Computer underground Digest Sun Feb 13, 1994 Volume 6 : Issue 15
ISSN 1004-042X
Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
Archivist: Brendan Kehoe (Improving each day)
Acting Archivist: Stanton McCandlish
Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
Ian Dickinson
Cowpie Editor: Buffy A. Lowe
CONTENTS, #6.15 (Feb 13, 1994)
File 1--"Internet users get a warning"
File 2--Vice President Gore Questions Current Key Escrow Policy!
File 3--CPSR ANNOUNCES CAMPAIGN TO OPPOSE CLIPPER PROPOSAL
File 4--EFF Wants You (to add your voice to the crypto fight!)
File 5--Text of Cantwell Bill (HR 3627)
File 6--Austrialian Federal Regulation ofBBSes
File 7--Regulation of BBSes in Canada
File 8--Pessimism in CuD (Response to Technological Disasters)
File 9--Response to "Technological Disasters"
File 10--How to avoid Postal Entrapment (Re: CuD #6.11)
File 11--CNS-Internet (Internet access service)
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: 09 Feb 94 13:49:16 EST
From: Lou Poppler <71231.2724@COMPUSERVE.COM>
Subject: File 1--"Internet users get a warning"
((MODERATORS' COMMENT: We've seen a number of media blurbs in the
past few weeks with headlines such as "HACKERS BREAK INTO THE
INTERNET." To readers (or politicians) with little understanding
of the Nets, the headlines and accompanying stories suggest images
of roving gangs lurking beneath every PC. The following comes from
the Lansing State Journal)).
WASHINGTON -- Users of the international computer network Internet are
being advised to change their passwords because of a rash of break-ins
to the system.
Computer break-ins occur when an unauthorized user finds a way
to connect to a computer system, often using a stolen password. Once
connected, they can read private information or change or eliminate
data belonging to others.
"Intruders have already captured access information for tens of
thousands of systems across the Internet," said an advisory late
Thursday by the Computer Emergency Response Team, a federally funded
panel that helps coordinate interconnections among computer systems.
In the short term, the advisory panel urged users to change
passwords. But it said this is not a permanent solution and said that
the long-term solution lies in finding a way to eliminate reusable
passwords on the Internet.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 18:54:59 -0500 (EST)
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@EFF.ORG>
Subject: File 2--Vice President Gore Questions Current Key Escrow Policy!
National Information Infrastructure Advisory Committee met today in
Washington at the Old Executive Office Building. In comments made
after a question and answer period, Vice President Al Gore said that
key escrow policy announced last Friday (2/4/94) had serious flaws and
that he hope the issue of who holds the keys and under what terms
would be given more serious, careful consideration.
Gore made it clear that some amount of control of cryptography
technology was necessary for national security. However, the key
escrow policies announced by the Departments of Justice, Commerce &
State, and the NSA, were "low level decisions" that got out before
thorough analysis. In a conversation with Mitchell Kapor, Esther
Dyson, and Mike Nelson (of the White House Staff), Gore said that he
would prefer that the keys be held by some part of the Judiciary
branch, or perhaps even by trusted, private escrow agents. He made it
clear that he believed that the escrow agents named in last Friday's
announcement (National Institute of Standards & Technology and the
Treasure Department) were no appropriate key holders. Mike Nelson
also indicated that there was real interest in a software-based escrow
system instead of the hardware-based SKIPJACK standard
Those of us who heard Gore were quite surprised. His remarks suggest
that the key escrow policies to date do not have full support of the
White House.
Still, Gore was quite firm in asserting that some control of
encryption technology is essential to national security. "Encryption
and codebreaking have determined the outcome of world wars. He stated
(incorrectly) that most our industrialized allies place must stricter
controls in encryption that the US does. In fact, almost all COCOM
countries allow the export of DES-based products, though some do not
allow DES to be imported.
The whole question of encryption was raised when Mitchell Kapor told
the Vice President that over half of the Advisory Council members had
serious reservations about the current Clipper/Skipjack policies.
