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    October 06, 2011

After 10-Year War, Afghans Faces Uncertain Future

   Gary Thomas
   Afghan President Hamid Karzai with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan
   Singh, Oct. 4, 2011.
   Photo: Reuters
   Afghan President Hamid Karzai with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan
   Singh, Oct. 4, 2011.

   After 10 years in Afghanistan, new fears of a possible resumption of
   Afghan civil war are surfacing as the United States and its allies
   begin to edge their troops toward the exit by 2014.
   Analysts point to a worrisome trend: Increased boldness of Taliban
   attacks in urban areas and targeted assassinations, the most notable
   being the recent killing of former Afghan president Burhanuddin
   Rabbani.
   U.S. Army War College professor Larry Goodson says the conflict's lack
   of a clear-cut outcome increases the likelihood of a return to the kind
   of bloody chaos that gripped the country in the early 1990s.
   "I fear another civil war is coming," said Gordon. "I hear Afghans who
   say, 'No, it won't come because we're just tired of war.' And that's my
   great hope, that war-weariness will get us there. But my fear is that
   we haven't seen a decisive war in Afghanistan. We haven't seen a
   crushing of the Taliban, for example, or a crushing of the current
   regime and the Taliban taking back over."
   In recent congressional testimony, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
   Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, warned of possible civil war if President
   Hamid Karzai could not aggressively tackle the rampant corruption in
   his government.
   "If we continue to draw down forces at pace while such public and
   systemic corruption is left unchecked, I believe we risk leaving behind
   a government in which we cannot reasonably expect the Afghans to have
   faith," said Adm. Mullen. "At best, this would lead to localized
   conflicts inside the country. At worst, it could lead to government
   collapse and civil war."
   The current U.S. counterinsurgency strategy is to degrade the Taliban
   to the point that they will be forced to the negotiating table, while
   building up the central government's ability to provide for its own
   security by training the army and police.
   Central to the strategy is to give space for a process of
   reconciliation between the government and at least some elements of the
   Taliban. But the recent wave of attacks has convinced many that the
   Taliban is not interested in talking. After the assassination of former
   president Rabbani, who headed the High Peace Council, even President
   Karzai said he was no longer open to talks.
   Francesc Vendrell, former European Union Special Representative for
   Afghanistan, said reconciliation is not dead, but is, as he put it,
   comatose. "Rabbani's assassination has only confirmed in the minds of
   the northerners, whether they liked Rabbani or not, that the Taliban
   are against them, and therefore [his death] only strengthens their
   opposition to any idea of compromise," he said.
   Vendrell said he would not be at all surprised if the Taliban are
   simply awaiting U.S. and NATO departure before making a move.

   U.S. calls Taliban significantly weakened
   U.S. officials, however, have publicly maintained that things are going
   in their favor. In recent congressional testimony, Defense Secretary
   Leon Panetta played down the importance of recent attacks, including
   one on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.
   "Overall, we judge this change in tactics to be a result in a shift in
   momentum in our favor and a sign of weakness of the insurgency," he
   said. "While overall violence in Afghanistan is trending down, and down
   substantially in areas where we concentrated the surge, we must be more
   effective in stopping these attacks and limiting the ability of
   insurgents to create perceptions of decreasing security."
   But Professor Goodson, emphasizing that he is voicing purely personal
   views, says numbers used to measure success of counterinsurgency don't
   tell the entire story.
   'It's a misreading of the situation that begins with the notion that we
   have made combat inroads in the south and southwest, [which] is based
   on a number of metrics," he said, explaining that simply calculating
   the number of deaths and attacks, for example, isn't an appropriate way
   to profile an insurgency or counterinsurgency. "[The numbers] don't
   really tell us the strategic mindset of the Taliban or the Taliban
   supporters."

   Battle to balance regional interests
   Meanwhile, U.S. has accused Pakistan's controversial intelligence
   service of backing Taliban or Taliban-related groups that have carried
   out recent attacks. Karzai, refusing to talk to the Taliban has said he
   will deal with Pakistan, which he termed the "other side." The Afghan
   leader then flew to New Delhi to sign a strategic partnership with
   Islamabad's archrival, India.
   Vendrell has expressed concern that Karzai's moves may cause Pakistan
   not to pull back from Afghanistan, but to become more adventurous
   there.
   "I think the [New Delhi visit] only feeds Pakistan's paranoia that
   India and Afghanistan are going to get together and leave Pakistan
   sandwiched in between," he said. "If it's true that Afghanistan is
   going to accept Indian trainers for the army or the police, this would
   be very bad because this will obviously drive Pakistan up the wall."
   But Vendrell suggests conciliatory tactics could defuse tensions. He
   says that if the U.S. were to pressure India to be more forthcoming on
   bilateral India-Pakistan issues - especially on the matter of the
   disputed area of Kashmir - it could mollify disenfranchised Pakistan
   officials. But Kashmir remains a deeply contentious issue that is a
   source of great friction between the two nations.