Computer underground Digest Sun Oct 12, 1997 Volume 9 : Issue 73
ISSN 1004-042X
Editor: Jim Thomas (cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu)
News Editor: Gordon Meyer (gmeyer@sun.soci.niu.edu)
Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
Shadow Master: Stanton McCandlish
Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
Ian Dickinson
Field Agent Extraordinaire: David Smith
Cu Digest Homepage: http://www.soci.niu.edu/~cudigest
CONTENTS, #9.73 (Sun, Oct 12, 1997)
File 1--"Net Law: How Lawyers Use the Internet" by Jacobsen
File 2--Markup of H.R. 695 (SAFE) ACT
File 3--Secret FBI Files Web Site
File 4--Things to Do on the Web When You're Dead
File 5--Agent Steal in Gray Areas
File 6--Export Controls and Scare Tactics
File 7--Netly News special report: "The Privacy Snatchers"
File 8--Spam Analysis
File 9--THE X-STOP FILES: The Truth Isn't Out There
File 10--Mitnick Trial Date Set
File 11--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 May, 1997)
CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN
THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 01 Oct 1997 11:25:25 EST
From: "Rob Slade, doting grandpa of Ryan & Trevor"
Subject: File 1--"Net Law: How Lawyers Use the Internet" by Jacobsen
BKNLHLUI.RVW 970221
"New Law: How Lawyers Use the Internet", Paul Jacobsen, 1997, 1-56592-258-1,
U$29.95
%A Paul Jacobsen jacobsen@brainerd.net
%C 103 Morris Street, Suite A, Sebastopol, CA 95472
%D 1997
%G 1-56592-258-1
%I O'Reilly & Associates, Inc.
%O U$29.95/C$42.95 800-998-9938 707-829-0515 fax: 707-829-0104 nuts@ora.com
%P 254
%T "New Law: How Lawyers Use the Internet"
Come on. You give it a title like that *and* stick in an AOL disk and still
expect me to refrain from joking?
Well then, this is a realistic and reasonable overview of net uses and
usefulness for lawyers. Not usage; per se; the coverage of actual Internet
applications is fairly brief. The content is more of a sales pitch, in line
with other Songline titles, studded with personal testimonials and examples.
(The book does, though, properly note that law offices will probably want a
direct, dedicated link to the net, rather than the dialup arrangement most
other books push.)
Along the way there are numerous, helpful resources recommended. A large
proportion of these do, as expected, deal with US law, but overall the book is
less US-centric than others of its ilk, given that the practice of law must be
similar anywhere.
"Netlaw" (cf. BKNETLAW.RVW) is for people; "Net Law" is for lawyers.
copyright Robert M. Slade, 1997 BKNLHLUI.RVW 970221
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 26 Sep 1997 17:05:57 -0500
From: cudigest@SUN.SOCI.NIU.EDU(Computer underground Digest)
Subject: File 2--Markup of H.R. 695 (SAFE) ACT
Source - http://www.house.gov/commerce/full/092497/markup.htm
Full Committee Markup
September 24, 1997
2123 Rayburn House Office Building
PDF Versions of Committee Print and Amendments will be available by
11:00 AM EDT [IMAGE] Some of the the documents below have been created
using Adobe Acrobat. To view these documents, you will need the Adobe
PDF Viewer
H.R. 695 SECURITY AND FREEDOM THROUGH ENCRYPTION (SAFE) ACT, was
ordered reported, amended, by a roll call vote of 44 yeas to 6 nays
(Roll Call Vote #42).
A unanimous consent request by Mr. Bliley to discharge the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection
from further consideration and proceed to the immediate consideration
of H.R. 695, as reported to the House by the Committee on the
Judiciary, was agreed to without objection.
The following amendments were offered.
An Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute by Mr. Tauzin, #1, was
AGREED TO, amended, by a voice vote. (A unanimous consent request by
Mr. Tauzin to have the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute
considered as base text for purposes of amendment was agreed to
without objection.)
An amendment to the Tauzin Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute
by Mr. Markey, #1A, was AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 40 yeas to
11 nays (Roll Call Vote #41).
An amendment by Mr. Oxley to the Markey Amendment to the Tauzin
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute, #1A(1), was NOT AGREED TO
by a roll call vote of 16 yeas to 35 nays (Roll Call Vote #40).
