself. Whoever
considers man as nothing else than a more highly developed brute will hold different
ethical views from one who discerns in man a creature fashioned to the image and
likeness of God, possessing a spiritual, immortal soul and destined to eternal life;
whoever refuses to recognize the freedom of the will destroys the very foundation of
ethics. Whether man was created by God or possesses a spiritual, immortal soul which
is endowed with free will, or is essentially different from brute creation, all these are
questions pertaining to metaphysics. Anthropology, moreover, is necessarily
presupposed by ethics. No rules can be prescribed for man's actions, unless his nature
is clearly understood. Another untenable system is Traditionalism, which in France,
during the last half of the nineteenth century, counted many adherents (among others,
de Bonald, Bautain), and which advanced the doctrine that complete certainty in
religious and moral questions was not to be attained by the aid of reason alone, bt only
by the light of revelation as made known to us through tradition. They failed to see
that for all reasonable belief certain knowledge of the existence of God and of the fact
of revelation is necessarily presupposed, and this knowledge cannot be gathered from
revelation. Fideism, or, as Paulsen designated it, the Irrationalism of many Protestants,
also denies the ability of reason to furnish certainty in matters relating to God and
religion. With Kant, it teaches that reason does not rise above the phenomena of the
visible world; faith alone can lead us into the realm of the supersensible and instruct us
in matters moral and religious. This faith, however, is not the acceptance of truth on
the strength of external authority, but rather consists in certain appreciative judgments,
i.e. assumptions or convictions which are the result of each one's own inner
experiences, and which have, therefore, for him a precise worth, and corrspond to his
own peculier temperament. Since these persuasions are not supposed to come within
the range of reason, exception to them cannot be taken on scientific grounds.
According to this opinion, religion and morals are relegated to pure subjectivism and
lose all their objectivity and universality of value.
III. Historical View of Ethics
As ethics is the philosophical treatment of the moral order, its history does not consist
in narrating the views of morality entertained by different nations at differnt times; this
is properly the scope of the history of civilisation, and of ethnology. The history of
ethics is concerned solely with the various philosophical systems which in the course of
time have been elaborated with reference to the moral order. Hence the opinions
advanced by the wise men of antiquity, such as Pythagoras (582-500 B.C.), Heraclitus
(535-475 B.C.), Confucius (558-479 B.C.), scarcely belong to the history of ethics; for,
though they proposed various moral truths and principles, they dis so in a dogmatic
and didactic, and not in a philosophically systematic manner. Ethics properly so-called
is first met with among the Greeks, i.e.in the teaching of Socrates (470- 399 B.C.).
According to him the ultimate object of human activity is happiness, and the necessary
means to reach it, virtue. Since everybody necessarily seeks happiness, no one is
deliberately corrupt. All evil arises from ignorance, and the virtues are one and all but
so many kinds of prudence. Virtue can, therefore, be imparted by instruction. The
disciple of Socrates, Plato (427-347 B.C.) declares that the <summum bonum> consists
in the perfect imitation of God, the Absolute Good, an imitation which cannot be fully
realised in this life. Virtue enables man to order his conduct, as he properly should,
according to the dictates of reason, and acting thus he becomes like unto God. But
Plato differed from Socrates in that he did not consider virtue to consist in wisdom
alone, but in justice, temperance, and fortitude as well, these constituting the proper
harmony of man's activities. In a sense, the State is man writ large, and its function its
function is to train its citizens in virtue. For his ideal State he proposed the community
of goods and of wives and the public education of children. Though Socrates and Plato
had been to the fore in this mighty work and had contributed much valuable material
to the upbuilding of ethics; nevertheless, Plato's illustroius disciple, Aristotle (384-322
B.C.), must be considered the real founder of systematic ethics. With characteristic
keenness he solved, in his ethical and political writings, most of the problems with
which ethics concerns itself. Unlike Plato, who began with ideas as the basis of his
observation, Aristotle chose rathe to take the facts of experience as his starting-point;
these he analysed accurately, and sought to trace to their highest and ultimate causes.
He set out from the point that all men tend to happiness as the ultimate object of all
their endeavours, as the highest good, which is sought for its own sake, and to which
all other goods merely serve as means. This happiness cannot consist in external goods,
but only in the activity proper to human nature - not indeed in such a lower activity of
the vegetative and sensitive life as man possesses in common with plants and brutes,
but in the highest and most perfect activity of his reason, which springs in turn from
virtue. This activity, however, has to be exercised in a perfect and enduring life. The
highest pleasure is naturally bound up with this activity, yet, to constitute perfect
happiness, external goods must also supply their share. True happiness, though
prepared for him by the gods as the object and reward of virtue, can be attained only
through a man's own individual exertion. With keen penetration Aristotle therupon
proceeds to investigate in turn each of the intellectual and moral virtues, and his
treatment of them must, even at the present time, be regarded as in great part correct.
The nature of the State and of the family were, in the main, rightly explained by him.
The only pity is that his vision did not penetrate beyond this earthly life, and that he
never saw clearly the relationss of man to God.
A more hedonistic (<edone>, "pleasure") turn in ethics begins with Democritus (about
460-370 B.C.), who considers a perpetually joyous and cheerful disposition as the
highest good and happiness of man. The means thereto is virtue, which makes us
independent of external goods - so far as that is possible - and which wisely
discriminates between the pleasures to be sought after and those that are to be
shunned. Pure Sensualism or Hedonism was first taught by Aristippus of Cyrene ( 435-
354 B.C.), according to whom the greatest possible pleasure, is the end and supreme
good of human endeavour. Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) differs from Aristippus in holding
that the largest sum total possible of spiritual and sensual enjoyments, with the greatest
possible freedom from displeasure and pain, is man's highest good. Virtue is the
proper directive norm in the attainmemt of this end. The Cynics, Antisthenes (444-
369 B.C.) and Diogenes of Sinope (414-324 B.C.), taught the direct contrary of
Hedonism, namely that virtue alone suffices for happiness, that pleasure is an evil, and
that the truly wise man is above human laws. This teaching soon degenerated into
haughty arrogance and open contempt for law and for the remainder of men
(Cynicism). The Stoics, Zeno (336-264 B.C.) and his disciples, Cleanthes, Chrysippus,
and others, strove to refine and perfect the views of Antisthenes. Virtue, in their
opinion, consist in man's living according to the dictates of his rational, and, as each
one's individual nature is but a part of the entire natural order, virtue is, therefore, the
harmonious agreement with the Divine Reason, which shapes the whole course of
nature. Whether they conceived this relation of God to the world in a pantheistic or a
theistic sense, is not altogether clear. Virtue is to be sought for its own sake, and it
suffices for man's happiness. All other things are indifferent and are, as circumstances
require, to be striven after or shunned. The passions and affections are bad, and the
wise man is independent of them. Among the Roman Stoics were Seneca (4 B.C. - A.D.
