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Subject: Risks Digest 31.54
RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Tuesday 28 January 2020 Volume 31 : Issue 54
ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks)
Peter G. Neumann, moderator, chmn ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy
***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
<http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/31.54>
The current issue can also be found at
<http://www.csl.sri.com/users/risko/risks.txt>
Contents: [MASSIVE REJECTION OF RISKS-31.53. PICK UP at risks.org]
Boeing 737s can't land facing west (FAA via Clive D.W. Feather)
GPS jamming expected in southeast during military exercise (AOPA)
Election Security At The Chip Level (SemiEngineering)
Russians Hacked Ukrainian Gas Company at Center of Impeachment
(Nicole Perlroth and Matthew Rosenberg)
Scientists Deliver, Once Again, a Horrifying Report About
How Hot Earth Is Getting (VICE)
Ransomware attack forces cancer patients to re-schedule (CBC Web)
An Avenue by Which It Might Be Technically Possible to Give an iPhone The
Software Equivalent of Cancer (Pixel Envy)
Please Stop Sending Terrifying Alerts to Our Cell Phones (WIRED)
Update Firefox now, says Homeland Security, to block attacks (9to5mac)
A field guide to Iran's hacking groups (Web Informant)
Iran hackers have been password-spraying the U.S. electric grid (WiReD)
Re: The shooting down of flight PS752 in Iran (Martyn Thomas)
In a desperate bid to stay relevant in 2020's geopolitical upheaval,
N. Korea upgrades its Apple Jeus macOS malware (The Register)
Inside Documents Show How Amazon Chose Speed Over Safety in Building Its
Delivery Network (ProPublica)
Feds Are Content to Let Cars Drive, and Regulate, Themselves (WIRED)
Should Automakers Be Responsible for Accidents? (Gabe Goldberg)
Paul Krugman's no-good, very bad Internet day (Ars Techica)
Hackers Cripple Airport Currency Exchanges, Seeking $6 Million Ransom
(NYTimes)
Hacker offers for sale 49M user records from US data broker LimeLeads
(Security Affairs)
Over two dozen encryption experts call on India to rethink changes
to its intermediary liability rules (Tech Crunch)
Chosen-Prefix attack against SHA-1 Reported (Ars Technica)
Patch Tuesday, January 2020 (Rapid7)
Facebook Says Encrypting Messenger by Default Will Take Years (WiReD)
China's new Cryptolaw (Cointelegraph)
Some consumers have noticed that computerization isn't always the answer
(Star Tribune)
At Mayo Clinic AI engineers face an acid test: Will their algorithms help
real patients? (StatNews)
AI Comes to the Operating Room (The New York Times)
A Very Real Potential for Abuse: Using AI to Score Video Interviews (CNN)
5G, AI, blockchain, quantum, ... (Marketoonist)
Inside the Billion-Dollar Battle Over .Org (Steve Lohr)
A lazy fix 20 years ago means the Y2K bug is taking down computers now
(New Scientist)
When 2 < 7 => failure (Ars Technica via Jeremy Epstein)
Make It Your New Year's Resolution Not to Share Misinformation
(Mother Jones)
Inside the Feds' Battle Against Huawei (WiReD)
Apple Is Bullying a Security Company with a Dangerous DMCA Lawsuit (iFixit)
How to Protect Yourself From Real Estate Scams (NYTimes)
Dutch Artists Celebrate George Orwell's Birthday By Putting Party Hats On
Surveillance Cameras (BuzzFeed News)
Re: reliability of computers (Chris Drewe)
Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 20:24:07 +0000
From: "Clive D.W. Feather" <clive@davros.org>
Subject: Boeing 737s can't land facing west (FAA)
"The FAA received reports earlier this year of three incidents of display
electronic unit (DEU) software errors on Model 737 NG airplanes flying into
runway PABR in Barrow, Alaska. All six display units (DUs) blanked with a
selected instrument approach to a runway with a 270-degree true heading, and
all six DUs stayed blank until a different runway was selected. [...] The
investigation revealed that the problem occurs when this combination of
software is installed and a susceptible runway with a 270-degree true
heading is selected for instrument approach. Not all runways with a
270-degree true heading are susceptible; only seven runways worldwide, as
identified in this AD, have latitude and longitude values that cause the
blanking behavior."
(Note that this is all 6 displays on each plane, not 2 displays on each of
three planes.)
The runways in question are:
Runway 26, Pine Bluffs, Wyoming, USA (82V)
Runway 28, Wayne County, Ohio, USA (KBJJ)
Runway 28, Chippewa County, Michigan, USA (KCIU)
Runway 26, Cavern City, New Mexico, USA (KCNM)
Runway 25, Barrow, Alaska, USA (PABR)
Runway 28, La Mina, La Guajira, Colombia (SKLM)
Runway 29, Cheddi Jagan, Georgetown, Guyana (SYCJ)
(The numbers are magnetic bearings, whereas the problem is apparently
related to true bearing.)