An amendment to the Tauzin Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute
by Mr. Tauzin, #1B, was AGREED TO by a voice vote.
THE COMMITTEE ADJOURNED SUBJECT TO THE CALL OF THE CHAIR
U.S. House Seal The Committee on Commerce
2125 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
(202) 225-2927
Commerce@mail.house.gov
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 6 Oct 1997 16:42:27 -0500 (CDT)
From: Michael Ravnitzky <mikerav@IX.NETCOM.COM>
Subject: File 3--Secret FBI Files Web Site
Please pardon any interruption, but I believe that you may be interested in
the Secret FBI Files Website at
http://www.crunch.com/01secret/01secret.htm
This free site has been carefully compiled from FBI records and lists
thousands of important and interesting FBI Files that you can get very
easily from the government simply by asking.
This material has never, repeat never been published before anywhere. If
you are interested in FBI files, this is a wonderful resource.
Sorry again for any interruption, and I won't send you any other
correspondence, but I hope you can provide me with some feedback on my
website, which is real a labor of love. And if you like it, tell a friend.
Michael Ravnitzky
Second Year Law Student
MikeRav@ix.netcom.com
http://www.crunch.com/01secret/01secret.htm
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 97 09:01:28 -0700
From: "Gordon R. Meyer" <grmeyer@ricochet.net>
Subject: File 4--Things to Do on the Web When You're Dead
Moderators' Note: Okay, the last thing we "need" is another
Internet-based newsletter. Nonetheless, "NetBits" has arrived on the
scene and it's fresh, interesting, and helpful. If you're interested in a
nice mix of articles on technology, society, and news -- all with a 'net
focus -- give NetBits a try. The article below is from their second issue.
To subscribe to NetBITS, send email to <netbits-on@netbits.net>.
Visit the NetBITS Web site at <http://www.netbits.net/>.
Things to Do on the Web When You're Dead
----------------------------------------
by David Blatner <david@afterlife.org>
Perhaps it speaks to my Western-based culture that I was so
surprised when a friend of mine [not our friend and colleague Cary
Lu, who had no desire to build a Web site before he passed away,
as mentioned in TidBITS-399_. -Adam] asked me some time ago if I
would host his Web site after he died. I had simply not given any
thought to the problem of what happens to a site after someone
passes away or can no longer support it for health reasons.
This man had put several years of work into his Web site, and it
had become an archive of his life's musings and beliefs. He felt
(and feels) strongly that this material should remain available to
people after he is no longer around to share it, and there is no
reason why this shouldn't be possible. The site takes up little
space, requires no real maintenance, and holds a treasure-trove of
wonderful writing that will probably never see its way into print.
I don't know how many elderly people or people with terminal
illnesses are currently building Web pages, but I can only assume
that the number is increasing and that within the next few years
the "passing on" question will become one of significance. There
are many important and emotional issues at stake here, as people's
personal Web sites become repositories and reflections of who they
are and what they feel is important to share with others.
I believe this situation calls for an international not-for-profit
organization. People could bequest their Web sites to this
organization with the knowledge that the site will be available
indefinitely to their loved ones and other interested parties.
Some small commercial startups already offer this kind of service,
but I'm more concerned about people who won't be able to afford an
expensive solution that requires trust funds or other
sophisticated financing.
**Enter the AfterLife** -- AfterLife is just such an organization.
Over the past few months, several volunteers have been working
together to address the concerns and issues of archiving Web sites
after their authors die. The effort is still very much in its
developmental stage, and more volunteers are needed. Currently,
AfterLife has been donated server space and bandwidth, and the
organization is applying for tax-exempt status in the United
States.
I was honored that my friend asked me to protect something so
precious to him, and I willingly agreed. But I wonder how many
people's sites are simply being "turned off" when they no longer
have a voice (or a checkbook) to sustain them? I keep thinking: if
my grandparents had built a Web site, wouldn't I want it archived
and available online in the years to come for my grandchildren?
Of course, no one knows what the online world will look like in my
grandchildren's time. There's no question that the Web will evolve
during the intervening years, and AfterLife will be exploring
issues surrounding the conversion of Web pages into other formats
for the continuance of access when that becomes necessary. Since
HTML is relatively simple and HTML files are pure text, Web pages
stand a much better chance of surviving into an unknown technical
future than content that requires specific hardware or operating
systems. CD-ROMs, for instance, may physically last for many
years, but that's no help if there aren't any CD-ROM drives to
read them or applications that understand the file formats used.