Gore and Kapor agreed that the Advisory Council should be used to have
a serious dialogue about encryption policy. Given Gore's departure
from the current Clipper proposals, there might actually be something
to talk about.
==========
NOTE: This DOES NOT mean that Clipper is going away. Part of stopping
Clipper is to lift export controls on encryption and enable US
companies to start producing products that enable all of us to protect
our privacy with strong encryption.
I urge you to write to Rep. Cantwell today at cantwell@eff.org. In the
Subject header of your message, type "I support HR 3627." In the body
of your message, express your reasons for supporting the bill. EFF
will deliver printouts of all letters to Rep. Cantwell. With a strong
showing of support from the Net community, Rep. Cantwell can tell her
colleagues on Capitol Hill that encryption is not only an industry
concern, but also a grassroots issue. *Again: remember to put "I
support HR 3627" in your Subject header.*
P.S. If you want additional information about the Cantwell bill, send
e-mail to cantwell-info@eff.org. To join EFF, write
membership@eff.org. For introductory info about EFF, send any message
to info@eff.org.
The text of the Cantwell bill can be found on the Internet with the
any of the following URLs (Universal Resource Locaters):
ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/Policy/Legislation/cantwell.bill
http://www.eff.org/ftp/EFF/Policy/Legislation/cantwell.bill
gopher://gopher.eff.org/00/EFF/legislation/cantwell.bill
**************************************************************************
Relying on the government to protect your privacy is like asking a
peeping tom to install your window blinds. - John Perry Barlow, EFF
co-founder
The Electronic Frontier Foundation is working to protect your
privacy. To help stop Clipper and eliminate export controls on
cryptography, support a bill introduced in the House of
Representatives, HR 3627. To support the bill, send email to
<cantwell@eff.org>.
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 13:41:30 -0800
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@WASHOFC.CPSR.ORG>
Subject: File 3--CPSR ANNOUNCES CAMPAIGN TO OPPOSE CLIPPER PROPOSAL
Campaign Against Clipper
CPSR ANNOUNCES CAMPAIGN TO OPPOSE CLIPPER PROPOSAL
Embargoed until 2 pm, Monday, February 7, 1994
contact: rotenberg@washofc.cpsr.org (202 544 9240)
Washington, DC -- Following the White House decision on Friday to
endorse a secret surveillance standard for the information highway,
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) today announced
a national campaign to oppose the government plan.
The Clipper proposal, developed in secret by the National Security
Agency, is a technical standard that will make it easier for government
agents to wiretap the emerging data highway.
Industry groups, professional associations and civil liberties
organizations have expressed almost unanimous opposition to the plan
since it was first proposed in April 1993.
According to Marc Rotenberg, CPSR Washington director, the
Administration made a major blunder with Clipper. "The public does not
like Clipper and will not accept it. This proposal is fatally flawed."
CPSR cited several problems with the Clipper plan:
o The technical standard is subject to misuse and compromise. It would
provide government agents with copies of the keys that protect
electronic communications. "It is a nightmare for computer security,"
said CPSR Policy Analyst Dave Banisar.
o The underlying technology was developed in secret by the NSA, an
intelligence agency responsible for electronic eavesdropping, not
privacy protection. Congressional investigations in the 1970s disclosed
widespread NSA abuses, including the illegal interception of millions of
cables sent by American citizens.
o Computer security experts question the integrity of the technology.
Clipper was developed in secret and its specifications are classified.
CPSR has sued the government seeking public disclosure of the Clipper
scheme.
o NSA overstepped its legal authority in developing the standard. A
1987 law explicitly limits the intelligence agency's power to set
standards for the nation's communications network.
o There is no evidence to support law enforcement's claims that new
technologies are hampering criminal investigations. CPSR recently forced
the release of FBI documents that show no such problems.
o The Administration ignored the overwhelming opposition of the general
public. When the Commerce Department solicited public comments on the
proposal last fall, hundreds of people opposed the plan while only a few
expressed support.