Original FAA notice:
<http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf/0/3948342a978cc27b862584dd005c1a60/$FILE/2019-25-17.pdf>
[Clive, Can you think of the significance of 270? Perhaps an instance of
Buridan's Ass algorithm, in this case being halfway between 180 and 360,
and not being able to decide? PGN]
[I have no idea. Also, why don't all runways facing 270 have the
problem? I suspect we'll never find out. Clive]
[Li Gong noted
Blackout Bug: Boeing 737 cockpit screens go blank if pilots land on
specific runways (The Register)
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/01/08/boeing_737_ng_cockpit_screen_blank_bug/
PGN]
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 07:30:56 -0800
From: Paul Saffo <paul@saffo.com>
Subject: GPS jamming expected in southeast during military exercise (AOPA)
Dan Namowitz, AOPA, 14 Jan 2020
GPS reception may be unavailable or unreliable over a large portion of the
southeastern states and the Caribbean during offshore military exercises
scheduled between January 16 and 24.
aopa.org/news-and-media/all-news/2020/january/14/gps-jamming-expected-in-southeast-during-military-exercise
Graphic depicting area of GPS interference testing. Courtesy of the FAA.
The FAA has posted a flight advisory for the exercises that will require
jamming of GPS signals for periods of several hours each day of the
event. Navigation guidance, ADS-B, and other services associated with GPS
could be affected for up to 400 nautical miles at Flight Level 400, down to
a radius of 180 nm at 50 feet above the ground.
The flight advisory encourages pilots to report any GPS anomalies they
encounter. Reports may be submitted using this online form.
AOPA reported on a similar event in the southeastern United States in 2019.
AOPA is aware of hundreds of reports of interference to aircraft during
events around the country for which notices to airmen were issued, and we
consider the risks to GA aircraft highly concerning.
In one example, an aircraft lost navigation capability and did not regain it
until after landing. Other reports have highlighted aircraft veering off
course and heading toward active military airspace -- and the wide range of
reports makes it clear that interference affects aircraft differently. In
some cases, recovery from signal interference may not occur until well after
the aircraft exits the jammed area.
In a January 2019 AOPA survey, more than 64 percent of 1,239 pilots who
responded noted concern about the impact of interference on their use of GPS
and ADS-B.
AOPA continues to advocate for officials to place more focus on efforts
to address the well-documented safety concerns raised by such events.
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2020 00:40:24 -0500
From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: Election Security At The Chip Level (SemiEngineering)
https://semiengineering.com/how-secure-are-electronic-voting-machines/
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2020 15:11:02 PST
From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com>
Subject: Russians Hacked Ukrainian Gas Company at Center of Impeachment
(Nicole Perlroth and Matthew Rosenberg)
Nicole Perlroth and Matthew Rosenberg, *The New York Times* 13 Jan 2020,
updated in the online version 15 Jan 2020
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/13/us/politics/russian-hackers-burisma-ukraine.html
Offices in Kyiv of a subsidiary of the Ukrainian energy company
Burisma. Security experts suggest the hackers may have been looking for
damaging information on Joe Biden.
With President Trump facing an impeachment trial over his efforts to
pressure Ukraine to investigate former Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr.
and his son Hunter Biden, Russian military hackers have been boring into the
Ukrainian gas company at the center of the affair, according to security
experts.
The hacking attempts against Burisma, the Ukrainian gas company on whose
board Hunter Biden served, began in early November, as talk of the Bidens,
Ukraine and impeachment was dominating the news in the United States.
It is not yet clear what the hackers found, or precisely what they were
searching for. But the experts say the timing and scale of the attacks
suggest that the Russians could be searching for potentially embarrassing
material on the Bidens - the same kind of information that Mr. Trump wanted
from Ukraine when he pressed for an investigation of the Bidens and Burisma,
setting off a chain of events that led to his impeachment.
The Russian tactics are strikingly similar to what American intelligence
agencies say was Russia's hacking of emails from Hillary Clinton's campaign
chairman and the Democratic National Committee during the 2016 presidential
campaign. In that case, once they had the emails, the Russians used trolls
to spread and spin the material, and built an echo chamber to widen its
effect.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 14:20:00 -1000
From: the keyboard of geoff goodfellow <geoff@iconia.com>
Subject: Scientists Deliver, Once Again, a Horrifying Report About
How Hot Earth Is Getting (VICE)
``These are big numbers for our planet,'' one NASA scientist told VICE News
EXCERPT:
In 2019, parts of the planet were hotter than they've ever been before,
according to NASA and NOAA's annual temperature report. And scientists are
warning the world won't be able to reverse the damage.
For the first time ever, the average temperature in Alaska was above
freezing. And Australia, at more than 1.5 degrees Celsius above normal, was
as hot as the UN hopes the world will ever get.