You can find more information about AfterLife at the Web site
below or by sending email to <info@afterlife.org>. If you are
interested in either participating as a volunteer or bequeathing
your Web site to AfterLife, drop us a line. Although AfterLife is
still at an early stage, we want to encourage people to start
thinking about the issues involved as the Web, along with the rest
of us, continues to age.
<http://www.afterlife.org/>
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 4 Oct 1997 17:55:31 -0400
From: grayarea <grayarea@openix.com>
Subject: File 5--Agent Steal in Gray Areas
((MODERATORS NOTE: Netta Gilboa, editor of Gray Areas,
sent the following information over to us. Gray Areas is a
nifty magazine that's been around for a few years, and mixes
rock, cyberculture, counterculture, and generally fringe news
unavailable elsewhere. It's well checking out)).
Two articles by Justin Petersen, a.k.a. Agent Steal, were just
published by Gray Areas Magazine. The first is called "Hackers
In Chains" and details some encounters Justin had with other
notorious computer hackers while in federal prison. The second
piece is called "Everything A Hacker Needs To Know About Getting
Busted By The Feds. The articles are available on the Gray Areas
Magazine Home Page at: http://www.grayarea.com/gray2.htm
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 29 Sep 97 10:48:22 MDT
From: Dave++ Ljung <dxl@HPESDXL.FC.HP.COM>
Subject: File 6--Export Controls and Scare Tactics
|Which would you rather have export controls on, technology used
|for encryption or technology used in the development of nuclear
|weaponry? The answer is obvious to most people.
Is it? Let's not shoot ourselves in the foot - if you make strong
encryption technology available, then you let *any* technology that
can be sent through encryption channels available.
|Here's the conundrum: The mandarins of law enforcement say that ...
|machines employed in the engineering of modern thermonuclear bombs can
|be sold to Russian scientists in the former Soviet Union's most famous
|nuclear weapons shop.
No - the law doesn't say that at all. SGI broke export regulations by
selling those computers, your article even admits that later:
|Around the same time the Department of Commerce, along with the
|Department of Justice, began a criminal investigation of the case.
It seems that the 'mandarins of law enforcement' don't like strong
encryption *or* export of computing technology that can create
nuclear weaponry.
|This is similar to the arguments fielded by concerned Netizens
|against control of encryption, with one small exception: The first U.S
|hydrogen bomb blew a crater one mile wide in the Pacific atoll of
|Eniwetok.
And the plans for that bomb could have been sent using encryption. There
you go shooting your other foot, that must hurt. All you're doing is
using the same scare tactics that the 'law' is using to stop
encryption. Encryption in itself is not dangerous, but it admittedly
can transmit dangerous information. Workstations by themselves are
not dangerous, but they can create dangerous things, such as nuclear
weaponry. If you use scare tactics to focus on the dangerous
possibilities of technology, you might as well hand it all in now.
|The four machines, for which Silicon Graphics was paid
|$200,000, aren't really supercomputers, argued Thompson. At Silicon
|Graphics, he said, they're thought of as "desktop servers," capable of
Well - that's what they are. Admittedly the lines between PCs, workstations,
servers and supercomputers is no longer clear, I think most of the
industry would consider such machines as servers, not supercomputers.
|supercomputers made by Cray Research. Conversely, a 486 PC -- what
|this article is being written on -- is capable of approximately 12.5
|million operations per second. Compared to it, the SGI machines in
|question are, relatively speaking, Crays.
Now you're just being silly. Conversely, say, an Altair 8800 -- what
this reply is being written on -- is capable of a couple of operations
per second. Compared to it, the 486 PC in your house is, relatively
speaking, the most powerful computer ever made. Please destroy it
immediately - don't let it fall into the hands of the Russkies.
|Thus, since Silicon Graphics insisted it was unaware of
|Chelyabinsk-70's true nature, there was no need to review the sale.
You are absolutely correct. I won't defend SGI because the made a
mistake and they broke the law. In fact, they're direct competitors
with the company I work for, so I don't really want to discuss SGI at
all. But I don't see what this has to do with the *government* selling
supercomputers to Russia (which they didn't), or with strong encryption,
or ... heck, with anything except maybe the discussion of export controls,
which didn't seem to be the point of your article.
So, what exactly is your point, George?