65), Epictetus (born about A.D. 50), and the Emperor Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 121-180),
upon whom however, at least upon the latter two, Christian influences had already
begun to make themselves felt. Cicero (106-43 B.C.) elaborated no new philosophical
system of his own, but chose those particular views from the various systems of
Grecian philosophy which appeared best to him. He maintained that moral goodness,
which is the general object of all virtues, consists in what is becoming to man as a
rational being as distinct from the brute. Actions are often good or bad, just or unjust,
not because of human institutions or customs, but of their own intrinsic nature. Above
and beyond human laws, there is a natural law embracing all nations and all times, the
expression of the rational will of the Most High God, from obedience to which no
human authority can exempt us. Cicero gives an exhaustive exposition of the cardinal
virtues and the obligations connected with them; he insists especially on devotion to the
gods, without which human society could not exist.
Parallel with the above-mentioned Greek and Roman ethical systems runs a
sceptical tendency, which rejects eery natural moral law, bases the whole moral order
on custom or human arbitrariness, and frees the wise man from subjection to the
ordinary precepts of the moral order. This tendency was furthered by the Sophists,
against whom Socrates and Plato arrayed themselves, and later on by Carnea, Theodore
of Cyrene, and others.
A new epoch in ethics begins with the dawn of Christianity. Ancient paganism
never had a clear and definite concept of the relation between God and the world, of
the unity of the human race, of the destiny of man, of the nature and meaning of the
moral law. Christianity first shed full light on these and similar questions. As St. Paul
teaches (Rom., ii, 24 sq.), God has written his moral law in the hearts of all men, even of
those outside the influence of Christian Revelation; this law manifests itself in the
conscience of every man and is the norm according to which the whole human race will
be judged on the day of reckoning. In consequence of their perverse inclinations, this
law had to a great extent become obscured and distorted among the pagans;
Christianity, however, restored it to its prestine integrity. Thus, too, ethics received its
richest and most fruitful stimulus. Proper ethical methods were now unfolded, and
philosophy was in a position to follow up and develop these methods by means
supplied from its own store-house. This corse was soon adopted in the early ages of
the Church by the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers, as Justin Martyr, Iranaeus,
Tertulian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, but especially the illustrius Doctors of the
Church, Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine, who, in the exposition and defence of
Christian truth, made use of the principles laid down by the pagan philosophers. True,
the Fathers had no occasion to treat moral questions from a purely philosophical
standpoint, and independently of Christin Revelation; but in the explanation of
Catholic doctrine their discussions naturally led to philosophical investigations. This is
particularly true of St Augustine, who proceeded to thoroughly develop along
philosophical lines and to establish firmly most of the truths of Christian morality. The
eternal law (lex aterna), the original type and source of all temporal laws, the natural
law, conscience, the ultimate end of man, the cardinal virtues, sin, marriage, etc. were
treated by him in the clearest and most penetrating manner. Hardly a single portion of
ethics does he present to us but is enriched with his keen philosophical commentaries.
Late ecclesiastical writers followed in his footsteps.
A sharper line of separation between philosophy and theology, and in particular
between ethics and moral theology, is first met with in the works of the great
Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, especially of Albert the Great (1193-1280), Thomas
Aquinas (1225- 1274), Bonaventure (1221-1274), and Duns Scotus (1274-1308).
Philosophy and, by means of it, theology reaped abundant fruit from the works of
Aristotle, which had until then been a sealed treasure to Western civilization, and had
first been elucidated by the detailed and profound commentaries of St. Albert the Great
and St. Thomas Aquinas and pressed into the service of Christian philosophy. The
same is particularly true as regards ethics. St. Thomas, in his commentaries on the
political and ethical writings of the Stagirite, in his "Summa contra Gentiles" and his
"Quaestiones disputatae, treated with his wonted clearness and penetration nearly the
whole range of ethics in a purely philosophical manner, so that even to the present day
his wors are an inexhaustible source whence ethics draws its supply. On the
foundations laid by him the Catholic philosophers and theoologians of succeeding ages
have continued to build. It is true that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, thanks
especially to the influence of theco-called Nominalists, a period of stagnation and
decline set in, but the sixteenth century is marked by a revival. Ethical questions, also,
though largely treated in connexion with theology, are again made the subject of
careful investigation. We mention as examples the great theologians Victoria,
Dominicus Soto, L. Molina, Suarez, Lessius, and De Lugo. Since the sixteenth century
special chairs of ethics (moral philosophy) have been erected in many Catholic
universities. The larger, purely philosophical works on ethics, however do not appear
until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as an example of which we may
instance the production of Ign. Schwarz, "Instituitiones juris universalis naturae et
gentium" (1743).
Far different from Catholic ethical methods were those adopted for the most part by
Protestants. With the rejection of the Church's teaching authority, each individual
became on principle his own supreme teacher and arbiter in matters appertaining to
faith and morals. True it is that the Reformers held fast to Holy Writ as the infallible
wourse of revelation, but as to what belongs or does not belong to it, whether, and how
far, it is inspired, and what is its meaning - all this was left to the final decision of the
individual. The inevitable result was that philosophy arrogantly threw to the winds all
regard for revealed truth, and in many cases became involved in the most pernicious
errors. Melanchthon, in his "Elementa philosophiae moralis", still clung to the
Aristotelean philosophy; so, too, did Hugo Grotius, in his work, "De jure belli et pacis".