CPSR today announced four goals for its campaign to oppose the Clipper
initiative:
o First, to educate the public about the implications of the Clipper
proposal.
o Second, to encourage people to express their views on the Clipper
proposal, particularly through the computer network.
Toward that goal, CPSR has already begun an electronic petition on the
Internet computer network urging the President to withdraw the Clipper
proposal. In less than one week, the CPSR campaign has drawn thousands
of electronic mail messages expressing concern about Clipper. To sign
on, email clipper.petition@cpsr.org with the message "I oppose clipper"
in the body of the text.
o Third, to pursue litigation to force the public disclosure of
documents concerning the Clipper proposal and to test the legality of
the Department of Commerce's decision to endorse the plan.
o Fourth, to examine alternative approaches to Clipper.
Mr. Rotenberg said "We want the public to understand the full
implications of this plan. Today it is only a few experts and industry
groups that understand the proposal. But the consequences of Clipper
will touch everyone. It will affect medical payments, cable television
service, and everything in between.
CPSR is a membership-based public interest organization. For more
information about CPSR, send email to cpsr@cpsr.org or call 415 322
3778. For more information about Clipper, check the CPSR Internet
library CPSR.ORG. FTP/WAIS/Gopher and listserv access are available.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 1994 18:32:26 -0500 (EST)
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@EFF.ORG>
Subject: File 4--EFF Wants You (to add your voice to the crypto fight!)
The Electronic Frontier Foundation needs your help to ensure privacy rights!
* DISTRIBUTE WIDELY *
Monday, February 7th, 1994
From: Jerry Berman, Executive Director of EFF
jberman@eff.org
Dear Friends on the Electronic Frontier,
I'm writing a personal letter to you because the time has now come for
action. On Friday, February 4, 1994, the Administration announced that it
plans to proceed on every front to make the Clipper Chip encryption scheme
a national standard, and to discourage the development and sale of
alternative powerful encryption technologies. If the government succeeds
in this effort, the resulting blow to individual freedom and privacy could
be immeasurable.
As you know, over the last three years, we at EFF have worked to ensure
freedom and privacy on the Net. Now I'm writing to let you know about
something *you* can do to support freedom and privacy. *Please take a
moment to send e-mail to U.S. Rep. Maria Cantwell (cantwell@eff.org) to
show your support of H.R. 3627, her bill to liberalize export controls on
encryption software.* I believe this bill is critical to empowering
ordinary citizens to use strong encryption, as well as to ensuring that
the U.S. software industry remains competitive in world markets.
Here are some facts about the bill:
Rep. Cantwell introduced H.R. 3627 in the House of Representatives on
November 22, 1993. H.R. 3627 would amend the Export Control Act to move
authority over the export of nonmilitary software with encryption
capabilities from the Secretary of State (where the intelligence community
traditionally has stalled such exports) to the Secretary of Commerce. The
bill would also invalidate the current license requirements for
nonmilitary software containing encryption capablities, unless there is
substantial evidence that the software will be diverted, modified or
re-exported to a military or terroristic end-use.
If this bill is passed, it will greatly increase the availability of
secure software for ordinary citizens. Currently, software developers do
not include strong encryption capabilities in their products, because the
State Department refuses to license for export any encryption technology
that the NSA can't decipher. Developing two products, one with less secure
exportable encryption, would lead to costly duplication of effort, so even
software developed for sale in this country doesn't offer maximum
security. There is also a legitimate concern that software companies will
simply set up branches outside of this country to avoid the export
restrictions, costing American jobs.
The lack of widespread commercial encryption products means that it will
be very easy for the federal government to set its own standard--the
Clipper Chip standard. As you may know, the government's Clipper Chip
initiative is designed to set an encryption standard where the government
holds the keys to our private conversations. Together with the Digital
Telephony bill, which is aimed at making our telephone and computer
networks "wiretap-friendly," the Clipper Chip marks a dramatic new effort
on the part of the government to prevent us from being able to engage in
truly private conversations.