As a whole, 2019 was the second hottest year on record, according to the
report, published by government scientists on Wednesday. That caps off the
hottest decade in recorded history. The last half of the decade was also
one for the record books: All five years, together, were the hottest on
record. The cause, the scientists say, is clearly human-emitted greenhouse
gases.
``The last ice age, where we had ice covering North America and most of
Europe was only five degrees [Celsius] colder than the pre-industrial
planet,'' Gavin Schmidt, director of NASA's Goddard Institute for Space
Studies, told VICE News.
``We've warmed up a fifth of that,'' he added. ``These are big numbers for our
planet.''
In addition to Alaska and Australia, Poland and other parts of eastern
Europe also broke temperature records, as did Madagascar, New Zealand,
parts of Southern Africa, and eastern South America. And on top of the high
temperatures, glaciers are melting at record rates
<https://www.businessinsider.com/greenland-ice-melting-is-2070-worst-case-2019-8>
in
Greenland. Hurricanes and typhoons are becoming more intense. And wildfires
are getting bigger and more frequent.
The planet' has already warmed a full degree Celsius above pre-industrial
levels -- and scientists say there's likely no turning back. Just because
the planet wasn't *quite* as warm in 2019 as it was in 2016 that shouldn't
not be misinterpreted as climate change turning around.
``This whole, `Oh, we've been cooling since 2016' point -- that's just
bullshit,'' Schmidt said...
[...]
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/884gx3/scientists-deliver-once-again-a-horrifying-report-about-how-hot-earth-is-getting
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 14:36:55 -0800
From: "David E. Ross" <david@rossde.com>
Subject: Ransomware attack forces cancer patients to re-schedule (CBC Web)
eHealth is the provincial health authority in Saskatchewan, Canada. Note
that they have a backup plan for such situations. The attack began 6
January. Treatments for affected patients were delayed 24 to 48 hours. By
14 January, the effects of the attack were apparently resolved.
The news article on the Canadian Broadcasting Company Web site had the
headline:
Ransomware attack on eHealth forces 31 cancer patients to re-schedule
radiation treatment
The article read:
Six patients booked for chemotherapy also affected.
A ransomware attack on the computer system that stores confidential medical
data for Saskatchewan residents ended up affecting almost 40 patients
getting cancer treatment in Saskatoon and Regina.
The attack on eHealth Saskatchewan began Jan. 6. Antivirus software
immediately began sending alerts to staff.
When eHealth officials attempted to open files on affected servers they
received a message that the files had been encrypted and would remain
inaccessible until a payment was made.
The Saskatchewan Cancer Agency oversees the two cancer clinics in Saskatoon
and Regina. It disconnected from the eHealth network after learning of the
assault on the system.
While the move served to protect patient data, it also meant that staff
could not immediately access provincial lab results, imaging pathology and
pharmacy and medical information.
eHealth hit by ransomware attack but personal health data is secure, says
CEO.
The clinics have contingency plans for when the electronic records are not
accessible but it took time to co-ordinate retrieving the information.
As a result, 31 patients booked for radiation and another six with
chemotherapy appointments had their treatment delayed by between 24 and 48
hours.
Each patient was given a personal explanation and apology for the delay and
inconvenience, officials with Saskatchewan Cancer Agency said in an emailed
statement.
The agency fully reconnected with the eHealth network on Jan. 14.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 18:23:10 -0500
From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: An Avenue by Which It Might Be Technically Possible to Give an
iPhone The Software Equivalent of Cancer (Pixel Envy)
https://pxlnv.com/blog/software-equivalent-of-cancer/
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2020 20:04:15 -0500
From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: Please Stop Sending Terrifying Alerts to Our Cell Phones (WIRED)
https://www.wired.com/story/please-stop-sending-terrifying-alerts-to-my-cell-phone/
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 11:30:15 -0500
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Subject: Update Firefox now, says Homeland Security, to block attacks
(9to5mac)
https://ww.9to5mac.com/2020/01/10/update-firefox-now/
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 09:54:15 -0500
From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: A field guide to Iran's hacking groups (Web Informant)
https://blog.strom.com/wp/?p=7529
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 20:50:38 -0500
From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: Iran hackers have been password-spraying the U.S. electric grid
(WiReD)
A state-sponsored group called Magnallium has been probing American electric
utilities for the past year.
https://www.wired.com/story/iran-apt33-us-electric-grid/
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2020 10:10:55 PST
From: Martyn Thomas <martyn@thomas-associates.co.uk>
Subject: Re: The shooting down of flight PS752 in Iran
It seems to me that commercial aircraft shouldn't fly within range of
anti-aircraft systems at a time of high military alert, because human
error or computer system error is too likely. If that wasn't obvious
before the USS Vincennes shot down Iran Air 655 in 1988, it should have
become obvious immediately afterwards. Iran Air 655 has been regarded in
the literature as a "Normal Accident", using Chick Perrow's terminology.