But Cumberland and his follower, Samuel Pufendorf, moreover, assumed, with
Descartes, that the ultimate ground for every distinction between good and evil lay in
the free determination of God's will, a view which renders the philosophical treatment
of ethics fundamentally impossible. Quite an influential factor in the development of
ethics was Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). He suposes that the human race originally
existed in existed in a rude condition (<status naturae>) in which every man was free to
act as he pleased, and possessed a right to all things, whence arose a war of all against
all. Lest destruction should be the result, it was decided to abandon this condition of
nature and to found a state in which, by agreement, all were to be subject to one
common will (one ruler). This authority ordains, by the law of the State, what is to be
considered by all as good and as evil, and only then does there arise a distinction
between good and evil of universal binding force on all. The Pantheist Baruch Spinoza
(1632-1677) considers the instinct to self-preservation as the foundation of virtue. Every
being is endowed with the necessary impulse to assert itself, and, as reason demands
nothing contrary to nature, it requires each one to follow this impulse and to stive after
whatever is useful to him. And each individual possesses power and virtue just in so
far as he obeys this impulse. Freedom of the will consists merely in the ability to follow
unrestrainedly this natural impulse. Shaftesbury (1671-1713) bases ethics on the
affections or inclinations of man. There are sympathetic, idiopathic, and unnatural
inclinations. The first of these regard the common good, the second the private good of
the agent, the third are opposed to the other two. To lead a morally good life, war must
be waged upon the unnatural impulses, while the idiopathetic and sympathetic
inclinations must be made to harmonize. This harmony constitutes virtue. In the
attainment of virtue the subjective guiding principle of knowledge is the "moral sense",
a sort of moral instinct. This "moral sense" theory was further developed by Hutcheson
(1694-1747); meanwhile "common sense" was suggested by Thoms Reid (1710-1796) as
the highest norm of moral conduct. In France the materialistic philosophers of the
eighteenth century - as Helvetius, de la Mettrie, Holbach, Condillac, and others -
disseminated the teachings of Sensualism and Hedonism as understood by Epicurus.
A complete revolution in ethics was introduced by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).
From the wreck of pure theoretical reason he turned for rescue to practical reason, in
which he found an absolute, universal, and categorical moral law. This law is not to be
conceived as an enactmnt of external authority, for this would be heteromony, which is
foreign to true morality; it is rather the law of our own reason, which is, therefore,
autonomous, that is, it must be observed for its own sake, without regard to any
pleasure or utility arising therefrom. Only that will is morally good which obeys the
moral law under the influence of such a subjective principle or motive as can be willed
by the individual to become the universal law for all men. The followers of Kant have
selected now one now another doctrine from his ethics and combined therewith various
pantheistical systems. Fichte places man's supreme good and destiny in absolute
spontaniety and liberty; Schleiermacher, in co-operating with the progressive
civilization of mankind. A similar view recurs substantially in the writings of Wilhelm
Wundt and, to a certain extent, in those of the pessimist, Edward von Hartmann,
though the latter regards culture and progress merely as means to the ultimate end,
which, according to him, consists in delivering the Absolute from the torment of
existence. The system of Cumberland, who maintained the common good of
mankind to be the end and criterion of moral conduct, was renewed on a positive basis
in the nineteenth century by Auguste Comte and has counted many adherents, e.g., in
England, John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick, Alexander Bain; in Germany, G.T. Fechner,
F.E. Beneke, F. Paulsen, and others. Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) sought to effect a
compromise between social Utilitarianism (Altruism) and private Utilitarianism
(Egoism) in accordance with the theory of evolution. In his opinion, that conduct is
good which serves to augment life and pleasure withut any admixture of displeasure.
In consequence, however, of man's lack of adaptation to the conditions of life, such
absolute goodness of conduct is not as yet possible, and hence various compromises
must be made between Altruism and Egoism. With the progress of evolution,
however, this adaptability to existing conditions will become more and more perfect,
and consequently the benefits accruing to the individual from his own conduct will be
most useful to society at large. In particular, sympathy (in joy) will enable us to take
pleasure in altrusitic actions.
The great majority of non-Christian moral philosophers have followed the path
trodden by Spencer. Starting with the assumption that man, by a series of
transformations, was gradually evolved from the brute, and therefore differs from it in
degree only, they seek the first traces and beginnings of moral ideas in the brute irself.
Charles Darwin had done some preparatory work along these lines, and Spencer did
not hesitate to descant on brute-ethics, on the pre-human justice, conscience, and self-
control of brutes. Present-day Evolutionists follow his view and attempt to show how
animal morality has in man continually become more perfect. With the aid of analogies
taken from ethnology, they relate how mankind originally wandered over the face of
the earth in semi-savage hordes, knew nothing of marriage or the familt, and only by
degrees reached a higher level of morality. These are the merest creations of fancy. If
man is nothing more than a highly developed brute, he cannot possess a spiritual and
immortal soul, and there can no longer be question of the freedom of the will, of the
future retribution of good and evil, nor can man in consequence be hindered from
ordering his life as he pleases and regarding the weel-being of others only in so far as it
redounds to his own profit.
As the Evolutionists, so too the Socialists favour the theory of evolution from their
ethical viewpoint; yet the latter do not base their observations on scientific principles,
but on social and economic considerations. Acoording to K. Marx, F. Engels, and other
exponents of the so-called "materialistic interpretation of history", all moral, religious,
juridical and philosophical concepts are but the reflex of the economical conditions of
society in the minds of men. Now these social relations are subject to constant change;
hence the ideas of morality, religion, etc. are also continually changing. Every age,
every people, and even each class in a given people forms its moral and religious ideas
in accordance with its own peculiar economical situation. Hence, no universal code of
morality exists binding on all men at all times; the morality of the present day is not of
Divine origin, but the product of history, and will soon have to make room for anoter
system of morality. Allied to this materialistic hidtorical interpretation, though derived
from other sources, is the system of Relativism, which resognizes no absolute and
unchangeable truths in regard to ethics or anything else. Those who follow this
opinion aver that nothing objectively true can be known by us. Men differ from one
another and are subject to change, and with them the manner and means of viewing the
world about them also change. Moreover the judgments passed on matters religious
and moral depend essentially on the inclinations, interests, and character of the person
judgng, while these latter are constantly varying. Pragmatism differs from Relativism
inasmuch as that not only is to be considered true which is proven by experience to be
useful; and, since the same thing is not always useful, unchangeable truth is impossible.
In view of the chaos of opinions and systems just described, it need not surprise us that,
as regards ethical problems, scepticism is extending its sway to the utmost limits, in fact
many exhibit a fromal contempt for the traditional morality. According to Max
Nordau, moral precepts are nothing but "conventional lies"; according to Max Stirner,
that alone is good which serves my interests, whereas the common good, the love for
all men, etc. are but empty phantoms. Men of genius and superiority in particular are
coming more and more to be regarded as exempt from the moral law. Nietzsche is the
originator of a school whose doctrines are founded on these principles. According to
him, goodness was originaly identified with nobility and gentility of rank. Whatever
the man of rank and power did, whatever inclinations he possessed were good. The
down-trodden proletariat, on the other hand were bad, i.e. lowly and ignoble, without
any other derogatory meaning being given to the word bad. It was only by a gradual
process that the oppressed multitude through hatred and envy evolved the distinction
between good and bad, in the moral sense, by denominating the characteristics and
conduct of those in power and rank as bad, and their own behaviour as good. And
thus arose the opposition between the morality of the master and that of the slave.