We've been fighting Clipper Chip and Digital Telephony in the policy arena
and will continue to do so. But there's another way to fight those
initiatives, and that's to make sure that powerful alternative encryption
technologies are in the hands of any citizen who wants to use them. The
government hopes that, by pushing the Clipper Chip in every way short of
explicitly banning alternative technologies, it can limit your choices for
secure communications.
Here's what you can do:
I urge you to write to Rep. Cantwell today at cantwell@eff.org. In the
Subject header of your message, type "I support HR 3627." In the body of
your message, express your reasons for supporting the bill. EFF will
deliver printouts of all letters to Rep. Cantwell. With a strong showing
of support from the Net community, Rep. Cantwell can tell her colleagues
on Capitol Hill that encryption is not only an industry concern, but also
a grassroots issue. *Again: remember to put "I support HR 3627" in your
Subject header.*
This is the first step in a larger campaign to counter the efforts of
those who would restrict our ability to speak freely and with privacy.
Please stay tuned--we'll continue to inform you of things you can do to
promote the removal of restrictions on encryption.
In the meantime, you can make your voice heard--it's as easy as e-mail.
Write to cantwell@eff.org today.
Sincerely,
Jerry Berman
Executive Director, EFF
jberman@eff.org
P.S. If you want additional information about the Cantwell bill, send
e-mail to cantwell-info@eff.org. To join EFF, write membership@eff.org.
For introductory info about EFF, send any message to info@eff.org.
The text of the Cantwell bill can be found on the Internet with the any of
the following URLs (Universal Resource Locaters):
ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/Policy/Legislation/cantwell.bill
http://www.eff.org/ftp/EFF/Policy/Legislation/cantwell.bill
gopher://gopher.eff.org/00/EFF/legislation/cantwell.bill
It will be available on AOL (keyword EFF) and CIS (go EFFSIG) soon.
------------------------------
Date: 09 Feb 94 13:33:32 EST
From: CuD Moderators <cudigest@mindvox.phantom.com>
Subject: File 5--Text of Cantwell Bill (HR 3627)
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MS. CANTWELL (for herself and ___) introduced the following bill which
was referred to the Committee on __________.
---------------------------------------
A BILL
To amend the Export Administration Act of 1979 with
respect to the control of computers and related equipment.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled,
SECTION 1. GENERALLY AVAILABLE SOFTWARE
Section 17 of the Export Administration Act of 1979
(50 U.S.C. App. 2416) is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following new subsection:
``(g) COMPUTERS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT.---
``(1) GENERAL RULE.---Subject to paragraphs
(2) and (3), the Secretary shall have exclusive au-
thority to control exports of all computer hardware,
software and technology for information security
(including encryption), except that which is specifi-
cally designed or modified for military use, including
command, control and intelligence applications.
``(2) ITEMS NOT REQUIRING LICENSES.---
No validated license may be required, except pursuant
to the Trading With The Enemy Act or the Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers Act (but only
to the extent that the authority of such act is not
exercised to extend controls imposed under this act),
for the export or reexport of---
``(A) any software, including software with
encryption capabilities, that is---
``(i) generally available, as is, and is
designed for installation by the purchaser; or
``(ii) in the public domain or publicly
available because it is generally accessible
to the interested public in any form; or
``(B) any computing device soley because
it incorporates or employs in any form software
(including software with encryption capabilities)
exempted from any requirement for a validated
license under subparagraph (A).
``(3) SOFTWARE WITH ENCRYPTION CAPABILITIES.
--- The Secretary shall authorize the export or
reexport of software with encryption capabilities for
nonmilitary end-uses in any country to which ex-
ports of software of similar capability are permitted
for use by financial institutions not controlled in fact
by United States persons, unless there is substantial
evidence that such software will be---
``(A) diverted to a military end-use or an
end-use supporting international terrorism;
``(B) modified for military or terrorist end-
use; or
``(C) reexported without requisite United
States authorization.