Air defence systems are major intelligence targets, so several states with
significant cyber capability will have been trying to compromise the Iranian
system over an extended period. It would surprise me if they had all
completely failed. This heightens the probability that an aircraft may be
misidentified.
If an air defence system identifies (or appears to identify) a radar
contact as something that will strike fatally within a small number of
seconds, the missile defences will be fired, whether there is a human in
the loop or not.
I find it impossible to allocate blame.
[As we have said so often in RISKS, blame can often be remarkably widely
distributed. Here are subsequent reports of the Iranian revolutionary
guards air-defense comms being jammed, and other issues relating to this
shootdown. See the NYTimes article "Anatomy of a Lie", on how the events
around the shootdown unfolded:
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/26/world/middleeast/iran-plane-crash-coverup.html
This item came in recently, although RISKS-31.54 was ready to be sent
weeks ago. We are still resolving internal mailer problems that massively
rejected delivery of RISKS-31.53 to many readers. It appears to be Office
365 problem or a side-effect of SRI's installation of proofpoint to block
executable attachments. Let's see if this issue gets through.
PLEASE submit RISKS items for consideration as ASCII text to RISKS without
attachments to facilitate my efforts. Office 365 is now introducing
several hundred lines of headers, which makes things even worse. PGN]
WARNING: I've had a slew of mailman messages dropping readers's
subscriptions. If you did not get this message via the normal mailing,
you need to resubscribe. SORRY. I have no control over this. PGN
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2020 11:56:01 -0500
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Subject: In a desperate bid to stay relevant in 2020's geopolitical
upheaval, N. Korea upgrades its Apple Jeus macOS malware (The Register)
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/01/08/applejeus_malware_returns/
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2020 23:45:24 -0500
From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: Inside Documents Show How Amazon Chose Speed Over Safety in
Building Its Delivery Network (ProPublica)
https://www.propublica.org/article/inside-documents-show-how-amazon-chose-speed-over-safety-in-building-its-delivery-network
...but we all want our stuff right now...
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 11 Jan 2020 17:29:06 -0500
From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: Feds Are Content to Let Cars Drive, and Regulate, Themselves (WIRED)
A new Transportation Department policy on self-driving cars is long on
boosting the industry and short on ensuring its safety.
Not all road safety advocates are pleased with that approach. “The DOT is
supposed to ensure that the US has the safest transportation system in the
world, but it continues to put this mission second, behind helping industry
rush automated vehicles,” Ethan Douglas, a senior policy analyst for cars
and product safety at Consumer Reports, said in a statement.
https://www.wired.com/story/feds-content-cars-drive-regulate-themselves/
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 10:29:53 -0500
From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: Should Automakers Be Responsible for Accidents?
What a strange scheme:
Automaker enterprise liability would have useful incentives that driver
liability law misses.
My basic argument is that while current negligence-based auto liability
rules could in theory work to provide optimal accident-avoidance incentives,
in practice they do not. The current system requires courts and drivers to
evaluate benefit–cost tradeoffs they are not equipped to make. Also under
the current system, much of auto-accident costs are offloaded onto medical
and disability insurers or taxpayers. By contrast, under an automaker
enterprise liability system, responsibility for those costs would be placed
on the parties in the best position to reduce and insure them: vehicle
manufacturers. In addition, automakers would be induced to charge enough for
cars to fully internalize the costs of automobile accidents. Further, if
auto-insurance contracts—and auto-insurance premium adjustments—could be
deployed to improve driving habits, auto manufacturers would be induced to
coordinate with auto insurers to achieve these deterrence gains. Moreover,
to the extent that Level 5s reduce the cost of accidents, they would be
cheaper to purchase than conventional vehicles, which would provide a
natural subsidy to encourage (and potentially accelerate) their deployment.
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2019/3/regulation-v42n1-1.pdf
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 12:29:04 -0500
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Subject: Paul Krugman's no-good, very bad Internet day (Ars Techica)
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/01/paul-krugmans-no-good-very-bad-internet-day/
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2020 23:07:32 -0500
From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: Hackers Cripple Airport Currency Exchanges, Seeking $6 Million
Ransom (NYTimes)
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/business/travelex-hack-ransomware.html
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 14:34:46 -0500
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Subject: Hacker offers for sale 49M user records from US data broker
LimeLeads (Security Affairs)
https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/96432/data-breach/limeleads-data-leak.html
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 12:17:45 -0500
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Subject: Over two dozen encryption experts call on India to rethink changes
to its intermediary liability rules (Tech Crunch)
https://techcrunch.com/2020/01/09/over-two-dozen-encryption-experts-call-on-india-to-rethink-changes-to-its-intermediary-liability-rules/
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 07 Jan 2020 13:12:37 -0700
From: "Bob Gezelter" <gezelter@rlgsc.com>
Subject: Chosen-Prefix attack against SHA-1 Reported (Ars Technica)
As reported in Ars Technica, a team of researchers recently presented a
paper reporting a successful chosen-prefix attack against SHA-1. This has
implications for OpenSSL, PGP, Git, and other components and processes that
rely on the use of SHA-1 message digests for proving authenticity.