Those in power still continued to look upon their own egoistic inclinations as noble and
good, while the oppresed populace lauded the "instincts of the common herd", i.e. all
those qulaities necessary and useful to its existence - as patience, meekness, obedience
and love of one's neighbour. Weakness became goodness, cringing obsequiousness
became humility, subjection to hated oppressors was obedience, cowardice meant
patience. "All morality is one long and audacious deception." Hence, the value
attached to the prevailing concepts of morality must be entirely re- arranged.
Intellectual superiority is above and beyond good and evil as understood in the
traditional sense. There is no higher moral order to which men of such calibra are
amenable. The end of society is not the common good of its members; the intellectual
aristocracy (the over-man) is its own end; in its behalf the common herd, the "too
many", must be reduced to slavery and decimated. As it rests with each individual to
decide who belongs to this intellectual aristocracy, so each man is at liberty to
emancipate himself from the existing moral order.
In conclusion, one other tendency in ethics may be noted, which has manifested
itself far and wide; namely, the effort to make all morality independent of all religion.
It is clear that many of the above-mentioned ethical systems essentially exclude all
regard for God and religion, and this is true especially of materialistic, agnostic, and in
the last analysis, of all pantheistic systems. Apart, also, from these systems,
"independent morality", called also "lay morality", has gained many followers and
defenders. Kant's ideas formed the basis of this tendency, for he himself founded a
code of morality on the categorical imperative and expressly declared that morality is
sufficient for itself, and therefore has no need of religion. Many modern philosophers -
Herbart, Eduard von Hartmann, Zeller, Wundt, Paulsen, Ziegler, and a number of
others - have followed Kant in this respect. For several decades practical attempts have
been made to emanicpate morality from religion. In France religious instruction was
banished from the schools in 1882 and moral instruction substituted. This tendency
manifests a lively activity in what is known as the "ethical movement", whose home,
properly speaking, is in the United States. In 1876, Felix Adler, professor at Cornell
University, founded the "Society for Ethical Culture", in New York City. Similar
societies were formed in other cities. These were consolidated in 1887 into the "Union
of the Societies for Ethical Culture." Besides Adler, the chief propagators of the
movement by word of mouth and writing were W.M. Salter and Stanton Coit. The
purpose of these societies is declared to be "the improvement of the moral life of the
members of the societies and of the community to which they belong, without any
regard to theological or philosophical opinions". In most of the European countries
ethical societies were founded on the model of the American organization. All these
were combined in 1894 into the "International Ethical Asociation". Their purpose, i.e.
the amelioration of man's moral condition, is indeed praiseworthy, but it is erroneoud
to suppose that any such moral improvement can be brought about without taking
religion into consideration. In fact many members of the ethical societies are openly
antagonistic to all religions, and would therefore do away with denominational schools
and supplant religious teaching by mere moral instruction. Even upon purely ethical
considerations such attempts must be unhesitatingly rejected. If it be true that even in
the case of adults moral instruction without religion, without any higher obligation or
sanction, is a nonentity, a meaningless sham, how much more so is it in the case of the
young? It is evident that, judged from the standpoint of Christianity, these efforts must
meet with a still more decided condemnation. Christians are bound to observe not only
the prescriptions of the natural law, but also all the precepts given by Christ concerning
faith, hope, love, Divine worship, and the imitation of Himself. The Christian,
moreover, knows that without Divine grace and, hence, without prayer and the
frequent reception of the sacraments, a morally good life for any considerable length of
time is impossible. >From their earliest years, therefore, the young must not only
receive thorough instruction in all the Commandments, but must be exercised and
trained in the practical use of the means of grace. Religion must be the soil and
atmosphere in which education develops and flourishes.
While, among non-Catholics ever since the Reformation, and especially since Kant,
there has been an increasing tendency to divorce ethics from religion, and to dissolve it
into countless venturesome and frequently contradictory systems, Catholics for the
most part have remained free from these errors, because, in the Church's infallible
teaching authority, the Guardian of Christian Revelation, they have always found
secure orientation. It is true that towards the end of the eighteenth, and at the
beginning of the nineteenth century, Illuminism and Rationalism penetrated here and
there into Catholic circles and attempted to replace moral theology by purely
philosophical ethics, and in turn to transform the latter according to the Kantian
autonomy. This movement, however, was but a passing phase. With a reawakening of
the Church's activity, fresh impetus was given to Catholic science, which was of benefit
to ethics also and produced in its domain some excellent fruits. Recourse was again
had to the illustrius past of Catholicism, while, at the same time, modern ethical
systems gave occasion to a thorough investigation and verification of principles of the
moral order. Taparelli d'Azeglio led the way with his great work "Saggio teoretico di
diritto naturale appogiato sul fatto" (1840-43). Then followed, in Italy, Audisio,
Rosmini, Liberatore, Sanseverino, Rosselli, Zigliara, Signoriello, Schiffini, Ferretti,
Talamo, and others. In Spain this revival of ethics was due to, among others, J. Balmes,
Donoso Cortes, Zefirio Gonzalez, Mendive, R. de Cepeda; in France and Belgium, to de
Lehen (Institutes de droit naturel), de Margerie, Onclair, Ath, Vallet, Charles Perin,
Piat, de Pascal, Moulart, Castelein; in England and America, to Joseph Rickaby, Jouin,
Russo, Hollaind, J.J. Ming. In German-speaking countries the reawakening of
Scolasticism in general begins with Kleutgen (Theologie der Vorzeit, 1853); Philosophie
der Vorzeit, 1860), and of ethics in particular with Th. Meyer (Die Grundsatze der
Sittlichkeit und des Rechts, 1868; Institutiones juris naturalis seu philosophiae moralis
universae, 1885-1900). After them came A. Stockl, Ferd, Walter, Moy de Sons, C.
Gutberlet, Fr. J. Stein, Brandis, Costa-Rossetti, A.M. Weiss, Renninger, Lehmen,
Willems, V. Frins, Heinrich Pesch, and others. We pass over numerous Catholic
writers, who have made a specialty of sociology and political economy.
IV. Outlines of Ethics
It is clear that the following statement cannot pretend to treat thoroughly all ethical
questions; it is intended rather to afford the reader an insight into the most important
problems dealt with by ethics, as well as into the methods adopted in their treatment.