``(4) DEFINITIONS.---As used in this subsection---
``(A) the term `generally available' means,
in the case of software (including software with
encryption capabilities), software that is offered
for sale, license, or transfer to any person with-
out restriction through any commercial means,
including, but not limited to, over-the-counter
retail sales, mail order transactions, phone
order transactions, electronic distribution, or
sale on approval;
``(B) the term `as is' means, in the case of
software (including software with encryption ca-
pabilities), a software program that is not de-
signed, developed, or tailored by the software
company for specific purchasers, except that
such purchasers may supply certain installation
parameters needed by the software program to
function properly with the purchaser's system
and may customize the software program by
choosing among options contained in the soft-
ware program;
``(C) the term `is designed for installation
by the purchaser' means, in the case of soft-
ware (including software with encryption capa-
bilities)---
``(i) the software company intends for
the purchaser (including any licensee or
transferee), who may not be the actual
program user, to install the software pro-
gram on a computing device and has sup-
plied the necessary instructions to do so,
except that the company may also provide
telephone help line services for software in-
stallation, electronic transmission, or basic
operations; and---
``(ii) that the software program is de-
signed for installation by the purchaser
without further substantial support by the
supplier;
``(D) the term `computing device' means a
device which incorporates one or more
microprocessor-based central processing units
that can accept, store, process or provide out-
put of data; and
``(E) the term `computer hardware', when
used in conjunction with information security,
includes, but is not limited to, computer sys-
tems, equipment, application-specific assem-
blies, modules and integrated circuits.''
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 6 Feb 1994 16:21:45 +0800 (WST)
From: hardone <hardguy@GARION.IT.COM.AU>
Subject: File 6--Austrialian Federal Regulation ofBBSes
Federal check on computer bulletin boards.
Financial Rev. Feb 4th Page 4
Mounting evidence that computer bulletin boards were being used by
criminals, neo-Nazis and paedophiles has prompted a federal
investigation into their use.
The Attorney-General, Mr. Lavarch, said he and the Minister for
communications, Mr. Lee, had agreed to set up a joint task force to
consider ways of regulating the use of computer bulletin boards.
Mr. Lavarch said he was concerned that the bulletin boards - which
anyone with a home computer and modem could access - were being used
to disseminate "extremely offensive and often illegal material".
"There is ample evidence that bulletin boards are being used to
distribute banned publications, including child pornography," he said
in a statement released yesterday.
Although the Government has no idea how many Australians were
tapping into bulletin boards, according to industry submissions to the
Office of Film and Literature Classification, Australia was the
second-largest user after the US where an estimated 40,000 people
regularly used the boards.
Mar Lavarch said in Amercia, paedophiles have been detected using
bulletin boards to contact each other and their victims.
"Other examples of misuse include neo-Nazi propaganda dissemination,
unauthorized copying of software and other protected materials, sale
of stolen credit card numbers and the spread of other defamatory
information."
He said it was time to look at ways to curb the growing misuse of
technology.
"We are in an era where children operate computers as easily as
their parents rode bicycles.
"We cannot allow advances in technology to overtake the legal and
law
enforcement measure designed to protect them, in particular, from
undesirable material."
He said the issue of bulletin boards was on the agenda for the next
meeting of Federal, State and Territory censorship ministers in
Canberra on February 17 where the proposed new classification system
for over-the-counter video and computer games would be finalised.
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 09 Feb 94 16:09:08 EST
From: pcalarco <FPCA@MUSICB.MCGILL.CA>
Subject: File 7--Regulation of BBSes in Canada
The CRTC (Canadian Radio & Television Comission) is the most
powerful government organization in Canada regarding radio,television,
telephone, and telecommunications service. Recently, there have been
unconfirmed rumours abounding across Fidonet and some mailing lists
that the CRTC is looking at regulating computer bulletin boards as well.