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 13:48:12 -0400
From: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
Subject: File 7--Netly News special report: "The Privacy Snatchers"
Source - fight-censorship@vorlon.mit.edu
Recently the FBI has started to demand a creepy new anti-privacy
law. It requires that all future technologies -- from cell
phones to WordPerfect -- include a kind of electronic peephole
to let law enforcement agents snoop through your private files
and communications without your knowledge or permission. One
House committee has already approved the FBI's bill.
Such easy access is the fantasy of every unethical policeman and
corrupt bureaucrat. Now, the police say they'll never peek
through this peephole without a judge's approval. But history
reveals that time and again, the FBI, the military and other law
enforcement organizations have ignored the law and spied on
Americans illegally, without court authorization. Government
agencies have subjected hundreds of thousands of law-abiding
Americans to unjust surveillance, illegal wiretaps and
warrantless searches. Eleanor Roosevelt, Martin Luther King,
feminists, gay rights leaders and Catholic priests were spied on.
Even Supreme Court justices were monitored. Can we trust the FBI?
Visit the Netly News for a special report on The Privacy Snatchers:
http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1466,00.html
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 30 Sep 1997 09:03:21 -0400 (EDT)
From: editor@TELECOM-DIGEST.ORG
Subject: File 8--Spam Analysis
((MODERATORS' NOTE: For those not familiar with Pat Townson's
TELECOM DIGEST, it's an exceptional resource. From the header
of TcD:
"TELECOM Digest is an electronic journal devoted mostly but
not exclusively to telecommunications topics. It is
circulated anywhere there is email, in addition to various
telecom forums on a variety of public service systems and
networks including Compuserve and America On Line. It is also
gatewayed to Usenet where it appears as the moderated
newsgroup 'comp.dcom.telecom'. Subscriptions are available to
qualified organizations and individual readers. Write and tell
us how you qualify:
* ptownson@massis.lcs.mit.edu * ======" ))
==================
Source - TELECOM Digest Tue, 30 Sep 97 Volume 17 : Issue 265
Date: Sun, 28 Sep 1997 19:02:54 -0400
From--The Old Bear <oldbear@arctos.com>
Subject--Spam Analysis
Pat:
The following is something I did about two months ago to get a better
understanding of the kind of "unsolicitied commercial email" that
is being spewed into my mailbox. Readers of TELECOM Digest may
find it of interest, particularly the observations about:
1. the *size* of the typical spam email message versus
the that of the typical legitimate individual message;
2. the volume of spam compared with legitimate messages
(other than subscribed mailing lists and other solicited
bulk mail);
3. the apparent evolution of a subset of standard English
punctuation which might be called 'spammese'.
From--oldbear@arctos.com (The Old Bear)
Subject--the case of the telltale exclamation point !
Date--Fri, 1 Aug 1997 18:48:18 -0400
Since the beginning of the year, rather than deleting email SPAM, I
have been filtering it off into a file called "SPAM" for purposes of
intellectual curiosity.
Well, it being a slow Friday afternoon, I decided to do some analysis.
First, let me say that I already filter the 'from:' field to sort
mail from subscribed lists and newsletters into appropriate folders.
That reduces the mail volume in my general in-box considerably.
I also filter mail from about ten individuals from whom I regularly
expect to receive mail into a priority folder.
That left 2,195 messages as "general" in-box material, or for the 213
days, an average of 10.3 unclassified messages per day.
Of these 2,195 messages, I had manually sorted out 715 "spam" messages,
or roughly 32% of the total unclassified message traffic.
It should be noted that on a 'number of bytes' basis, the percentage
of "spam" is much larger, totally 3,385KB of 6,809KB, or 50%. This
means that the average "spam" email is 4.74KB compared with the
average "real" e-mail being only 2.31KB including headers. A very
scary statistic.
Having noticed that spammers are not only verbose, but have a propensity
to use needless exclamation points in the subject line, I decided to
see what would happen if I filtered out any email message from the
unclassified message traffic which contained a "!" in the subject line.
Of 715 spams, 262 messages were selected -- a detection rate of 37%.
Of 1480 "real" messages, 75 were selected -- a false positive rate of
only 5%.
A further examination of the "false positives" showed that 22 of
them related to the contact management software "ACT!" made by
Symantec and about which I had been in correspondence with several
other users at one point earlier in the year. Obviously, an
unfortunate choice of product name.