Ethics is usually divided into two parts: general, or theoretical ethics, and special, or
applied ethics. General ethics expounds and verifies the general principles and
concepts of the moral order; special ethics applies these general principles to the
various relations of man, and determines his duties in particular.
Reason itself can rise from the knowledge of the visible creation to the certain
knowledge of the existence of God, the origin and end of all things. On this
fundamental truth the structure of ethics must be based. God created man, as he
created all things else, for His own honour and glory. The ultimate end is the proper
motive of the will's activity. If God were not the ultimate object and end of His own
activity, he would depend upon His creatures, and would not be infinitely perfect. He
is, then, the ultimate end of all things, they are created for His sake, not, indeed, that he
can derive any benefit from them, which would be repugnant to an infinitely perfect
being, but for His glory. They are to manifest His goodness and perfection. Irrational
creatures cannot of themselves directly glorify God, for they are incapable of knowing
Him. The are intended as means to the end for which rational man was created. The
end of man, however, is to know God, to love Him and serve Him, and thereby attain
to perfect and unending happiness. Every man has within him an irresistible,
indestructible dersire for perfect happiness; he seeks to be free from every evil and to
possess every attainable good. This impulse to happiness is founded on man's nature;
it is implanted there by his Maker; and hence will be duly realised, if nothing is
wanting on the part of man's own individual endeavour. But perfect happiness is
unattainable in the present life, if for no other reason, at least for this, that inexorable
death puts an early end to all earthly happiness. There is reserved for man a better life,
if he freely chooses to glorify God here on earth. It will be the crown of victory to be
conferred upon him hereafter, if at present he remains subject to God and keeps His
Commandments. Only from the viewpoint of eternity do this earthly life and the moral
order acquire their proper significance and value. But how does mna, considered in
the natural order, or apart from every influence of supernatural revelations, come to
know what God requires of him here below, or how he is to serve and glorify Him, in
order to arrive at eternal happiness? - By means of the natural law.
From eternity there existed in the mind of God the idea of the world, which he
determined to create, as well as the plan of government according to which He wished
to rule the world and direct it to its end. This ordination existing in the mind of God
from all eternity, and depending on the nature and essential relations of rational
beings, is the eternal law of God (lex aeternaDei), the source from which all temporal
laws take their rise. God does not move and govern His creatures by a mere external
directive impetus, as the archer does the arrow, but by means of internal impulses and
inclinations, which He has bound up with their natures. Irrational creatures are urged,
by means of physical forces or natural impulses and instincts to exercise the activity
peculiar to them and keep the order designed for them. Man, on the other hand, is a
being endowed with reason and free will; as such, he cannot be led by blind impulses
and instincts in a manner conformable to his nature, but must needs depend on
practical principles and judgments, which point out to him how he is to order his
conduct. These principles must somehow or other be manifested to him by nature. All
created things have implanted in their natures certain guiding principles, necessary to
their corresponding activities. Man must be no exception to this rule. He must be led
by a natural inborn light, manifesting to him what he is to do, or not to do. This natural
light is the natural law. When we speak of man as possessing a natural, inborn light, it
is not to be understood in the sense that man has innate ideas. Innate ideas do not
exist. It is true, nevertheless, that the Creator has endowed man with the ability and
the inclination to form many concepts anf develop principles. As soon as he comes to
the use of reason, he forms, by a natural necessity, on the basis of experience, certain
general concepts of theoretical reason - e.g. those of being and not being, of cause and
effect, of space and time - and so he arrives at universal principles, e.g. that "nothing
can exist and not exist at the same time", that "every effect has its cause", etc. As it is in
the theoretical, so also in the practical order. As soon as reason has been sufficiently
devloped, and the individual can somehow or other practically judge that he is
something more than a mere animal, by an intrinsic necessity of his nature he forms the
concept of good and evil, i.e. of something that is proper to the rational nature which
distinguishes him from the brute, and which is therefore worth striving for, and
something which is unbecoming and therefore to be avoided. Adn, as by nature he
feels himself attracted by what is good, and repelled by what is evil, he naturaly forms
the judgments, that "good is to be done and evil avoided", that "man ought to live
according to the dictates of reason", etc. From hid own reflections, especially when
assisted by instruction from others, he easily comes to the conclusion that in these
judgments the will of a superior being, of the Creator and Designer of nature, has its
expression. Around about him he perceives that all things are well ordered, so that it is
very easy for him to discern in them the handiwork of a superior and all-wise power.
He himself has been appointed to occupy in the domain of nature the position of lord
and master; he, too, must lead a well regulated life, as befits a rational being, not
merely because he himself chooses to do so, but also in obedience to his Creator. Man
did not give himself his nature with all its faculties and inclinations; he received it
from a superior being, whose wisdom and power are everywhere manifest to him in
Creation. The general practical judgments and principles: "Do good and avoid evil",
"Lead a life regulated according to reason", etc., from which all the Commandments of
the Decalogue are derived, are the basis of the natural law, of which St. Paul (Rom., ii,
14) says, that it is written in the hearts of all men. This law is an emanation of the
Divine law, made known to all men by nature herself; it is the expression of the will of
nature's Author, a participation of the created rational being in the eternal law of God.
Hence the obligation it imposes does not arise from na's own autonomy, as Kant held,
nor from any other human authority, but from the will of the Creator; and man cannot
violate it without rebelling against God, his master, offending Him, and becoming
amenable to his justice. How deeply rooted among all nations this conviction of the
higher origin of the natural law was, is shown by the fact that for various violations of
it (as murder, adultery, erjury, etc.) they did their utmost to propitiate the angered
deity by means of prayers and sacrifices. Hence they looked upon the deity as the
guardian and protector of the moral order, who would not let the contempt of it to go
unpunished. The same conviction is manifested by the value all nations have attached
to the moral order, a value far surpassing that all other earthly goods. The noblest
among the nations maintained that it was better to undergo any hardship, even death
itself, rather than prove recreant to one's duty. They understood, therefore, that, over
and above earthly tresures, there were higher and more lasting goods whose
attainment was dependent upon the observance of the moral order, and this not by
reason of any ordinance of man, but because of the law of God. This being premised, it
is clearly impossible to divorce morality from religion without robbing it of its true
obligation and sanction, of its sanctity and inviolability and of its importance as
transcending every other earthly consideration.