A recent story on BBSes on one of our national television networks (CTV,
5/2/94) focused on the proliferation of 'pornographic BBSes' in Canada
in recent years, and the question naturally came up, "Should we regulate
computer BBSes?" To the general public watching this, the response
probably would be "Yes!" after seeing the very great danger to the
moral fibre of this nation's youth <har!>. An interview with the new
Minister of Communications, Mr. Jon Gerrard, on CBC Radio the same even-
ing did not discount the idea. Mr. Gerrard evaded the pointed questions
quite nicely, and gave no answer one way or the other as to whether
regulation of BBSes was being considered. As Minister of Communications
Mr. Gerrard is directly responsible for policy input into the CRTC, and
can direct the CRTC to new areas. The recently-passed Telecommunication
Act of June, 1993 does not include computer networks (and BBSes specific
-ally) in its mandate, but their are clauses in the document that leave
regulation of areas not specified by the legislation to fall under
regulation at any future point, at the discretion of the CRTC. As
to whether this is some nasty rumour or covert fact, none of us who
have been investigating the issue can find out. Mr. Gerrard, however,
did release his e-mail address on the Saturday night CBC program, and
invited inputs from Canadians on this specific issue. I would venture
to say that Americans should take interest in this issue as well. With
the II initiative in the U.S. heating up, escrow still remaining very
much a probabability in the Clinton administration, and the prolifera-
tion of BBSes and Freenets in both countries, the issue of increased
regulation of computer networks, especially at the more grassroots
level, is a very real possibility. Along with regulation of the
medium, we can see a number of consequences here in Canada: 1) a
licensing fee of some kind, which hobbists presently running BBSes
may or may not be able to afford; 2) a definite limit as to what is
and what is not permissable to archive/disseminate/discuss on these
licensed boards; 3) those not adhering to licensing, would become, in
effect, 'pirate' boards, due to their non-registration, regardless of
content; 4) a general homongenization of the BBS scene: the rules
would be in favour of larger, more established (re: commercial) boards,
killing off small hobby boards, and limiting all BBSes content.
I urge all Canadians and Americans to please respond to Mr. Gerrard.
Tell him from your perspective what you think the effects of regulation
of our media would be. The more pressure we can place at earlier stages
of policy development, the more effect we can have on any policy. Mr.
Gerrard's Internet e-mail address is
Gerrard.jon@istc.ca
Please be polite and respectful. Coming off as boorish and juvenile
will get this effort nowhere. I am also archiving any files & info
that I can on the subject on my BBS, RadioCityZen, here in Montreal.
All new users will have full access to all the file bases, and there
are no download ratios. The files are contained in file SIG #27:
CRTC & BBS licensing. Thanx for your time! Anybody with new info
as things develop, please post to can.legal or alt.bbs.allsysop.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 1994 09:16:08 -0500
From: gbs@PANIX.COM(Eric Braun)
Subject: File 8--Pessimism in CuD (Response to Technological Disasters)
The anti-hype of your "A GUIDE TO TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTERS TO COME" in
CuD 6.13 is refreshing and much appreciated, but unfortunately your
pessimistic future is presented as a forgone conclusion rather than a
possible endpoint. Perhaps that was rhetorically necessary, but there
are a couple things to keep in mind:
1) Numerous on-line commercial ventures were set up hoping to spoon
feed their customers with home-shopping and entertainment services,
but found that the inter-personal communication services that had been
tacked on as an afterthought were what people really wanted. This
paints a different picture from your gloomy one of the slobby American
couch potato.
2) Changes in form can be accompanied by changes in content, in fact,
the _best_ time to change the structure of content, its quality
control and the incentives systems that produce it, is when form is
changing as well. You might say that every political revolution is
doomed to failure because "the mediums may change but the content will
remain the same," but clearly this is not true. Occasionally when an
old regime is overthrown the new form of government, enables an
entirely new kind of nation.
It is up to us to seize the day.