Another 20 messages were replies to subject lines containing "!"
which I foolishly had originated myself, such as "Happy birthday!"
and "thanks!" -- something I pledge never to do again.
That brings random "false positives" to 33, or 2% which may or may not
be an acceptable level to any particular email user.
In summary, based upon my sample (your mileage may vary), just
filtering for exclamation points intercepts 37% of incoming "spam"
while erroneously intercepting only 2% of bona fide message traffic.
Personally, manually trashing ten messages per day is not so onerous
that I would risk losing 2% of my valid unclassified email. But it
does provide some indication of how "intelligent" filtering might be
possible under current circumstances.
Unfortuantely, 'professional' spammers eventually will figure out the
filtering algorithms much like professional tax advisors have figured
out what provokes an electronic IRS audit flag, or how shrewd job
applicants have figured out what will get their resumes flagged by
personnel departments which use electronic scanning.
Even so, most of the annoying amateur multi-level marketing and chain
letter garbage is so stupidly constructed that taking it out of the
mailstream should be relatively easy -- even though doing it at the
end point remains a tremendously inefficient use of resources.
Cheers,
The Old Bear
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 09 Oct 1997 09:01:18 -0700
From: Jonathan Wallace <jw@bway.net>
Subject: File 9--THE X-STOP FILES: The Truth Isn't Out There
SLAC Bulletin, October 9, 1997
-----------------------------
The SLAC bulletin is a periodic mailer on Internet freedom of
speech issues from the authors of Sex, Laws and Cyberspace (Henry
Holt 1996). For more information, contact Jonathan Wallace,
jw@bway.net, or visit our Web pages at
http://www.spectacle.org/freespch/.
THE X-STOP FILES: The Truth Isn't Out There
by Seth Finkelstein
So another censorware product has been found to secretly been
blacklisting gay and lesbian material, anti-censorship sites, feminist
resources and an incomprehensible scattershot collection of totally
innocuous organizations. We can treat this as yet another "bad apple" in
the endless search for the magic anti-porn program. Or we can use it as
a basis for examining why such a program won't ever exist.
A censorware blacklist seems to enjoy the enviable status of
being assumed perfect until exposed as otherwise. Even though
CyberSitter and NetNanny were caught banning the National Organization
for Women, and CyberPatrol stigmatizes feminist discussion and
electronic newspaper articles about gays as "Sexual Acts", every new
expose of this type seems to follow a pattern. First, it is greeted with
great surprise (and denial) by too many people. Then the company's
public relations staff issues a weasel-worded press release of
excuses. Finally, later, we are told that that particular program may
have problems, but there's another one which is better, and the cycle
begins anew.
The X-stop case is notable not for what it was exposed to be
banning in secret - that had a heavy helping of the usual suspects who
fare badly under any sort of blacklisting. But the significance lies in
that the claims it made were such an egregious example of statements
which were dubious to ludicrous, yet were frequently uncritically
repeated in debate. Journalists would not dream of, say, gullibly
accepting a politician's claim that no campaign actions violated
controlling legal authority even though all records are secret and
would not be disclosed, but the outlandish propaganda of
censorware-touters is too often parroted without the slightest
skepticism (this isn't restricted to X-Stop, others such as BESS,
Websense, etc. have received similar build-ups, and are now starting
along the cycle of exposure described above).
Just to start, X-stop's marketers made a prominent assertion
that their censorware had a blacklist which contained only entries for
material which is obscene according to the _Miller_ standard (a
definition set out by the Supreme Court). Note this is not a vague
claim about "pornography", which is a broad and hard to pin down term,
but a very strong statement about a legal standard. Obscenity is a
legal terms of art. A complex test must be met, and it is a difficult
judicial determination. All material is initially presumed non-obscene
until such a ruling. Moreover, obscenity is not a constant, not an
intrinsic property, but a geographic variable. It varies from place to
place, that is the "community standards" part of the _Miller_ test
(note this prong is typically greatly overemphasized by people trying
to suppress material, it's just one aspect of a highly involved
determination).
Just from this, it should be obvious that either X-Stop was
lying, or it was a *very* small list. No great knowledge is required,
just basic understanding of the meaning of the terms in the claim. And
such a list would be unlikely to please many censorware advocates. For
example, explicit safer-sex educational information, a frequent
subject of controversy, wouldn't be obscene.