The natural law consists of general practical principles (commands and
prohibitions) and the conclusion necessarily flowing therefrom. It is the peculiar
function of man to formulate these conclusions himself, though instruction and training
are to assist him in doing so. Besides this, each individual has to take these principles
as a guide of his conduct and apply them to his particular actions. This, to a certain
extent, everybody does spontaneously, by virtue of an innate tendency. As in the case
of all practical things, so in regard to what concerns the moral order, reason uses
syllogistic processes. When a person, e.g., is on the point of telling a lie, or saying what
is contrary to his convictions, there rises before his mental vision the general precept of
the natural law: "Lying is wrong and forbidden." Hence he avails himself, at least
virtually, of the following syllogisim: "Lying is forbidden; what you are about to say is
a lie; therefore, what you are about to say is forbidden." The conclusion thus arrived at
is our conscience, the proximate norm of our conduct. Conscience, therefore, is not an
obscure feeling or a sort of moral instinct, but a practical judgment of our reason on the
moral character of individual acts. If we follow the voice of conscience, our reward is
peace and calm of soul, if we resist this voice, we experience disquiet and remorse.
The natural law is the foundation of all human laws and precepts. It is only because we
recognize the necessity of authority for human society, and because the natural law
enjoins obedience to regularly constituted authority, that it is possible for a human
superior to impose laws and commands binding in conscience. Indeed all human laws
and precepts are fundamentally the conclusions, or more minute determinations, of the
general principles of the natural law, and for this very reason every deliberate
infraction of a law or precept binding in conscience is a sin, i.e. the violation of a Divine
commandment, a rebellion against God, an offence against Him, which will not escape
punishment in this life or in the next, unless dult repented of before death. The
problems hitherto mentioned belong to general, or theoretical, ethics, and their
investigation in nearly all cases bear upon the natural law, whose origin, nature,
subject- matter, obligation, and properties it is the scope of ethics to explain thoroughly
and verify. The general philosophical doctrine of right is usually treated in general
ethics. Under no circumstances may the example of Kant and others be imitated in
severing the doctrine of right from ethics, or moral philosophy, and developing it as a
seperate and independent science. The juridical order is but a part of the moral order,
even as justice is but one of the moral virtues. The first principle of right: "Give every
man his due"; "Commit no injustice"; and the necessary conclusions from these: "Thou
shalt not kill"; "Thou shalt not commit adultery", and the like, belong to the natural law,
and cannot be deviated from without violating one's duty and one's neighbour's rights,
and staining one's conscience with guilt in the sight of God. Special ethcis applies the
principles of general, or theoretical, ethics to the various relations of man, and thus
deduces his duties in particular. General ethics teaches that man must do good and
avoid evil, and must inflict injury upon no one. Special ethics descends to particulars
and demonstrates what is good or bad, right or wrong, and therefore to be done or
avoided in the various relations of human life. First of al, it trest of man as an
individual in his relations to God, to himself, and to his fellow-men. God is the
Creator, Master, and ultimate end of man; from these relations arise man's dutie toward
God. Presupposing his own individual efforts, he is, with God's assistance, to hope for
eternal happiness from Him; he must love God above all things as the highest, infinite
good, in such a manner that no creature shall be preferred to Him; he must
acknowledge Him as his absolute lord and master, adore and reverence Him, and
resign himself entirely to His holy Will. The first, highest, and most essential business
of man is to serve God. In case it is God's good pleasure to reveal a supernatural
religion and to determine in detail the manner and means of our worship of Him, man
is bound by the natural law to accept this revelation in a spirit of faith. and to order his
life accordingly. Here, too, it is plain that to divorce morality from religion is
impossible. Religious duties, those, namely, which have direct reference to God, are
man's prinicpal and most essential moral duties. Linked to these duties to God are
man's duties regarding himself. Man loves himself by an intrinsic necessity of his
nature. From this fact Schopenhauer drew the conclusion that the commandment
concerning sel-love was superflous. This would be true, if it were a matter of
indifference how man loved himself. But such is not the case; he must love himself
with a well-ordered love. He is to be solicitous for the welfare of his soul and to do
what is necessary to attain to eternal happiness. He is not his own master, but was
created for the service of God; hence the deliberate arbitrary destruction of one's own
life (suicide), as well as the freely intended mutilation of self, is a criminal attack on the
proprietary right God has to man's person. Furthermore, every man is supposed to
take a reasonable care to preserve his health. He has certain duties also as regards
temperance; for the body must not be his master, but an instrument in the service of the
soul, and hence must be cared for in so far only as is conducive to this purpose. A
further duty concerns the acquisition of external material goods, as far as they are
necessary for man's support and the fulfillment of his other obligations. This again
involves the obligation to work; furthermore, God has endowed man with the capacity
for work in order that he might prove himself a beneficial member of society; for
idleness is the root of all evil. Besides these self-regarding duties, there are simial ones
regarding our fellow-men: duties of love, justice, fidelity, truthfullness, gratitude, etc.
The commandment of the love of our neighbour first received its true appreciation in
the Christian Dispensation. Though doublessly contained to a certain extent in the
natural law, the pagans had so lost sight of the unity of the human race, and of the fact
that all men are members of one vast family dependent upon God, that they looked on
every stranger as an enemy. Christianity restored to mankind the consciousness of its
unity and solidarity, and supernaturally transfigured the natural precept to love our
neighbour, by demonstrating that all men are children of the same Father in heaven,
were redeemed by the same blood of the same Saviour, and are destined to the same
supernatual salvation. And, better still, Christianity provided man with the grace
necessary to the fulfillment of this precept and thus renewed the face of the earth. In
man's intercourse with his fellow-men the precepts of justice and of the other allied
virtues go hand in hand with the precept of love. There exists in man the natural
tendency to assert himself when there is question of his goods or property. He expects
his fellow-men to respect what belongs to him, and instinctively resists any unjust
attempt to violate this proprietorship. He will brook an injury from no one in all that
regards his life or health, his wife or child, his honour or good name; he resents
faithlessness and ingratitude on the part of others, and the lie by which they would
lead him into error. Yet he clearly understands that only then can he reasonably expect
others to respect his rights when he in turn respects theirs. Hence the general maxim:
"Do not do to others, what you would not wish them to do to you"; from which are
naturally deduced the general commandments known to all men: "Thou shalt not kill,
nor commit adultery, nor steal, nor bear false witness against thy neighbour", etc. In
this part of ethics it is customary to investigate the principles of right as regards private
ownership. Has every man the right to acquire property? Or, at least, may not society
(the State) abolish private ownership and assume possession and control of all material
goods either wholly or in part, in order to thus distribute among the members of the
community the products of their joint industry? This latter question is answered in the
affirmative by the Socialists; and yet, it is the experience of all ages that the community
of goods and of ownership is altogether impracticable in larger commonwealths, and
would, if realiszd in any case, invlolve widespread slavery.