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 94 03:16:02 -0500 (EST)
From: Gray Watson <gray@ANTAIRE.COM>
Subject: File 9--Response to "Technological Disasters"
In Cu Digest #6.13, A GUIDE TO TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTERS TO COME,
Kohntark (ktark@src4src.linet.org) says that the multimedia products
of the future, like the television of the present, will contain "the
usual fare of idiocy, sex and violence" and will be another way for
the corporate world and the government to "spoon-feed its citizens with
mindless, easy entertainment".
Goodness. What cynically narrow view of the future. Might as well
log off now.
Before we go, let's take a second to not lose sight of the trees from
the forest. New technology will give us access to information we did
not have before. Period. Let's not worry about the emphasis being on
the entertainment side of the coin. Talking about 500 channels and
on-demand movie rental is the only way business can sell multimedia to
its investors, stock holders, and to us the market.
Sure, there will always be tripe entertainment -- the "People"
magazine of the air-waves or fiber-lines. Why? Because there will
always be those of us who read/watch it. The [entertainment] media is
not to blame. You might say that they are being morally reprehensible
by *serving* the junk, but you can't say they are dictating it. They
are just responding to the market. We should not blame the
supermarket owner who provides donuts for the obese.
In the midst of all the crap -- maybe on the 475th channel -- next to
the 24hr/day Harding/Bobbit station -- there is going to be something
truly exciting -- truly educational. A multimedia Discovery Channel
if you will.
I'm not going to comment on the ease-of-use problems possibly inherent
in future entertainment systems, except to point out that if they
*are* too complicated, no one will buy them. This is a powerful
signal to the companies that will be making the stuff, don't you
think?
Also, let's not point the finger at big business and government like
they are some sort of *active* evil process. They are not. They both
are just responding (or trying to respond) to our wants and needs --
whether voiced or not.
And I'm not going to TOUCH what I think the root of our social
problems are and what the warning signs Kohntark mentioned really
indicate.
I will say that we must continually encourage all forms of new
technology -- entertainment or otherwise. Because it just may be the
500 channel, on demand, 'Geraldo' episode super-vision system that
brings the $2/month, 100mb/sec digital fiber Internet line to our
doorsteps.
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 1994 15:04:27 PST
From: pamsmith%pamsmith@INFOSERV.COM(Pamela Smith)
Subject: File 10--How to avoid Postal Entrapment (Re: CuD #6.11)
Several issues ago, you had an article about how to avoid getting caught
in a Post Office child porn trap. I found the suggestions of the
writer valid, but unneccessarily risky. I am an attorney who has done
some criminal defense work.
There is no way most of us are going to be careful enough to not open
a package that comes to us. So--you have opened a package that
contains child porn, and you can feel the knock on the door coming any
minute. I think you should immediately call 911 or the local
equivilant. Tell the dispacher what you have, who it is from, and
request that the police come get it.
This does several things. The most important is that you now have a
recording of your voice, telling the authorities about your horror at
having recieved such dreck. Second, the locals might give the US Post
Office a hard time.
If you wait even an hour to call 911, then you risk the Feds picking
you up, leaving you with no record of how you were really trying to
take it back to the Post Office.
Do not worry about whether or not the package contains material which
is illegal locally. You want to be ON RECORD as not wanting the
package, and you want this to happen as soon as possible. The time
spent returning the package to the Post Office, or trying to get your
attorney on the phone, is time the Post Office can use to execute
their warrant.
I know this advice might tie up an emmergency line, but you have no
choice. The police do not always tape record their other calls. So
make your call short, and be sure to mention the package contents, and
the sender's name. Be sure your roommates who may open your packages
are also told what to do.
Hope this advice saves an innocent (if anyone is truely an innocent
these days.)
Pamela Smith, Attorney at Law
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 94 23:20:21 MST
From: info@CSCNS.COM(CNS Information)
Subject: File 11--CNS-Internet (Internet access service)
CNS is an affiliation of Telephone Express, a long distance carrier.