Perhaps someone wants to be generous, and rewrite X-Stop's claim
into something such as "likely to be obscene somewhere in the country".
This would still be a near-impossible task to list with any significant
coverage of the net. There are so many sites on the Internet, all
changing so rapidly, that it would require an army of censors to even
try to keep up in evaluating them. And people who have some knowledge of
how to make a legal determination typically aren't working for minimum
wage.
X-Stop's answer to the above barrier was the "Mudcrawler"
searching program. However, for a computer program to have any sort of
ability to apply a complex legal standard would be an
artificial-intelligence breakthrough of Nobel Prize magnitude. It hardly
will be the technology of a little company making blacklists. While
this perhaps isn't obvious to the general public, it should be clear to
anyone with the most minimal familiarity with technical issues.
Yet with all of this pointing to the near-impossibility of
X-Stop's claims, they passed very much unchallenged. The lesson here
isn't "another bad blocker". It is rather how easy it is for even the
most absurd censorware public-relations fluff to be taken seriously,
while the truth is far different. And that whenever censor-minded people
are given free reign to ban with secret blacklists, no matter what they
say in public, in reality they also target their traditional enemies -
feminists, gays and lesbians, anti-censorship sites, and so on.
----------------------------------------------------
Seth Finkelstein is a software developer who takes a
particular interest in censorware and ratings systems.
His Web pages on the subject are at
http://www.mit.edu/activities/safe/labeling/summary.html.
---------------------------------------
Jonathan Wallace
The Ethical Spectacle http://www.spectacle.org
Co-author, Sex, Laws and Cyberspace http://www.spectacle.org/freespch/
"We must be the change we wish to see in the world."--Gandhi
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 09 Oct 1997 20:31:49 -0400
From: "Evian S. Sim" <evian@escape.com>
Subject: File 10--Mitnick Trial Date Set
October 8, 1997
By DAVID HOUSTON
City News Service
LOS ANGELES (CNS) - A federal judge today seemed to back away
from her earlier promise not to let famed hacker Kevin Mitnick
anywhere near a computer to prepare for his trial.
Mitnick attorney Donald Randolph told U.S. District Judge Mariana
Pfaelzer there are potentially millions of documents on databases
that could take hundreds of hours to inspect and read.
Assistant U.S. Attorney David Schindler said if all the documents
were printed it would fill up a larger space than the courtroom.
Reluctantly, the judge seemed to warm to the idea of allowing the
defendant to use a computer. She told Randolph to confer with
prosecutors to find the best way for Mitnick to view evidence
against him.
But Pfaelzer warned: "I'm not going to have a whole succession
of unfortunate events to take place because while he was
incarcerated we gave him access to a computer."
Randolph wants Mitnick to be allowed to use a laptop computer,
under supervision, at the federal Metropolitan Detention Center.
He promised the computer would be modem-less, to prevent Mitnick
from wreaking the kind of havoc he has done in the past.
Mitnick was on parole for other computer-related offenses when he
and co-defendant Lewis DePayne went on a 1992-95 hacking spree.
According to a 25-count federal indictment, Mitnick and DePayne
stole millions of dollars in software from high-tech companies,
damaged USC computers and used stolen computer passwords.
DePayne, who is not in custody, did not show up in court today.
Attorney Richard Sherman said his client was in San Francisco.
Pfaelzer's comments came during a trial date-setting status
conference.
The judge tentatively set trial for April 14. But Randolph
warned that it might have to be pushed back if it takes longer
than expected to view the computer-held evidence.
"I'm told it could take more than 200 hours to look at all the
stuff that is there," he said.
Earlier this year, Pfaelzer told Randolph "no way, no how" would
she allow the habitual hacker access to another computer.
Pfaelzer has good reason to be leery of Mitnick.
He has been before her several times for different,
computer-related offenses. In June, she gave him 22 months
behind bars for violating his parole and breaking into Pacific
Bell's computers.
The judge also chastised Randolph for the amount of bills he has
submitted to the court for Mitnick's defense---particularly for
computer experts. Mitnick has no money and the government is
paying the legal bills.
"I've rarely ever seen bills that high. I'm absolutely stunned
at what those bills look like," she said. "If you think you're
going to have an unlimited budget, you're wrong."
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 7 May 1997 22:51:01 CST
From: CuD Moderators <cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu>
Subject: File 11--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 May, 1997)
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End of Computer Underground Digest #9.73
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