The second part of special, or applied, ethics, called by many sociology, considers
man as a member of society, as far as this can be made the subject of philosophical
investigation. Man is by nature a social being; out of his innate needs, inclinations, and
tendencies the family and State necessarily arise. And first of all the Creator had to
provide for the preservation and propagation of the human race. Man's life is brief,
were no provision made for the perpetuation of the human species, the world would
soon become an uninhabited solitude, a well-appointed abode without occupants.
Hence God has given man the power and propensity to propagate his kind. The
generative function was not primarily intended for man's indicidual well-being, but for
the general good of his species, and in its exercise, therefore, he must be guided
accordingly. This general good cannot be perfectly realized except in a lasting
indissoluble monogamy. The unity and indissolubility of the marriage bond are
requirements of the natural law, at least in the sense that man may not on his own
authority set them aside. Marriage is a Divine institution, for which God Himself has
provided by means of definite laws, and in regard to which, therefore, man has not the
power to make any change. The Creator might, of course, dispense for a time from the
unity and indissolubility of the marriage tie; for, though the perfection of the married
state demands these qualities, they are not of absolute necessity; the principal end of
marriage may be attained to a certain degree without them. God could, therefore, for
wise reasons grant a dispensation in regard to them for a certain length of time. Christ,
however, restored marriage to the original perfection consonant with its nature.
Moreover He raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament and made it symbolic of His
own union with the Church; and had he done nothing more in this respect than restore
the natural law to its prestine integrity, mankind would be bound to Him by an eternal
debt of gratitude. For it was chiefly be means of the unity and indissolubility of the
married life that the sanctuary of the Christian family was established, from which
mankind has reaped the choicest blessings, and compared with which paganism has no
equivalent to offer. This exposition of the nature of marriage from a theistic standpoint
is diametrically opposed to the views of modern Darwinists. According to them, men
did not primitively recognize any such institution as the married state, but lived
together in complete promiscuity. Marriage was the result of gradual development,
woman was originally the centre about which the family crystallized, and from this
latter circumstance there arises an explanation of the fact that many savage tribes
reckon heredity and kinship between families accoding to the lineal descent of the
female. We cannot dwell long upon these fantastic speculations, because they do not
consider man as essentially different from the brute, but as gradually developed from a
purely animal origin. Although marriage is of Divine institution, not every individual
is obliged, as a human being, to embrace the married state. God intends marriage for
the propagation of the human race. To achieve this purpose it is by no means necessary
for each and every member of the human family to enter upon marriage, and this
particularly at the present time, when the question of over-population presents so many
grave difficulties to social economists. In this connexion certain other considerations
from a Christian point of view arise, which do not, however, belong to philosophical
ethics. Since the principal end of marriage is the procreation and education of children,
it is encumbent upon both parents to co-operate according to the requirements of sex in
the attainment of this end. From this it may readily be gathered what duties exist
between husband and wife, and between parents and their children.
The second natural society, the State, is a logical and necessary outcome of the
family. A completely isolated family could scarcely support itself, at all events it could
never rise above the lowest grade of civilization. Hence we see that at all times and in
all places, owing to natural needs and tendencies, larger groups of families are formed.
A division of labour takes place. Each family devotes itself to some industry in which
it may improve and develop its resources, and then exchanges its products for those of
other families. And now the way is opened to civilization and progress. This grouping
of families, in order to be permanent, has need of authority, which makes for security,
order, and peace, and in general provides for what is necessary to the common good.
Since God intends men to live together in harmony and order, He likewise desires such
authority in the community as will have the right to procure what is needful for the
common good. This authority, considered in itself and apart from the human vehicle in
which it is placed, comes immediately from God, and hence, within its proper sphere, it
imposes upon the consciences of the subjects the duty of obedience. In the light of this
interpretation, the exercise of public power is vested with its proper dignity and
inviolability, and at the same time is circumscribed by necessary limitations. A group
of families under a common authoritive head, and not subject to any similar
aggregation, forms the primitive State, however small this may be. By further
development, or by coalition with other States, larger States gradually come into
existence. It is not the purpose of the State to supplant the families, but to safeguard
their rights, to protect them, and to supplement their efforts. It is not to forfeit their
rights or to abandon their proper functions that individuals and families combine to
form the State, but to be secured in these rights, and to find support and
encouragement in the discharge of the various duties assigned them. Hence the State
may not deprive the family of its right to educate and instruct the children, but must
simply lend its assistance by supplying, wheneer needful, opportunities for the better
accomplishment of this duty. Only so far as the order and prosperity of the body
politic requires it, may the State circumscribe individual effort and activity. In other
words, the State is to posit the conditions under which, provided private endeavour be
not lacking, each individual and each family may attain to true earthly happiness. By
true earthly happiness is meant such as not only does not interfere with the free
performance of the individual's moral duties, but even upholds and encourages him
therin.
Having defined the end and aim of the State, we are now in a position to examine in
detail its various functions and extent. Private morality is not subject to State
interference; but it is the proper function of the State to concern itself with the interests
of public morality. It must not only prevent vice from parading in public and
becoming a snare to many (e.g. through immoral literature, theatres, plays, or other
means of seduction), but also see to it that the public ordinances and laws facilitate and
advance morally good behaviour. The State may not affect indifference as regards
religion; the obligation to honour God publicly is binding upon the Sate as such. It is
true that the direct supervision of religious matters in the present supernatural order
was entrusted by Christ to His Church; nevertheless, it is the duty of the Christian State
to protect and uphold the Church, the one true Church founded by Christ. Of course,
owing to the unfortunate division of Christians into numerous religious systems, such
an intimate relation betwen Church and State is at the present day but rarely
maintained. The separation of Church and State, with complete liberty of conscience
and worship, is often the only practical <modus vivendi>. In circumstances such as
these the State must be satisfied to leave the affairs of religion to various bodies, and to
protect the latter in those rights which have reference to the general public order. The
education and instruction of children belongs <per se> to the family, and should not be
monopolized by the State. The later has, however, the right and the duty to suppress
schools which disseminate immoral doctrine or foster the practice of vice; beyond such
control it may not set limits to free individual endeavour. It may, however, assist the
individual in his efforts to secure an education, and, in case these do not suffice, it may
establish schools and institutions for his benefit. Finally, the State has to exercise
important economical functions. It must protect private property and see to it that in
man's industrial life the laws affecting justice be carried out in all their force and
vigour. But its duties do not stop here. It should pass such laws as will enable its
subjects to procure what is needed for their respectable sustenance and even to attain a
moderate competency. Both excessive wealth and extreme poverty involve many
dangers to the individual and to society. Hence the State should pass such laws as will
favour the sturdy middle class of citizens and add to their numbers. Much can be done
to bring about this desirable condition by the enactment of proper tax and inheritance
laws, of laws which protect the labouring, manufacturing, and agricultural interests,
and which supervise and control trusts, syndicates, etc.