The full article can be found at:
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/01/pgp-keys-software-security-and-much-more-threatened-by-new-sha1-exploit/
The underlying paper is at: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2020 23:48:50 -0500
From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: 2020 first Patch Tuesday: Windows' ECC certificates (Rapid7)
The first Patch Tuesday of 2020 has been hotly anticipated due to a rumour
that Microsoft would be fixing a severe vulnerability in a fundamental
cryptographic library. It turns out that the issue in question is indeed
serious, and was reported to Microsoft by the NSA: CVE-2020-0601 is a flaw
in the way Windows validates Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
certificates. It allows attackers to spoof a code-signing certificate that
could be used to sign a malicious executable, which would look totally
legitimate to the end user. It also enables attackers to conduct
man-in-the-middle attacks and decrypt confidential information on user
connections to affected systems. This vulnerability exists in Windows 10,
Server 2016, and Server 2019. These systems need to be patched immediately,
as correct certificate validation is vital for determining trust.
https://blog.rapid7.com/2020/01/14/patch-tuesday-january-2020/
[Steven Cheung noted this (WSJ)
"The flaw at issue involves a mistake in how Microsoft uses digital
signatures to verify software as authentic, which helps block malware
from being deployed on a computer. The error would potentially enable
hackers to install powerful malware on systems undetected."]
https://www.wsj.com/articles/microsoft-releases-patch-to-severe-windows-flaw-detected-by-nsa-11579030780
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 12 Jan 2020 16:19:24 -0500
From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: Facebook Says Encrypting Messenger by Default Will Take Years
(WiReD)
Mark Zuckerberg promised default end-to-end encryption throughout Facebook's
platforms. Nearly a year later, Messenger's not even close.
https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-messenger-end-to-end-encryption-default/
No rush...
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2020 10:26:01 PST
From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com>
Subject: China's new Cryptolaw (Cointelegraph)
cointelegraph.com/news/china-prepares-for-cbdc-with-cryptography-law-on-encryption-standards
On 1 Jan 2020, China's law governing cryptographic password management came
into power. Essentially, the act aims to set standards for the application
of cryptography and the management of passwords, and, therefore, ultimately
reduces China's cyber vulnerabilities on a nationwide scale. Some local
media outlets rumor that the law is paving the way for the long-awaited
release of China's central bank digital currency, although it does not make
any explicit references in that regard. Meanwhile, the private sector is
worried about the anonymity of its data. [...]
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 10:30:34 -0500
From: scs@eskimo.com (Steve Summit)
Subject: Some consumers have noticed that computerization isn't always the
answer (Star Tribune)
Not the usual sort of risk, but here's a nice article on the premium placed
by savvy farmers on tractors built before 1980 or so, in significant part
because they're *not* computerized and can therefore be maintained by
anyone.
http://www.startribune.com/for-tech-weary-midwest-farmers-40-year-old-tractors-now-a-hot-commodity/566737082/
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 12 Jan 2020 12:22:00 +0800
From: Richard Stein <rmstein@ieee.org>
Subject: At Mayo Clinic AI engineers face an acid test: Will their
algorithms help real patients? (StatNews)
https://www.statnews.com/2019/12/18/mayo-clinic-artificial-intelligence-acid-test/
A sobering peak at AI's potential role in medicine at the front line, with
patient data-in-the-loop, applied to ferret out atrial fibrillation (a-fib)
precursors using a convolution neural network -- the same algorithm applied
by driverless vehicles to recognize traffic signs and road obstacles, etc.
"The largest share of the data is derived from electrocardiograms (EKGs), a
century-old technology that is commonly used to evaluate heart function by
recording electrical pulses that cause the heart to beat. About 250,000
EKGs are performed every year at Mayo, which has a digital dataset of 7
million records stretching back to the mid-1990s.
"EKGs have been able to detect a-fib for decades, but Mayo is seeking to
take it a step further — by trying to predict which patients will experience
this arrhythmia in the future." [...]
"In a study published in August, Mayo reported the algorithm was able to
accurately identify patients with a-fib at an 80-percent accuracy rate. On
a recent afternoon, its power was displayed in the case of a patient who had
undergone EKGs over a 30-year period but had never been diagnosed with
a-fib. Inside a conference room, a group of engineers and cardiologists
scanned the peaks and valleys of the data projected on a screen for any sign
of an abnormality.