Internet service through CNS is approved for commercial purposes.
CNS provides full INTERNET access through dial-in lines in Colorado
Springs (719-520-1700), in Denver (303-758-2656), and through a
national 800 service. CNS is connected to the Internet via a T1 (1.544
Megabyte/sec), and runs on a network of SUN SPARC 10 platforms.
CNS provides dial-in, uucp, and slip services. CNS also provides dedicated
56K and T1 circuits throughout the United States. Please call our customer
support at 1-800-748-1200 if you have any questions.
CNS- A FULL INTERNET PROVIDER
Provided at full T1 speeds are:
email (mail and elm readers supported)
ftp (File Transfer Protocol at 1.544 Meg/sec)
telnet (Live Connection to Remote sites)
newsgroups (All newsgroups, including ClariNet)
irc (Internet Relay Chat- Networked Live Teleconference)
4m (A new emerging chat system)
gopher (menu driven INTERNET information system)
wais (Wide Area Information System)
uucp (newsfeeds available)
slip (newsfeeds and POP mail supported)
full UNIX shell (csh, ksh, all UNIX commands, on line man pages)
editors (vi, pico, and jove are supported)
xwindows (supports xgopher, xmosiac, xachie, and more)
Service is provided through easy-to-use menus which require no experience
to use, or a full UNIX shell.
BUSINESS SERVICES
CNS also offers several business services, including electronic access to
the COMMERCE BUSINESS DAILY, USA TODAY decision line, ClariNet news feed,
and a number of services of interest to businesses local to the greater
Denver and Colorado Springs area (such as city & county RFP, City, BBB,
and Chamber of Commerce Press Releases, Events Calendars, SBDC Business
Programs, etc). Part of the business services includes helping businesses
use the Internet to their maximum benefit.
CNS-BBS
The CNS-INTERNET system is connected to a MajorBBS Galacticomm
entertainment system. This BBS has primarily a social purpose. Access to
this system is provided at no additional charge to CNS-INTERNET customers.
You may also access this system through telnet (telnet bbs.cscns.com).
CUSTOMER SERVICE
Most importantly, CNS provides friendly and professional customer service.
If you have special needs, or special information to carry, we would be
delighted to customize your needs. Call customer service at 719-592-1240,
or toll-free at 800-748-1200.
RATES
There are two plans to choose from:
OPTION 1: $10 per month minimum
4.5 cents per minute for Colo Springs/Denver access
13.0 cents per minute for 800 access
OPTION 2: $29.95 per month minmum
2.0 cents per minute for Colo Springs/Denver Access
13.0 cents per minute for 800 access
Notice that our 800 service includes your long distance and your internet
access charges for a price lower than the average long distance phone call!
Local (Colo Springs or Denver) access charges are capped at $250 per
month.
In both options, there is a $35 one time set up fee. The first 1 Meg of disk
space is free. Beyond the first 1 Meg there is a monthly fee of $2.50.
Charges can be paid via credit card (Visa, Master Charge, American
Express, or Discover) or by monthly invoice.
The rate structure described above applies to UUCP, SLIP, or PPP
connections as well with one exception: the setup fee for uucp is $45, and
for slip/ppp is $75.
Please write to service@cscns.com for quotes on 56K and T1 access.
TO SIGN UP
The following sign-up methods are available:
1) Call customer service at 1-800-748-1200.
2) Telnet to cscns.com. Log in as "new", password "newsuser".
During business hours, your account is set up within 1 hour.
Write to service@cscns.com or call us at 1-800-748-1200 if you have any
questions! We would be delighted to help you.
Important Phone Numbers:
CNS-INTERNET 719-520-1700 Colorado Springs
303-758-2656
800 modem number given to subscribers only
FAX 719-592-1201
VOICE 719-592-1240
SUPPORT 800-748-1200
You may write questions to service@cscns.com.
Please do not hestitate to write if you have further questions.
------------------------------
End of Computer Underground Digest #6.15
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