Although the authority of the State comes immediately from God, the person who
exercises it is not immediately designated by Him. This determination is left to the
circumstances of men's progress and development or of their modes of social
aggregation. According as the supreme power resides in one individual, or in a
privileged class, or in the people collectively, governments are divided into three
forms: the monarchy; the aristocracy; the democracy. The monarchy is hereditary or
elective, according as succession to supreme power follows the right of primogeniture
of a family (dynasty) or is subject to suffrage. At the present day the only existing kind
of monarchy is the hereditary, the elective monarchies, such as Poland and the old
German Sovereignty, having long since disappeared. Those States in which the
sovereign power resides in the body of the people are called polycracies, or more
commonly, republics, and are divided into aristocracies and democracies. In republics
sovereignty is vested in the people. The latter elect from their number representatives
who frame their laws and administer the affairs of government in their name. The
almost universally prevailing form of government in Europe, fashioned upon the
model created in England, is the constitutional monarchy, a mixture of the monarchical,
aristocratic, and democratic forms. The law- making power is vested in the king and
two chambers. The members of one chamber represent the aristocratic and
conservative element, while the other chamber, elected from the body of citizens,
represents the democratic element. The monarch himself is responsible to no one, yet
his governmental acts require the counter-signature of the ministers, who in turn are
responsible to the chamber.
With regard to its appointed functions the government of the State is divided into
the legislative, judiciary, and executive powers. It is of primary importace that the
State enact general and stable laws governing the activities of its subjects, as far as this
is required for the good order and well-being of the whole body. For this purpose it
must possess the right to legislate; it must, moreover, carry out these laws and provide,
by means of the administrative, or rather executive, power for what is needful to the
general good of the community; finally, it has to punish infractions of the laws and
authoritively settle legal disputes, and for this purpose it has need of the judiciary
power (in civil and criminal courts). This right of the State to impose penalties is
founded on the necessity to preserve good order and of providing for the security of
the whole body politic. In a community there are always found those who can in no
other way be effectually forced to observe the laws and respect the rights of others than
by the infliction of punishment. Hence the State must have the right to enact penal
statutes, calculated to deter its subjects from violating the laws, and the right,
moreover, to actually inflict punishment after the violation has occurred. Among the
legitimate modes of punishment is capital punishment. It is considered, and rightly so,
a step forward in civilization, that nowadays a milder practice has been adopted in this
regard, and that capital punishment is more rarely inflicted, and then only for such
heinous crimes as murder and high treason. Nevertheless humanitarian
sentimentalism has no doubt been carried to an exaggerated degree, so much so that
many would on principle do away with capital punishment altogether. And yet, this is
the only sanction sufficiently effective to deter some men from committing the gravest
crimes.
When it is asserted, with Aristotle, that the State is a society sufficient for itself, this
is to be considered true in the sense that the State needs no further development to
complete its organization, but not in the sense that it is independent in every respect.
The greater the advance of mankind in progress and civilization, the more necessary
and frequent the communication between nations becomes. Hence the question arises
as to what rights and duties mutually exist between nation and nation. That portion of
ethics which treats thisquestion from a philosophical standpoint is called the theory of
international law, or of the law of nations. Of course, many writers of the present day
deny the propriety of a philosophical treatment of international law. According to
them the only international rights and duties are those which have been established by
some positive measure either implicitly or explicitly agreed upon. This, indeed, is the
position that must be taken by all who reject the natural law. On the other hand, this
position precludes the possibility of any positive international law whatever, for lasting
and binding compacts between various States are possible only when the primary
principle of right is recognized - that it is just and obligatory to stand by lawful
agreements. Now this is a principle of natural law; hence, those who deny the
existence of natural law (e.g. E. von Hartmann) must consequently reject any
international law properly so called. In their opinion any international agreements are
mere conventions, which each one observes as long as he finds it necessary or
advantageous. And so we are eventually led back to the principle of ancient
paganism, which, in the intercourse between nations, too often identified right with
might. But Christianity brought the nations into a closer union and broke down the
barriers of narrow-minded policy. It proclaimed, moreover, the duties of love and
justice as binding on all nations, thus restoring and perfecting the natural law. The
fundamental principles: "Give each one his due", "Do injury to no man", "Do not to
others what you would not have them do to you", etc., have an absolute and universal
value, and hence must obtain also in the intercourse between nations. Purely natural
duties and rights are comon to all nations; the acquired or positive ones may vary
considerably. Various, too, are the rights and duties of nations in peace and in war.
Since, however, there are, under this head, many details of a doubtful and changeable
character, the codification of international law is a most urgent desideratum. Besides
this an international court should be established to attend to the execution of the
various measures promulgated by the law and to arbitrate in case of dispute. The
foundations of such an intenational court of arbitration have been laid at The Hague;
unfortunately, its competence has been hitherto very much restricted, and besides, it
exercises its functions only when the Powers at variance appeal to it of their own
accord. In the codification of international law no one would be more competent to
lend effective cooperation and to maintain the principles of justice and love which
should exist between nations in their intercourse with one another, than the pope. No
one can offer sounder guarantees for the righteousness of the principles to be laid
down, and no one can exert greated moral influence towards carrying them into effect.
This is even recognized by unprejudiced Protestants. At the Vatican Council not only
the many Catholic bishops present, but the Protestant David Urquhart appealed to the
pope to draw up a schedule of the more important principles of international law,
which were to be binding on all Christian nations. Religious prejudice, however, places
many difficulties in the way of realizing this plan.
V. CATHREIN
Transcribed by Brendan Byrne
Taken from the New Advent Web Page (www.knight.org/advent).
This article is part of the Catholic Encyclopedia Project, an effort aimed at placing the
entire Catholic Encyclopedia on the World Wide Web. The coordinator is Kevin Knight,
editor of the New Advent Catholic Website. If you would like to contribute to this
worthwhile project, you can contact him by e-mail at (knight@knight.org). For
more information please download the file cathen.txt/.zip.
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