"Dr. Samuel Asirvatham, an electrophysiologist who reads EKGs as
automatically as most people drive a flat stretch of interstate, jumped up
from his chair to take a closer look. He flipped forward in the series of
EKGs and then back, but nothing seemed to call out a certainty of atrial
fibrillation. However, the AI system, when it was shown the same data,
detected a hidden pattern pinpointing two occasions when the patient’s risk
of atrial fibrillation had increased dramatically.
"As it turned out, both of those EKGs preceded cryptogenic strokes, or
strokes of unknown cause, that, in hindsight, may have been caused by the
a-fib."
Focusing on patient outcome improvement potential is a key performance
indicator for effective medical care delivery. That the article does not
mention false-negative/positive and
area-under-curve/receiver-operating-characteristics (AUCROC) suggests some
undisclosed algorithmic sensitivity derived from the MAYO dataset -- though
it embodies a sizable patient sample history.
As described by the essay, the data used is selective and filtered --
presented as evidence of merit for premonitory a-fib detection where none is
currently visible in a given cardiogram -- normal sinus rhythm
presented. That a physician skilled in the art can recognize 'cryptogenic
stroke' indicators based on prior cardiogram reading, as can the machine,
suggests equivalent detection capability when both are given a sufficiently
rich dataset.
Interpreting an isolated electro-cardiogram to predict a-fib occurrence
or recurrence risks, independent of patient history, is quack medicine.
Cardiac electrophysiologists often assess a-fib risks using patient factors
that antagonize: high blood pressure, obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, high
cholesterol, sedentary life style, prior a-fib events, etc. Typically, the
CHADS2 score
(https://www.mdcalc.com/chads2-score-atrial-fibrillation-stroke-risk)
encapsulates these factors to estimate stroke risk.
Perhaps the motive to justify proactive a-fib prediction is to suppress or
optimize future medical care expenditures. ~1% of the US population (~3
million people) are diagnosed with a-fib each year.
How many patients will be falsely diagnosed or misdiagnosed by "The Stroke
Predictor Model 9000"? What costs (and potential hardships) will be incurred
by patients, physicians, and medical system who rely on AI-enhanced
incidents? Will these adverse incidents diminish or increase in frequency?
Where's the double-blind study to certify and justify adoption of this
device into cardiac care protocol?
Risk: AI-based cardiogram signal processing and interpretation.
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2020 12:14:15 +0800
From: Richard Stein <rmstein@ieee.org>
Subject: AI Comes to the Operating Room (The New York Times)
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/health/artificial-intelligence-brain-cancer.html
"Images made by lasers and read by computers can help speed up the diagnosis
of brain tumors during surgery."
A 'frozen section' analysis of brain tissue only requires ~2 minutes given
the candidate technique. In the old days, 30+ minutes elapsed while the
patient waited under anesthesia for a carbon-based pathology assessment.
Speed is important, too: less time on the operating room table, and a "quick
second opinion," albeit by 'deep learning' trained-machine to recognize
tumors in the flesh. MRIs apparently don't always yield a conclusive pre-op
diagnosis. Hence the need for biopsy supplement.
"The study involved brain tissue from 278 patients, analyzed while the
surgery was still going on. Each sample was split, with half going to AI and
half to a neuropathologist. The diagnoses were later judged right or wrong
based on whether they agreed with the findings of lengthier and more
extensive tests performed after the surgery.
"The result was a draw: humans, 93.9 percent correct; AI, 94.6 percent."
'Correct'? No false-positive or false-negative AUC ROC measures?
You should your physician -- they swear by the Hippocratic Oath. Trust the
physician's tool supply chain? Not so fast.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 04:01:34 -0700
From: "Bob Gezelter" <gezelter@rlgsc.com>
Subject: A Very Real Potential for Abuse: Using AI to Score Video Interviews
(CNN)
CNN has published an article on an interesting trend: the use of AI
evaluations of candidate video interviews during the selection process for
internships and jobs.
As in other cases with AI-based evaluation of imagery, the potential for
baked-in bias is clear. Without extensive study, is there a way to validate
that such mechanisms are free of explicit or implicit bias concerning race,
culture, and other factors. As an example, the subject of "word choice". In
some cultures, directness is valued, in other cultures, precisely the
opposite is true. It would be far too simple for a bot to downgrade a
candidate for "lack of directness" when their cultural background values
it. Would that not be effective discrimination on race, national origin, or
other prohibited or suspect factor.
A thought experiment: Consider scoring the statement "The patient has a
tumor" with the all-but-required phrasing used by a radiologist "The
patient's imagery is consistent with the presence of a tumor". Is one of
these options "evasive"?
One could argue that it is a matter of what questions are asked, but that
presupposes a degree of sophistication which is likely not present in
practice.
https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/15/tech/ai-job-interview/index.html
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2020 13:19:47 -0500
From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: 5G, AI, blockchain, quantum, ... (Marketoonist)
Smart Devices and 5G cartoon | Marketoonist | Tom Fishburne
With the imminent arrival of 5G, there’s a lot of euphoric talk about about
the future of connected devices, which is leading to a fair amount of
technology-for-technology-sake. And there are many funny and no-so-funny
bumps in the road.
On the funny end of the spectrum, GE was mocked
<https://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-ridiculous-ge-video-showing-14-steps-to-reset-a-smart-lightbulb-has-suddenly-gone-viral-2019-06-20>
a few months ago for releasing a guide to reset their Smart Lightbulb. It
requires 14 complicated steps of turning it off and on at exact second
counts with a stopwatch (“turn off for two seconds … turn on for eight
seconds”). Stephen Fry remarked
<https://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-ridiculous-ge-video-showing-14-steps-to-reset-a-smart-lightbulb-has-suddenly-gone-viral-2019-06-20>,
“This is insane enough to be joyous.”
On the not-so-funny end of the spectrum, smart-device maker Wyze announced
<https://www.marketwatch.com/story/smart-device-maker-wyze-confirms-data-breach-that-could-affect-millions-2019-12-29>
two weeks ago that both of the company’s production databases were left
entirely open to the Internet, exposing the data of 2.4 million users of
their smart-home cameras and devices.
These are all reflections of the awkward adolescent stage of technology
we’re living and working in. We have to continually question just how
“smart” all of this “smart” technology really is.
https://marketoonist.com/2020/01/smart.html
------------------------------
Date: January 8, 2020 8:14:28 JST
From: Richard Forno <rforno@infowarrior.org>
Subject: Inside the Billion-Dollar Battle Over .Org (Steve Lohr)
[via Dave Farber]
Steve Lohr, *The New York Times*, 7 Jan 2020
A private equity firm wants to buy the Internet domain used by nonprofits. A
group of online pioneers says it is not the place to maximize profits.
Two months ago, Ethos Capital, a private equity firm, announced that it
planned to buy the rights to a tract of Internet real estate for more than
$1 billion. But it wasn't just any piece of digital property. It was
dot-org, the cyber neighborhood that is home to big nonprofits and
nongovernmental organizations like the United Nations (un.org) and NPR
(npr.org), and to li ttle ones like neighborhood clubs.
The deal was met with a fierce backlash. Critics argued that a less
commercial corner of the Internet should not be controlled by a
profit-driven private equity firm, as a matter of both principle and
practice. Online petitions and letters of concern came from hundreds of
organizations, thousands of individuals and four Democrats in Congress,
including Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts.
Rarely has the acronym-strewn realm of Internet addresses -- so-called
domain names -- stirred such passion.
Now, a group of respected Internet pioneers and nonprofit leaders is
offering an alternative to Ethos Capital's bid: a nonprofit cooperative
corporation. The incorporation papers for the new entity, the Cooperative
Corporation of .ORG Registrants, were filed this week in California.
[...] [PGN-ed, longish item, truncated]
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/technology/dot-org-private-equity-battle.html?emc=3Drss&partner=3Drss
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2020 21:03:39 -0800
From: Paul Saffo <paul@saffo.com>
Subject: A lazy fix 20 years ago means the Y2K bug is taking down computers
now (New Scientist)
[Re: Martyn Thomas, This might be a genuine Y2K problem -- are there more?
RISKS-31.50]
Chris Stokel-Walker, *New Scientist*, 7 Jan 2020
https://www.newscientist.com/article/2229238-a-lazy-fix-20-years-ago-means-the-y2k-bug-is-taking-down-computers-now/
[PGN-ed to avoid duplication with RISKS-31.50 and 53.]
[...] Programmers wanting to avoid the Y2K bug had two broad options:
entirely rewrite their code, or adopt a quick fix called ``windowing'',
which would treat all dates from 00 to 20, as from the 2000s, rather than
the 1900s. An estimated 80 per cent of computers fixed in 1999 used the
quicker, cheaper option.
``Windowing, even during Y2K, was the worst of all possible solutions
because it kicked the problem down the road,'' says Dylan Mulvin at the
London School of Economics.
Coders chose 1920 to 2020 as the standard window because of the significance
of the midpoint, 1970. ``Many programming languages and systems handle
dates and times as seconds from 1970/01/01, also called Unix time,'' says
Tatsuhiko Miyagawa, an engineer at cloud platform provider Fastly.
Unix is a widely used operating system in a variety of industries, and this
v``epoch time'' is seen as a standard.
The theory was that these windowed systems would be outmoded by the time
2020 arrived, but many are still hanging on and in some cases the issue had
been forgotten.
``Fixing bugs in old legacy systems is a nightmare: it's spaghetti and
nobody who wrote it is still around,'' says Paul Lomax, who handled the Y2K
bug for Vodafone. ``Clearly they assumed their systems would be long out of
use by 2020. Much as those in the 60s didn't think their code would still be
around in the year 2000.''
Those systems that used the quick fix have now reached the end of that
window, and have rolled back to 1920. Utility company bills have reportedly
been produced with the erroneous date 1920, while tens of thousands of
parking meters in New York City have declined credit card transactions
because of the date glitch.
Thousands of cash registers manufactured by Polish firm Novitus have been
unable to print receipts due to a glitch in the register's clock. The
company is attempting to fix the machines.
WWE 2K20, a professional wrestling video game, also stopped working at
midnight on 1 January 2020. Within 24 hours, the game's developers, 2K,
issued a downloadable fix.
Another piece of software, Splunk, which ironically looks for errors in
computer systems, was found to be vulnerable to the Y2020 bug in
November. The company rolled out a fix to users the same week -- which
include 92 of the Fortune 100, the top 100 companies in the US.
Some hardware and software glitches have been incorrectly attributed to the
bug. One healthcare professional claimed Y2020 hit a system developed by
McKesson, which produces software for hospitals. A spokesperson for McKesson
told New Scientist the firm was unaware of any outage tied to Y2020.
Exactly how long these Y2020 fixes will last is unknown, as companies
haven't disclosed details about them. If the window has simply been pushed
back again, we can expect to see the same error crop up.
Another date storage problem also faces us in the year 2038. The issue again
stems from Unix's epoch time: the data is stored as a 32-bit integer, which
will run out of capacity at 3.14 am on 19 January 2038.
[In response to a request from Eric Hofnagel, I pulled together a historical
list of Y2K-related problems. It is now on my website
http://www.csl.sri.com/neumann/neumann.html at
http://www.csl.sri.com/neumann/y2k-pgn.txt
PGN]
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2020 13:35:59 -0500
From: Jeremy Epstein <jeremy.j.epstein@gmail.com>
Subject: When 2 < 7 => failure (Ars Technica)
Grocery store system does periodic audits of self-checkout users, but the
system doesn't work if you have fewer than 7 items - the audit requires
auditing exactly seven items.
Granted, not the biggest risk in the world, but if the venue didn't
have in-person employees, what would the customer do?
https://arstechnica.com/staff/2020/01/how-i-broke-my-grocery-stores-app-by-not-buying-enough-stuff/
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2020 20:18:50 -0500
From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: Make It Your New Year's Resolution Not to Share Misinformation
(Mother Jones)
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2020/01/make-it-your-new-years-resolution-not-to-share-misinformation/
Not profound but worth sharing with the less tech-savvy.
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 11:50:03 -0500
From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: Inside the Feds' Battle Against Huawei (WiReD)
https://www.wired.com/story/us-feds-battle-against-huawei/
Long, interesting...
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2020 19:57:42 -0500
From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: Apple Is Bullying a Security Company with a Dangerous DMCA Lawsuit
(iFixit)
https://www.ifixit.com/News/apple-is-bullying-a-security-company-with-a-dangerous-dmca-lawsuit
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2020 19:58:52 -0500
From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: How to Protect Yourself From Real Estate Scams (NYTimes)
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/realestate/how-to-protect-yourself-from-real-estate-scams.html
Not entirely new, but worth reading how it works, what to do and not to.
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 10:14:25 -0500
From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: Dutch Artists Celebrate George Orwell's Birthday By Putting Party
Hats On Surveillance Cameras (BuzzFeed News)
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ellievhall/dutch-artists-celebrate-george-orwells-birthday-by-adorning
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 06 Jan 2020 20:27:28 +0000
From: Chris Drewe <e767pmk@yahoo.co.uk>
Subject: Re: reliability of computers (RISKS-31.53)
This brought back memories from a guy at the company where I used to work,
as he told of being called in as an expert witness on something very similar
back in the 1990s. As I recall, he said that two banks or building
societies (mortgage providers) had merged; they had totally different
computer systems, but the new managers simply fired one of the support teams
and expected the other to cope with both systems, which they struggled to
do. His expert opinion was that security on the unsupported system was a
disaster area, with security features not enabled, passwords and log-ins
left with default settings, etc. As mentioned, he felt sympathy for the
police officer, who queried some transactions on his account and ended up
being charged with attempting to obtain money by deception. The
geographical location for the case was Woodbridge, Suffolk.
By the way, there was a similar "our computers are never wrong" item on a
BBC radio programme covering consumer affairs a couple of months ago. This
featured a woman with a regular Chip&PIN credit/debit card, which had
expired and been routinely replaced by the card provider. She was told to
cut up the old one but forgot to do this, however she expected it to be
cancelled anyway so wasn't concerned. Quite some time later she found
unexpected transactions on the account and was told "the security with these
cards has never failed so it must have been stolen", which she knew was
untrue as she still had it in her hands. After much argument it turned out
that the old card had *not* been cancelled, so the woman went through normal
life unknowingly having a pair of duplicate cards, then didn't notice when
one was stolen...
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 11:11:11 -0800
From: RISKS-request@csl.sri.com
Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)
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End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 31.54
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